This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create tag 'v9_7_0b1'.

This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'rt20406'.
This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'rt20284'.
2009-10-19 23:42:55 +00:00 · 2009-10-19 23:42:53 +00:00 · 2009-10-14 12:49:12 +00:00 · 2009-10-14 03:54:24 +00:00 · 2009-10-13 23:48:13 +00:00 · 2009-10-09 06:09:22 +00:00
20 changed files with 817 additions and 2881 deletions
--- a/2
+++ b/2
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ to perform based on the flag bits.
 	0x20 NONSEC

 If you wish to go straight to a secure zone using NSEC3 you should
-also add a NSEC3PARAM record to the update request with the flags
+also add a NSECPARAM record to the update request with the flags
 field set to indicate whether the NSEC3 chain will have the OPTOUT
 bit set or not.

--- a/README.pkcs11
+++ b/README.pkcs11
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ and other cryptographic support devices.

 BIND 9 is known to work with two HSMs:  The Sun SCA 6000 cryptographic
 acceration board, tested under Solaris x86, and the AEP Keyper
-network-attached key storage device, tested with Debian Linux,
+network-attached key storage device, tested with a Debian Linux system,
 Solaris x86 and Windows Server 2003.

 PREREQUISITES
@@ -203,9 +203,8 @@ for use by PKCS #11 provider library.  If the machine file is in
    export KEYPER_LIBRARY_PATH=/opt/Keyper/PKCS11Provider

 These environment variables must be set whenever running any tool
-that uses the HSM, including pkcs11-keygen, pkcs11-list, pkcs11-destroy,
-dnssec-keyfromlabel, dnssec-signzone, dnssec-keygen (which will use
-the HSM for random number generation), and named.
+which uses the HSM, including pkcs11-keygen, pkcs11-list, pkcs11-destroy,
+dnssec-keyfromlabel, dnssec-signzone, and named.

 We can now create and use keys in the HSM.  In this case, we will
 create a 2048 bit key and give it the label "sample-ksk":
@@ -300,10 +299,6 @@ Sample openssl.cnf:
        [ pkcs11_section ]
        PIN = <PLACE PIN HERE>

-This will also allow the dnssec-* tools to access the HSM without
-PIN entry.  (The pkcs11-* tools access the HSM directly, not via
-OpenSSL, so a PIN will still be required to use them.)
-
 PLEASE NOTE:  Placing the HSM's PIN in a text file in this manner
 may reduce the security advantage of using an HSM.  Be sure this
 is what you want to do before configuring BIND 9 in this way.
--- a/bin/dnssec/dnssec-keyfromlabel.8
+++ b/bin/dnssec/dnssec-keyfromlabel.8
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
 .\" OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR
 .\" PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 .\"
-.\" $Id: dnssec-keyfromlabel.8,v 1.14 2009/10/17 01:14:35 tbox Exp $
+.\" $Id: dnssec-keyfromlabel.8,v 1.13 2009/10/07 01:14:42 tbox Exp $
 .\"
 .hy 0
 .ad l
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ Sets the date on which a key is to be published to the zone. After that date, th
 .PP
 \-A \fIdate/offset\fR
 .RS 4
-Sets the date on which the key is to be activated. After that date, the key will be included in the zone and used to sign it. If not set, and if the \-G option has not been used, the default is "now".
+Sets the date on which the key is to be activated. After that date, the key will be included and the zone and used to sign it. If not set, and if the \-G option has not been used, the default is "now".
 .RE
 .PP
 \-R \fIdate/offset\fR
--- a/bin/dnssec/dnssec-keyfromlabel.docbook
+++ b/bin/dnssec/dnssec-keyfromlabel.docbook
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
 - PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 -->

