MySQL 8 rejects CAST(... AS int) (only SIGNED/UNSIGNED/CHAR/... are
accepted as target types), causing /api/v1/projects, /api/v1/tasks,
and /api/v1/labels to return HTTP 500 for every authenticated user on
MySQL 8. SQLite, Postgres, and MariaDB lax mode silently accepted the
expression, which is why the regression (introduced in e3045dfd0,
shipped in v2.3.0) passed CI — the mysql CI matrix leg uses
mariadb:12, not real MySQL 8.
Replace the two CAST(all_projects.is_archived AS int) expressions in
the recursive project CTE with MAX(CASE WHEN ... THEN 1 ELSE 0 END),
which is dialect-agnostic and needs no cast on any supported backend.
Fixes#2589
Regression test for #2589. Locks the contract that getAllProjectsForUser
exposes inherited is_archived for child projects of archived parents and
filters them out when getArchived=false, exercising both the MAX(...)
column expression and the HAVING MAX(...) = 0 filter.
The TestProject_ReadAll/search case on the ParadeDB path was still
expecting 6 results, but adding fixture project 43 (child of project
10) means the recursive CTE now pulls it in as a descendant whenever
the fuzzy search matches project 10. The non-ParadeDB branch was
already updated to account for this (+1, asserting project 43 is in
the result); the ParadeDB branch was missed.
CI was failing with "should have 6 item(s), but has 7" on the
test-api (paradedb, feature) job. Bump the expected length to 7 and
add the matching Contains assertion for project 43.
No fixture or production-code changes.
GHSA-2vq4-854f-5c72 / CVE-2026-35595: the recursive permission CTE
cascades Admin from any owned ancestor, so a user with Write on a
shared project could reparent it under an attacker-owned root and
resolve as Admin on the moved project via the new parent.
Require Admin on both the moved project and the new parent whenever
parent_project_id is set to a non-zero value that differs from the
stored value. The gate lives in UpdateProject rather than CanUpdate
because CanUpdate is reused by permission-check-only callers
(buckets, webhooks, task ops) that pass stub &Project{ID:...} values
with ParentProjectID=0 and never commit a reparent — gating there
would spuriously trip the check for every such call.
Only non-zero ParentProjectID is gated: the generic update handler
binds a fresh struct, so an omitted parent_project_id is
indistinguishable from an explicit 0. Detach-to-root via the generic
endpoint is therefore out of scope for this fix and is tracked as a
follow-up (needs a pointer field to disambiguate).
Covers GHSA-2vq4-854f-5c72 / CVE-2026-35595: attackers with direct or
inherited Write on a project must not be able to reparent it under their
own tree nor detach it to root. Also pins the legitimate rename-with-Write
and owner-detach flows so the upcoming fix does not regress them.
Adds project 43 as a child of project 10 so tests can exercise the
"inherited Write via parent" path exploited by GHSA-2vq4-854f-5c72.
User 1 has Write on project 10 via users_projects id=4 and therefore
inherits Write on this child via the permission CTE.
Task/project duplication and the Todoist migration were passing stored
or API-reported sizes into NewAttachment. Derive the size from the
actual buffered content so every caller matches the hardened boundary
behaviour (GHSA-qh78-rvg3-cv54 defence-in-depth).
Authoritative size now comes from the reader instead of the caller's
claim in CreateWithMimeAndSession. The migration import path accepts
attacker-controlled metadata (GHSA-qh78-rvg3-cv54), so trusting
realsize for the limit check allowed oversized uploads to be accepted
and stored.
measureReaderSize leaves the reader seeked to 0 so the measured value
matches the bytes storage backends will actually write.
Add MaxTaskRepeatAfterSeconds (10 years in seconds) and reject any
create/update that tries to store a value outside [0, cap] with a new
ErrInvalidTaskRepeatInterval (error code 4029). Defense-in-depth
alongside the arithmetic fix in addRepeatIntervalToTime: keeps stored
values well away from int64 overflow and bounds the range of inputs
a future refactor could trip over.
Exercises updateDone end-to-end with a 1900-01-01 due date, 1-second
interval, and asserts the call completes in well under a second.
Catches any regression that reintroduces the O(n) loop in
addRepeatIntervalToTime (GHSA-r4fg-73rc-hhh7).
addRepeatIntervalToTime used to advance t by whole intervals via an
unbounded loop. A repeating task with an ancient due_date and a
one-second interval required billions of iterations per task update,
turning completion of such a task into a trivial denial-of-service
(GHSA-r4fg-73rc-hhh7). Compute the number of intervals directly, with
guards for zero/negative durations, saturated time.Sub, and int64
overflow.
Covered by TestAddRepeatIntervalToTime, including the 1900-01-01 PoC
case.
Previously GetTasksByUIDs returned any task matching the UID regardless
of the caller's access, letting any authenticated CalDAV user read any
task by guessing or knowing a UID. Filter by accessible project IDs at
the SQL level using the existing accessibleProjectIDsSubquery helper.
