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DNSOP W. Hardaker
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Internet-Draft Sparta, Inc.
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Intended status: Informational February 12, 2009
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Expires: August 16, 2009
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Requirements for Management of Name Servers for the DNS
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draft-ietf-dnsop-name-server-management-reqs-02.txt
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Status of this Memo
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This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
|
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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|
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
|
||||
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
|
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other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
|
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Drafts.
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|
||||
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
|
||||
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
|
||||
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
|
||||
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
|
||||
|
||||
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
|
||||
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
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||||
|
||||
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
|
||||
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
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||||
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||||
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 16, 2009.
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Copyright Notice
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Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
|
||||
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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||||
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
|
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publication of this document. Please review these documents
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
|
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to this document.
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Abstract
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Management of name servers for the Domain Name Service (DNS) has
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traditionally been done using vendor-specific monitoring,
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Hardaker Expires August 16, 2009 [Page 1]
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Internet-Draft Name Server Management Requirements February 2009
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configuration and control methods. Although some service monitoring
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||||
platforms can test the functionality of the DNS itself there is not a
|
||||
interoperable way to manage (monitor, control and configure) the
|
||||
internal aspects of a name server itself.
|
||||
|
||||
This document discusses the requirements of a management system for
|
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DNS name servers. A management solution that is designed to manage
|
||||
the DNS can use this document as a shopping list of needed features.
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Table of Contents
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1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
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1.1. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
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1.1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
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1.1.2. Document Layout and Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . 5
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2. Management Architecture Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
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2.1. Expected Deployment Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
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2.1.1. Zone Size Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
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2.1.2. Name Server Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
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2.1.3. Configuration Data Volatility . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
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2.1.4. Protocol Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
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2.1.5. Common Data Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
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2.1.6. Operational Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
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2.2. Name Server Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
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3. Management Operation Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
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3.1. Control Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
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3.1.1. Needed Control Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
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3.1.2. Asynchronous Status Notifications . . . . . . . . . . 8
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3.2. Configuration Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
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3.2.1. Served Zone Modification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
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3.2.2. Trust Anchor Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
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3.2.3. Security Expectations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
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3.2.4. TSIG Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
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3.2.5. DNS Protocol Authorization Management . . . . . . . . 9
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3.3. Monitoring Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
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3.4. Alarm and Event Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
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4. Security Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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4.1. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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4.2. Integrity Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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4.3. Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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4.4. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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4.5. Solution Impacts on Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
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5. Other Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
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5.1. Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
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5.1.1. Vendor Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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5.1.2. Extension Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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5.1.3. Name-Space Collision Protection . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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Hardaker Expires August 16, 2009 [Page 2]
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Internet-Draft Name Server Management Requirements February 2009
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6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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8. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
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10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
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10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
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10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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Appendix A. Deployment Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
|
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A.1. Non-Standard Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
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A.2. Redundancy Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
|
||||
A.3. DNSSEC Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
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||||
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
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Hardaker Expires August 16, 2009 [Page 3]
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Internet-Draft Name Server Management Requirements February 2009
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1. Introduction
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Management of name servers for the Domain Name Service (DNS)
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||||
[RFC1034] [RFC1035] has traditionally been done using vendor-specific
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monitoring, configuration and control methods. Although some service
|
||||
monitoring platforms can test the functionality of the DNS itself
|
||||
there is not a interoperable way to manage (monitor, control and
|
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configure) the internal aspects of a name server itself.
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|
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Previous standardization work within the IETF resulted in the
|
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creation of two SNMP MIB modules [RFC1611] [RFC1612] but they failed
|
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to achieve significant implementation and deployment. The perceived
|
||||
reasons behind the failure for the two MIB modules are further
|
||||
documented in [RFC3197].
|
||||
|
||||
This document discusses the requirements of a management system for
|
||||
DNS name servers. A management solution that is designed to manage
|
||||
the DNS can use this document as a shopping list of needed features.
|
||||
|
||||
Specifically out of scope for this document are requirements
|
||||
associated with management of stub resolvers. It is not the intent
|
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of this document to document stub resolver requirements, although
|
||||
some of the requirements listed are applicable to stub resolvers as
|
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well.
