These were the only two ydoc Socket.IO handlers missing the SESSION_POOL guard that
every sibling (join/state/update) enforces. With always_connect=True admitting
unauthenticated sockets, a client that knew a note's document_id could broadcast
spoofed awareness (cursors/presence) and fake ydoc:user:left events into a live
editing room, attributed to any client-supplied user_id.
Both handlers now require an authenticated SESSION_POOL session; the awareness handler
additionally requires prior ydoc:document:join (room membership); and the broadcast
user_id is fixed to the authenticated identity instead of the client-supplied value,
removing the impersonation. Document content was never reachable (ydoc:document:update
already enforces write permission).
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The SCIM update_user (PUT) and patch_user (PATCH) handlers mapped the SCIM active field
unconditionally onto the role column (role = 'user' if active else 'pending'), so a routine
IdP sync or a misconfigured IdP that marked a locally-provisioned admin inactive would
silently strip that admin's role and could lock an instance out of its own administration.
Gate both active->role assignments on user.role != 'admin' so SCIM provisioning can
activate/deactivate ordinary users but never demotes an existing admin; admin role changes
continue to go through the dedicated admin endpoints. SCIM already cannot promote to admin
(active only maps to user/pending), so this is symmetric.
Credit to @HOHK0923 for surfacing the admin-demotion footgun.
Co-authored-by: HOHK0923 <118590749+HOHK0923@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(oauth): use Protected Resource Metadata scopes in MCP DCR flow
The Dynamic Client Registration flow seeded the registration request
`scope` from the Authorization Server's `scopes_supported` (RFC 8414),
which is a full catalog of every scope the AS can grant across all
resources. Per RFC 9728 and the MCP Scope Selection Strategy, the
resource-specific Protected Resource Metadata `scopes_supported` is the
correct, least-privilege source.
The PRM is already fetched in this function; this change prefers its
`scopes_supported` and keeps the AS `scopes_supported` only as a
fallback when the PRM advertises none. Mirrors the static-credentials
fix in #24690.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(oauth): trim DCR scope comment per review feedback
Shortens the inline comment per review feedback on #25958.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
is_string_allowed does endswith() matching and was called with the full URL
(retrieval/web/utils.py) against WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST, so a blocklisted host with any
path (https://blocked.example/x) ended with /x, not the host, and slipped through; the
allowlist direction false-rejected legitimate URLs and admitted attacker URLs ending in
an allowed string. The same endswith caused label confusion at the hostname call site
(retrieval/web/main.py): corp.com matched evilcorp.com, 10.0.0.1 matched 110.0.0.1.
Add is_host_allowed(host, ...) matching on DNS label boundaries (host == pattern or
host.endswith('.' + pattern)), called with the parsed hostname at both web-fetch call
sites. is_string_allowed is left unchanged for the unrelated function-name filters
(utils/middleware.py, utils/tools.py).
The separate is_global guard (validate_url / _ssrf_safe_new_conn, active when
ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH is off) already blocks RFC1918/loopback/link-local, so this
restores the admin's intended blocking of specific public hosts.
Co-authored-by: addcontent <59762500+addcontent@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The connection-layer DNS-rebinding guard (_SSRFSafeResolver / _SSRFSafeAdapter, PR #24759) was
mounted only on SafeWebBaseLoader. Two user-reachable image fetches validate the URL then fetch
it through the shared get_session() pool with the default resolver, so a TTL-0 rebinding answer
that passed validate_url reaches an internal address at connect:
- get_image_base64_from_url (utils/files.py): user image_url on every chat completion.
- load_url_image (routers/images.py, POST /api/v1/images/edit): user-supplied image field.
Add get_ssrf_safe_session() (a one-off aiohttp session mounting _SSRFSafeResolver) and use it
for both fetches, so the connect-time IP is re-validated and a rebound loopback / RFC1918 /
metadata address is rejected. The shared pool is left untouched for the admin-configured
image-generation callers, which legitimately reach internal hosts.
Co-authored-by: dhyabi2 <32069256+dhyabi2@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: geo-chen <2404584+geo-chen@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
process_uploaded_file auto-links an uploaded file to the knowledge base named in
client-supplied metadata.knowledge_id, but it called Knowledges.add_file_to_knowledge_by_id
directly with no authorization, while the dedicated POST /knowledge/{id}/file/add endpoint
gates the same operation on owner / admin / write grant. A read-only collaborator (or any
verified user who knows the KB id) could therefore attach arbitrary files to a knowledge base
they cannot write: the KnowledgeFile membership row was committed, and the later vector-index
write check failed closed but left the row in place.
Gate the auto-link on the same owner/admin/write check before inserting the membership row;
otherwise skip the link and log. The file still uploads as the user's own file, it just is
not linked to a KB they cannot write.
Co-authored-by: jagstack <52110932+jagstack@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
generate_chat_completion() checks model access on line 200 only when bypass_filter is
False. When an arena model reaches this function without a pre-resolved selected_model_id,
which is the task and background path (the /api/v1/tasks/* endpoints call
generate_chat_completion directly rather than through process_chat_payload), the fallback
resolves the arena to an underlying model and recurses with bypass_filter=True, so the
resolved model's access check is skipped. An authenticated user with access to an arena
could therefore reach a model they are denied directly, and for the default or exclude
arena, whose candidate pool is every non-arena model, any model on the instance (CWE-862).