-<!-- $Id: dnssec-keyfromlabel.docbook,v 1.13 2009/10/16 15:37:01 jreed Exp $ -->
+<!-- $Id: dnssec-keyfromlabel.docbook,v 1.12 2009/10/06 22:58:45 each Exp $ -->
 <refentry id="man.dnssec-keyfromlabel">
  <refentryinfo>
    <date>February 8, 2008</date>
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@
        <listitem>
          <para>
            Sets the date on which the key is to be activated.  After that
-            date, the key will be included in the zone and used to sign
+            date, the key will be included and the zone and used to sign
            it.  If not set, and if the -G option has not been used, the
            default is "now".
          </para>
--- a/bin/dnssec/dnssec-keyfromlabel.html
+++ b/bin/dnssec/dnssec-keyfromlabel.html
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 - OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR
 - PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 -->
-<!-- $Id: dnssec-keyfromlabel.html,v 1.13 2009/10/17 01:14:35 tbox Exp $ -->
+<!-- $Id: dnssec-keyfromlabel.html,v 1.12 2009/10/07 01:14:42 tbox Exp $ -->
 <html>
 <head>
 <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1">
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@
 <dt><span class="term">-A <em class="replaceable"><code>date/offset</code></em></span></dt>
 <dd><p>
            Sets the date on which the key is to be activated.  After that
-            date, the key will be included in the zone and used to sign
+            date, the key will be included and the zone and used to sign
            it.  If not set, and if the -G option has not been used, the
            default is "now".
          </p></dd>
--- a/bin/dnssec/dnssec-keygen.8
+++ b/bin/dnssec/dnssec-keygen.8
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 .\" OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR
 .\" PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 .\"
-.\" $Id: dnssec-keygen.8,v 1.50 2009/10/17 01:14:35 tbox Exp $
+.\" $Id: dnssec-keygen.8,v 1.49 2009/10/06 01:14:41 tbox Exp $
 .\"
 .hy 0
 .ad l
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ Sets the date on which a key is to be published to the zone. After that date, th
 .PP
 \-A \fIdate/offset\fR
 .RS 4
-Sets the date on which the key is to be activated. After that date, the key will be included in the zone and used to sign it. If not set, and if the \-G option has not been used, the default is "now".
+Sets the date on which the key is to be activated. After that date, the key will be included and the zone and used to sign it. If not set, and if the \-G option has not been used, the default is "now".
 .RE
 .PP
 \-R \fIdate/offset\fR
--- a/bin/dnssec/dnssec-keygen.docbook
+++ b/bin/dnssec/dnssec-keygen.docbook
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
 - PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 -->

-<!-- $Id: dnssec-keygen.docbook,v 1.30 2009/10/16 15:37:01 jreed Exp $ -->
+<!-- $Id: dnssec-keygen.docbook,v 1.29 2009/10/05 17:30:49 fdupont Exp $ -->
 <refentry id="man.dnssec-keygen">
  <refentryinfo>
    <date>June 30, 2000</date>
@@ -400,7 +400,7 @@
        <listitem>
          <para>
            Sets the date on which the key is to be activated.  After that
-            date, the key will be included in the zone and used to sign
+            date, the key will be included and the zone and used to sign
            it.  If not set, and if the -G option has not been used, the
            default is "now".
          </para>
--- a/bin/dnssec/dnssec-keygen.html
+++ b/bin/dnssec/dnssec-keygen.html
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 - OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR
 - PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 -->
-<!-- $Id: dnssec-keygen.html,v 1.42 2009/10/17 01:14:35 tbox Exp $ -->
+<!-- $Id: dnssec-keygen.html,v 1.41 2009/10/06 01:14:41 tbox Exp $ -->
 <html>
 <head>
 <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1">
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@
 <dt><span class="term">-A <em class="replaceable"><code>date/offset</code></em></span></dt>
 <dd><p>
            Sets the date on which the key is to be activated.  After that
-            date, the key will be included in the zone and used to sign
+            date, the key will be included and the zone and used to sign
            it.  If not set, and if the -G option has not been used, the
            default is "now".
          </p></dd>
--- a/bin/dnssec/dnssec-settime.8
+++ b/bin/dnssec/dnssec-settime.8
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
 .\" OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR
 .\" PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 .\"
-.\" $Id: dnssec-settime.8,v 1.8 2009/10/17 01:14:35 tbox Exp $
+.\" $Id: dnssec-settime.8,v 1.7 2009/10/06 01:14:41 tbox Exp $
 .\"
 .hy 0
 .ad l
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ Sets the date on which a key is to be published to the zone. After that date, th
 .PP
 \-A \fIdate/offset\fR
 .RS 4
-Sets the date on which the key is to be activated. After that date, the key will be included in the zone and used to sign it.
+Sets the date on which the key is to be activated. After that date, the key will be included and the zone and used to sign it.
 .RE
 .PP
 \-R \fIdate/offset\fR
--- a/bin/dnssec/dnssec-settime.docbook
+++ b/bin/dnssec/dnssec-settime.docbook
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
 - PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 -->