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Also out of scope for this document is management of the host or
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other components of the host upon which the name server software is
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running. This document only discusses requirements for managing the
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name server component of a system.
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The task of creating a management system for managing DNS servers is
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not expected to be a small one. It is likely that components of the
|
||||
solution will need to be designed in parts over time and these
|
||||
requirements take this into consideration. In particular,
|
||||
Section 5.1 discusses the need for future extensibility of the base
|
||||
management solution. This document is intended to be a road-map
|
||||
towards a desired outcome and is not intended to define an "all-or-
|
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nothing" system. Successful interoperable management of name servers
|
||||
even in part is expected to be beneficial to network operators
|
||||
compared to the entirely custom solutions that are used at the time
|
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of this writing.
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||||
1.1. Requirements notation
|
||||
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||||
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
|
||||
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
|
||||
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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Hardaker Expires August 16, 2009 [Page 4]
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Internet-Draft Name Server Management Requirements February 2009
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1.1.1. Terminology
|
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|
||||
This document is consistent with the terminology defined in Section 2
|
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of [RFC4033]. Additional terminology needed for this document is
|
||||
described below:
|
||||
|
||||
Name Server: When we are discussing servers that don't fall into a
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||||
more specific type of server category defined in other documents,
|
||||
this document will refer to them generically as "name servers".
|
||||
In particular "name servers" can be considered to be any valid
|
||||
combination of authoritative, recursive, validating, or security-
|
||||
aware. The more specific name server labels will be used when
|
||||
this document refers only to a specific type of server. However,
|
||||
the term "name server", in this document, will not include stub
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||||
resolvers.
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||||
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||||
1.1.2. Document Layout and Requirements
|
||||
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||||
The document is written so that each numbered section will contain
|
||||
only a single requirement if it contains one at all. Each
|
||||
requirement will contain needed wording from the terminology
|
||||
described in Section 1.1. Subsections, however, might exist with
|
||||
additional related requirements. The document is laid out in this
|
||||
way so that a specific requirement can be uniquely referred to using
|
||||
the section number itself and the document version from which it
|
||||
came.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
2. Management Architecture Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
This section discusses requirements that reflect the needs of the
|
||||
expected deployment environments.
|
||||
|
||||
2.1. Expected Deployment Scenarios
|
||||
|
||||
DNS zones vary greatly in the type of content published within them.
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Name Servers, too, are deployed with a wide variety of configurations
|
||||
to support the diversity of the deployed content. It is important
|
||||
that a management solution trying to meet the criteria specified in
|
||||
this document consider supporting the largest number of potential
|
||||
deployment cases as possible. Further deployment scenarios that are
|
||||
not used as direct examples of specific requirements are listed in
|
||||
Appendix A.
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||||
|
||||
2.1.1. Zone Size Constraints
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||||
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The management solution MUST support both name servers that are
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serving a small number of potentially very large zones (e.g. Top
|
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||||
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||||
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Hardaker Expires August 16, 2009 [Page 5]
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Internet-Draft Name Server Management Requirements February 2009
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Level Domains (TLDs)) as well as name servers that are serving a very
|
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large number of small zones. These scenarios are both commonly seen
|
||||
deployments.
|
||||
|
||||
2.1.2. Name Server Discovery
|
||||
|
||||
Large enterprise network deployments may contain multiple name
|
||||
servers operating within the boundaries of the enterprise network.
|
||||
These name servers may each be serving multiple zones both in and out
|
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of the parent enterprise's zone. Finding and managing large
|
||||
quantities of name servers would be a useful feature of the resulting
|
||||
management solution. The management solution MAY support the ability
|
||||
to discover previously unknown instances of name servers operating
|
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within a deployed network.