Fixes GHSA-48ch-p4gq-x46x.
Task titles, project titles, team names, doer/assignee names, and API
token titles were interpolated raw into Line(...) calls whose content is
rendered to HTML by goldmark and then sanitized with bluemonday UGCPolicy.
UGCPolicy intentionally allows safe <a href> and <img src> with
http/https URLs, so a title containing Markdown link or image syntax
would survive sanitization as a working phishing link or tracking pixel
in a legitimate Vikunja email.
Introduce notifications.EscapeMarkdown, which prefixes every CommonMark
§2.4 backslash-escapable ASCII punctuation character — including '<' so
autolinks like `<https://evil.com>` are neutralized before reaching
goldmark — with a backslash. Apply it to every user-controlled argument
of every Line(...) call in pkg/models that feeds into an i18n template,
and to the hand-built "* [title](url) (project)" Markdown link in the
overdue-tasks digest notification.
Also escape the migration error string in MigrationFailedNotification,
an additional sink not listed in the advisory (error messages can carry
user-controlled content from the external migration source).
Subject(...), Greeting(...), and CreateConversationalHeader(...) are
left unchanged: Subject is passed directly to the mail library and is
not markdown-rendered, Greeting is rendered via html/template's built-in
HTML escaping without markdown, and the conversational header is
sanitized as raw HTML by bluemonday in mail_render.go.
Fixes GHSA-45q4-x4r9-8fqj.
The previous hasAccessToLabel implementation ran `Get(ll)` against a
label_tasks LEFT JOIN with no ORDER BY, which meant the database was
free to pick any matching row. When a label had multiple attachments,
or when access was granted via the creator branch while the label also
had label_tasks rows pointing at inaccessible tasks, the picked row
could belong to a task the caller could not actually read.
That led to two concrete problems reported on the follow-up review of
GHSA-hj5c-mhh2-g7jq:
1. maxPermission (exposed as the x-max-permission response header)
could be derived from a task the caller has no access to, ending
up as 0 or lower than the caller's real best permission on the
label.
2. Task.CanRead on a dangling/inaccessible task could return an
error and surface as a 500, even though the label itself was
perfectly readable via the creator branch.
Split the logic instead:
* Use `Exist` for the boolean access check, using the same carefully
grouped `And(Eq{labels.id}, Or(accessibleTask, creator))` cond.
* Compute maxPermission by selecting the label_tasks rows whose
task lives in a project the caller can access, then iterating
those tasks with `Task.CanRead` and taking the maximum.
* Fall back to PermissionRead when the access was granted via the
creator branch and no accessible task attachment exists.
hasAccessToLabel built its WHERE clause by chaining xorm session .Where,
.Or, and .And calls. xorm flattened those to `WHERE A OR B OR C AND D`,
which under SQL precedence evaluates as
`A OR B OR (C AND D)` — so the `labels.id = ?` predicate only narrowed
the project-access branch. The standalone
`label_tasks.label_id IS NOT NULL` branch leaked every label with any
label_tasks row to any authenticated user, and the
`labels.created_by_id = ?` branch leaked any label the caller had ever
created regardless of the requested id.
Rewrite the query using explicit builder.And / builder.Or grouping so
the label-id scope wraps the entire disjunction, drop the bogus
label_tasks-is-not-null branch, and keep the creator branch only for
real user auths. Replace Exist(ll) with Get(ll) so the resulting
LabelTask row is populated and the follow-up Task.CanRead check that
computes maxPermission actually runs; fall back to PermissionRead when
the match came via the creator branch and no task row is joined.
Previously GetLinkShareFromClaims built a *LinkSharing entirely from JWT
claims with no DB interaction, so deleted shares and permission downgrades
took up to 72h (the JWT TTL) to take effect. The permission and sharedByID
claims were trusted blindly.
GetLinkShareFromClaims now takes an *xorm.Session, looks up the share via
GetLinkShareByID, verifies the hash claim against the DB row, and returns
ErrLinkShareTokenInvalid when the row is missing or the hash mismatches.
The permission and sharedByID claims are discarded; the DB row is
authoritative. GetAuthFromClaims opens a read session for the link-share
branch, mirroring the existing API-token branch.
Token creation and the JWT format are unchanged, so already-issued tokens
keep working except when the underlying share has been deleted or its hash
no longer matches.
Fixes GHSA-96q5-xm3p-7m84 / CVE-2026-35594.
CanDoAPIRoute's non-CRUD fallback branch compared a path-derived
permission name to the token's permission strings without checking
the request method. A token with projects.background (registered for
GET /projects/:project/background) could therefore invoke DELETE on
the same path. The same method-confusion affected the whole
/projects/:project/views/:view/buckets[/:bucket] cluster, where a
token with projects.views_buckets (registered for GET) authorized
PUT, POST, and DELETE on any accessible view's buckets.
