From 0820a90b41d344bf927f7bf4683e002078f24fc4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20=C5=A0pa=C4=8Dek?= Date: Thu, 16 May 2024 12:10:41 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 1/6] Remove support for SIG(0) message verification (cherry picked from commit 857fd5c346e3309ee8e280c29174b46579af5a13) --- lib/dns/message.c | 99 +++-------------------------------------------- lib/ns/client.c | 7 ++++ 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 93 deletions(-) diff --git a/lib/dns/message.c b/lib/dns/message.c index 7d9ee5f9d8..e23baf7e09 100644 --- a/lib/dns/message.c +++ b/lib/dns/message.c @@ -3304,111 +3304,24 @@ dns_message_dumpsig(dns_message_t *msg, char *txt1) { isc_result_t dns_message_checksig(dns_message_t *msg, dns_view_t *view) { - isc_buffer_t b, msgb; + isc_buffer_t msgb; REQUIRE(DNS_MESSAGE_VALID(msg)); - if (msg->tsigkey == NULL && msg->tsig == NULL && msg->sig0 == NULL) { + if (msg->tsigkey == NULL && msg->tsig == NULL) { return (ISC_R_SUCCESS); } INSIST(msg->saved.base != NULL); isc_buffer_init(&msgb, msg->saved.base, msg->saved.length); isc_buffer_add(&msgb, msg->saved.length); - if (msg->tsigkey != NULL || msg->tsig != NULL) { #ifdef SKAN_MSG_DEBUG - dns_message_dumpsig(msg, "dns_message_checksig#1"); + dns_message_dumpsig(msg, "dns_message_checksig#1"); #endif /* ifdef SKAN_MSG_DEBUG */ - if (view != NULL) { - return (dns_view_checksig(view, &msgb, msg)); - } else { - return (dns_tsig_verify(&msgb, msg, NULL, NULL)); - } + if (view != NULL) { + return (dns_view_checksig(view, &msgb, msg)); } else { - dns_rdata_t rdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT; - dns_rdata_sig_t sig; - dns_rdataset_t keyset; - isc_result_t result; - - result = dns_rdataset_first(msg->sig0); - INSIST(result == ISC_R_SUCCESS); - dns_rdataset_current(msg->sig0, &rdata); - - /* - * This can occur when the message is a dynamic update, since - * the rdata length checking is relaxed. This should not - * happen in a well-formed message, since the SIG(0) is only - * looked for in the additional section, and the dynamic update - * meta-records are in the prerequisite and update sections. - */ - if (rdata.length == 0) { - return (ISC_R_UNEXPECTEDEND); - } - - result = dns_rdata_tostruct(&rdata, &sig, NULL); - if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) { - return (result); - } - - dns_rdataset_init(&keyset); - if (view == NULL) { - result = DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED; - goto freesig; - } - result = dns_view_simplefind(view, &sig.signer, - dns_rdatatype_key /* SIG(0) */, 0, - 0, false, &keyset, NULL); - - if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) { - /* XXXBEW Should possibly create a fetch here */ - result = DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED; - goto freesig; - } else if (keyset.trust < dns_trust_secure) { - /* XXXBEW Should call a validator here */ - result = DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED; - goto freesig; - } - result = dns_rdataset_first(&keyset); - INSIST(result == ISC_R_SUCCESS); - for (; result == ISC_R_SUCCESS; - result = dns_rdataset_next(&keyset)) - { - dst_key_t *key = NULL; - - dns_rdata_reset(&rdata); - dns_rdataset_current(&keyset, &rdata); - isc_buffer_init(&b, rdata.data, rdata.length); - isc_buffer_add(&b, rdata.length); - - result = dst_key_fromdns(&sig.signer, rdata.rdclass, &b, - view->mctx, &key); - if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) { - continue; - } - if (dst_key_alg(key) != sig.algorithm || - dst_key_id(key) != sig.keyid || - !