|
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|
||||
2.1.3. Configuration Data Volatility
|
||||
|
||||
Configuration data is defined as data that relates only to the
|
||||
configuration of a server and the zones it serves. It specifically
|
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does not include data from the zone contents that is served through
|
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DNS itself. The solution MUST support servers that remain fairly
|
||||
statically configured over time as well as servers that have numerous
|
||||
zones being added and removed within an hour. Both of these
|
||||
scenarios are also commonly seen deployments.
|
||||
|
||||
2.1.4. Protocol Selection
|
||||
|
||||
There are many requirements in this document for many different types
|
||||
of management operations (see Section 3 for further details). It is
|
||||
possible that no one protocol will ideally fill all the needs of the
|
||||
requirements listed in this document and thus multiple protocols
|
||||
might be needed to produce a completely functional management system.
|
||||
Multiple protocols might be used to create the complete management
|
||||
solution, but the number of protocols used SHOULD be reduced to a
|
||||
reasonable minimum number.
|
||||
|
||||
2.1.5. Common Data Model
|
||||
|
||||
Defining a standardized protocol (or set of protocols) to use for
|
||||
managing name servers would be a step forward in achieving an
|
||||
interoperable management solution. However, just defining a protocol
|
||||
to use by itself would not achieve the complete end goal of a
|
||||
complete interoperable management solution. Devices also need to
|
||||
represent their internal management interface using a common
|
||||
management data model. The solution MUST create a common data model
|
||||
that management stations can make use of when sending or collecting
|
||||
data from a managed device so it can successfully manage equipment
|
||||
from vendors as if they were generic DNS servers. This common data
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Hardaker Expires August 16, 2009 [Page 6]
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|
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Internet-Draft Name Server Management Requirements February 2009
|
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|
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||||
model is needed for of the operations discussion in Section 3. Note
|
||||
that this does not preclude the fact that name server vendors might
|
||||
provide additional management infrastructure beyond a base management
|
||||
specification, as discussed further in Section 5.1.
|
||||
|
||||
2.1.6. Operational Impact
|
||||
|
||||
It is impossible to add new features to an existing server (such as
|
||||
the inclusion of a management infrastructure) and not impact the
|
||||
existing service and/or server in some fashion. At a minimum, for
|
||||
example, more memory, disk and/or CPU resources will be required to
|
||||
implement a new management system. However, the impact to the
|
||||
existing DNS service MUST be minimized since the DNS service itself
|
||||
is still the primary service to be offered by the modified name
|
||||
server.
|
||||
|
||||
2.2. Name Server Types
|
||||
|
||||
There are multiple ways in which name servers can be deployed. Name
|
||||
servers can take on any of the following roles:
|
||||
|
||||
o Master Servers
|
||||
|
||||
o Slave Servers
|
||||
|
||||
o Recursive Servers
|
||||
|
||||
The management solution SHOULD support all of these types of name
|
||||
servers as they are all equally important. Note that "Recursive
|
||||
Servers" can be further broken down by the security sub-roles they
|
||||
might implement, as defined in section 2 of [RFC4033]. These sub-
|
||||
roles are also important to support within any management solution.
|
||||
|
||||
As stated earlier, the management of stub resolvers is considered out
|
||||
of scope for this documents.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
3. Management Operation Types
|
||||
|
||||
Management operations can traditionally be broken into four
|
||||
categories:
|
||||
|
||||
o Control
|
||||
|
||||
o Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
o Health and Monitoring
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Hardaker Expires August 16, 2009 [Page 7]
|
||||
|
||||
Internet-Draft Name Server Management Requirements February 2009
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
o Alarms and Events
|
||||
|
||||
This section discusses requirements for each of these four management
|
||||
types in detail.
|
||||
|
||||
3.1. Control Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
The management solution MUST be capable of performing basic service
|
||||
control operations.
