The mechanism was published as RFC 8509. I've briefly looked at diff
between versions -08 and the RFC and did not find significant protocol
change. Quick manual check confirms what we seem to comply with the
published protocol.
Draft was eventually published as RFC 9276 but we did not update our
docs. Also add couple mentions in relevant places in the ARM and
dnssec-signzone man page, mainly around "do not touch" places.
Resolve "SVCB/HTTPS: Bind9 and Dig fail to parse packet if zero SvcPriority and existing SvcParams"
Closes#4704
See merge request isc-projects/bind9!9000
When parsing a zonefile named-checkzone (and others) could loop
infinitely if a directory was $INCLUDED. Record the error and treat
as EOF when looking for multiple errors.
This was found by Eric Sesterhenn from X41.
In nibble mode if the value to be converted was negative the parser
would loop forever. Process the value as an unsigned int instead
of as an int to prevent sign extension when shifting.
This was found by Eric Sesterhenn from X41.
This test is outdated because it tested the 'sig-validity-interval'
option that has been replaced by dnssec-policy's 'signatures-validity',
'signatures-refresh', and 'signatures-jitter' options.
Nevertheless, it tests if the jitter is spread correctly.
Update the test to make use of 'signatures-jitter', set the value
to 1 day (meaning resign in 499 days since 'signatures-validity' is
set to 500 days).
Note that this previously changed erroneously the refresh value to
449 days (should have been 499 days, but that is not allowed by
checkconf, since it is above 90% of 'signatures-validity').
After we have changed the maximum allowed iterations to 51 for signing,
the NSEC3 chain has changed and requires one more NSEC to be returned
in the answer (plus corresponding RRSIG). So the expected number or
records in the authority section is now 8.
If the key is offline and the keymgr runs, it will treat it as a missing key,
and generate a new key (according to the policy). Fix the test by putting
back the KSK temporarily when we run 'rndc loadkeys'.
1. When generating keys, don't set timing metadata. Otherwise keys
are considered to be in use and won't be selected when dnssec-policy
starts a new key rollover.
2. Add an extra check to make sure the new ZSK (zsk2) is prepublished.
Also add a check to make sure it has become active.
3. When using dnssec-settime, add -s to also write to key state files.
The config was recently modified to ensure ns4 won't leak any queries to
root servers. However, the test wasn't executed and it turns out the way
this was handled actually broke the test case. Add our custom root hint
to both of the views to ensure the test can still pass without leaking
any queries.
An RPZ response's SOA record TTL is set to 1 instead of the SOA TTL,
a boolean value is passed on to query_addsoa, which is supposed to be
a TTL value. I don't see what value is appropriate to be used for
overriding, so we will pass UINT32_MAX.
Now that this function also creates the DNSKEY record for the KSKs,
as well as other associated records such as CDS and CDNSKEY, rename
the function to something slightly better.
Creating the KSR happens on the "ZSK side". The KSK is offline and while
the public key and state file may be present, draft-icann-dnssec-keymgmt-01.txt
suggest that the KSR only contains ZSKs.
This is also what knot dns does, so it would also be in the spirit of
interoperability.
The final line in a KSR ";; KeySigningRequest generated at ..." was
missing the version number, that has now been fixed.
Thanks Libor Peltan for reporting.
Petr Špaček
Mark Andrews
Michal Nowak
Nicki Křížek
Matthijs MekkingandNicki Křížek
Tom KrizekandNicki Křížek