The matcher also leaked CRUD permissions between parent and nested
sub-resource groups. When the request targeted a nested CRUD resource
(e.g. projects_teams, projects_shares, projects_users, projects_views,
projects_webhooks, projects_views_tasks, tasks_assignees, tasks_labels,
tasks_comments, tasks_relations, tasks_attachments, teams_members),
the matcher fell back from the specific group to the parent's permission
list but then looked the permission name up inside the sub-resource's
RouteDetail map. The effect was that a token holding only projects.read_all
also authorized GET on every nested projects_* list endpoint, and the
same held for create/update/delete and for the tasks.* family.
Rewrite the matcher to iterate the token's own permissions and accept
only when the stored RouteDetail's (Path, Method) matches the request.
This removes all the path-derived group guessing and makes the stored
detail the single source of truth. Preserve the tasks.read_all quirk
(one permission, two list endpoints) as an explicit two-path allowlist
inside the loop.
Extract a GetAPITokenRoutes accessor so the new property-based webtest
can consume the same snapshot served by GET /api/v1/routes.
Add TestAPITokenMethodMatching in pkg/webtests: using the live echo
router and the live apiTokenRoutes map, it iterates every advertised
permission against every registered route and asserts the matcher
accepts iff the stored (Path, Method) matches. Any future collision
introduced by a new non-CRUD route on a shared path will be caught.
After this change, previously-dead permissions like
projects.background_delete, projects.views_buckets_{put,post,delete},
other.avatar, other.ws and caldav.access start working as their UI
labels imply. Tokens that relied on the over-broad background /
views_buckets grants, or on cross-cluster CRUD bleed-through, will
lose the extra access - that is the fix.
Refs: GHSA-v479-vf79-mg83
When a repeating task dropped on the done bucket is already in the
view's default bucket, the upsert would try to UPDATE with an
unchanged bucket_id. MySQL reports 0 affected rows for unchanged
updates, so upsert fell through to INSERT and hit the unique
constraint on (task_id, project_view_id).
Previously WebhookListener.Handle fetched matching webhooks with
Find(&ws) without an explicit ORDER BY, so iteration order depended on
the DB driver. Add ORDER BY id ASC so the fan-out order is stable for
both project- and user-level webhooks, and update the sibling-blocking
regression test to insert webhooks with explicit ids so its ordering
assumption is robust to autoincrement state.
A nil payload signals data corruption or a version mismatch on the
event bus, not a safe-to-drop condition. Returning an error lets the
watermill retry middleware retry the message and eventually park it in
the poison queue instead of silently acking it.
Previously the HTTP response status was only logged, so retries never
triggered for failing webhooks and downstream fan-out bugs (#2569) were
impossible to exercise via tests. Returning an error lets the watermill
retry middleware do its job.
The filter view cron built an unbounded builder.Or(deleteCond...) tree
that exceeded SQLite's 1000-node expression depth limit when many tasks
needed removal. Delete conditions are now processed in chunks of 500.
Ref: #2550
resolvePositionConflictsAfterInsert now falls back to a full position
recalculation when resolveTaskPositionConflicts returns
ErrNeedsFullRecalculation, instead of bubbling the error up as HTTP 500.
This mirrors the existing fallback logic in the CLI repair command.
Ref: #2550
Resolves#2490. Users with team access on a parent project were not seeing
subtask relations for tasks in child projects because getUserProjectsStatement
does not walk the project hierarchy. The fix wraps the base query in a
recursive CTE that traverses child projects via parent_project_id.
GetMailDomain called log.Warningf which panics when the logger is not
initialized (e.g. in unit tests). Add log.IsInitialized() guard.
Also fix TestGetThreadID tests that hardcoded "vikunja" as the expected
fallback domain - on CI the os.Hostname() fallback produces a different
value. Tests now dynamically compute the expected domain.
Fixes#2495, fixes#2400
When tasks are created, setTaskInBucketInViews() assigns positions
without checking for conflicts. If two tasks get the same position value,
their order scrambles on reload. This adds a conflict check after
bulk-inserting positions, reusing the existing resolution logic from the
update path.
Add resolvePositionConflictsAfterInsert() which checks newly inserted
task positions for duplicate position values within the same view and
resolves them using existing conflict resolution logic.
The UpdateProject function referenced done_bucket_id and default_bucket_id
in its column update list, but these columns belong to the project_views
table, not the projects table. This caused SQL errors when archiving or
updating a project on MySQL/PostgreSQL.
Also adds a test for archiving a non-archived project.
Fixes#2459
When expand[]=subtasks is used, the LEFT JOIN on task_relations filters
out same-project subtasks. If a parent task was deleted, the JOIN
produces NULL for parent_tasks.id/project_id, and since NULL != value
evaluates to NULL (not TRUE) in SQL, these tasks were incorrectly
excluded.
Add builder.IsNull{"parent_tasks.id"} to the OR condition so tasks
whose parent was deleted are still included in results.