|
||||
|
||||
3.1.1. Needed Control Operations
|
||||
|
||||
These operations SHOULD include, at a minimum, the following
|
||||
operations:
|
||||
|
||||
o Starting the name server
|
||||
|
||||
o Reloading the service configuration
|
||||
|
||||
o Reloading zone data
|
||||
|
||||
o Restarting the name server
|
||||
|
||||
o Stopping the name server
|
||||
|
||||
Note that no restriction is placed on how the management system
|
||||
implements these operations. In particular, at least "starting the
|
||||
name server" will require a minimal management system component to
|
||||
exist independently of the name server itself.
|
||||
|
||||
3.1.2. Asynchronous Status Notifications
|
||||
|
||||
Some control operations might take a long time to complete. As an
|
||||
example, some name servers take a long time to perform reloads of
|
||||
large zones. Because of these timing issues, the management solution
|
||||
SHOULD take this into consideration and offer a mechanism to ease the
|
||||
burden associated with awaiting the status of a long-running command.
|
||||
This could, for example, result in the use of asynchronous
|
||||
notifications for returning the status of a long-running task or it
|
||||
might require the management station to poll for the status of a
|
||||
given task using monitoring commands. These and other potential
|
||||
solutions need to be evaluated carefully to select one that balances
|
||||
the result delivery needs with the perceived implementation costs.
|
||||
|
||||
Also, see the related discussion in Section 3.4 on notification
|
||||
messages for supporting delivery of alarm and event messages.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Hardaker Expires August 16, 2009 [Page 8]
|
||||
|
||||
Internet-Draft Name Server Management Requirements February 2009
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
3.2. Configuration Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
Many features of name servers need to be configured before the server
|
||||
can be considered functional. The management solution MUST be able
|
||||
to provide name servers with configuration data. The most important
|
||||
data to be configured, for example, is the served zone data itself.
|
||||
|
||||
3.2.1. Served Zone Modification
|
||||
|
||||
The ability to add, modify and delete zones being served by name
|
||||
servers is needed. Although there are already solutions for zone
|
||||
content modification (such as Dynamic DNS (DDNS) [RFC2136] [RFC3007],
|
||||
AXFR [RFC1035], and incremental zone transfer (IXFR) [RFC1995]) that
|
||||
might be used as part of the final management solution, the
|
||||
management system SHOULD still be able to natively create a new zone
|
||||
(with enough minimal data to allow the other mechanisms to function
|
||||
as well) as well as delete a zone. This might be, for example, a
|
||||
management operation that at least allows for the creation of the
|
||||
initial SOA record for a new zone as that's the minimum amount of
|
||||
zone data needed for the other operations to function.
|
||||
|
||||
3.2.2. Trust Anchor Management
|
||||
|
||||
The solution SHOULD support the ability to add, modify and delete
|
||||
trust anchors that are used by DNS Security (DNSSEC) [RFC4033]
|
||||
[RFC4034] [RFC4035] [RFC4509] [RFC5011] [RFC5155]. These trust
|
||||
anchors might be configured using the data from the DNSKEY Resource
|
||||
Records (RRs) themselves or by using Delegation Signer (DS)
|
||||
fingerprints.
|
||||
|
||||
3.2.3. Security Expectations
|
||||
|
||||
DNSSEC Validating resolvers need to make policy decisions about the
|
||||
requests being processed. For example, they need to be configured
|
||||
with a list of zones expected to be secured by DNSSEC. The
|
||||
management solution SHOULD be able to add, modify and delete
|
||||
attributes of DNSSEC security policies.
|
||||
|
||||
3.2.4. TSIG Key Management
|
||||
|
||||
TSIG [RFC2845] allows transaction level authentication of DNS
|
||||
traffic. The management solution SHOULD be able to add, modify and
|
||||
delete TSIG keys known to the name server.
