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13 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Mark Andrews
201f5fd82e 2522. [security] Handle -1 from DSA_do_verify(). 2008-12-24 00:20:59 +00:00
Mark Andrews
1553b2e323 9.5.1 2008-12-21 23:47:31 +00:00
Tatuya JINMEI 神明達哉
636f45365f exlain the reason for change #2520:
2520.	[bug]		Update xml statistics version number to 2.0 as change
			#2388 made the schema incompatible to the previous
			version. [RT #19080]
2008-12-19 23:00:43 +00:00
Tatuya JINMEI 神明達哉
1477f628c3 clarification for change #2411 (RT #18783)
Note: with changes #2469 and #2421 above, there is no
			need to tweak ISC_SOCKET_MAXSOCKETS at compilation time
			any more.
2008-12-18 23:51:06 +00:00
Mark Andrews
709007012a 2520. [bug] Update xml statistics version number to 2.0.
[RT #19080]
2008-12-18 02:39:12 +00:00
Automatic Updater
063ffec985 newcopyrights 2008-12-13 23:30:45 +00:00
Mark Andrews
adc62dbc06 2513 [bug] Fix windows cli build. [RT #19062] 2008-12-13 00:27:52 +00:00
Mark Andrews
f70ca045de 9.5.1rc2 2008-12-11 02:04:58 +00:00
Automatic Updater
56cafef3ab update copyright notice 2008-12-11 00:05:30 +00:00
Mark Andrews
44199f64a7 2510. [bug] "dig +sigchase" could trigger REQUIRE failures.
[RT #19033]
2008-12-10 23:25:06 +00:00
Mark Andrews
9cb865d512 2509. [bug] Specifying a fixed query source port was broken.
[RT #19051]
2008-12-10 22:02:48 +00:00
Mark Andrews
52de6eafac 2504. [bug] Address race condition in the socket code. [RT #18899] 2008-12-03 02:33:23 +00:00
cvs2git
5a60f7218a This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'v9_5_1_patch'. 2008-11-20 00:06:03 +00:00
17 changed files with 122 additions and 1216 deletions

25
CHANGES
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@@ -1,3 +1,24 @@
--- 9.5.1-P1 released ---
2522. [security] Handle -1 from DSA_do_verify().
--- 9.5.1 released ---
2520. [bug] Update xml statistics version number to 2.0 as change
#2388 made the schema incompatible to the previous
version. [RT #19080]
--- 9.5.1rc2 released ---
2513 [bug] Fix windows cli build. [RT #19062]
2510. [bug] "dig +sigchase" could trigger REQUIRE failures.
[RT #19033]
2509. [bug] Specifying a fixed query source port was broken.
[RT #19051]
2504. [bug] Address race condition in the socket code. [RT #18899]
--- 9.5.1rc1 released ---
@@ -238,6 +259,10 @@
for select(). To enable this, set ISC_SOCKET_MAXSOCKETS
at compilation time. [RT #18433]
Note: with changes #2469 and #2421 above, there is no
need to tweak ISC_SOCKET_MAXSOCKETS at compilation time
any more.
2410. [bug] Correctly delete m_versionInfo. [RT #18432]
2409. [bug] Only log that we disabled EDNS processing if we were

3
README
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@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ BIND 9
Nominum, Inc.
BIND 9.5.1
BIND 9.5.1 is a maintence release for BIND 9.5.
BIND 9.5.0
BIND 9.5.0 has a number of new features over 9.4,