(dst_key_proto(key) == DNS_KEYPROTO_DNSSEC || - dst_key_proto(key) == DNS_KEYPROTO_ANY)) - { - dst_key_free(&key); - continue; - } - result = dns_dnssec_verifymessage(&msgb, msg, key); - dst_key_free(&key); - if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) { - break; - } - } - if (result == ISC_R_NOMORE) { - result = DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED; - } - - freesig: - if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&keyset)) { - dns_rdataset_disassociate(&keyset); - } - dns_rdata_freestruct(&sig); - return (result); + return (dns_tsig_verify(&msgb, msg, NULL, NULL)); } } diff --git a/lib/ns/client.c b/lib/ns/client.c index d4ce000be8..2679a5e8d9 100644 --- a/lib/ns/client.c +++ b/lib/ns/client.c @@ -2041,6 +2041,13 @@ ns__client_request(isc_nmhandle_t *handle, isc_result_t eresult, ns_client_log(client, DNS_LOGCATEGORY_SECURITY, NS_LOGMODULE_CLIENT, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "request is signed by a nonauthoritative key"); + } else if (result == DNS_R_NOTVERIFIEDYET && + client->message->sig0 != NULL) + { + ns_client_log(client, DNS_LOGCATEGORY_SECURITY, + NS_LOGMODULE_CLIENT, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), + "request has a SIG(0) signature but its support " + "was removed (CVE-2024-1975)"); } else { char tsigrcode[64]; isc_buffer_t b; From 9f31ec7ec98269093128d8fe4649a2942e5b3587 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20=C5=A0pa=C4=8Dek?= Date: Thu, 16 May 2024 12:15:23 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 2/6] Document SIG(0) verification removal (cherry picked from commit 654ba34d80b8b6ed805461d7ada2466f8c19a6f1) --- doc/arm/advanced.rst | 18 +++--------------- doc/arm/general.rst | 6 ++---- doc/arm/reference.rst | 4 ++-- doc/arm/security.rst | 4 ++-- 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/doc/arm/advanced.rst b/doc/arm/advanced.rst index 4405b5c1a9..f3325d9a74 100644 --- a/doc/arm/advanced.rst +++ b/doc/arm/advanced.rst @@ -537,7 +537,7 @@ zone). The TKEY process is initiated by a client or server by sending a query of type TKEY to a TKEY-aware server. The query must include an appropriate KEY record in the additional section, and must be signed -using either TSIG or SIG(0) with a previously established key. The +using either TSIG with a previously established key. The server's response, if successful, contains a TKEY record in its answer section. After this transaction, both participants have enough information to calculate a shared secret using Diffie-Hellman key @@ -555,20 +555,8 @@ deletion" mode. SIG(0) ------ -BIND partially supports DNSSEC SIG(0) transaction signatures as -specified in :rfc:`2535` and :rfc:`2931`. SIG(0) uses public/private keys to -authenticate messages. Access control is performed in the same manner as with -TSIG keys; privileges can be granted or denied in ACL directives based -on the key name. - -When a SIG(0) signed message is received, it is only verified if -the key is known and trusted by the server. The server does not attempt -to recursively fetch or validate the key. - -SIG(0) signing of multiple-message TCP streams is not supported. - -The only tool shipped with BIND 9 that generates SIG(0) signed messages -is ``nsupdate``. +Support for DNSSEC SIG(0) transaction signatures was removed. +This is a countermeasure for CVE-2024-1975. .. include:: managed-keys.rst .. include:: pkcs11.rst diff --git a/doc/arm/general.rst b/doc/arm/general.rst index d7b7c20019..136e806253 100644 --- a/doc/arm/general.rst +++ b/doc/arm/general.rst @@ -367,10 +367,8 @@ Notes .. [#rfc1035_2] CLASS ANY queries are not supported. This is considered a feature. -.. [#rfc2931] When receiving a query signed with a SIG(0), the server is - only able to verify the signature if it has the key in its local - authoritative data; it cannot do recursion or validation to - retrieve unknown keys. +.. [#rfc2931] Support for SIG(0) message verification was removed + as a countermeasure for CVE-2024-1975. .. [#rfc2874] Compliance is with loading and serving of A6 records only. A6 records were moved to the experimental category by :rfc:`3363`. diff --git a/doc/arm/reference.rst b/doc/arm/reference.rst index ecc84d4b37..f982e0ac3a 100644 --- a/doc/arm/reference.rst +++ b/doc/arm/reference.rst @@ -5900,7 +5900,7 @@ The ``update-policy`` clause allows more fine-grained control over which updates are allowed. It specifies a set of rules, in which each rule either grants or denies permission for one or more names in the zone to be updated by one or more identities. Identity is determined by the key -that signed the update request, using either TSIG or SIG(0). In most +that signed the update request, using either TSIG. In most cases, ``update-policy`` rules