|
||||
|
||||
3.2.5. DNS Protocol Authorization Management
|
||||
|
||||
The management solution SHOULD have the ability to add, modify and
|
||||
delete authorization settings for the DNS protocols itself. Do not
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Hardaker Expires August 16, 2009 [Page 9]
|
||||
|
||||
Internet-Draft Name Server Management Requirements February 2009
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
confuse this with the ability to manage the authorization associated
|
||||
with the management protocol itself, which is discussed later in
|
||||
Section 4.4. There are a number of authorization settings that are
|
||||
used by a name server. Example authorization settings that the
|
||||
solution might need to cover are:
|
||||
|
||||
o Access to operations on zone data (e.g. DDNS)
|
||||
|
||||
o Access to certain zone data from certain sources (e.g. from
|
||||
particular network subnets)
|
||||
|
||||
o Access to specific DNS protocol services (e.g. recursive service)
|
||||
|
||||
Note: the above list is expected to be used as a collection of
|
||||
examples and is not a complete list of needed authorization
|
||||
protections.
|
||||
|
||||
3.3. Monitoring Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
Monitoring is the process of collecting aspects of the internal state
|
||||
of a name server at a given moment in time. The solution MUST be
|
||||
able to monitor the health of a name server to determine its
|
||||
operational status, load and other internal attributes. Example
|
||||
management tasks that the solution might need to cover are:
|
||||
|
||||
o Number of requests sent, responses sent, average response latency
|
||||
and other performance counters
|
||||
|
||||
o Server status (e.g. "serving data", "starting up", "shutting
|
||||
down", ...)
|
||||
|
||||
o Access control violations
|
||||
|
||||
o List of zones being served
|
||||
|
||||
o Detailed statistics about clients interacting with the name server
|
||||
(e.g. top 10 clients requesting data).
|
||||
|
||||
Note: the above list is expected to be used as a collection of
|
||||
examples and is not a complete list of needed monitoring operations.
|
||||
In particular, some monitoring statistics are expected to be
|
||||
computationally or resource expensive and are considered to be "nice
|
||||
to haves" as opposed to "necessary to have".
|
||||
|
||||
3.4. Alarm and Event Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
Events occurring at the name server that trigger alarm notifications
|
||||
can quickly inform a management station about critical issues. A
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Hardaker Expires August 16, 2009 [Page 10]
|
||||
|
||||
Internet-Draft Name Server Management Requirements February 2009
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
management solution SHOULD include support for delivery of alarm
|
||||
conditions.
|
||||
|
||||
Example alarm conditions might include:
|
||||
|
||||
o The server's status is changing. (e.g it is starting up, reloading
|
||||
configuration, restarting or shutting down)
|
||||
|
||||
o A needed resource (e.g. memory or disk space) is exhausted or
|
||||
nearing exhaustion
|
||||
|
||||
o An authorization violation was detected
|
||||
|
||||
o The server has not received any data traffic (e.g. DNS requests
|
||||
or NOTIFYs) recently (AKA the "lonely warning"). This condition
|
||||
might indicate a problem with its deployment.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
4. Security Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
The management solution will need to be appropriately secured against
|
||||
attacks on the management infrastructure.
|
||||
|
||||
4.1. Authentication
|
||||
|
||||
The solution MUST support mutual authentication. The management
|
||||
client needs to be assured that the management operations are being
|
||||
transferred to and from the correct name server. The managed name
|
||||
server needs to authenticate the system that is accessing the
|
||||
management infrastructure within itself.
|
||||
|
||||
4.2. Integrity Protection
|
||||
|
||||
Management operations MUST be protected from modification while in
|
||||
transit from the management client to the server.
|
||||
|
||||
4.3. Confidentiality
|
||||
|
||||
The management solution MUST support message confidentiality. The
|
||||
potential transfer of sensitive configuration is expected (such as
|
||||
TSIG keys or security policies). The solution does not, however,
|
||||
necessarily need to provide confidentiality to data that would
|
||||
normally be carried without confidentiality by the DNS system itself.