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@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
* PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/* $Id: dighost.c,v 1.304.12.7 2008/07/23 23:31:17 marka Exp $ */
/* $Id: dighost.c,v 1.304.12.7.6.1 2008/12/10 23:25:06 marka Exp $ */
/*! \file
* \note
@@ -3616,7 +3616,7 @@ dns_rdataset_t *
search_type(dns_name_t *name, dns_rdatatype_t type, dns_rdatatype_t covers) {
dns_rdataset_t *rdataset;
dns_rdata_sig_t siginfo;
dns_rdata_t sigrdata;
dns_rdata_t sigrdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT;
isc_result_t result;
for (rdataset = ISC_LIST_HEAD(name->list); rdataset != NULL;
@@ -3626,7 +3626,6 @@ search_type(dns_name_t *name, dns_rdatatype_t type, dns_rdatatype_t covers) {
return (rdataset);
} else if ((type == dns_rdatatype_rrsig) &&
(rdataset->type == dns_rdatatype_rrsig)) {
dns_rdata_init(&sigrdata);
result = dns_rdataset_first(rdataset);
check_result(result, "empty rdataset");
dns_rdataset_current(rdataset, &sigrdata);
@@ -4149,7 +4148,7 @@ isc_result_t
grandfather_pb_test(dns_name_t *zone_name, dns_rdataset_t *sigrdataset)
{
isc_result_t result;
dns_rdata_t sigrdata;
dns_rdata_t sigrdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT;
dns_rdata_sig_t siginfo;
result = dns_rdataset_first(sigrdataset);
@@ -4169,6 +4168,7 @@ grandfather_pb_test(dns_name_t *zone_name, dns_rdataset_t *sigrdataset)
}
dns_rdata_freestruct(&siginfo);
dns_rdata_reset(&sigrdata);
} while (dns_rdataset_next(chase_sigkeyrdataset) == ISC_R_SUCCESS);
@@ -4255,7 +4255,7 @@ contains_trusted_key(dns_name_t *name, dns_rdataset_t *rdataset,
isc_mem_t *mctx)
{
isc_result_t result;
dns_rdata_t rdata;
dns_rdata_t rdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT;
dst_key_t *trustedKey = NULL;
dst_key_t *dnsseckey = NULL;
int i;
@@ -4265,7 +4265,6 @@ contains_trusted_key(dns_name_t *name, dns_rdataset_t *rdataset,
result = dns_rdataset_first(rdataset);
check_result(result, "empty rdataset");
dns_rdata_init(&rdata);
do {
dns_rdataset_current(rdataset, &rdata);
@@ -4315,7 +4314,7 @@ sigchase_verify_sig(dns_name_t *name, dns_rdataset_t *rdataset,
isc_mem_t *mctx)
{
isc_result_t result;
dns_rdata_t keyrdata;
dns_rdata_t keyrdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT;
dst_key_t *dnsseckey = NULL;
result = dns_rdataset_first(keyrdataset);
@@ -4338,6 +4337,7 @@ sigchase_verify_sig(dns_name_t *name, dns_rdataset_t *rdataset,
return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
}
dst_key_free(&dnsseckey);
dns_rdata_reset(&keyrdata);
} while (dns_rdataset_next(chase_keyrdataset) == ISC_R_SUCCESS);
dns_rdata_reset(&keyrdata);
@@ -4351,7 +4351,7 @@ sigchase_verify_sig_key(dns_name_t *name, dns_rdataset_t *rdataset,
isc_mem_t *mctx)
{
isc_result_t result;
dns_rdata_t sigrdata;
dns_rdata_t sigrdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT;
dns_rdata_sig_t siginfo;
result = dns_rdataset_first(sigrdataset);
@@ -4389,6 +4389,7 @@ sigchase_verify_sig_key(dns_name_t *name, dns_rdataset_t *rdataset,
}
}
dns_rdata_freestruct(&siginfo);
dns_rdata_reset(&sigrdata);
} while (dns_rdataset_next(chase_sigkeyrdataset) == ISC_R_SUCCESS);
@@ -4403,25 +4404,23 @@ sigchase_verify_ds(dns_name_t *name, dns_rdataset_t *keyrdataset,
dns_rdataset_t *dsrdataset, isc_mem_t *mctx)
{
isc_result_t result;
dns_rdata_t keyrdata;
dns_rdata_t newdsrdata;
dns_rdata_t dsrdata;
dns_rdata_t keyrdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT;
dns_rdata_t newdsrdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT;
dns_rdata_t dsrdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT;
dns_rdata_ds_t dsinfo;
dst_key_t *dnsseckey = NULL;
unsigned char dsbuf[DNS_DS_BUFFERSIZE];
result = dns_rdataset_first(dsrdataset);
check_result(result, "empty DSset dataset");
dns_rdata_init(&dsrdata);
do {
dns_rdataset_current(dsrdataset, &dsrdata);
result = dns_rdata_tostruct(&dsrdata, &dsinfo, NULL);
check_result(result, "dns_rdata_tostruct for DS");
check_result(result, "dns_rdata_tostruct for DS");
result = dns_rdataset_first(keyrdataset);
check_result(result, "empty KEY dataset");
dns_rdata_init(&keyrdata);
do {
dns_rdataset_current(keyrdataset, &keyrdata);
@@ -4436,7 +4435,6 @@ sigchase_verify_ds(dns_name_t *name, dns_rdataset_t *keyrdataset,
* id of DNSKEY referenced by the DS
*/
if (dsinfo.key_tag == dst_key_id(dnsseckey)) {
dns_rdata_init(&newdsrdata);
result = dns_ds_buildrdata(name, &keyrdata,
dsinfo.digest_type,
@@ -4484,14 +4482,16 @@ sigchase_verify_ds(dns_name_t *name, dns_rdataset_t *keyrdataset,
dns_rdata_reset(&newdsrdata);
}
dst_key_free(&dnsseckey);
dns_rdata_reset(&keyrdata);
dnsseckey = NULL;
} while (dns_rdataset_next(chase_keyrdataset) == ISC_R_SUCCESS);
dns_rdata_reset(&keyrdata);
dns_rdata_reset(&dsrdata);
} while (dns_rdataset_next(chase_dsrdataset) == ISC_R_SUCCESS);
#if 0
dns_rdata_reset(&dsrdata); WARNING
#endif
dns_rdata_reset(&keyrdata);
dns_rdata_reset(&newdsrdata);
dns_rdata_reset(&dsrdata);
return (ISC_R_NOTFOUND);
}
@@ -4884,7 +4884,7 @@ getneededrr(dns_message_t *msg)
{
isc_result_t result;
dns_name_t *name = NULL;
dns_rdata_t sigrdata;
dns_rdata_t sigrdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT;
dns_rdata_sig_t siginfo;
isc_boolean_t true = ISC_TRUE;
@@ -4938,7 +4938,6 @@ getneededrr(dns_message_t *msg)
/* first find the DNSKEY name */
result = dns_rdataset_first(chase_sigrdataset);
check_result(result, "empty RRSIG dataset");
dns_rdata_init(&sigrdata);
dns_rdataset_current(chase_sigrdataset, &sigrdata);
result = dns_rdata_tostruct(&sigrdata, &siginfo, NULL);
check_result(result, "sigrdata tostruct siginfo");
@@ -5316,6 +5315,7 @@ prove_nx_domain(dns_message_t *msg,
}
dns_rdata_freestruct(&nsecstruct);
dns_rdata_reset(&nsec);
}
} while (dns_message_nextname(msg, DNS_SECTION_AUTHORITY)
== ISC_R_SUCCESS);

View File

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
* PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/* $Id: statschannel.c,v 1.2.2.13 2008/08/08 05:10:34 marka Exp $ */
/* $Id: statschannel.c,v 1.2.2.13.2.1 2008/12/18 02:39:12 marka Exp $ */
/*! \file */
@@ -635,7 +635,7 @@ generatexml(ns_server_t *server, int *buflen, xmlChar **buf) {
TRY0(xmlTextWriterStartElement(writer, ISC_XMLCHAR "bind"));
TRY0(xmlTextWriterStartElement(writer, ISC_XMLCHAR "statistics"));
TRY0(xmlTextWriterWriteAttribute(writer, ISC_XMLCHAR "version",
ISC_XMLCHAR "1.0"));
ISC_XMLCHAR "2.0"));
/* Set common fields for statistics dump */
dumparg.type = statsformat_xml;

View File

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
This Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-dnsext-forgery-resilience-01.txt, has expired, and has been deleted
from the Internet-Drafts directory. An Internet-Draft expires 185 days from
the date that it is posted unless it is replaced by an updated version, or the
Secretariat has been notified that the document is under official review by the
IESG or has been passed to the RFC Editor for review and/or publication as an
RFC. This Internet-Draft was not published as an RFC.
Internet-Drafts are not archival documents, and copies of Internet-Drafts that have
been deleted from the directory are not available. The Secretariat does not have
any information regarding the future plans of the author(s) or working group, if
applicable, with respect to this deleted Internet-Draft. For more information, or
to request a copy of the document, please contact the author(s) directly.
Draft Author(s):
Remco van Mook <remco@virtu.nl>,
Bert Hubert <bert.hubert@netherlabs.nl>