-<!-- $Id: dnssec-settime.docbook,v 1.6 2009/10/16 15:37:01 jreed Exp $ -->
+<!-- $Id: dnssec-settime.docbook,v 1.5 2009/10/05 17:30:49 fdupont Exp $ -->
 <refentry id="man.dnssec-settime">
  <refentryinfo>
    <date>July 15, 2009</date>
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@
        <listitem>
          <para>
            Sets the date on which the key is to be activated.  After that
-            date, the key will be included in the zone and used to sign
+            date, the key will be included and the zone and used to sign
            it.
          </para>
        </listitem>
--- a/bin/dnssec/dnssec-settime.html
+++ b/bin/dnssec/dnssec-settime.html
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 - PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 -->

-<!-- $Id: dnssec-settime.html,v 1.8 2009/10/17 01:14:35 tbox Exp $ -->
+<!-- $Id: dnssec-settime.html,v 1.7 2009/10/06 01:14:41 tbox Exp $ -->
 <html>
 <head>
 <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1">
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@
 <dt><span class="term">-A <em class="replaceable"><code>date/offset</code></em></span></dt>
 <dd><p>
            Sets the date on which the key is to be activated.  After that
-            date, the key will be included in the zone and used to sign
+            date, the key will be included and the zone and used to sign
            it.
          </p></dd>
 <dt><span class="term">-R <em class="replaceable"><code>date/offset</code></em></span></dt>
--- a/doc/arm/Bv9ARM.pdf
+++ b/doc/arm/Bv9ARM.pdf
--- a/doc/arm/man.dnssec-keyfromlabel.html
+++ b/doc/arm/man.dnssec-keyfromlabel.html
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 - OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR
 - PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 -->
-<!-- $Id: man.dnssec-keyfromlabel.html,v 1.72 2009/10/17 01:14:35 tbox Exp $ -->
+<!-- $Id: man.dnssec-keyfromlabel.html,v 1.71 2009/10/16 04:20:32 tbox Exp $ -->
 <html>
 <head>
 <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1">
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@
 <dt><span class="term">-A <em class="replaceable"><code>date/offset</code></em></span></dt>
 <dd><p>
            Sets the date on which the key is to be activated.  After that
-            date, the key will be included in the zone and used to sign
+            date, the key will be included and the zone and used to sign
            it.  If not set, and if the -G option has not been used, the
            default is "now".
          </p></dd>
--- a/doc/arm/man.dnssec-keygen.html
+++ b/doc/arm/man.dnssec-keygen.html
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 - OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR
 - PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 -->
-<!-- $Id: man.dnssec-keygen.html,v 1.140 2009/10/17 01:14:35 tbox Exp $ -->
+<!-- $Id: man.dnssec-keygen.html,v 1.139 2009/10/16 04:20:32 tbox Exp $ -->
 <html>
 <head>
 <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1">
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@
 <dt><span class="term">-A <em class="replaceable"><code>date/offset</code></em></span></dt>
 <dd><p>
            Sets the date on which the key is to be activated.  After that
-            date, the key will be included in the zone and used to sign
+            date, the key will be included and the zone and used to sign
            it.  If not set, and if the -G option has not been used, the
            default is "now".
          </p></dd>
--- a/doc/arm/man.dnssec-settime.html
+++ b/doc/arm/man.dnssec-settime.html
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 - OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR
 - PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 -->
-<!-- $Id: man.dnssec-settime.html,v 1.18 2009/10/17 01:14:35 tbox Exp $ -->
+<!-- $Id: man.dnssec-settime.html,v 1.17 2009/10/16 04:20:32 tbox Exp $ -->
 <html>
 <head>
 <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1">
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@
 <dt><span class="term">-A <em class="replaceable"><code>date/offset</code></em></span></dt>
 <dd><p>
            Sets the date on which the key is to be activated.  After that
-            date, the key will be included in the zone and used to sign
+            date, the key will be included and the zone and used to sign
            it.
          </p></dd>
 <dt><span class="term">-R <em class="replaceable"><code>date/offset</code></em></span></dt>
--- a/doc/draft/draft-ietf-behave-dns64-01.txt
+++ b/doc/draft/draft-ietf-behave-dns64-01.txt
--- a/doc/draft/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-gost-01.txt