|
||||
|
||||
4.4. Authorization
|
||||
|
||||
The solution SHOULD be capable of providing a fine-grained
|
||||
authorization model for any management protocols it introduces to the
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Hardaker Expires August 16, 2009 [Page 11]
|
||||
|
||||
Internet-Draft Name Server Management Requirements February 2009
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
completed system. This authorization differs from the authorization
|
||||
previously discussed in Section 3.2.5 in that this requirement is
|
||||
concerned solely with authorization of the management system itself.
|
||||
|
||||
There are a number of authorization settings that might be used by a
|
||||
managed system to determine whether the managing entity has
|
||||
authorization to perform the given management task. Example
|
||||
authorization settings that the solution might need to cover are:
|
||||
|
||||
o Access to the configuration that specifies which zones are to be
|
||||
served
|
||||
|
||||
o Access to the management system infrastructure
|
||||
|
||||
o Access to other control operations
|
||||
|
||||
o Access to other configuration operations
|
||||
|
||||
o Access to monitoring operations
|
||||
|
||||
Note: the above list is expected to be used as a collection of
|
||||
examples and is not a complete list of needed authorization
|
||||
protections.
|
||||
|
||||
4.5. Solution Impacts on Security
|
||||
|
||||
The solution MUST minimize the security risks introduced to the
|
||||
complete name server system. It is impossible to add new
|
||||
infrastructure to a server and not impact the security in some
|
||||
fashion as the introduction of a management protocol alone will
|
||||
provide a new avenue for potential attack. Although the added
|
||||
management benefits will be worth the increased risks, the solution
|
||||
still needs to minimize this impact as much as possible.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
5. Other Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
5.1. Extensibility
|
||||
|
||||
The management solution is expected to change and expand over time as
|
||||
lessons are learned and new DNS features are deployed. Thus, the
|
||||
solution MUST be flexible and be able to accommodate new future
|
||||
management operations. The solution might, for example, make use of
|
||||
protocol versioning or capability description exchanges to ensure
|
||||
that management stations and name servers that weren't written to the
|
||||
same specification version can still interoperate to the best of
|
||||
their combined ability.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Hardaker Expires August 16, 2009 [Page 12]
|
||||
|
||||
Internet-Draft Name Server Management Requirements February 2009
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
5.1.1. Vendor Extensions
|
||||
|
||||
It MUST be possible for vendors to extend the standardized management
|
||||
model with vendor-specific extensions to support additional features
|
||||
offered by their products.
|
||||
|
||||
5.1.2. Extension Identification
|
||||
|
||||
It MUST be possible for a management station to understand which
|
||||
parts of returned data are specific to a given vendor or other
|
||||
standardized extension. The data returned needs to be appropriately
|
||||
marked through the use of name spaces or similar mechanisms to ensure
|
||||
that the base management model data can be logically separated from
|
||||
extension data without needing to understand the extension data
|
||||
itself.
|
||||
|
||||
5.1.3. Name-Space Collision Protection
|
||||
|
||||
It MUST be possible to protect against multiple extensions
|
||||
conflicting with each other. The use of name-space protection
|
||||
mechanisms for communicated management variables is common practice
|
||||
to protect against problems. Name-space identification techniques
|
||||
also frequently solve the "Extension Identification" requirement
|
||||
discussed in Section 5.1.2 as well.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
6. Security Considerations
|
||||
|
||||
Any management protocol that meets the criteria discussed in this
|
||||
document needs to support the criteria discussed in Section 4 in
|
||||
order to protect the management infrastructure itself. The DNS is a
|
||||
core Internet service and management traffic that protects it could
|
||||
be the target of attacks designed to subvert that service. Because
|
||||
the management infrastructure will be adding additional interfaces to
|
||||
that service, it is critical that the management infrastructure
|
||||
support adequate protections against network attacks.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
7. IANA Considerations
|
||||
|
||||
No action is required from IANA for this document.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
8. Document History
|
||||
|
||||
A requirement gathering discussion was held at the December 2007 IETF
|
||||
meeting in Vancouver, BC, Canada and a follow up meeting was held at
|
||||
the March 2008 IETF meeting in Philadelphia. This document is a
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Hardaker Expires August 16, 2009 [Page 13]
|
||||
|
||||
Internet-Draft Name Server Management Requirements February 2009
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
compilation of the results of those discussions as well as
|
||||
discussions on the DCOMA mailing list.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
9. Acknowledgments
|
||||
|
||||
This draft is the result of discussions within the DCOMA design team
|
||||
chaired by Jaap Akkerhuis. This team consisted of a large number of
|
||||
people all of whom provided valuable insight and input into the
|
||||
discussions surrounding name server management. The text of this
|
||||
document was written from notes taken during meetings as well as from
|
||||
contributions sent to the DCOMA mailing list. This work documents
|
||||
the consensus of the DCOMA design team.
