When locking key files for a zone, we iterate over all the views and
lock a mutex inside the zone structure. However, if we envounter an
in-view zone, we will try to lock the key files twice, one time for
the home view and one time for the in-view view. This will lead to
a deadlock because one thread is trying to get the same lock twice.
(cherry picked from commit 42c601ae14)
When "max-cache-size" is changed to "unlimited" (or "0") for a running
named instance (using "rndc reconfig"), the hash table size limit for
each affected cache DB is not reset to the maximum possible value,
preventing those hash tables from being allowed to grow as a result of
new nodes being added.
Extend dns_rbt_adjusthashsize() to interpret "size" set to 0 as a signal
to remove any previously imposed limits on the hash table size. Adjust
API documentation for dns_db_adjusthashsize() accordingly. Move the
call to dns_db_adjusthashsize() from dns_cache_setcachesize() so that it
also happens when "size" is set to 0.
(cherry picked from commit 6b77583f54)
Upon creation, each dns_rbt_t structure has its "maxhashbits" field
initialized to the value of the RBT_HASH_MAX_BITS preprocessor macro,
i.e. 32. When the dns_rbt_adjusthashsize() function is called for the
first time for a given RBT (for cache RBTs, this happens when they are
first created, i.e. upon named startup), it lowers the value of the
"maxhashbits" field to the number of bits required to index the
requested number of hash table slots. When a larger hash table size is
subsequently requested, the value of the "maxhashbits" field should be
increased accordingly, up to RBT_HASH_MAX_BITS. However, the loop in
the rehash_bits() function currently ensures that the number of bits
necessary to index the resized hash table will not be larger than
rbt->maxhashbits instead of RBT_HASH_MAX_BITS, preventing the hash table
from being grown once the "maxhashbits" field of a given dns_rbt_t
structure is set to any value lower than RBT_HASH_MAX_BITS.
Fix by tweaking the loop guard condition in the rehash_bits() function
so that it compares the new number of bits used for indexing the hash
table against RBT_HASH_MAX_BITS rather than rbt->maxhashbits.
(cherry picked from commit c096f91451)
The timeout originally picked for "rndc status" invocations (2 seconds)
in the test attempting to reproduce a deadlock caused by running
multiple "rndc addzone", "rndc modzone", and "rndc delzone" commands
concurrently causes intermittent failures of the "addzone" system test
in GitLab CI. Increase the timeout to 10 seconds to make such failures
less probable. Adjust code comments accordingly.
(cherry picked from commit ac4c58e8ce)
When answering a query requires wildcard expansion, the AUTHORITY
section of the response needs to include NSEC(3) record(s) proving that
the QNAME does not exist.
When a response to a query is an insecure delegation, the AUTHORITY
section needs to include an NSEC(3) proof that no DS record exists at
the parent side of the zone cut.
These two conditions combined trip up the NSEC part of the logic
contained in query_addds(), which expects the NS RRset to be owned by
the first name found in the AUTHORITY section of a delegation response.
This may not always be true, for example if wildcard expansion causes an
NSEC record proving QNAME nonexistence to be added to the AUTHORITY
section before the delegation is added to the response. In such a case,
named incorrectly omits the NSEC record proving nonexistence of QNAME
from the AUTHORITY section.
The same block of code is affected by another flaw: if the same NSEC
record proves nonexistence of both the QNAME and the DS record at the
parent side of the zone cut, this NSEC record will be added to the
AUTHORITY section twice.
Fix by looking for the NS RRset in the entire AUTHORITY section and
adding the NSEC record to the delegation using query_addrrset() (which
handles duplicate RRset detection).
(cherry picked from commit 7a87bf468b)
Add a set of system tests which check the contents of the AUTHORITY
section for signed, insecure delegation responses constructed from CNAME
records and wildcards, both for zones using NSEC and NSEC3.
(cherry picked from commit 26ec4b9a89)
Instead of checking the value of the variable modified two lines earlier
(the number of SOA records present at the apex of the old version of the
zone), one of the RUNTIME_CHECK() assertions in zone_postload() checks
the number of SOA records present at the apex of the new version of the
zone, which is already checked before. Fix the assertion by making it
check the correct variable.
(cherry picked from commit 098639dc59)
When named restarts, it will examine signed zones and checks if the
current denial of existence strategy matches the dnssec-policy. If not,
it will schedule to create a new NSEC(3) chain.
However, on startup the zone database may not be read yet, fooling
BIND that the denial of existence chain needs to be created. This
results in a replacement of the previous NSEC(3) chain.
Change the code such that if the NSEC3PARAM lookup failed (the result
did not return in ISC_R_SUCCESS or ISC_R_NOTFOUND), we will try
again later. The nsec3param structure has additional variables to
signal if the lookup is postponed. We also need to save the signal
if an explicit resalt was requested.
In addition to the two added boolean variables, we add a variable to
store the NSEC3PARAM rdata. This may have a yet to be determined salt
value. We can't create the private data yet because there may be a
mismatch in salt length and the NULL salt value.
(cherry picked from commit 0ae3ffdc1c)