+++ b/doc/draft/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-gost-01.txt
@@ -1,435 +0,0 @@
-DNS Extensions working group                             V.Dolmatov, Ed.  
-Internet-Draft                                            Cryptocom Ltd.    
-Intended status: Standards Track                        October 18, 2009
-Expires: April 18, 2010                                 
-
-
- Use of GOST signature algorithms in DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource Records
-                               for DNSSEC
-                 draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-gost-01
-
-Status of this Memo
-
-   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
-   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
-
-   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
-   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
-   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
-   Drafts.
-
-   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
-   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
-   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
-   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
-
-   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
-   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
-
-   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
-   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
-
-   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 18 2010.
-
-Copyright Notice
-
-   Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
-   document authors.  All rights reserved.
-
-   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
-   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of
-   publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
-   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
-   and restrictions with respect to this document.
-
-Abstract
-
-   This document describes how to produce GOST signature and hash 
-   algorithms    DNSKEY and RRSIG resource records for use in the Domain
-   Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC, RFC 4033, RFC 4034, 
-   and RFC 4035).
-
-V.Dolmatov              Expires April 18, 2010               [Page 1]
-
-Table of Contents
-
-   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
-   2.  DNSKEY Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
-     2.1.  Using a public key with existing cryptographic libraries. . 3
-     2.2.  GOST DNSKEY RR Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
-   3.  RRSIG Resource Records  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
-     3.1 RRSIG RR Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
-   4.  DS Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
-     4.1 DS RR Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
-   5.  Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
-     5.1.  Key Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
-     5.2.  Signature Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
-     5.3.  Digest Sizes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
-   6.  Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
-     6.1.  Support for GOST signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
-     6.2.  Support for NSEC3 Denial of Existence . . . . . . . . . . . 5
-     6.3.  Byte order  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
-   7. Security consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
-   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
-   9.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
-   10.  References   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
-     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
-     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
-   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
-
-1.  Introduction
-
-   The Domain Name System (DNS) is the global hierarchical distributed
-   database for Internet Naming.  The DNS has been extended to use
-   cryptographic keys and digital signatures for the verification of the
-   authenticity and integrity of its data.  RFC 4033 [RFC4033], RFC 4034
-   [RFC4034], and RFC 4035 [RFC4035] describe these DNS Security
-   Extensions, called DNSSEC.
-
-   RFC 4034 describes how to store DNSKEY and RRSIG resource records,
-   and specifies a list of cryptographic algorithms to use.  This
-   document extends that list with the signature and hash algorithms 
-   GOST [GOST3410, GOST3411],
-   and specifies how to store DNSKEY data and how to produce
-   RRSIG resource records with these hash algorithms.
-
