has_access_to_file() derives file access from the objects a file is attached to
(knowledge bases, workspace models). Those branches returned True for any access_type
whenever the user held that permission on the object, write/delete included. Since a
user can create their own KB or model and attach any file they can merely READ (KB
attach and the model meta.knowledge validator both gate on read access only), a user
with read access to a victim file could launder it into write/delete: attach it to an
object they own, then rename, overwrite or delete it via the write-gated file routes
(POST /files/{id}/rename, /data/content/update, DELETE /files/{id}). This is the
residual of GHSA-vjqm-6gcc-62cr (CVE-2026-54012) left open by the read-only attach
validator (CWE-863).
An object now confers write/delete on a file only when the object's owner owns that
file, so delegation originates from the file's own owner. Read is unchanged (RAG and
shared-object reads still work), and legitimate delegation is preserved: a write grant
on an object whose owner owns the attached file still confers write. Applied to all
three object branches: knowledge base, file home collection, and workspace model.
Co-authored-by: rexpository <30176934+rexpository@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The direct image-edit route was the only image-edit surface with no authorization: it ran
on get_verified_user alone, while POST /generations enforces ENABLE_IMAGE_GENERATION +
features.image_generation and the built-in edit_image tool enforces ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT +
features.image_generation. A verified non-admin user could therefore reach the configured
image-edit provider (spending IMAGES_EDIT_OPENAI_API_KEY) even when the administrator had
globally disabled image editing (ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT=False) or denied the user image
generation.
Split the route from the shared impl (mirroring generate_images/image_generations): the new
/edit wrapper enforces ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT and the per-user image-generation permission, then
delegates to image_edits(). The internal callers (the edit_image tool and the chat
middleware) already gate themselves and call image_edits() directly, so they are unaffected.
Co-authored-by: jagstack <52110932+jagstack@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a 'Reset to Defaults' button to both the Edit Default Permissions
modal and the Edit User Group permissions modal.
- Default permissions modal: resets to stock/env-var configuration
- User group modal: resets to current global default permissions
Backend: new GET /api/v1/users/default/permissions/defaults endpoint
that returns DEFAULT_USER_PERMISSIONS (env-var-based initial defaults).
ws_terminal() interpolated the path parameter session_id directly into the upstream
terminal WebSocket URL and then appended ?user_id=<caller>, with no encoding or
validation (the HTTP sibling proxy_terminal runs _sanitize_proxy_path; this path ran
nothing). An encoded '?'/'&' smuggled through session_id survives Open WebUI's single
decode and is re-decoded by the upstream, injecting an attacker-chosen user_id ahead
of the appended one. Query parsing binds the first occurrence, so the orchestrator
resolves the spoofed user's terminal scope, letting a normal authenticated user
present another user's identity to the upstream (CWE-116/863).
Encode session_id as an opaque path segment with urllib.parse.quote(session_id,
safe=''). This neutralises '?'/'#'/'&' at any decode depth (the upstream's single
decode reverses only the quote, leaving the original delimiters inert as path
content), while legitimate UUID session ids pass through unchanged. The appended
user_id is then the only query parameter the upstream binds.
The separate concern that the forwarded identity is a bearer claim with no integrity
binding spans Open WebUI and the upstream terminal server and is not addressed here.
Co-authored-by: rexpository <30176934+rexpository@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
These were the only two ydoc Socket.IO handlers missing the SESSION_POOL guard that
every sibling (join/state/update) enforces. With always_connect=True admitting
unauthenticated sockets, a client that knew a note's document_id could broadcast
spoofed awareness (cursors/presence) and fake ydoc:user:left events into a live
editing room, attributed to any client-supplied user_id.
Both handlers now require an authenticated SESSION_POOL session; the awareness handler
additionally requires prior ydoc:document:join (room membership); and the broadcast
user_id is fixed to the authenticated identity instead of the client-supplied value,
removing the impersonation. Document content was never reachable (ydoc:document:update
already enforces write permission).
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The SCIM update_user (PUT) and patch_user (PATCH) handlers mapped the SCIM active field
unconditionally onto the role column (role = 'user' if active else 'pending'), so a routine
IdP sync or a misconfigured IdP that marked a locally-provisioned admin inactive would
silently strip that admin's role and could lock an instance out of its own administration.
Gate both active->role assignments on user.role != 'admin' so SCIM provisioning can
activate/deactivate ordinary users but never demotes an existing admin; admin role changes
continue to go through the dedicated admin endpoints. SCIM already cannot promote to admin
(active only maps to user/pending), so this is symmetric.
Credit to @HOHK0923 for surfacing the admin-demotion footgun.
Co-authored-by: HOHK0923 <118590749+HOHK0923@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(oauth): use Protected Resource Metadata scopes in MCP DCR flow
The Dynamic Client Registration flow seeded the registration request
`scope` from the Authorization Server's `scopes_supported` (RFC 8414),
which is a full catalog of every scope the AS can grant across all
resources. Per RFC 9728 and the MCP Scope Selection Strategy, the
resource-specific Protected Resource Metadata `scopes_supported` is the
correct, least-privilege source.
The PRM is already fetched in this function; this change prefers its
`scopes_supported` and keeps the AS `scopes_supported` only as a
fallback when the PRM advertises none. Mirrors the static-credentials
fix in #24690.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(oauth): trim DCR scope comment per review feedback
Shortens the inline comment per review feedback on #25958.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
is_string_allowed does endswith() matching and was called with the full URL
(retrieval/web/utils.py) against WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST, so a blocklisted host with any
path (https://blocked.example/x) ended with /x, not the host, and slipped through; the
allowlist direction false-rejected legitimate URLs and admitted attacker URLs ending in
an allowed string. The same endswith caused label confusion at the hostname call site
(retrieval/web/main.py): corp.com matched evilcorp.com, 10.0.0.1 matched 110.0.0.1.
Add is_host_allowed(host, ...) matching on DNS label boundaries (host == pattern or
host.endswith('.' + pattern)), called with the parsed hostname at both web-fetch call
sites. is_string_allowed is left unchanged for the unrelated function-name filters
(utils/middleware.py, utils/tools.py).
The separate is_global guard (validate_url / _ssrf_safe_new_conn, active when
ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH is off) already blocks RFC1918/loopback/link-local, so this
restores the admin's intended blocking of specific public hosts.
Co-authored-by: addcontent <59762500+addcontent@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
G30andGitHub
Classic298andGitHub
Algorithm5838andGitHub