only apply to key-based identities. There is no way to specify update permissions based on the client source address. @@ -5957,7 +5957,7 @@ field), and the type of the record to be updated matches the ``types`` field. Details for each rule type are described below. The ``identity`` field must be set to a fully qualified domain name. In -most cases, this represents the name of the TSIG or SIG(0) key that +most cases, this represents the name of the TSIG key that must be used to sign the update request. If the specified name is a wildcard, it is subject to DNS wildcard expansion, and the rule may apply to multiple identities. When a TKEY exchange has been used to diff --git a/doc/arm/security.rst b/doc/arm/security.rst index 817ebd0e8e..92b1668400 100644 --- a/doc/arm/security.rst +++ b/doc/arm/security.rst @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ Limiting access to the server by outside parties can help prevent spoofing and denial of service (DoS) attacks against the server. ACLs match clients on the basis of up to three characteristics: 1) The -client's IP address; 2) the TSIG or SIG(0) key that was used to sign the +client's IP address; 2) the TSIG key that was used to sign the request, if any; and 3) an address prefix encoded in an EDNS Client-Subnet option, if any. @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ and no queries at all from the networks specified in ``bogusnets``. In addition to network addresses and prefixes, which are matched against the source address of the DNS request, ACLs may include ``key`` -elements, which specify the name of a TSIG or SIG(0) key. +elements, which specify the name of a TSIG key. When BIND 9 is built with GeoIP support, ACLs can also be used for geographic access restrictions. This is done by specifying an ACL From c21a152445e5f03be70347bce9ca419a7c30c110 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Aram Sargsyan Date: Tue, 21 May 2024 08:45:48 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 3/6] Enable stdout autoflush in authsock.pl With enabled buffering the output gets lost when the process receives a TERM signal. Disable the buffering. (cherry picked from commit a0311dfb6e2a51f89dfa8b200b96a0f4675fb654) --- bin/tests/system/tsiggss/authsock.pl | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/authsock.pl b/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/authsock.pl index d629c652ff..d181b1a1d8 100644 --- a/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/authsock.pl +++ b/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/authsock.pl @@ -33,6 +33,10 @@ if (!defined($path)) { exit(1); } +# Enable output autoflush so that it's not lost when the parent sends TERM. +select STDOUT; +$| = 1; + unlink($path); my $server = IO::Socket::UNIX->new(Local => $path, Type => SOCK_STREAM, Listen => 8) or die "unable to create socket $path"; From c448b8be0dbe5d19fc12eb997e2abfdd8e76fa42 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20=C5=A0pa=C4=8Dek?= Date: Fri, 17 May 2024 12:23:05 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 4/6] Adapt the tsiggss test to the SIG(0) removal Test that SIG(0) signer is NOT sent to the external socket for authorization. It MUST NOT be considered a valid signature by any chance. Also check that the signer's name does not appear in authsock.pl output. (cherry picked from commit cf8838085905171fbc00747eb210e8b8284ca0e1) --- bin/tests/system/tsiggss/authsock.pl | 1 + bin/tests/system/tsiggss/clean.sh | 2 +- bin/tests/system/tsiggss/tests.sh | 12 +++++++----- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/authsock.pl b/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/authsock.pl index d181b1a1d8..b3888fb061 100644 --- a/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/authsock.pl +++ b/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/authsock.pl @@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ if ($timeout != 0) { } while (my $client = $server->accept()) { + printf("accept()\n"); $client->recv(my $buf, 8, 0); my ($version, $req_len) = unpack('N N', $buf); diff --git a/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/clean.sh