[9.16] [CVE-2024-1975] Remove support for SIG(0) message verification
Backport of isc-private/bind9!690 Fixes: isc-projects/bind9#4480 Merge branch '4480-drop-sig0-support-bind-9.16' into 'bind-9.16' See merge request isc-projects/bind9!9174
This commit is contained in:
@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
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parent NS records needed to get the DS result.
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[GL #4661]
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6396. [security] Remove SIG(0) support from named as a countermeasure
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for CVE-2024-1975. [GL #4480]
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--- 9.16.50 released ---
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6364. [protocol] Add RESOLVER.ARPA to the built in empty zones.
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@@ -33,6 +33,10 @@ if (!defined($path)) {
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exit(1);
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}
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# Enable output autoflush so that it's not lost when the parent sends TERM.
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select STDOUT;
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$| = 1;
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unlink($path);
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my $server = IO::Socket::UNIX->new(Local => $path, Type => SOCK_STREAM, Listen => 8) or
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die "unable to create socket $path";
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@@ -55,6 +59,7 @@ if ($timeout != 0) {
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}
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while (my $client = $server->accept()) {
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printf("accept()\n");
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$client->recv(my $buf, 8, 0);
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my ($version, $req_len) = unpack('N N', $buf);
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@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ rm -f ns1/_default.tsigkeys
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rm -f */named.memstats
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rm -f */named.conf
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rm -f */named.run
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rm -f authsock.pid
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rm -f authsock.log authsock.pid
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rm -f ns1/core
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rm -f nsupdate.out*
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rm -f ns*/named.lock
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@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ status=$((status + ret))
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echo_i "testing external update policy (CNAME) with auth sock ($n)"
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ret=0
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$PERL ./authsock.pl --type=CNAME --path=ns1/auth.sock --pidfile=authsock.pid --timeout=120 >/dev/null 2>&1 &
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$PERL ./authsock.pl --type=CNAME --path=ns1/auth.sock --pidfile=authsock.pid --timeout=120 >authsock.log 2>&1 &
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sleep 1
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test_update $n testcname.example.nil. CNAME "86400 CNAME testdenied.example.nil" "testdenied" || ret=1
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n=$((n + 1))
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@@ -130,17 +130,19 @@ n=$((n + 1))
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if [ "$ret" -ne 0 ]; then echo_i "failed"; fi
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status=$((status + ret))
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echo_i "testing external policy with SIG(0) key ($n)"
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echo_i "testing external policy with unsupported SIG(0) key ($n)"
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ret=0
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$NSUPDATE -k ns1/Kkey.example.nil.*.private <<END >/dev/null 2>&1 || ret=1
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$NSUPDATE -d -k ns1/Kkey.example.nil.*.private <<END >nsupdate.out${n} 2>&1 || true
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debug
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server 10.53.0.1 ${PORT}
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zone example.nil
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update add fred.example.nil 120 cname foo.bar.
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send
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END
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output=$($DIG $DIGOPTS +short cname fred.example.nil.)
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[ -n "$output" ] || ret=1
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[ $ret -eq 0 ] || echo_i "failed"
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# update must have failed - SIG(0) signer is not supported
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[ -n "$output" ] && ret=1
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grep -F "signer=key.example.nil" authsock.log >/dev/null && ret=1
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n=$((n + 1))
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if [ "$ret" -ne 0 ]; then echo_i "failed"; fi
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status=$((status + ret))
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@@ -262,10 +262,12 @@ if $FEATURETEST --enable-dnstap; then
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fi
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if test -f keyname; then
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echo_i "checking update forwarding to with sig0 ($n)"
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echo_i "checking update forwarding to with sig0 (expected to fail) ($n)"
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ret=0
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keyname=$(cat keyname)
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$NSUPDATE -k $keyname.private -- - <<EOF
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# SIG(0) is removed, update is expected to fail.
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{
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$NSUPDATE -k $keyname.private -- - <<EOF
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local 10.53.0.1
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server 10.53.0.3 ${PORT}
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zone example2
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@@ -273,8 +275,9 @@ if test -f keyname; then
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update add unsigned.example2. 600 TXT Foo
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send
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EOF
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} >nsupdate.out.$n 2>&1 && ret=1
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$DIG -p ${PORT} unsigned.example2 A @10.53.0.1 >dig.out.ns1.test$n || ret=1
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grep "status: NOERROR" dig.out.ns1.test$n >/dev/null || ret=1
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grep "status: NOERROR" dig.out.ns1.test$n >/dev/null && ret=1
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if [ $ret != 0 ]; then echo_i "failed"; fi
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status=$(expr $status + $ret)
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n=$(expr $n + 1)
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+3
-15
@@ -537,7 +537,7 @@ zone).