The normal chat path resolves the arena in process_chat_payload before this function, so its
resolved model is checked on line 200; the task path was not, which is the inconsistency.
Enforce check_model_access() on the resolved model in the fallback, before the
bypass_filter=True recursion, mirroring the normal-path check. Admins and already-bypassed
recursive calls are unaffected, and legitimate arena use of accessible models is unchanged.
Co-authored-by: rexpository <30176934+rexpository@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two lifecycle/authorization gaps let a deactivated (pending) account keep acting:
1. The background automation scheduler (execute_automation) rehydrated the owner by ID and
dispatched the chat pipeline without re-checking the owner. A user later set to pending,
or one whose features.automations permission was revoked, kept running scheduled
automations on the operator's provider credentials, even though the HTTP create/update/run
routes already gate on get_verified_user + features.automations. Re-gate the rehydrated
owner before dispatch: require role user/admin and, for non-admins, the features.automations
permission; otherwise record an error and skip the run.
2. check_model_access enforced per-model ACLs only for exactly role == 'user', so any other
non-admin role (a pending principal) fell through and was granted access. Enforce for every
non-admin role (admins still bypass), so the check fails closed (CWE-862, CWE-863).
Co-authored-by: rexpository <30176934+rexpository@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The decode-until-stable loops in _sanitize_proxy_path (terminals.py, cap 8) and
_safe_static_redirect_path (models.py, cap 2) proceed with whatever remains after the
cap instead of rejecting it. A path encoded more times than the cap therefore exits the
loop still percent-encoded, passes the literal '..' / prefix checks (the dots are still
%2E, not '..'), and is forwarded to the upstream terminal server, or emitted as a
redirect Location, which then decodes it once more and resolves the traversal. This is
the residual of the decode-until-stable hardening added for CVE-2026-54017: the cap is a
fixed depth, not a true stability guarantee.
Reject when the value is still not stable after the cap (unquote(x) != x), so anything
encoded more deeply than the cap fails closed rather than being forwarded. Legitimate
paths stabilize within a pass or two and are unaffected.
Co-authored-by: DavidCarliez <271374756+DavidCarliez@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: block private-IP webhook URLs to close SSRF on caller-controlled URL
post_webhook(url, ...) in utils/webhook.py forwards the URL straight to
aiohttp.ClientSession.post with no SSRF gate. The URL is caller-controlled
on two surfaces:
- User notification settings under ENABLE_USER_WEBHOOKS=true — any
authenticated user can set the URL their notifications POST to.
- Automation notification triggers (calendar alerts, etc.).
Without a gate, the URL can target cloud metadata (169.254.169.254 /
fd00:ec2::254), localhost-bound services, RFC1918 internal hosts, or any
other private address reachable from the server process. Blind SSRF — no
response body returned to the caller — but enough to enumerate internal
services via response timing / status codes, and on cloud deployments
enough to issue requests against IMDSv1 if available.
Call validate_url() at the top of post_webhook. The function blocks
private/reserved IPs when ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH is False (the
default), is the project's chosen SSRF gate, and is already applied to
the equivalent fetch surfaces (retrieval, image-load, OAuth profile
picture). Operators who legitimately need to webhook to private IPs
(internal monitoring, self-hosted Slack alternatives, etc.) can set
ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH=True — same opt-out as the other gated
surfaces.
Scope intentionally limited to webhooks. The OAuth discovery and
external reranker paths cwanglab also flagged are admin-configured with
intentional private-IP defaults (reranker defaults to
http://localhost:8080/v1/rerank) and are out of scope per Rule 9 — the
admin owns the URL choice and the operator opt-out exists for them too.
Reported by cwanglab in GHSA-5x9f-85cg-w3hf (cluster canonical with six
closed siblings: g36v-23gj-j69x, 6j8f-h58v-xgmw, xpwv-52pm-p8hj,
v9gp-hv2c-9qv8, fw7w-jrw7-p3v9, x7xq-74rg-m8mf).
Co-authored-by: cwanglab <cwanglab@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix: also pass allow_redirects=False on webhook post_webhook session.post
Companion to the previous commit. validate_url() only validates the
initial URL; aiohttp's default allow_redirects=True would still follow
a 302 to a private-IP target. Same redirect-bypass class as the rh5x
cluster's five call sites, sixth call site to receive the same gate.
Co-authored-by: cwanglab <cwanglab@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: cwanglab <cwanglab@users.noreply.github.com>
The Qdrant backends implemented delete(ids=...) as a payload filter on
metadata.id, but points are stored with the item id as the Qdrant point id
(see _create_points), and not every point carries an id in its payload.
Memory points store only {created_at} in metadata (KB metadata embeddings
likewise), so deleting a single memory matched nothing and left an orphaned
vector that kept being injected into RAG context.
Delete by point id instead: PointIdsList for the standard backend, and a
tenant-scoped HasIdCondition for multitenancy (point ids are unique, so tenant
isolation is preserved). Filter-based deletion is unchanged.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