View File

@@ -1,480 +0,0 @@
DNSEXT Working Group Paul Vixie, ISC
INTERNET-DRAFT
<draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2671bis-edns0-01.txt> March 17, 2008
Intended Status: Standards Track
Obsoletes: 2671 (if approved)
Revised extension mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)
Status of this Memo
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
Abstract
The Domain Name System's wire protocol includes a number of fixed
fields whose range has been or soon will be exhausted and does not
allow clients to advertise their capabilities to servers. This
document describes backward compatible mechanisms for allowing the
protocol to grow.
Expires September 2008 [Page 1]
INTERNET-DRAFT EDNS0 March 2008
1 - Introduction
1.1. DNS (see [RFC1035]) specifies a Message Format and within such
messages there are standard formats for encoding options, errors, and
name compression. The maximum allowable size of a DNS Message is fixed.
Many of DNS's protocol limits are too small for uses which are or which
are desired to become common. There is no way for implementations to
advertise their capabilities.
1.2. Unextended agents will not know how to interpret the protocol
extensions detailed here. In practice, these clients will be upgraded
when they have need of a new feature, and only new features will make
use of the extensions. Extended agents must be prepared for behaviour
of unextended clients in the face of new protocol elements, and fall
back gracefully to unextended DNS. RFC 2671 originally has proposed
extensions to the basic DNS protocol to overcome these deficiencies.
This memo refines that specification and obsoletes RFC 2671.
1.3. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2 - Affected Protocol Elements
2.1. The DNS Message Header's (see [RFC1035 4.1.1]) second full 16-bit
word is divided into a 4-bit OPCODE, a 4-bit RCODE, and a number of
1-bit flags. The original reserved Z bits have been allocated to
various purposes, and most of the RCODE values are now in use. More
flags and more possible RCODEs are needed. The OPT pseudo-RR specified
in Section 4 contains subfields that carry a bit field extension of the
RCODE field and additional flag bits, respectively; for details see
Section 4.6 below.
2.2. The first two bits of a wire format domain label are used to denote
the type of the label. [RFC1035 4.1.4] allocates two of the four
possible types and reserves the other two. Proposals for use of the
remaining types far outnumber those available. More label types were
needed, and an extension mechanism was proposed in RFC 2671 [RFC2671
Section 3]. Section 3 of this document reserves DNS labels with a first
octet in the range of 64-127 decimal (label type 01) for future
standardization of Extended DNS Labels.
Expires September 2008 [Page 2]
INTERNET-DRAFT EDNS0 March 2008
2.3. DNS Messages are limited to 512 octets in size when sent over UDP.
While the minimum maximum reassembly buffer size still allows a limit of
512 octets of UDP payload, most of the hosts now connected to the
Internet are able to reassemble larger datagrams. Some mechanism must
be created to allow requestors to advertise larger buffer sizes to
responders. To this end, the OPT pseudo-RR specified in Section 4
contains a maximum payload size field; for details see Section 4.5
below.
3 - Extended Label Types
The first octet in the on-the-wire representation of a DNS label
specifies the label type; the basic DNS specification [RFC1035]
dedicates the two most significant bits of that octet for this purpose.
This document reserves DNS label type 0b01 for use as an indication for
Extended Label Types. A specific extended label type is selected by the
6 least significant bits of the first octet. Thus, Extended Label Types
are indicated by the values 64-127 (0b01xxxxxx) in the first octet of
the label.
Allocations from this range are to be made for IETF documents fully
describing the syntax and semantics as well as the applicability of the
particular Extended Label Type.
This document does not describe any specific Extended Label Type.
4 - OPT pseudo-RR
4.1. One OPT pseudo-RR (RR type 41) MAY be added to the additional data
section of a request, and to responses to such requests. An OPT is
called a pseudo-RR because it pertains to a particular transport level
message and not to any actual DNS data. OPT RRs MUST NOT be cached,
forwarded, or stored in or loaded from master files. The quantity of
OPT pseudo-RRs per message MUST be either zero or one, but not greater.
4.2. An OPT RR has a fixed part and a variable set of options expressed
as {attribute, value} pairs. The fixed part holds some DNS meta data
and also a small collection of new protocol elements which we expect to
be so popular that it would be a waste of wire space to encode them as
{attribute, value} pairs.
Expires September 2008 [Page 3]
INTERNET-DRAFT EDNS0 March 2008
4.3. The fixed part of an OPT RR is structured as follows:
Field Name Field Type Description
------------------------------------------------------
NAME domain name empty (root domain)
TYPE u_int16_t OPT (41)
CLASS u_int16_t sender's UDP payload size
TTL u_int32_t extended RCODE and flags
RDLEN u_int16_t describes RDATA
RDATA octet stream {attribute,value} pairs
4.4. The variable part of an OPT RR is encoded in its RDATA and is
structured as zero or more of the following:
: +0 (MSB) : +1 (LSB) :
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
0: | OPTION-CODE |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
2: | OPTION-LENGTH |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
4: | |
/ OPTION-DATA /
/ /
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
OPTION-CODE (Assigned by IANA.)
OPTION-LENGTH Size (in octets) of OPTION-DATA.
OPTION-DATA Varies per OPTION-CODE.
4.4.1. Order of appearance of option tuples is never relevant. Any
option whose meaning is affected by other options is so affected no
matter which one comes first in the OPT RDATA.
4.4.2. Any OPTION-CODE values not understood by a responder or requestor
MUST be ignored. So, specifications of such options might wish to
include some kind of signalled acknowledgement. For example, an option
specification might say that if a responder sees option XYZ, it SHOULD
include option XYZ in its response.
Expires September 2008 [Page 4]
INTERNET-DRAFT EDNS0 March 2008
4.5. The sender's UDP payload size (which OPT stores in the RR CLASS
field) is the number of octets of the largest UDP payload that can be
reassembled and delivered in the sender's network stack. Note that path
MTU, with or without fragmentation, may be smaller than this. Values
lower than 512 are undefined, and may be treated as format errors, or
may be treated as equal to 512, at the implementor's discretion.
4.5.1. Note that a 512-octet UDP payload requires a 576-octet IP
reassembly buffer. Choosing 1280 on an Ethernet connected requestor
would be reasonable. The consequence of choosing too large a value may
be an ICMP message from an intermediate gateway, or even a silent drop
of the response message.
4.5.2. Both requestors and responders are advised to take account of the
path's discovered MTU (if already known) when considering message sizes.
4.5.3. The requestor's maximum payload size can change over time, and
therefore MUST NOT be cached for use beyond the transaction in which it
is advertised.
4.5.4. The responder's maximum payload size can change over time, but
can be reasonably expected to remain constant between two sequential
transactions; for example, a meaningless QUERY to discover a responder's
maximum UDP payload size, followed immediately by an UPDATE which takes
advantage of this size. (This is considered preferrable to the outright
use of TCP for oversized requests, if there is any reason to suspect
that the responder implements EDNS, and if a request will not fit in the
default 512 payload size limit.)
4.5.5. Due to transaction overhead, it is unwise to advertise an
architectural limit as a maximum UDP payload size. Just because your
stack can reassemble 64KB datagrams, don't assume that you want to spend
more than about 4KB of state memory per ongoing transaction.
4.6. The extended RCODE and flags (which OPT stores in the RR TTL field)