|
||||
|
||||
In particular, the following team members contributed significantly
|
||||
to the text in the document:
|
||||
|
||||
Stephane Bortzmeyer
|
||||
|
||||
Stephen Morris
|
||||
|
||||
Phil Regnauld
|
||||
|
||||
Further editing contributions and wording suggestions were made by:
|
||||
Alfred Hoenes.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
10. References
|
||||
|
||||
10.1. Normative References
|
||||
|
||||
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
|
||||
STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
|
||||
|
||||
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
|
||||
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
|
||||
|
||||
[RFC1995] Ohta, M., "Incremental Zone Transfer in DNS", RFC 1995,
|
||||
August 1996.
|
||||
|
||||
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
|
||||
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
|
||||
|
||||
[RFC2136] Vixie, P., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y., and J. Bound,
|
||||
"Dynamic Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)",
|
||||
RFC 2136, April 1997.
|
||||
|
||||
[RFC2845] Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake, D., and B.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Hardaker Expires August 16, 2009 [Page 14]
|
||||
|
||||
Internet-Draft Name Server Management Requirements February 2009
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS
|
||||
(TSIG)", RFC 2845, May 2000.
|
||||
|
||||
[RFC3007] Wellington, B., "Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Dynamic
|
||||
Update", RFC 3007, November 2000.
|
||||
|
||||
[RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
|
||||
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
|
||||
RFC 4033, March 2005.
|
||||
|
||||
[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
|
||||
Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
|
||||
RFC 4034, March 2005.
|
||||
|
||||
[RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
|
||||
Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
|
||||
Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.
|
||||
|
||||
[RFC4509] Hardaker, W., "Use of SHA-256 in DNSSEC Delegation Signer
|
||||
(DS) Resource Records (RRs)", RFC 4509, May 2006.
|
||||
|
||||
[RFC5011] StJohns, M., "Automated Updates of DNS Security (DNSSEC)
|
||||
Trust Anchors", RFC 5011, September 2007.
|
||||
|
||||
[RFC5155] Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS
|
||||
Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of
|
||||
Existence", RFC 5155, March 2008.
|
||||
|
||||
10.2. Informative References
|
||||
|
||||
[RFC1611] Austein, R. and J. Saperia, "DNS Server MIB Extensions",
|
||||
RFC 1611, May 1994.
|
||||
|
||||
[RFC1612] Austein, R. and J. Saperia, "DNS Resolver MIB Extensions",
|
||||
RFC 1612, May 1994.
|
||||
|
||||
[RFC2182] Elz, R., Bush, R., Bradner, S., and M. Patton, "Selection
|
||||
and Operation of Secondary DNS Servers", BCP 16, RFC 2182,
|
||||
July 1997.
|
||||
|
||||
[RFC3197] Austein, R., "Applicability Statement for DNS MIB
|
||||
Extensions", RFC 3197, November 2001.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Appendix A. Deployment Scenarios
|
||||
|
||||
This appendix documents some additional deployment scenarios that
|
||||
have been traditionally difficult to manage. They are provided as
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Hardaker Expires August 16, 2009 [Page 15]
|
||||
|
||||
Internet-Draft Name Server Management Requirements February 2009
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
guidance to protocol developers as data points of real-world name
|
||||
server management problems.
