This commit adds points to the CHANGES and the release notes about
supporting remote TLS certificates verification and support for Strict
and Mutual TLS transport connections verification.
Mention that some old cryptographic library versions lack the
functionality to implement ignoring the Subject field (and thus the
Common Name) when establishing DoT connections.
This commit extends the 'doth' system test with a set of Strict/Mutual
TLS related checks.
This commit also makes each doth NS instance use its own TLS
certificate that includes FQDN, IPv4, and IPv6 addresses, issued using
a common Certificate Authority, instead of ad-hoc certs.
Extend servers initialisation timeout to 60 seconds to improve the
tests stability in the CI as certain configurations could fail to
initialise on time under load.
This commit updates the reference manual with short descriptions of
different TLS authentication modes, as mentioned in the RFC 9103,
Section 9.3 (Opportunistic TLS, Strict TLS, Mutual TLS), and mentions
how these authentication modes can be achieved via BIND's
configuration file.
This commit adds support for Strict/Mutual TLS into BIND. It does so
by implementing the backing code for 'hostname' and 'ca-file' options
of the 'tls' statement. The commit also updates the documentation
accordingly.
This commit adds support for Strict/Mutual TLS to dig.
The new command-line options and their behaviour are modelled after
kdig (+tls-ca, +tls-hostname, +tls-certfile, +tls-keyfile) for
compatibility reasons. That is, using +tls-* is sufficient to enable
DoT in dig, implying +tls-ca
If there is no other DNS transport specified via command-line,
specifying any of +tls-* options makes dig use DoT. In this case, its
behaviour is the same as if +tls-ca is specified: that is, the remote
peer's certificate is verified using the platform-specific
intermediate CA certificates store. This behaviour is introduced for
compatibility with kdig.
This commit adds support for ISC_R_TLSBADPEERCERT error code, which is
supposed to be used to signal for TLS peer certificates verification
in dig and other code.
The support for this error code is added to our TLS and TLS DNS
implementations.
This commit also adds isc_nm_verify_tls_peer_result_string() function
which is supposed to be used to get a textual description of the
reason for getting a ISC_R_TLSBADPEERCERT error.
This commit adds support for keeping CA certificates stores associated
with TLS contexts. The intention is to keep one reusable store per a
set of related TLS contexts.
This commit adds a set of functions that can be used to implement
Strict and Mutual TLS:
* isc_tlsctx_load_client_ca_names();
* isc_tlsctx_load_certificate();
* isc_tls_verify_peer_result_string();
* isc_tlsctx_enable_peer_verification().
This commit adds a set of high-level utility functions to manipulate
the certificate stores. The stores are needed to implement TLS
certificates verification efficiently.
There is a possible code path of using the uninitialized `bname`
character array while logging an error message.
Initialize the `bname` buffer earlier in the function.
Also, change the initialization routine to use a helper function.
A successful call to `dns_rdata_tostruct()` expects an accompanying
call to `dns_rdata_freestruct()` to free up any memory that could have
been allocated during the first call.
In catz.c there are several places where `dns_rdata_freestruct()` call
is skipped.
Add the missing cleanup routines.
Because of the "goto" in the "if" body the "else" part is unnecessary
and adds another level of indentation.
Cleanup the code to not have the "else" part.
Catz logs a warning message when it is told to modify a zone which was
not added by the current catalog zone.
When logging a warning, distinguish the two cases when the zone
was not added by a catalog zone at all, and when the zone was
added by a different catalog zone.
The dnssec-settime -p and -up options print times in asctime() and
UNIX time_t formats, respectively. The asctime() format can also be
found inside K*.key public key files. Key files also contain times in
the YYYYMMDDHHMMSS format that can be used in timing parameter
options.
The dnssec-settime -p and -up time formats are now acceptable in
timing parameter options to dnssec-settime and dnssec-keygen, so it is
no longer necessary to parse key files to retrieve times that are
acceptable in timing parameter options.
The way the ns_client_t .shuttingdown member was practically dead code.
The .shuttingdown would be set to true only in ns__client_put() function
meaning that we have detached from all ns_client_t .*handles and the
ns_client_t object being freed:
client->magic = 0;
client->shuttingdown = true;
[...]
isc_mem_put(manager->ctx, client, sizeof(*client))
Meanwhile the ns_client_t object is accessed like this:
isc_nmhandle_detach(&client->fetchhandle);
client->query.attributes &= ~NS_QUERYATTR_RECURSING;
client->state = NS_CLIENTSTATE_WORKING;
qctx_init(client, &devent, 0, &qctx);
client_shuttingdown = ns_client_shuttingdown(client);
if (fetch_canceled || fetch_answered || client_shuttingdown) {
[...]