are structured as follows:
: +0 (MSB) : +1 (LSB) :
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
0: | EXTENDED-RCODE | VERSION |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
2: | DO| Z |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
Expires September 2008 [Page 5]
INTERNET-DRAFT EDNS0 March 2008
EXTENDED-RCODE Forms upper 8 bits of extended 12-bit RCODE. Note that
EXTENDED-RCODE value zero (0) indicates that an
unextended RCODE is in use (values zero (0) through
fifteen (15)).
VERSION Indicates the implementation level of whoever sets it.
Full conformance with this specification is indicated by
version zero (0). Requestors are encouraged to set this
to the lowest implemented level capable of expressing a
transaction, to minimize the responder and network load
of discovering the greatest common implementation level
between requestor and responder. A requestor's version
numbering strategy should ideally be a run time
configuration option.
If a responder does not implement the VERSION level of
the request, then it answers with RCODE=BADVERS. All
responses MUST be limited in format to the VERSION level
of the request, but the VERSION of each response MUST be
the highest implementation level of the responder. In
this way a requestor will learn the implementation level
of a responder as a side effect of every response,
including error responses, including RCODE=BADVERS.
DO DNSSEC OK bit [RFC3225].
Z Set to zero by senders and ignored by receivers, unless
modified in a subsequent specification [IANAFLAGS].
5 - Transport Considerations
5.1. The presence of an OPT pseudo-RR in a request is an indication that
the requestor fully implements the given version of EDNS, and can
correctly understand any response that conforms to that feature's
specification.
5.2. Lack of use of these features in a request is an indication that
the requestor does not implement any part of this specification and that
the responder SHOULD NOT use any protocol extension described here in
its response.
5.3. Responders who do not understand these protocol extensions are
expected to send a response with RCODE NOTIMPL, FORMERR, or SERVFAIL, or
to appear to "time out" due to inappropriate action by a "middle box"
such as a NAT, or to ignore extensions and respond only to unextended
Expires September 2008 [Page 6]
INTERNET-DRAFT EDNS0 March 2008
protocol elements. Therefore use of extensions SHOULD be "probed" such
that a responder who isn't known to support them be allowed a retry with
no extensions if it responds with such an RCODE, or does not respond.
If a responder's capability level is cached by a requestor, a new probe
SHOULD be sent periodically to test for changes to responder capability.
5.4. If EDNS is used in a request, and the response arrives with TC set
and with no EDNS OPT RR, a requestor should assume that truncation
prevented the OPT RR from being appended by the responder, and further,
that EDNS is not used in the response. Correspondingly, an EDNS
responder who cannot fit all necessary elements (including an OPT RR)
into a response, should respond with a normal (unextended) DNS response,
possibly setting TC if the response will not fit in the unextended
response message's 512-octet size.
6 - Security Considerations
Requestor-side specification of the maximum buffer size may open a new
DNS denial of service attack if responders can be made to send messages
which are too large for intermediate gateways to forward, thus leading
to potential ICMP storms between gateways and responders.
7 - IANA Considerations
IANA has allocated RR type code 41 for OPT.
This document controls the following IANA sub-registries in registry
"DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM PARAMETERS":
"EDNS Extended Label Type"
"EDNS Option Codes"
"EDNS Version Numbers"
"Domain System Response Code"
IANA is advised to re-parent these subregistries to this document.
This document assigns label type 0b01xxxxxx as "EDNS Extended Label
Type." We request that IANA record this assignment.
This document assigns option code 65535 to "Reserved for future
expansion."
This document assigns EDNS Extended RCODE "16" to "BADVERS".
Expires September 2008 [Page 7]
INTERNET-DRAFT EDNS0 March 2008
IESG approval is required to create new entries in the EDNS Extended
Label Type or EDNS Version Number registries, while any published RFC
(including Informational, Experimental, or BCP) is grounds for
allocation of an EDNS Option Code.
8 - Acknowledgements
Paul Mockapetris, Mark Andrews, Robert Elz, Don Lewis, Bob Halley,
Donald Eastlake, Rob Austein, Matt Crawford, Randy Bush, Thomas Narten,
Alfred Hoenes and Markku Savela were each instrumental in creating and
refining this specification.
9 - References
[RFC1035] P. Mockapetris, "Domain Names - Implementation and
Specification," RFC 1035, USC/Information Sciences
Institute, November 1987.
[RFC2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels," RFC 2119, Harvard University, March
1997.
[RFC2671] P. Vixie, "Extension mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)," RFC 2671,
Internet Software Consortium, August 1999.
[RFC3225] D. Conrad, "Indicating Resolver Support of DNSSEC," RFC
3225, Nominum Inc., December 2001.
[IANAFLAGS] IANA, "DNS Header Flags and EDNS Header Flags," web site
http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-header-flags, as of
June 2005 or later.
10 - Author's Address
Paul Vixie
Internet Systems Consortium
950 Charter Street
Redwood City, CA 94063
+1 650 423 1301
EMail: vixie@isc.org
Expires September 2008 [Page 8]
INTERNET-DRAFT EDNS0 March 2008
Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) IETF Trust (2007).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors retain
all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS OR
IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND THE
INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Intellectual Property
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this
document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or
might not be available; nor does it represent that it has made any
independent effort to identify any such rights. Information on the
procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be found in BCP
78 and BCP 79.
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt
made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such
proprietary rights by implementers or users of this specification can be
obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights
that may cover technology that may be required to implement this
standard. Please address the information to the IETF at
ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
Acknowledgement
Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
Administrative Support Activity (IASA).
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@@ -1,672 +0,0 @@
Network Working Group M. Andrews
Internet-Draft ISC
Intended status: BCP June 5, 2008
Expires: December 7, 2008
Locally-served DNS Zones
draft-ietf-dnsop-default-local-zones-05
Status of this Memo
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 7, 2008.
Abstract
Experience has shown that there are a number of DNS zones all
iterative resolvers and recursive nameservers should, unless
configured otherwise, automatically serve. RFC 4193 specifies that
this should occur for D.F.IP6.ARPA. This document extends the
practice to cover the IN-ADDR.ARPA zones for RFC 1918 address space
and other well known zones with similar characteristics.
Andrews Expires December 7, 2008 [Page 1]
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Reserved Words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Effects on sites using RFC 1918 addresses. . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Changes to Iterative Resolver Behaviour. . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Lists Of Zones Covered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. RFC 1918 Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. RFC 3330 Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. Local IPv6 Unicast Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.4. IPv6 Locally Assigned Local Addresses . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.5. IPv6 Link Local Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Zones that are Out-Of-Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix A. Change History [To Be Removed on Publication] . . . . 10