|
||||
|
||||
A.1. Non-Standard Zones
|
||||
|
||||
If an organization uses non-standard zones (for example a purely-
|
||||
local TLD), synchronizing all the name servers for these zones is
|
||||
usually a time-consuming task. It is made worse when two
|
||||
organizations with conflicting zones merge. This situation is not a
|
||||
recommended deployment scenario (and is even heavily discouraged) but
|
||||
it is, unfortunately, seen in the wild.
|
||||
|
||||
It is typically implemented using "forwarding" zones. But there is
|
||||
no way to ensure automatically that all the resolvers have the same
|
||||
set of zones to forward at any given time. New zones might be added
|
||||
to a local forwarding recursive server, for example, without
|
||||
modifying the rest of the deployed forwarding servers. It is hoped
|
||||
that a management solution which could handle the configuration of
|
||||
zone forwarding would finally allow management of servers deployed in
|
||||
this fashion.
|
||||
|
||||
A.2. Redundancy Sharing
|
||||
|
||||
For reliability reasons it is recommended that zone operators follow
|
||||
the guidelines documented in [RFC2182] which recommends that multiple
|
||||
name servers be configured for each zone and that the name servers
|
||||
are separated both physically and via connectivity routes. A common
|
||||
solution is to establish DNS-serving partnerships: "I'll host your
|
||||
zones and you'll host mine". Both entities benefit from increased
|
||||
DNS reliability via the wider service distribution. This frequently
|
||||
occurs between cooperating but otherwise unrelated entities (such as
|
||||
between two distinct companies) as well as between affiliated
|
||||
organizations (such as between branch offices within a single
|
||||
company).
|
||||
|
||||
The configuration of these relationships are currently required to be
|
||||
manually configured and maintained. Changes to the list of zones
|
||||
that are cross-hosted are manually negotiated between the cooperating
|
||||
network administrators and configured by hand. A management protocol
|
||||
with the ability to provide selective authorization, as discussed in
|
||||
Section 4.4, would solve many of the management difficulties between
|
||||
cooperating organizations.
|
||||
|
||||
A.3. DNSSEC Management
|
||||
|
||||
There are many different DNSSEC deployment strategies that may be
|
||||
used for mission-critical zones. The following list describes some
|
||||
example deployment scenarios that might warrant different management
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Hardaker Expires August 16, 2009 [Page 16]
|
||||
|
||||
Internet-Draft Name Server Management Requirements February 2009
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
strategies.
|
||||
|
||||
All contents and DNSSEC keying information controlled and operated
|
||||
by a single organization
|
||||
|
||||
Zone contents controlled and operated by one organization, all
|
||||
DNSSEC keying information controlled and operated by a second
|
||||
organization.
|
||||
|
||||
Zone contents controlled and operated by one organization, zone
|
||||
signing keys (ZSKs) controlled and operated by a second
|
||||
organization, and key signing keys (KSKs) controlled and operated
|
||||
by a third organization.
|
||||
|
||||
Although this list is not exhaustive in the potential ways that zone
|
||||
data can be divided up, it should be sufficient to illustrate the
|
||||
potential ways in which zone data can be controlled by multiple
|
||||
entities.
|
||||
|
||||
The end result of all of these strategies, however, will be the same:
|
||||
a live zone containing DNSSEC related resource records. Many of the
|
||||
above strategies are merely different ways of preparing a zone for
|
||||
serving. A management solution that includes support for managing
|
||||
DNSSEC zone data may wish to take into account these potential
|
||||
management scenarios.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Author's Address
|
||||
|
||||
Wes Hardaker
|
||||
Sparta, Inc.
|
||||
P.O. Box 382
|
||||
Davis, CA 95617
|
||||
US
|
||||
|
||||
Phone: +1 530 792 1913
|
||||
Email: ietf@hardakers.net
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Hardaker Expires August 16, 2009 [Page 17]
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user