-   Familiarity with DNSSEC  and GOST signature and hash
-   algorithms is assumed in this document.
-
-   The term "GOST" is not officially defined, but is usually used to
-   refer to the collection of the Russian cryptographic algorithms
-   GOST R 34.10-2001, GOST R 34.11-94, GOST 28147-89. 
-   Since GOST 28147-89 is not used in DNSSEC, "GOST" will only refer to
-   the GOST R 34.10-2001 and GOST R 34.11-94 in this document.
-
-   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
-   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
-   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
-
-V.Dolmatov              Expires April 18, 2010                [Page 2]
-
-2.  DNSKEY Resource Records
-
-   The format of the DNSKEY RR can be found in RFC 4034 [RFC4034].
-
-   GOST R 34.10-2001 public keys are stored with the algorithm number 
-   {TBA1}.
-      
-   The wire format of the public key is compatible with 
-   RFC 4491 [RFC4491]:
-
-   According to [GOSTR341001], a public key is a point on the elliptic
-   curve Q = (x,y).
-
-   The wire representation of a public key MUST contain 66 octets, 
-   where the first octet designates public key parameters, the second
-   octet designates digest parameters next 32 octets contain the 
-   little-endian representation of x and the second 32 octets contain
-   the little-endian representation of y. 
-   This corresponds to the binary representation of (<y>256||<x>256) 
-   from [GOSTR341001], ch.  5.3.
-
-   The only valid value for both parameters octets is 0.
-   Other parameters octets values are reserved for future use.
-   
-   Corresponding public key parameters are those identified by
-   id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet (1.2.643.2.2.35.1) [RFC4357],
-   and the digest parameters are those identified by
-   id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet (1.2.643.2.2.30.1) [RFC4357].
-
-2.1.  Using a public key with existing cryptographic libraries
-
-   Existing GOST-aware cryptographic libraries at the time of this 
-   document writing are capable to read GOST public keys via a generic
-   X509 API if the key is encoded according to RFC 4491 [RFC4491],
-   section 2.3.2.
-
-   To make this encoding from the wire format of a GOST public key 
-   with the parameters used in this document, prepend last 64 octets
-   of key data (in other words, substitute first two parameter octets)
-   with the following 37-byte sequence:
-
-   0x30 0x63 0x30 0x1c 0x06 0x06 0x2a 0x85 0x03 0x02 0x02 0x13 0x30 
-   0x12 0x06 0x07 0x2a 0x85 0x03 0x02 0x02 0x23 0x01 0x06 0x07 0x2a
-   0x85 0x03 0x02 0x02 0x1e 0x01 0x03 0x43 0x00 0x04 0x40
-  
-2.2.  GOST DNSKEY RR Example
-
-   Given a private key with the following value:
-
-   Private-key-format: v1.2
-   Algorithm: {TBA1} (GOST)
-   GostAsn1: MEUCAQAwHAYGKoUDAgITMBIGByqFAwICIwEGByqFAwICHgEE
-             IgQgAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
-
-   (corresponding to private key value 1)
-
-V.Dolmatov              Expires April 18, 2010                [Page 3]
-
-   The following DNSKEY RR stores a DNS zone key for example.net
- 
-  example.net. 86400 IN DNSKEY 256 3 {TBA1} ( AAABAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
-                                              AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABQe
-                                              n56cyawiseMj3y1PKTV2Kz9F
-                                              WlDfJ9qcmOBx5JGN )
-
-3.  RRSIG Resource Records
-
-   The value of the signature field in the RRSIG RR follows RFC 4490
-   [RFC4490] and is calculated as follows.  The values for the RDATA 
-   fields that precede the signature data are specified 
-   in RFC 4034 [RFC4034].
-
-   hash = GOSTR3411(data)
-
-   where "data" is the wire format data of the resource record set 
-   that is signed, as specified in RFC 4034 [RFC4034].
-   
-   Hash MUST be calculated with GOST R 34.11-94 parameters identified
-   by id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet [RFC4357].
-
-   Signature is calculated from the hash according to the 
-   GOST R 34.10-2001 standard and its wire format is compatible with 
-   RFC 4490 [RFC4490].
-
-   Quoting RFC 4490:
-
-   "The signature algorithm GOST R 34.10-2001 generates a digital
-   signature in the form of two 256-bit numbers, r and s.  Its octet
-   string representation consists of 64 octets, where the first 32
-   octets contain the big-endian representation of s and the second 32
-   octets contain the big-endian representation of r."
-
-3.1. RRSIG RR Example
-
-   With the private key from section 2.2 sign the following RRSet, 
-   consisting of one A record:
-
-   www.example.net. 3600 IN A 192.0.32.10
-
-   Setting the inception date to 2000-01-01 00:00:00 UTC and the 
-   expiration date to 2030-01-01 00:00:00 UTC, the following signature
-   should be created (assuming {TBA1}==249 until proped code is 
-   assigned by IANA)
-
-   www.example.net. 3600 IN RRSIG ( A {TBA1} 3 3600
-                    20300101000000 20000101000000 9033 example.net.
-                    96ObOt5gR6Xln8g42w70OZvi6BZoQvLIhrN9F+VBc29mp+ap
-                    DQov1re0hApGenYDd2zLaHecw4H2vnPj0NhhxA== )
-
-4.  DS Resource Records
-
-   GOST R 34.11-94 digest algorithm is denoted in DS RRs by the digest
-   type {TBA2}.  The wire format of a digest value is compatible with 
-   RFC 4490 [RFC4490]. 
-
-V.Dolmatov              Expires April 18, 2010                [Page 4]
-
-   Quoting RFC 4490: 
-   
-   "A 32-byte digest in little-endian representation."
-
-   The digest MUST always be calculated with GOST R 34.11-94 parameters
-   identified by id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet [RFC4357].
-
-4.1. DS RR Example
-
-   example.net. 3600 IN DS 9033 {TBA1} {TBA2} ( Su0ToNow7Lwex+wqac+cTQ
-                                                djJ733qubhan+KqUrselc= )
- 
-5.  Deployment Considerations
-
-5.1.  Key Sizes
-
-   According to RFC4357 [RFC4357], the key size of GOST public keys
-   MUST be 512 bits.
-
-5.2.  Signature Sizes
-
-   According to the GOST signature algorithm specification [GOST3410],
-   the size of a GOST signature is 512 bits.
-
-5.3.  Digest Sizes
-
-   According to the GOST R 34.11-94 [GOST3411], the size of a GOST digest
-   is 256 bits.
-
-6.  Implementation Considerations
-
-6.1.  Support for GOST signatures
-
-   DNSSEC aware implementations SHOULD be able to support RRSIG and
-   DNSKEY resource records created with the GOST algorithms as
-   defined in this document.
-
-6.2.  Support for NSEC3 Denial of Existence
-
-    Any DNSSEC-GOST implementation is required to have either NSEC or
-    NSEC3 support.
-
-6.3  Byte order
-
-    Due to the fact that all existing industry implementations of GOST
-    cryptographic libraries are returning GOST blobs in little-endian 
-    format and in order to avoid the necessity for DNSSEC developers 
-    to hanlde different cryptographic algorithms differently, it was
-    chosen to send these blobs on the wire "as is" without 
-    transformation of endianness.
-
-7.  Security considerations
-
-    Currently, the cryptographic resistance of the GOST 34.10-2001 
-    digital signature algorithm is estimated as 2**128 operations
-    of multiple elliptic curve point computations on prime modulus
-    2**256.
-
-V.Dolmatov              Expires April 18, 2010                [Page 5]
-
-    Currently, the cryptographic resistance of GOST 34.11-94 hash
-    algorithm is estimated as 2**128 operations of computations of a
-    step hash function. (There is known method to reduce this 
-    estimate to 2**105 operations, but it demands padding the 
-    colliding message with 1024 random bit blocks each of 256 bit
-    length, thus it cannot be used in any practical implementation).
-
-8.  IANA Considerations
-
-   This document updates the IANA registry "DNS SECURITY ALGORITHM
-   NUMBERS -- per [RFC4035] "
-   (http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers).  The 
-   following entries are added to the registry:
-                                        Zone     Trans.
-   Value   Algorithm          Mnemonic  Signing  Sec.   References   Status
-   {TBA1}  GOST R 34.10-2001  GOST      Y        *      (this memo)  OPTIONAL
-
-   This document updates the RFC 4034 [RFC4034] Digest Types assignment
-   (RFC 4034, section A.2):
-
-   Value   Algorithm        Status
-   {TBA2}  GOST R 34.11-94  OPTIONAL
-
-9. Acknowledgments
-
-   This document is a minor extension to RFC 4034 [RFC4034].  Also, we
-   tried to follow the documents RFC 3110 [RFC3110], RFC 4509 [RFC4509],
-   and RFC 4357 [RFC4357] for consistency. The authors of and 
-   contributors to these documents are gratefully acknowledged for 
-   their hard work.
-
-   The following people provided additional feedback and text: Dmitry 
-   Burkov, Jaap Akkerhuis, Olafur Gundmundsson,Jelte Jansen 
-   and Wouter Wijngaards.
-
-
-10.  References
-
-10.1.  Normative References
-
-   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
-              Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997.
-
-   [RFC3110]  Eastlake D., "RSA/SHA-1 SIGs and RSA KEYs in the Domain
-              Name System (DNS)", RFC 3110, May 2001.
-
-   [RFC4033]  Arends R., Austein R., Larson M., Massey D., and S.