A.1. draft-ietf-dnsop-default-local-zones-05.txt . . . . . . . 10
A.2. draft-ietf-dnsop-default-local-zones-04.txt . . . . . . . 10
A.3. draft-ietf-dnsop-default-local-zones-03.txt . . . . . . . 10
A.4. draft-ietf-dnsop-default-local-zones-02.txt . . . . . . . 10
A.5. draft-ietf-dnsop-default-local-zones-01.txt . . . . . . . 11
A.6. draft-ietf-dnsop-default-local-zones-00.txt . . . . . . . 11
A.7. draft-andrews-full-service-resolvers-03.txt . . . . . . . 11
A.8. draft-andrews-full-service-resolvers-02.txt . . . . . . . 11
Appendix B. Proposed Status [To Be Removed on Publication] . . . 11
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 12
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1. Introduction
Experience has shown that there are a number of DNS [RFC 1034] [RFC
1035] zones that all iterative resolvers and recursive nameservers
SHOULD, unless intentionally configured otherwise, automatically
serve. These zones include, but are not limited to, the IN-ADDR.ARPA
zones for the address space allocated by [RFC 1918] and the IP6.ARPA
zones for locally assigned unique local IPv6 addresses, [RFC 4193].
This recommendation is made because data has shown that significant
leakage of queries for these name spaces is occurring, despite
instructions to restrict them, and because it has therefore become
necessary to deploy sacrificial name servers to protect the immediate
parent name servers for these zones from excessive, unintentional,
query load [AS112] [I-D.draft-ietf-dnsop-as112-ops]
[I-D.draft-ietf-dnsop-as112-under-attack-help-help]. There is every
expectation that the query load will continue to increase unless
steps are taken as outlined here.
Additionally, queries from clients behind badly configured firewalls
that allow outgoing queries for these name spaces but drop the
responses, put a significant load on the root servers (forward but no
reverse zones configured). They also cause operational load for the
root server operators as they have to reply to enquiries about why
the root servers are "attacking" these clients. Changing the default
configuration will address all these issues for the zones listed in
Section 4.
[RFC 4193] recommends that queries for D.F.IP6.ARPA be handled
locally. This document extends the recommendation to cover the IN-
ADDR.ARPA zones for [RFC 1918] and other well known IN-ADDR.ARPA and
IP6.ARPA zones for which queries should not appear on the public
Internet.
It is hoped that by doing this the number of sacrificial servers
[AS112] will not have to be increased, and may in time be reduced.
This recommendation should also help DNS responsiveness for sites
which are using [RFC 1918] addresses but do not follow the last
paragraph in Section 3 of [RFC 1918].
1.1. Reserved Words
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119].
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2. Effects on sites using RFC 1918 addresses.
For most sites using [RFC 1918] addresses, the changes here will have
little or no detrimental effect. If the site does not already have
the reverse tree populated the only effect will be that the name
error responses will be generated locally rather than remotely.
For sites that do have the reverse tree populated, most will either
have a local copy of the zones or will be forwarding the queries to
servers which have local copies of the zone. Therefore this
recommendation will not be relevant.
The most significant impact will be felt at sites that make use of
delegations for [RFC 1918] addresses and have populated these zones.
These sites will need to override the default configuration expressed
in this document to allow resolution to continue. Typically, such
sites will be fully disconnected from the Internet and have their own
root servers for their own non-Internet DNS tree.
3. Changes to Iterative Resolver Behaviour.
Unless configured otherwise, an iterative resolver will now return
authoritatively (aa=1) name errors (RCODE=3) for queries within the
zones in Section 4, with the obvious exception of queries for the
zone name itself where SOA, NS and "no data" responses will be
returned as appropriate to the query type. One common way to do this
is to serve empty (SOA and NS only) zones.
An implementation of this recommendation MUST provide a mechanism to
disable this new behaviour, and SHOULD allow this decision on a zone
by zone basis.
If using empty zones one SHOULD NOT use the same NS and SOA records
as used on the public Internet servers as that will make it harder to
detect the origin of the responses and thus any leakage to the public
Internet servers. This document recommends that the NS record
defaults to the name of the zone and the SOA MNAME defaults to the
name of the only NS RR's target. The SOA RNAME should default to
"nobody.invalid." [RFC 2606]. Implementations SHOULD provide a
mechanism to set these values. No address records need to be
provided for the name server.
Below is an example of a generic empty zone in master file format.
It will produce a negative cache TTL of 3 hours.
@ 10800 IN SOA @ nobody.invalid. 1 3600 1200 604800 10800
@ 10800 IN NS @
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The SOA RR is needed to support negative caching [RFC 2308] of name
error responses and to point clients to the primary master for DNS
dynamic updates.
SOA values of particular importance are the MNAME, the SOA RR's TTL
and the negTTL value. Both TTL values SHOULD match. The rest of the
SOA timer values MAY be chosen arbitrarily since they are not
intended to control any zone transfer activity.
The NS RR is needed as some UPDATE [RFC 2136] clients use NS queries
to discover the zone to be updated. Having no address records for
the name server is expected to abort UPDATE processing in the client.
4. Lists Of Zones Covered
The following subsections are intended to seed the IANA registry as
requested in the IANA Considerations Section. The zone name is the
entity to be registered.
4.1. RFC 1918 Zones
The following zones correspond to the IPv4 address space reserved in
[RFC 1918].
+----------------------+
| Zone |
+----------------------+
| 10.IN-ADDR.ARPA |
| 16.172.IN-ADDR.ARPA |
| 17.172.IN-ADDR.ARPA |
| 18.172.IN-ADDR.ARPA |
| 19.172.IN-ADDR.ARPA |
| 20.172.IN-ADDR.ARPA |
| 21.172.IN-ADDR.ARPA |
| 22.172.IN-ADDR.ARPA |
| 23.172.IN-ADDR.ARPA |
| 24.172.IN-ADDR.ARPA |
| 25.172.IN-ADDR.ARPA |
| 26.172.IN-ADDR.ARPA |
| 27.172.IN-ADDR.ARPA |
| 28.172.IN-ADDR.ARPA |
| 29.172.IN-ADDR.ARPA |
| 30.172.IN-ADDR.ARPA |
| 31.172.IN-ADDR.ARPA |
| 168.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA |
+----------------------+
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4.2. RFC 3330 Zones
The following zones correspond to those address ranges from [RFC
3330] that are not expected to appear as source or destination
addresses on the public Internet and to not have a unique name to
associate with.
The recommendation to serve an empty zone 127.IN-ADDR.ARPA is not a
attempt to discourage any practice to provide a PTR RR for
1.0.0.127.IN-ADDR.ARPA locally. In fact, a meaningful reverse
mapping should exist, but the exact setup is out of the scope of this
document. Similar logic applies to the reverse mapping for ::1
(Section 4.3). The recommendations made here simply assume no other
coverage for these domains exists.
+------------------------------+------------------------+
| Zone | Description |
+------------------------------+------------------------+
| 0.IN-ADDR.ARPA | IPv4 "THIS" NETWORK |
| 127.IN-ADDR.ARPA | IPv4 LOOP-BACK NETWORK |
| 254.169.IN-ADDR.ARPA | IPv4 LINK LOCAL |
| 2.0.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA | IPv4 TEST NET |
| 255.255.255.255.IN-ADDR.ARPA | IPv4 BROADCAST |
+------------------------------+------------------------+
4.3. Local IPv6 Unicast Addresses
The reverse mappings ([RFC 3596], Section 2.5 IP6.ARPA Domain) for
the IPv6 Unspecified (::) and Loopback (::1) addresses ([RFC 4291],
Sections 2.4, 2.5.2 and 2.5.3) are covered by these two zones:
