[9.16] [CVE-2024-1975] Remove support for SIG(0) message verification

Backport of isc-private/bind9!690 

Fixes: isc-projects/bind9#4480

Merge branch '4480-drop-sig0-support-bind-9.16' into 'bind-9.16'

See merge request isc-projects/bind9!9174
This commit is contained in:
Nicki Křížek
2024-07-24 11:51:02 +00:00
11 changed files with 44 additions and 125 deletions
+3
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
parent NS records needed to get the DS result.
[GL #4661]
6396. [security] Remove SIG(0) support from named as a countermeasure
for CVE-2024-1975. [GL #4480]
--- 9.16.50 released ---
6364. [protocol] Add RESOLVER.ARPA to the built in empty zones.
+5
View File
@@ -33,6 +33,10 @@ if (!defined($path)) {
exit(1);
}
# Enable output autoflush so that it's not lost when the parent sends TERM.
select STDOUT;
$| = 1;
unlink($path);
my $server = IO::Socket::UNIX->new(Local => $path, Type => SOCK_STREAM, Listen => 8) or
die "unable to create socket $path";
@@ -55,6 +59,7 @@ if ($timeout != 0) {
}
while (my $client = $server->accept()) {
printf("accept()\n");
$client->recv(my $buf, 8, 0);
my ($version, $req_len) = unpack('N N', $buf);
+1 -1
View File
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ rm -f ns1/_default.tsigkeys
rm -f */named.memstats
rm -f */named.conf
rm -f */named.run
rm -f authsock.pid
rm -f authsock.log authsock.pid
rm -f ns1/core
rm -f nsupdate.out*
rm -f ns*/named.lock
+7 -5
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@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ status=$((status + ret))
echo_i "testing external update policy (CNAME) with auth sock ($n)"
ret=0
$PERL ./authsock.pl --type=CNAME --path=ns1/auth.sock --pidfile=authsock.pid --timeout=120 >/dev/null 2>&1 &
$PERL ./authsock.pl --type=CNAME --path=ns1/auth.sock --pidfile=authsock.pid --timeout=120 >authsock.log 2>&1 &
sleep 1
test_update $n testcname.example.nil. CNAME "86400 CNAME testdenied.example.nil" "testdenied" || ret=1
n=$((n + 1))
@@ -130,17 +130,19 @@ n=$((n + 1))
if [ "$ret" -ne 0 ]; then echo_i "failed"; fi
status=$((status + ret))
echo_i "testing external policy with SIG(0) key ($n)"
echo_i "testing external policy with unsupported SIG(0) key ($n)"
ret=0
$NSUPDATE -k ns1/Kkey.example.nil.*.private <<END >/dev/null 2>&1 || ret=1
$NSUPDATE -d -k ns1/Kkey.example.nil.*.private <<END >nsupdate.out${n} 2>&1 || true
debug
server 10.53.0.1 ${PORT}
zone example.nil
update add fred.example.nil 120 cname foo.bar.
send
END
output=$($DIG $DIGOPTS +short cname fred.example.nil.)
[ -n "$output" ] || ret=1
[ $ret -eq 0 ] || echo_i "failed"
# update must have failed - SIG(0) signer is not supported
[ -n "$output" ] && ret=1
grep -F "signer=key.example.nil" authsock.log >/dev/null && ret=1
n=$((n + 1))
if [ "$ret" -ne 0 ]; then echo_i "failed"; fi
status=$((status + ret))
+6 -3
View File
@@ -262,10 +262,12 @@ if $FEATURETEST --enable-dnstap; then
fi
if test -f keyname; then
echo_i "checking update forwarding to with sig0 ($n)"
echo_i "checking update forwarding to with sig0 (expected to fail) ($n)"
ret=0
keyname=$(cat keyname)
$NSUPDATE -k $keyname.private -- - <<EOF
# SIG(0) is removed, update is expected to fail.
{
$NSUPDATE -k $keyname.private -- - <<EOF
local 10.53.0.1
server 10.53.0.3 ${PORT}
zone example2
@@ -273,8 +275,9 @@ if test -f keyname; then
update add unsigned.example2. 600 TXT Foo
send
EOF
} >nsupdate.out.$n 2>&1 && ret=1
$DIG -p ${PORT} unsigned.example2 A @10.53.0.1 >dig.out.ns1.test$n || ret=1
grep "status: NOERROR" dig.out.ns1.test$n >/dev/null || ret=1
grep "status: NOERROR" dig.out.ns1.test$n >/dev/null && ret=1
if [ $ret != 0 ]; then echo_i "failed"; fi
status=$(expr $status + $ret)
n=$(expr $n + 1)
+3 -15
View File
@@ -537,7 +537,7 @@ zone).