b/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/clean.sh index 0ace209efb..ce885d5744 100644 --- a/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/clean.sh +++ b/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/clean.sh @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ rm -f ns1/_default.tsigkeys rm -f */named.memstats rm -f */named.conf rm -f */named.run -rm -f authsock.pid +rm -f authsock.log authsock.pid rm -f ns1/core rm -f nsupdate.out* rm -f ns*/named.lock diff --git a/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/tests.sh b/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/tests.sh index a66570301e..34b8c890c7 100644 --- a/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/tests.sh +++ b/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/tests.sh @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ status=$((status + ret)) echo_i "testing external update policy (CNAME) with auth sock ($n)" ret=0 -$PERL ./authsock.pl --type=CNAME --path=ns1/auth.sock --pidfile=authsock.pid --timeout=120 >/dev/null 2>&1 & +$PERL ./authsock.pl --type=CNAME --path=ns1/auth.sock --pidfile=authsock.pid --timeout=120 >authsock.log 2>&1 & sleep 1 test_update $n testcname.example.nil. CNAME "86400 CNAME testdenied.example.nil" "testdenied" || ret=1 n=$((n + 1)) @@ -130,17 +130,19 @@ n=$((n + 1)) if [ "$ret" -ne 0 ]; then echo_i "failed"; fi status=$((status + ret)) -echo_i "testing external policy with SIG(0) key ($n)" +echo_i "testing external policy with unsupported SIG(0) key ($n)" ret=0 -$NSUPDATE -k ns1/Kkey.example.nil.*.private </dev/null 2>&1 || ret=1 +$NSUPDATE -d -k ns1/Kkey.example.nil.*.private <nsupdate.out${n} 2>&1 || true +debug server 10.53.0.1 ${PORT} zone example.nil update add fred.example.nil 120 cname foo.bar. send END output=$($DIG $DIGOPTS +short cname fred.example.nil.) -[ -n "$output" ] || ret=1 -[ $ret -eq 0 ] || echo_i "failed" +# update must have failed - SIG(0) signer is not supported +[ -n "$output" ] && ret=1 +grep -F "signer=key.example.nil" authsock.log >/dev/null && ret=1 n=$((n + 1)) if [ "$ret" -ne 0 ]; then echo_i "failed"; fi status=$((status + ret)) From fbbb9f2f6e8f68797cdb74563adde5185482e592 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Aram Sargsyan Date: Tue, 21 May 2024 09:29:35 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 5/6] Adapt the upforwd test to the SIG(0) removal Change the check so that update with SIG(0) is expected to fail. (cherry picked from commit 5f7558f6dbb0527c08caf281299245ab8de268cd) --- bin/tests/system/upforwd/tests.sh | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/bin/tests/system/upforwd/tests.sh b/bin/tests/system/upforwd/tests.sh index 9165ba9e32..89e22415f0 100644 --- a/bin/tests/system/upforwd/tests.sh +++ b/bin/tests/system/upforwd/tests.sh @@ -262,10 +262,12 @@ if $FEATURETEST --enable-dnstap; then fi if test -f keyname; then - echo_i "checking update forwarding to with sig0 ($n)" + echo_i "checking update forwarding to with sig0 (expected to fail) ($n)" ret=0 keyname=$(cat keyname) - $NSUPDATE -k $keyname.private -- - <nsupdate.out.$n 2>&1 && ret=1 $DIG -p ${PORT} unsigned.example2 A @10.53.0.1 >dig.out.ns1.test$n || ret=1 - grep "status: NOERROR" dig.out.ns1.test$n >/dev/null || ret=1 + grep "status: NOERROR" dig.out.ns1.test$n >/dev/null && ret=1 if [ $ret != 0 ]; then echo_i "failed"; fi status=$(expr $status + $ret) n=$(expr $n + 1) From 09788757259bad9d6de49455c5c242a71d6f49a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20=C5=A0pa=C4=8Dek?= Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2024 17:43:20 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 6/6] Add CHANGES note for [GL #4480] (cherry picked from commit 6eda4f465aa75eb6d66a27f2d7a3dfae7611ecf9) --- CHANGES | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES index e039299ea2..36169a577d 100644 --- a/CHANGES +++ b/CHANGES @@ -2,6 +2,9 @@ parent NS records needed to get the DS result. [GL #4661] +6396. [security] Remove SIG(0) support from named as a countermeasure + for CVE-2024-1975. [GL #4480] + --- 9.16.50 released --- 6364. [protocol] Add RESOLVER.ARPA to the built in empty zones.