+-------------------------------------------+
| Zone |
+-------------------------------------------+
| 0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.\ |
| 0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.IP6.ARPA |
| 1.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.\ |
| 0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.IP6.ARPA |
+-------------------------------------------+
Note: Line breaks and a escapes '\' have been inserted above for
readability and to adhere to line width constraints. They are not
parts of the zone names.
4.4. IPv6 Locally Assigned Local Addresses
Section 4.4 of [RFC 4193] already required special treatment of:
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+--------------+
| Zone |
+--------------+
| D.F.IP6.ARPA |
+--------------+
4.5. IPv6 Link Local Addresses
IPv6 Link-Local Addresses as of [RFC 4291], Section 2.5.6 are covered
by four distinct reverse DNS zones:
+----------------+
| Zone |
+----------------+
| 8.E.F.IP6.ARPA |
| 9.E.F.IP6.ARPA |
| A.E.F.IP6.ARPA |
| B.E.F.IP6.ARPA |
+----------------+
5. Zones that are Out-Of-Scope
IPv6 site-local addresses, [RFC 4291] Sections 2.4 and 2.5.7, and
IPv6 Non-Locally Assigned Local addresses [RFC 4193] are not covered
here. It is expected that IPv6 site-local addresses will be self
correcting as IPv6 implementations remove support for site-local
addresses. However, sacrificial servers for C.E.F.IP6.ARPA through
F.E.F.IP6.ARPA may still need to be deployed in the short term if the
traffic becomes excessive.
For IPv6 Non-Locally Assigned Local addresses (L = 0) [RFC 4193],
there has been no decision made about whether the Regional Internet
Registries (RIRs) will provide delegations in this space or not. If
they don't, then C.F.IP6.ARPA will need to be added to the list in
Section 4.4. If they do, then registries will need to take steps to
ensure that name servers are provided for these addresses.
This document also ignores IP6.INT. IP6.INT has been wound up with
only legacy resolvers now generating reverse queries under IP6.INT
[RFC 4159].
This document has also deliberately ignored names immediately under
the root domain. While there is a subset of queries to the root name
servers which could be addressed using the techniques described here
(e.g. .local, .workgroup and IPv4 addresses), there is also a vast
amount of traffic that requires a different strategy (e.g. lookups
for unqualified hostnames, IPv6 addresses).
Andrews Expires December 7, 2008 [Page 7]
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6. IANA Considerations
This document requests that IANA establish a registry of zones which
require this default behaviour. The initial contents of which are in
Section 4. Implementors are encouraged to check this registry and
adjust their implementations to reflect changes therein.
This registry can be amended through "IETF Consensus" as per [RFC
2434].
IANA should co-ordinate with the RIRs to ensure that, as DNSSEC is
deployed in the reverse tree, delegations for these zones are made in
the manner described in Section 7.
7. Security Considerations
During the initial deployment phase, particularly where [RFC 1918]
addresses are in use, there may be some clients that unexpectedly
receive a name error rather than a PTR record. This may cause some
service disruption until their recursive name server(s) have been re-
configured.
As DNSSEC is deployed within the IN-ADDR.ARPA and IP6.ARPA
namespaces, the zones listed above will need to be delegated as
insecure delegations, or be within insecure zones. This will allow
DNSSEC validation to succeed for queries in these spaces despite not
being answered from the delegated servers.
It is recommended that sites actively using these namespaces secure
them using DNSSEC [RFC 4035] by publishing and using DNSSEC trust
anchors. This will protect the clients from accidental import of
unsigned responses from the Internet.
8. Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the US National Science Foundation
(research grant SCI-0427144) and DNS-OARC.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC 1034]
Mockapetris, P., "DOMAIN NAMES - CONCEPTS AND FACILITIES",
STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
Andrews Expires December 7, 2008 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft Locally-served DNS Zones June 2008
[RFC 1035]
Mockapetris, P., "DOMAIN NAMES - IMPLEMENTATION AND
SPECIFICATION", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
[RFC 1918]
Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G.,
and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
BCP 5, RFC 1918, February 1996.
[RFC 2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC 2136]
Vixie, P., Thomson, A., Rekhter, Y., and J. Bound,
"Dynamic Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)",
RFC 2136, April 1997.
[RFC 2308]
Andrews, M., "Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS
NCACHE)", RFC 2398, March 1998.
[RFC 2434]
Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,
October 1998.
[RFC 2606]
Eastlake, D. and A. Panitz, "Reserved Top Level DNS
Names", BCP 32, RFC 2606, June 1999.
[RFC 3596]
Thomson, S., Huitema, C., Ksinant, V., and M. Souissi,
"DNS Extensions to Support IPv6", RFC 3596, October 2003.
[RFC 4035]
Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.
[RFC 4159]
Huston, G., "Deprecation of "ip6.int"", BCP 109, RFC 4159,
August 2005.
[RFC 4193]
Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast
Addresses", RFC 4193, October 2005.
Andrews Expires December 7, 2008 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft Locally-served DNS Zones June 2008
[RFC 4291]
Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006.
9.2. Informative References
[AS112] "AS112 Project", <http://www.as112.net/>.
[I-D.draft-ietf-dnsop-as112-ops]
Abley, J. and W. Maton, "AS112 Nameserver Operations",
draft-ietf-dnsop-as112-ops-00 (work in progress),
February 2007.
[I-D.draft-ietf-dnsop-as112-under-attack-help-help]
Abley, J. and W. Maton, "I'm Being Attacked by
PRISONER.IANA.ORG!",
draft-ietf-dnsop-as112-under-attack-help-help-00 (work in
progress), February 2007.
[RFC 3330]
"Special-Use IPv4 Addresses", RFC 3330, September 2002.
Appendix A. Change History [To Be Removed on Publication]
A.1. draft-ietf-dnsop-default-local-zones-05.txt
none, expiry prevention
A.2. draft-ietf-dnsop-default-local-zones-04.txt
Centrally Assigned Local addresses -> Non-Locally Assigned Local
address
A.3. draft-ietf-dnsop-default-local-zones-03.txt
expanded section 4 descriptions
Added references [RFC 2136], [RFC 3596],
[I-D.draft-ietf-dnsop-as112-ops] and
[I-D.draft-ietf-dnsop-as112-under-attack-help-help].
Revised language.
A.4. draft-ietf-dnsop-default-local-zones-02.txt
RNAME now "nobody.invalid."
Andrews Expires December 7, 2008 [Page 10]
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Revised language.
A.5. draft-ietf-dnsop-default-local-zones-01.txt
Revised impact description.
Updated to reflect change in IP6.INT status.
A.6. draft-ietf-dnsop-default-local-zones-00.txt
Adopted by DNSOP.
"Author's Note" re-titled "Zones that are Out-Of-Scope"
Add note that these zone are expected to seed the IANA registry.
Title changed.
A.7. draft-andrews-full-service-resolvers-03.txt
Added "Proposed Status".
A.8. draft-andrews-full-service-resolvers-02.txt
Added 0.IN-ADDR.ARPA.
Appendix B. Proposed Status [To Be Removed on Publication]
This Internet-Draft is being submitted for eventual publication as an
RFC with a proposed status of Best Current Practice.
Author's Address
Mark P. Andrews
Internet Systems Consortium
950 Charter Street
Redwood City, CA 94063
US
Email: Mark_Andrews@isc.org
Andrews Expires December 7, 2008 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft Locally-served DNS Zones June 2008
Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND
THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS
OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Intellectual Property
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information
on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at
ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
Andrews Expires December 7, 2008 [Page 12]

