This error code fits better than the more generic "Internal Server
Error" (500) which implies that the problem is on the server.
Also, do not end the whole HTTP/2 session on a bad request.
We were too strict regarding the value and presence of "Accept" HTTP
header, slightly breaking compatibility with the specification.
According to RFC8484 client SHOULD add "Accept" header to the requests
but MUST be able to handle "application/dns-message" media type
regardless of the value of the header. That basically suggests we
ignore its value.
Besides, verifying the value of the "Accept" header is a bit tricky
because it could contain multiple media types, thus requiring proper
parsing. That is doable but does not provide us with any benefits.
Among other things, not verifying the value also fixes compatibility
with clients, which could advertise multiple media types as supported,
which we should accept. For example, it is possible for a perfectly
valid request to contain "application/dns-message", "application/*",
and "*/*" in the "Accept" header value. Still, we would treat such a
request as invalid.
The commit fixes BIND hanging when browsers end HTTP/2 streams
prematurely (for example, by sending RST_STREAM). It ensures that
isc__nmsocket_prep_destroy() will be called for an HTTP/2 stream,
allowing it to be properly disposed.
The problem was impossible to reproduce using dig or DoH benchmarking
software (e.g. flamethrower) because these do not tend to end HTTP/2
streams prematurely.
This commit adds two new autoconf options `--enable-doh` (enabled by
default) and `--with-libnghttp2` (mandatory when DoH is enabled).
When DoH support is disabled the library is not linked-in and support
for http(s) protocol is disabled in the netmgr, named and dig.
if a control channel listener was configured with more than one
key algorithm, message verification would be attempted with each
algorithm in turn. if the first key failed due to the wrong
signature length, the entire verification process was aborted,
rather than continuing on to try with another key.
The isc/platform.h header was left empty which things either already
moved to config.h or to appropriate headers. This is just the final
cleanup commit.
The last remaining defines needed for platforms without NAME_MAX and
PATH_MAX (I'm looking at you, GNU Hurd) were moved to isc/dir.h where
it's prevalently used.
The ISC_STRERRORSIZE was defined in isc/platform.h header as the
value was different between Windows and POSIX platforms. Now that
Windows is gone, move the define to where it belongs.
The function 'private_type_record()' is now used in multiple system
setup scripts and should be moved to the common configuration script
conf.sh.common.
The old approach where each zone structure has its own mutex that
a thread needs to obtain multiple locks to do safe keyfile I/O
operations lead to a race condition ending in a possible deadlock.
Consider a zone in two views. Each such zone is stored in a separate
zone structure. A thread that needs to read or write the key files for
this zone needs to obtain both mutexes in seperate structures. If
another thread is working on the same zone in a different view, they
race to get the locks. It would be possible that thread1 grabs the
lock of the zone in view1, while thread2 wins the race for the lock
of the zone in view2. Now both threads try to get the other lock, both
of them are already locked.
Ideally, when a thread wants to do key file operations, it only needs
to lock a single mutex. This commit introduces a key management hash
table, stored in the zonemgr structure. Each time a zone is being
managed, an object is added to the hash table (and removed when the
zone is being released). This object is identified by the zone name
and contains a mutex that needs to be locked prior to reading or
writing key files.
(cherry-picked from commit ef4619366d49efd46f9fae5f75c4a67c246ba2e6)
Similar to notify, add code to send and keep track of checkds requests.
On every zone_rekey event, we will check the DS at parental agents
(but we will only actually query parental agents if theree is a DS
scheduled to be published/withdrawn).
On a zone_rekey event, we will first clear the ongoing checkds requests.
Reset the counter, to avoid continuing KSK rollover premature.
This has the risk that if zone_rekey events happen too soon after each
other, there are redundant DS queries to the parental agents. But
if TTLs and the configured durations in the dnssec-policy are sane (as
in not ridiculous short) the chance of this happening is low.
This code gathers DNSSEC keys from key files and from the DNSKEY RRset.
It is used for the 'rndc dnssec -status' command, but will also be
needed for "checkds". Turn it into a function.
Change the static function 'get_ksk_zsk' to a library function that
can be used to determine the role of a dst_key. Add checks if the
boolean parameters to store the role are not NULL. Rename to
'dst_key_role'.
Add a Pytest based system test for the 'checkds' feature. There is
one nameserver (ns9, because it should be started the latest) that
has configured several zones with dnssec-policy. The zones are set
in such a state that they are waiting for DS publication or DS
withdrawal.
Then several other name servers act as parent servers that either have
the DS for these published, or not. Also one server in the mix is
to test a badly configured parental-agent.
There are tests for DS publication, DS publication error handling,
DS withdrawal and DS withdrawal error handling.
The tests ensures that the zone is DNSSEC valid, and that the
DSPublish/DSRemoved key metadata is set (or not in case of the error
handling).
It does not test if the rollover continues, this is already tested in
the kasp system test (that uses 'rndc -dnssec checkds' to set the
DSPublish/DSRemoved key metadata).
Add checks for "parental-agents" configuration, checking for the option
being at wrong type of zone (only allowed for primaries and
secondaries), duplicate definitions, duplicate references, and
undefined parental clauses (the name referenced in the zone clause
does not have a matching "parental-agent" clause).