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The TKEY process is initiated by a client or server by sending a query
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of type TKEY to a TKEY-aware server. The query must include an
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appropriate KEY record in the additional section, and must be signed
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using either TSIG or SIG(0) with a previously established key. The
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using either TSIG with a previously established key. The
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server's response, if successful, contains a TKEY record in its
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answer section. After this transaction, both participants have
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enough information to calculate a shared secret using Diffie-Hellman key
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@@ -555,20 +555,8 @@ deletion" mode.
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SIG(0)
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------
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BIND partially supports DNSSEC SIG(0) transaction signatures as
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specified in :rfc:`2535` and :rfc:`2931`. SIG(0) uses public/private keys to
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authenticate messages. Access control is performed in the same manner as with
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TSIG keys; privileges can be granted or denied in ACL directives based
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on the key name.
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When a SIG(0) signed message is received, it is only verified if
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the key is known and trusted by the server. The server does not attempt
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to recursively fetch or validate the key.
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SIG(0) signing of multiple-message TCP streams is not supported.
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The only tool shipped with BIND 9 that generates SIG(0) signed messages
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is ``nsupdate``.
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Support for DNSSEC SIG(0) transaction signatures was removed.
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This is a countermeasure for CVE-2024-1975.
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.. include:: managed-keys.rst
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.. include:: pkcs11.rst
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+2
-4
@@ -367,10 +367,8 @@ Notes
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.. [#rfc1035_2] CLASS ANY queries are not supported. This is considered a
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feature.
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.. [#rfc2931] When receiving a query signed with a SIG(0), the server is
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only able to verify the signature if it has the key in its local
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authoritative data; it cannot do recursion or validation to
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retrieve unknown keys.
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.. [#rfc2931] Support for SIG(0) message verification was removed
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as a countermeasure for CVE-2024-1975.
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.. [#rfc2874] Compliance is with loading and serving of A6 records only.
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A6 records were moved to the experimental category by :rfc:`3363`.
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@@ -5900,7 +5900,7 @@ The ``update-policy`` clause allows more fine-grained control over which
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updates are allowed. It specifies a set of rules, in which each rule
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either grants or denies permission for one or more names in the zone to
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be updated by one or more identities. Identity is determined by the key
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that signed the update request, using either TSIG or SIG(0). In most
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that signed the update request, using either TSIG. In most
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cases, ``update-policy`` rules only apply to key-based identities. There
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is no way to specify update permissions based on the client source address.
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@@ -5957,7 +5957,7 @@ field), and the type of the record to be updated matches the ``types``
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field. Details for each rule type are described below.
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The ``identity`` field must be set to a fully qualified domain name. In
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most cases, this represents the name of the TSIG or SIG(0) key that
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most cases, this represents the name of the TSIG key that
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must be used to sign the update request. If the specified name is a
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wildcard, it is subject to DNS wildcard expansion, and the rule may
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apply to multiple identities. When a TKEY exchange has been used to
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@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ Limiting access to the server by outside parties can help prevent
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spoofing and denial of service (DoS) attacks against the server.
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ACLs match clients on the basis of up to three characteristics: 1) The
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client's IP address; 2) the TSIG or SIG(0) key that was used to sign the
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client's IP address; 2) the TSIG key that was used to sign the
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request, if any; and 3) an address prefix encoded in an EDNS
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Client-Subnet option, if any.
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@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ and no queries at all from the networks specified in ``bogusnets``.
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In addition to network addresses and prefixes, which are matched against
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the source address of the DNS request, ACLs may include ``key``
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elements, which specify the name of a TSIG or SIG(0) key.
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elements, which specify the name of a TSIG key.