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@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
LIBINTERFACE = 45
LIBREVISION = 2
LIBREVISION = 4
LIBAGE = 0

View File

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
* PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/* $Id: dispatch.c,v 1.137.128.18 2008/09/04 00:23:59 jinmei Exp $ */
/* $Id: dispatch.c,v 1.137.128.18.2.2 2008/12/11 00:05:30 tbox Exp $ */
/*! \file */
@@ -2588,6 +2588,15 @@ get_udpsocket(dns_dispatchmgr_t *mgr, dns_dispatch_t *disp,
* If this fails 1024 times, we then ask the kernel for
* choosing one.
*/
} else {
/* Allow to reuse address for non-random ports. */
result = open_socket(sockmgr, localaddr,
ISC_SOCKET_REUSEADDRESS, &sock);
if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS)
*sockp = sock;
return (result);
}
memset(held, 0, sizeof(held));

View File

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
* IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/* $Id: openssldsa_link.c,v 1.11 2007/08/28 07:20:42 tbox Exp $ */
/* $Id: openssldsa_link.c,v 1.11.178.1 2008/12/24 00:20:59 marka Exp $ */
#ifdef OPENSSL
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ openssldsa_verify(dst_context_t *dctx, const isc_region_t *sig) {
status = DSA_do_verify(digest, ISC_SHA1_DIGESTLENGTH, dsasig, dsa);
DSA_SIG_free(dsasig);
if (status == 0)
if (status != 1)
return (dst__openssl_toresult(DST_R_VERIFYFAILURE));
return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);

View File

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
/*
* Principal Author: Brian Wellington
* $Id: opensslrsa_link.c,v 1.16 2007/06/19 23:47:16 tbox Exp $
* $Id: opensslrsa_link.c,v 1.16.214.1 2008/12/24 00:20:59 marka Exp $
*/
#ifdef OPENSSL
@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ opensslrsa_verify(dst_context_t *dctx, const isc_region_t *sig) {
status = RSA_verify(type, digest, digestlen, sig->base,
RSA_size(rsa), rsa);
if (status == 0)
if (status != 1)
return (dst__openssl_toresult(DST_R_VERIFYFAILURE));
return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);

View File

@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ CLEAN :
-@erase "$(INTDIR)\gssapictx.obj"
-@erase "$(INTDIR)\spnego.obj"
-@erase "$(INTDIR)\hmac_link.obj"
-@erase "$(INTDIR)\iptable.obj"
-@erase "$(INTDIR)\journal.obj"
-@erase "$(INTDIR)\key.obj"
-@erase "$(INTDIR)\keytable.obj"
@@ -266,6 +267,7 @@ LINK32_OBJS= \
"$(INTDIR)\dnssec.obj" \
"$(INTDIR)\ds.obj" \
"$(INTDIR)\forward.obj" \
"$(INTDIR)\iptable.obj" \
"$(INTDIR)\journal.obj" \
"$(INTDIR)\keytable.obj" \
"$(INTDIR)\lib.obj" \
@@ -405,6 +407,8 @@ CLEAN :
-@erase "$(INTDIR)\spnego.sbr"
-@erase "$(INTDIR)\hmac_link.obj"
-@erase "$(INTDIR)\hmac_link.sbr"
-@erase "$(INTDIR)\iptable.obj"
-@erase "$(INTDIR)\iptable.sbr"
-@erase "$(INTDIR)\journal.obj"
-@erase "$(INTDIR)\journal.sbr"
-@erase "$(INTDIR)\key.obj"
@@ -575,6 +579,7 @@ BSC32_SBRS= \
"$(INTDIR)\dnssec.sbr" \
"$(INTDIR)\ds.sbr" \
"$(INTDIR)\forward.sbr" \
"$(INTDIR)\iptable.sbr" \
"$(INTDIR)\journal.sbr" \
"$(INTDIR)\keytable.sbr" \
"$(INTDIR)\lib.sbr" \
@@ -661,6 +666,7 @@ LINK32_OBJS= \
"$(INTDIR)\dnssec.obj" \
"$(INTDIR)\ds.obj" \
"$(INTDIR)\forward.obj" \
"$(INTDIR)\iptable.obj" \
"$(INTDIR)\journal.obj" \
"$(INTDIR)\keytable.obj" \
"$(INTDIR)\lib.obj" \