-              Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
-              RFC 4033, March 2005.
-
-   [RFC4034]  Arends R., Austein R., Larson M., Massey D., and S.
-              Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
-              RFC 4034, March 2005.
-
-V.Dolmatov              Expires April 18, 2010                [Page 6]
-
-   [RFC4035]  Arends R., Austein R., Larson M., Massey D., and S.
-              Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
-              Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.
-
-   [GOST3410] "Information technology.  Cryptographic data security.
-              Signature and verification processes of [electronic]
-              digital signature.", GOST R 34.10-2001, Gosudarstvennyi
-              Standard of Russian Federation, Government Committee of
-              the Russia for Standards, 2001.  (In Russian)
-
-   [GOST3411] "Information technology.  Cryptographic Data Security.
-              Hashing function.", GOST R 34.11-94, Gosudarstvennyi
-              Standard of Russian Federation, Government Committee of
-              the Russia for Standards, 1994.  (In Russian)
-
-   [RFC4357] Popov V., Kurepkin I., and S. Leontiev, "Additional
-             Cryptographic Algorithms for Use with GOST 28147-89,
-             GOST R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94
-             Algorithms", RFC 4357, January 2006.
-
-   [RFC4490] S. Leontiev and G. Chudov, "Using the GOST 28147-89, 
-	     GOST R 34.11-94, GOST R 34.10-94, and GOST R 34.10-2001 
-             Algorithms with Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
-             RFC 4490, May 2006.
-
-   [RFC4491] S. Leontiev and D. Shefanovski, "Using the GOST 
-             R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94 
-             Algorithms with the Internet X.509 Public Key 
-             Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile", RFC 4491,
-             May 2006. 
-
-
-
-10.2.  Informative References
-
-   [NIST800-57]
-              Barker E., Barker W., Burr W., Polk W., and M. Smid,
-              "Recommendations for Key Management", NIST SP 800-57,
-              March 2007.
-
-   [RFC3447]  Jonsson J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
-              Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
-              Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003.
-
-   [RFC4509]  Hardaker W., "Use of SHA-256 in DNSSEC Delegation Signer
-              (DS) Resource Records (RRs)", RFC 4509, May 2006.
-
-   [RFC5155]  Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS
-              Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of
-              Existence", RFC 5155, March 2008.
-
-   [DRAFT1]   Dolmatov V., Kabelev D., Ustinov I., Vyshensky S.,
-              "GOST R 34.10-2001 digital signature algorithm"
-              draft-dolmatov-cryptocom-gost3410-2001-05,
-              work in progress
-V.Dolmatov              Expires April 18, 2010               [Page 7]
-
-   [DRAFT2]   Dolmatov V., Kabelev D., Ustinov I., Vyshensky S.,
-              "GOST R 34.11-94 Hash function algorithm"
-              draft-dolmatov-cryptocom-gost341194-03, work in progress
-
-   [DRAFT3]   Dolmatov V., Kabelev D., Ustinov I., Emelyanova I.,
-              "GOST 28147-89 encryption, decryption and MAC algorithms"
-              draft-dolmatov-cryptocom-gost2814789-03, work in progress
-
-Authors' Addresses
-
-
-Vasily Dolmatov, Ed.
-Cryptocom Ltd.
-Bolotnikovskaya, 23
-Moscow, 117303, Russian Federation
-
-EMail: dol@cryptocom.ru
-
-Artem Chuprina
-Cryptocom Ltd.
-Bolotnikovskaya, 23
-Moscow, 117303, Russian Federation
-
-EMail: ran@cryptocom.ru
-
-Igor Ustinov
-Cryptocom Ltd.
-Bolotnikovskaya, 23
-Moscow, 117303, Russian Federation
-
-EMail: igus@cryptocom.ru
-
-V.Dolmatov              Expires April 18, 2010                [Page 8]
-
-
--- a/doc/private/branches
+++ b/doc/private/branches
@@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ custom_WFB_v9_5_0_P1		private	marka	// 2008-07-15 00:05 +0000
 custom_WFB_v9_5_0_P2		new	each	// 2008-08-05 21:06 +0000
 custom_WFB_v9_5_0_P2_1_servfail	new	jinmei	// 2008-12-08 22:38 +0000
 custom_WFB_v9_6_0_P1		new	marka	// 2009-02-05 07:00 +0000
-custom_YAHOO_v9_7_0b1		new	ebersman	// 2009-10-16 00:16 +0000
 gsstsig4			open	sra	// head + gsstsig as of 12 may 2006
 gsstsig4_win32			open	danny	// sub-branch off gsstsig4 for windows development
 jinmei-mmapzone-test		open		// mmap based zone file. very experimental, just for reference purposes
--- a/lib/dns/dnssec.c
+++ b/lib/dns/dnssec.c
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 */