The TKEY process is initiated by a client or server by sending a query
of type TKEY to a TKEY-aware server. The query must include an
appropriate KEY record in the additional section, and must be signed
using either TSIG or SIG(0) with a previously established key. The
using either TSIG with a previously established key. The
server's response, if successful, contains a TKEY record in its
answer section. After this transaction, both participants have
enough information to calculate a shared secret using Diffie-Hellman key
@@ -555,20 +555,8 @@ deletion" mode.
SIG(0)
------
BIND partially supports DNSSEC SIG(0) transaction signatures as
specified in :rfc:`2535` and :rfc:`2931`. SIG(0) uses public/private keys to
authenticate messages. Access control is performed in the same manner as with
TSIG keys; privileges can be granted or denied in ACL directives based
on the key name.
When a SIG(0) signed message is received, it is only verified if
the key is known and trusted by the server. The server does not attempt
to recursively fetch or validate the key.
SIG(0) signing of multiple-message TCP streams is not supported.
The only tool shipped with BIND 9 that generates SIG(0) signed messages
is ``nsupdate``.
Support for DNSSEC SIG(0) transaction signatures was removed.
This is a countermeasure for CVE-2024-1975.
.. include:: managed-keys.rst
.. include:: pkcs11.rst
+2 -4
View File
@@ -367,10 +367,8 @@ Notes
.. [#rfc1035_2] CLASS ANY queries are not supported. This is considered a
feature.
.. [#rfc2931] When receiving a query signed with a SIG(0), the server is
only able to verify the signature if it has the key in its local
authoritative data; it cannot do recursion or validation to
retrieve unknown keys.
.. [#rfc2931] Support for SIG(0) message verification was removed
as a countermeasure for CVE-2024-1975.
.. [#rfc2874] Compliance is with loading and serving of A6 records only.
A6 records were moved to the experimental category by :rfc:`3363`.
+2 -2
View File
@@ -5900,7 +5900,7 @@ The ``update-policy`` clause allows more fine-grained control over which
updates are allowed. It specifies a set of rules, in which each rule
either grants or denies permission for one or more names in the zone to
be updated by one or more identities. Identity is determined by the key
that signed the update request, using either TSIG or SIG(0). In most
that signed the update request, using either TSIG. In most
cases, ``update-policy`` rules only apply to key-based identities. There
is no way to specify update permissions based on the client source address.
@@ -5957,7 +5957,7 @@ field), and the type of the record to be updated matches the ``types``
field. Details for each rule type are described below.
The ``identity`` field must be set to a fully qualified domain name. In
most cases, this represents the name of the TSIG or SIG(0) key that
most cases, this represents the name of the TSIG key that
must be used to sign the update request. If the specified name is a
wildcard, it is subject to DNS wildcard expansion, and the rule may
apply to multiple identities. When a TKEY exchange has been used to
+2 -2
View File
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ Limiting access to the server by outside parties can help prevent
spoofing and denial of service (DoS) attacks against the server.
ACLs match clients on the basis of up to three characteristics: 1) The
client's IP address; 2) the TSIG or SIG(0) key that was used to sign the
client's IP address; 2) the TSIG key that was used to sign the
request, if any; and 3) an address prefix encoded in an EDNS
Client-Subnet option, if any.
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ and no queries at all from the networks specified in ``bogusnets``.
In addition to network addresses and prefixes, which are matched against
the source address of the DNS request, ACLs may include ``key``
elements, which specify the name of a TSIG or SIG(0) key.
elements, which specify the name of a TSIG key.