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
LIBINTERFACE = 45
LIBREVISION = 2
LIBREVISION = 3
LIBAGE = 0

View File

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
* PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/* $Id: socket.c,v 1.275.10.32 2008/11/20 00:06:01 jinmei Exp $ */
/* $Id: socket.c,v 1.275.10.32.2.1 2008/12/03 02:33:23 marka Exp $ */
/*! \file */
@@ -2360,18 +2360,15 @@ isc_socket_detach(isc_socket_t **socketp) {
isc_result_t
isc_socket_close(isc_socket_t *sock) {
int fd;
isc_socketmgr_t *manager;
isc_sockettype_t type;
REQUIRE(VALID_SOCKET(sock));
LOCK(&sock->lock);
REQUIRE(sock->references == 1);
REQUIRE(sock->type != isc_sockettype_fdwatch);
UNLOCK(&sock->lock);
/*
* We don't need to retain the lock hereafter, since no one else has
* this socket.
*/
REQUIRE(sock->fd >= 0 && sock->fd < (int)sock->manager->maxsocks);
INSIST(!sock->connecting);
@@ -2383,6 +2380,8 @@ isc_socket_close(isc_socket_t *sock) {
INSIST(ISC_LIST_EMPTY(sock->accept_list));
INSIST(sock->connect_ev == NULL);
manager = sock->manager;
type = sock->type;
fd = sock->fd;
sock->fd = -1;
sock->listener = 0;
@@ -2390,8 +2389,9 @@ isc_socket_close(isc_socket_t *sock) {
sock->connecting = 0;
sock->bound = 0;
isc_sockaddr_any(&sock->peer_address);
UNLOCK(&sock->lock);
closesocket(sock->manager, sock->type, fd);
closesocket(manager, type, fd);
return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
}
@@ -3028,6 +3028,7 @@ process_fd(isc_socketmgr_t *manager, int fd, isc_boolean_t readable,
{
isc_socket_t *sock;
isc_boolean_t unlock_sock;
isc_boolean_t unwatch_read = ISC_FALSE, unwatch_write = ISC_FALSE;
int lockid = FDLOCK_ID(fd);
/*
@@ -3043,11 +3044,10 @@ process_fd(isc_socketmgr_t *manager, int fd, isc_boolean_t readable,
}
sock = manager->fds[fd];
UNLOCK(&manager->fdlock[lockid]);
unlock_sock = ISC_FALSE;
if (readable) {
if (sock == NULL) {
(void)unwatch_fd(manager, fd, SELECT_POKE_READ);
unwatch_read = ISC_TRUE;
goto check_write;
}
unlock_sock = ISC_TRUE;
@@ -3058,13 +3058,13 @@ process_fd(isc_socketmgr_t *manager, int fd, isc_boolean_t readable,
else
dispatch_recv(sock);
}
(void)unwatch_fd(manager, fd, SELECT_POKE_READ);
unwatch_read = ISC_TRUE;
}
check_write:
if (writeable) {
if (sock == NULL) {
(void)unwatch_fd(manager, fd, SELECT_POKE_WRITE);
return;
unwatch_write = ISC_TRUE;
goto unlock_fd;
}
if (!unlock_sock) {
unlock_sock = ISC_TRUE;
@@ -3076,10 +3076,18 @@ check_write:
else
dispatch_send(sock);
}
(void)unwatch_fd(manager, fd, SELECT_POKE_WRITE);
unwatch_write = ISC_TRUE;
}
if (unlock_sock)
UNLOCK(&sock->lock);
unlock_fd:
UNLOCK(&manager->fdlock[lockid]);
if (unwatch_read)
(void)unwatch_fd(manager, fd, SELECT_POKE_READ);
if (unwatch_write)
(void)unwatch_fd(manager, fd, SELECT_POKE_WRITE);
}
#ifdef USE_KQUEUE

View File

@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ CLEAN :
-@erase "$(INTDIR)\parseint.obj"
-@erase "$(INTDIR)\portset.obj"
-@erase "$(INTDIR)\quota.obj"
-@erase "$(INTDIR)\radix.obj"
-@erase "$(INTDIR)\random.obj"
-@erase "$(INTDIR)\ratelimiter.obj"
-@erase "$(INTDIR)\refcount.obj"
@@ -258,6 +259,7 @@ LINK32_OBJS= \
"$(INTDIR)\netscope.obj" \
"$(INTDIR)\ondestroy.obj" \
"$(INTDIR)\quota.obj" \
"$(INTDIR)\radix.obj" \
"$(INTDIR)\random.obj" \
"$(INTDIR)\ratelimiter.obj" \
"$(INTDIR)\refcount.obj" \
@@ -386,6 +388,8 @@ CLEAN :
-@erase "$(INTDIR)\portset.sbr"
-@erase "$(INTDIR)\quota.obj"
-@erase "$(INTDIR)\quota.sbr"
-@erase "$(INTDIR)\radix.obj"
-@erase "$(INTDIR)\radix.sbr"
-@erase "$(INTDIR)\random.obj"
-@erase "$(INTDIR)\random.sbr"
-@erase "$(INTDIR)\ratelimiter.obj"
@@ -509,6 +513,7 @@ BSC32_SBRS= \
"$(INTDIR)\netscope.sbr" \
"$(INTDIR)\ondestroy.sbr" \
"$(INTDIR)\quota.sbr" \
"$(INTDIR)\radix.sbr" \
"$(INTDIR)\random.sbr" \
"$(INTDIR)\ratelimiter.sbr" \
"$(INTDIR)\refcount.sbr" \
@@ -591,6 +596,7 @@ LINK32_OBJS= \
"$(INTDIR)\netscope.obj" \
"$(INTDIR)\ondestroy.obj" \
"$(INTDIR)\quota.obj" \
"$(INTDIR)\radix.obj" \
"$(INTDIR)\random.obj" \
"$(INTDIR)\ratelimiter.obj" \
"$(INTDIR)\refcount.obj" \
@@ -1362,6 +1368,24 @@ SOURCE=..\inet_pton.c
$(CPP) $(CPP_PROJ) $(SOURCE)
!ENDIF
SOURCE=..\iterated_hash.c
!IF "$(CFG)" == "libisc - Win32 Release"
"$(INTDIR)\iterated_hash.obj" : $(SOURCE) "$(INTDIR)"
$(CPP) $(CPP_PROJ) $(SOURCE)
!ELSEIF "$(CFG)" == "libisc - Win32 Debug"
"$(INTDIR)\iterated_hash.obj" "$(INTDIR)\iterated_hash.sbr" : $(SOURCE) "$(INTDIR)"
$(CPP) $(CPP_PROJ) $(SOURCE)
!ENDIF
SOURCE=..\lex.c

View File

@@ -2030,7 +2030,7 @@
./lib/dns/win32/libdns.def X 2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,2007,2008
./lib/dns/win32/libdns.dsp X 2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,2007,2008
./lib/dns/win32/libdns.dsw X 2001
./lib/dns/win32/libdns.mak X 2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,2007
./lib/dns/win32/libdns.mak X 2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,2007,2008
./lib/dns/win32/version.c C 1998,1999,2000,2001,2004,2007
./lib/dns/xfrin.c C 1999,2000,2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,2007,2008
./lib/dns/zone.c C 1999,2000,2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,2007,2008

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# $Id: version,v 1.39.18.9 2008/11/16 21:59:04 marka Exp $
# $Id: version,v 1.39.18.9.2.3 2008/12/24 00:20:59 marka Exp $
#
# This file must follow /bin/sh rules. It is imported directly via
# configure.
@@ -6,5 +6,5 @@
MAJORVER=9
MINORVER=5
PATCHVER=1
RELEASETYPE=rc
RELEASETYPE=-P
RELEASEVER=1