 /*
- * $Id: dnssec.c,v 1.106 2009/10/16 23:47:54 tbox Exp $
+ * $Id: dnssec.c,v 1.105 2009/10/16 02:59:41 each Exp $
 */

 /*! \file */
@@ -1284,9 +1284,9 @@ dns_dnssec_keylistfromrdataset(dns_name_t *origin,

 		addkey(keylist, &privkey, savekeys, mctx);
 again:
-		if (pubkey != NULL)
+ 		if (pubkey != NULL)
 			dst_key_free(&pubkey);
-		if (privkey != NULL)
+ 		if (privkey != NULL)
 			dst_key_free(&privkey);
 	}
 	if (result == ISC_R_NOMORE)
--- a/lib/isc/include/isc/entropy.h
+++ b/lib/isc/include/isc/entropy.h
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 * PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 */

-/* $Id: entropy.h,v 1.35 2009/10/19 02:37:08 marka Exp $ */
+/* $Id: entropy.h,v 1.34 2009/01/17 23:47:43 tbox Exp $ */

 #ifndef ISC_ENTROPY_H
 #define ISC_ENTROPY_H 1
@@ -182,8 +182,8 @@ isc_result_t
 isc_entropy_createsamplesource(isc_entropy_t *ent,
 			       isc_entropysource_t **sourcep);
 /*!<
- * \brief Create an entropy source that consists of samples.  Each sample is
- * added to the source via isc_entropy_addsamples(), below.
+ * \brief Create an entropy source that consists of samples.  Each sample is added
+ * to the source via isc_entropy_addsamples(), below.
 */

 isc_result_t
@@ -254,11 +254,11 @@ void
 isc_entropy_putdata(isc_entropy_t *ent, void *data, unsigned int length,
 		    isc_uint32_t entropy);
 /*!<
- * \brief Add "length" bytes in "data" to the entropy pool, incrementing the
- * pool's entropy count by "entropy."
+ * \brief Add "length" bytes in "data" to the entropy pool, incrementing the pool's
+ * entropy count by "entropy."
 *
- * These bytes will prime the pseudorandom portion even if no entropy is
- * actually added.
+ * These bytes will prime the pseudorandom portion even no entropy is actually
+ * added.
 */

 void
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
cvs2git	97745aa14d	This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create tag 'v9_7_0b1'.	2009-10-19 23:42:55 +00:00
cvs2git	cecc0246f9	This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'rt20406'.	2009-10-19 23:42:53 +00:00
cvs2git	c3d7f20265	This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'rt20284'.	2009-10-14 12:49:12 +00:00
cvs2git	3034ba971f	This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'rt20405'.	2009-10-14 03:54:24 +00:00
cvs2git	c54a23d204	This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'rt20399'.	2009-10-13 23:48:13 +00:00
cvs2git	f0866cfca0	This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'rt20340'.	2009-10-09 06:09:22 +00:00
cvs2git	9f9396b043	This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'rt20310a'.	2009-10-09 01:14:48 +00:00
cvs2git	fd89818a63	This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'rt20372'.	2009-10-06 22:14:14 +00:00
cvs2git	2153419e82	This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'rt20369'.	2009-10-06 04:40:15 +00:00
cvs2git	e392974d41	This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'rt20230a'.	2009-10-04 01:14:59 +00:00
cvs2git	a24d225645	This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'rt20256b'.	2009-09-29 15:08:13 +00:00
cvs2git	d5bcdef435	This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'rt20256'.	2009-09-26 01:14:52 +00:00
cvs2git	bb7ce60ac3	This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'rt19943a'.	2009-09-25 06:47:51 +00:00
cvs2git	5cfd283e57	This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'rt19943a'.	2009-09-25 05:48:18 +00:00
cvs2git	7586313fec	This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'rt19943a'.	2009-09-25 02:44:07 +00:00
cvs2git	ed5b68f42d	This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'rt19943a'.	2009-09-25 01:42:10 +00:00
cvs2git	2d808fdf25	This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'rt19943a'.	2009-09-25 01:07:37 +00:00
cvs2git	5d678e0266	This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'rt19943a'.	2009-09-24 23:48:14 +00:00
cvs2git	8b3ab790da	This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'rt19943a'.	2009-09-24 23:30:35 +00:00
cvs2git	a975773cab	This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'rt19943a'.	2009-09-24 23:18:22 +00:00
cvs2git	b7dc5f846e	This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'rt19943a'.	2009-09-24 14:39:18 +00:00
cvs2git	02ad31fde8	This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'rt19943a'.	2009-09-24 13:03:40 +00:00
cvs2git	416e525932	This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'rt19943a'.	2009-09-23 22:15:25 +00:00
cvs2git	3181370b8e	This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'rt20191'.	2009-09-19 23:18:27 +00:00
cvs2git	be9d9c6be7	This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'rt20230'.	2009-09-19 21:47:14 +00:00
cvs2git	8c7be412e7	This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'rt20257'.	2009-09-18 13:14:48 +00:00
cvs2git	ed3dce02e6	This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'rt20225'.	2009-09-18 11:07:05 +00:00
cvs2git	8d5044250a	This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'rt19943'.	2009-09-15 03:13:45 +00:00
cvs2git	c3faaf1e92	This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'rt19234a'.	2009-09-10 23:48:02 +00:00
cvs2git	d3a73fa95a	This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'rt20247'.	2009-09-10 23:48:01 +00:00
cvs2git	c753388888	This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'rt19294'.	2009-09-04 03:58:58 +00:00