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When BIND 9 is built with GeoIP support, ACLs can also be used for
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geographic access restrictions. This is done by specifying an ACL
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+6
-93
@@ -3304,111 +3304,24 @@ dns_message_dumpsig(dns_message_t *msg, char *txt1) {
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isc_result_t
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dns_message_checksig(dns_message_t *msg, dns_view_t *view) {
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isc_buffer_t b, msgb;
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isc_buffer_t msgb;
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REQUIRE(DNS_MESSAGE_VALID(msg));
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if (msg->tsigkey == NULL && msg->tsig == NULL && msg->sig0 == NULL) {
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if (msg->tsigkey == NULL && msg->tsig == NULL) {
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return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
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}
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INSIST(msg->saved.base != NULL);
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isc_buffer_init(&msgb, msg->saved.base, msg->saved.length);
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isc_buffer_add(&msgb, msg->saved.length);
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if (msg->tsigkey != NULL || msg->tsig != NULL) {
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#ifdef SKAN_MSG_DEBUG
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dns_message_dumpsig(msg, "dns_message_checksig#1");
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dns_message_dumpsig(msg, "dns_message_checksig#1");
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#endif /* ifdef SKAN_MSG_DEBUG */
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if (view != NULL) {
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return (dns_view_checksig(view, &msgb, msg));
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} else {
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return (dns_tsig_verify(&msgb, msg, NULL, NULL));
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}
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if (view != NULL) {
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return (dns_view_checksig(view, &msgb, msg));
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} else {
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dns_rdata_t rdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT;
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dns_rdata_sig_t sig;
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dns_rdataset_t keyset;
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isc_result_t result;
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result = dns_rdataset_first(msg->sig0);
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INSIST(result == ISC_R_SUCCESS);
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dns_rdataset_current(msg->sig0, &rdata);
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/*
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* This can occur when the message is a dynamic update, since
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* the rdata length checking is relaxed. This should not
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* happen in a well-formed message, since the SIG(0) is only
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* looked for in the additional section, and the dynamic update
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* meta-records are in the prerequisite and update sections.
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*/
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if (rdata.length == 0) {
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return (ISC_R_UNEXPECTEDEND);
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}
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result = dns_rdata_tostruct(&rdata, &sig, NULL);
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if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
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return (result);
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}
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dns_rdataset_init(&keyset);
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if (view == NULL) {
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result = DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED;
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goto freesig;
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}
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result = dns_view_simplefind(view, &sig.signer,
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dns_rdatatype_key /* SIG(0) */, 0,
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0, false, &keyset, NULL);
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if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
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/* XXXBEW Should possibly create a fetch here */
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result = DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED;
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goto freesig;
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} else if (keyset.trust < dns_trust_secure) {
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/* XXXBEW Should call a validator here */
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result = DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED;
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goto freesig;
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}
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result = dns_rdataset_first(&keyset);
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INSIST(result == ISC_R_SUCCESS);
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for (; result == ISC_R_SUCCESS;
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result = dns_rdataset_next(&keyset))
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{
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dst_key_t *key = NULL;
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dns_rdata_reset(&rdata);
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dns_rdataset_current(&keyset, &rdata);
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isc_buffer_init(&b, rdata.data, rdata.length);
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isc_buffer_add(&b, rdata.length);
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result = dst_key_fromdns(&sig.signer, rdata.rdclass, &b,
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view->mctx, &key);
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if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
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continue;
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}
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if (dst_key_alg(key) != sig.algorithm ||
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dst_key_id(key) != sig.keyid ||
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!(dst_key_proto(key) == DNS_KEYPROTO_DNSSEC ||
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dst_key_proto(key) == DNS_KEYPROTO_ANY))
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{
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dst_key_free(&key);
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continue;
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}
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result = dns_dnssec_verifymessage(&msgb, msg, key);
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dst_key_free(&key);
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if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
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break;
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}
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}
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if (result == ISC_R_NOMORE) {
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result = DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED;
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}
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freesig:
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if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&keyset)) {
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dns_rdataset_disassociate(&keyset);
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}
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dns_rdata_freestruct(&sig);
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return (result);
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return (dns_tsig_verify(&msgb, msg, NULL, NULL));
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}
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}
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@@ -2041,6 +2041,13 @@ ns__client_request(isc_nmhandle_t *handle, isc_result_t eresult,
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ns_client_log(client, DNS_LOGCATEGORY_SECURITY,
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NS_LOGMODULE_CLIENT, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
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"request is signed by a nonauthoritative key");
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} else if (result == DNS_R_NOTVERIFIEDYET &&
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client->message->sig0 != NULL)
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{
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ns_client_log(client, DNS_LOGCATEGORY_SECURITY,
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NS_LOGMODULE_CLIENT, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
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"request has a SIG(0) signature but its support "
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"was removed (CVE-2024-1975)");
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} else {
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char tsigrcode[64];
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isc_buffer_t b;
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Block a user