When BIND 9 is built with GeoIP support, ACLs can also be used for
geographic access restrictions. This is done by specifying an ACL
+6 -93
View File
@@ -3304,111 +3304,24 @@ dns_message_dumpsig(dns_message_t *msg, char *txt1) {
isc_result_t
dns_message_checksig(dns_message_t *msg, dns_view_t *view) {
isc_buffer_t b, msgb;
isc_buffer_t msgb;
REQUIRE(DNS_MESSAGE_VALID(msg));
if (msg->tsigkey == NULL && msg->tsig == NULL && msg->sig0 == NULL) {
if (msg->tsigkey == NULL && msg->tsig == NULL) {
return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
}
INSIST(msg->saved.base != NULL);
isc_buffer_init(&msgb, msg->saved.base, msg->saved.length);
isc_buffer_add(&msgb, msg->saved.length);
if (msg->tsigkey != NULL || msg->tsig != NULL) {
#ifdef SKAN_MSG_DEBUG
dns_message_dumpsig(msg, "dns_message_checksig#1");
dns_message_dumpsig(msg, "dns_message_checksig#1");
#endif /* ifdef SKAN_MSG_DEBUG */
if (view != NULL) {
return (dns_view_checksig(view, &msgb, msg));
} else {
return (dns_tsig_verify(&msgb, msg, NULL, NULL));
}
if (view != NULL) {
return (dns_view_checksig(view, &msgb, msg));
} else {
dns_rdata_t rdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT;
dns_rdata_sig_t sig;
dns_rdataset_t keyset;
isc_result_t result;
result = dns_rdataset_first(msg->sig0);
INSIST(result == ISC_R_SUCCESS);
dns_rdataset_current(msg->sig0, &rdata);
/*
* This can occur when the message is a dynamic update, since
* the rdata length checking is relaxed. This should not
* happen in a well-formed message, since the SIG(0) is only
* looked for in the additional section, and the dynamic update
* meta-records are in the prerequisite and update sections.
*/
if (rdata.length == 0) {
return (ISC_R_UNEXPECTEDEND);
}
result = dns_rdata_tostruct(&rdata, &sig, NULL);
if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
return (result);
}
dns_rdataset_init(&keyset);
if (view == NULL) {
result = DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED;
goto freesig;
}
result = dns_view_simplefind(view, &sig.signer,
dns_rdatatype_key /* SIG(0) */, 0,
0, false, &keyset, NULL);
if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
/* XXXBEW Should possibly create a fetch here */
result = DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED;
goto freesig;
} else if (keyset.trust < dns_trust_secure) {
/* XXXBEW Should call a validator here */
result = DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED;
goto freesig;
}
result = dns_rdataset_first(&keyset);
INSIST(result == ISC_R_SUCCESS);
for (; result == ISC_R_SUCCESS;
result = dns_rdataset_next(&keyset))
{
dst_key_t *key = NULL;
dns_rdata_reset(&rdata);
dns_rdataset_current(&keyset, &rdata);
isc_buffer_init(&b, rdata.data, rdata.length);
isc_buffer_add(&b, rdata.length);
result = dst_key_fromdns(&sig.signer, rdata.rdclass, &b,
view->mctx, &key);
if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
continue;
}
if (dst_key_alg(key) != sig.algorithm ||
dst_key_id(key) != sig.keyid ||
!(dst_key_proto(key) == DNS_KEYPROTO_DNSSEC ||
dst_key_proto(key) == DNS_KEYPROTO_ANY))
{
dst_key_free(&key);
continue;
}
result = dns_dnssec_verifymessage(&msgb, msg, key);
dst_key_free(&key);
if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
break;
}
}
if (result == ISC_R_NOMORE) {
result = DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED;
}
freesig:
if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&keyset)) {
dns_rdataset_disassociate(&keyset);
}
dns_rdata_freestruct(&sig);
return (result);
return (dns_tsig_verify(&msgb, msg, NULL, NULL));
}
}
+7
View File
@@ -2041,6 +2041,13 @@ ns__client_request(isc_nmhandle_t *handle, isc_result_t eresult,
ns_client_log(client, DNS_LOGCATEGORY_SECURITY,
NS_LOGMODULE_CLIENT, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
"request is signed by a nonauthoritative key");
} else if (result == DNS_R_NOTVERIFIEDYET &&
client->message->sig0 != NULL)
{
ns_client_log(client, DNS_LOGCATEGORY_SECURITY,
NS_LOGMODULE_CLIENT, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
"request has a SIG(0) signature but its support "
"was removed (CVE-2024-1975)");
} else {
char tsigrcode[64];
isc_buffer_t b;