}
Even if the isc_nmhandle_detach(...) was the last handle detach, it
would mean that immediatelly, after calling the isc_nmhandle_detach(),
we would be causing use-after-free, because the ns_client_t is
immediatelly destroyed after setting .shuttingdown to true.
The similar code in the query_hookresume() already noticed this:
/*
* This event is running under a client task, so it's safe to detach
* the fetch handle. And it should be done before resuming query
* processing below, since that may trigger another recursion or
* asynchronous hook event.
*/
Previously, it was possible to assign a bit of memory space in the
nmhandle to store the client data. This was complicated and prevents
further refactoring of isc_nmhandle_t caching (future work).
Instead of caching the data in the nmhandle, allocate the hot-path
ns_client_t objects from per-thread clientmgr memory context and just
assign it to the isc_nmhandle_t via isc_nmhandle_set().
The ns_client_t is always attached to ns_clientmgr_t which has
associated memory context, server context, task and threadid. Use those
directly from the ns_clientmgr_t instead of attaching it to an extra
copy in ns_client_t to make the ns_client_t more sleek and lean.
Additionally, remove some stray ns_client_t struct members that were not
used anywhere.
Some ancient versions of clang reported uninitialized memory use false
positive (see https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14461). Since clang
4.0.1 has been long obsoleted, just remove the workarounds.
Historically, the inline keyword was a strong suggestion to the compiler
that it should inline the function marked inline. As compilers became
better at optimising, this functionality has receded, and using inline
as a suggestion to inline a function is obsolete. The compiler will
happily ignore it and inline something else entirely if it finds that's
a better optimisation.
Therefore, remove all the occurences of the inline keyword with static
functions inside single compilation unit and leave the decision whether
to inline a function or not entirely on the compiler
NOTE: We keep the usage the inline keyword when the purpose is to change
the linkage behaviour.
C11 has builtin support for _Noreturn function specifier with
convenience noreturn macro defined in <stdnoreturn.h> header.
Replace ISC_NORETURN macro by C11 noreturn with fallback to
__attribute__((noreturn)) if the C11 support is not complete.
Previously, the unreachable code paths would have to be tagged with:
INSIST(0);
ISC_UNREACHABLE();
There was also older parts of the code that used comment annotation:
/* NOTREACHED */
Unify the handling of unreachable code paths to just use:
UNREACHABLE();
The UNREACHABLE() macro now asserts when reached and also uses
__builtin_unreachable(); when such builtin is available in the compiler.
Gcc 7+ and Clang 10+ have implemented __attribute__((fallthrough)) which
is explicit version of the /* FALLTHROUGH */ comment we are currently
using.
Add and apply FALLTHROUGH macro that uses the attribute if available,
but does nothing on older compilers.
In one case (lib/dns/zone.c), using the macro revealed that we were
using the /* FALLTHROUGH */ comment in wrong place, remove that comment.
Instead of passing the "workers" variable back and forth along with
passing the single isc_nm_t instance, add isc_nm_getnworkers() function
that returns the number of netmgr threads are running.
Change the ns_interfacemgr and ns_taskmgr to utilize the newly acquired
knowledge.
From an attacker's point of view, a VLA declaration is essentially a
primitive for performing arbitrary arithmetic on the stack pointer. If
the attacker can control the size of a VLA they have a very powerful
tool for causing memory corruption.
To mitigate this kind of attack, and the more general class of stack
clash vulnerabilities, C compilers insert extra code when allocating a
VLA to probe the growing stack one page at a time. If these probes hit
the stack guard page, the program will crash.
From the point of view of a C programmer, there are a few things to
consider about VLAs:
* If it is important to handle allocation failures in a controlled
manner, don't use VLAs. You can use VLAs if it is OK for
unreasonable inputs to cause an uncontrolled crash.
* If the VLA is known to be smaller than some known fixed size,
use a fixed size array and a run-time check to ensure it is large
enough. This will be more efficient than the compiler's stack
probes that need to cope with arbitrary-size VLAs.
* If the VLA might be large, allocate it on the heap. The heap
allocator can allocate multiple pages in one shot, whereas the
stack clash probes work one page at a time.
Most of the existing uses of VLAs in BIND are in test code where they
are benign, but there was one instance in `named`, in the GSS-TSIG
verification code, which has now been removed.
This commit adjusts the style guide and the C compiler flags to allow
VLAs in test code but not elsewhere.
In the GSS-TSIG verification code there was an alarming
variable-length array whose size came off the network, from the
signature in the request. It turned out to be safe, because the caller
had previously checked that the signature had a reasonable size.
However, the safety checks are in the generic TSIG implementation, and
the risky VLA usage was in the GSS-specific code, and they are
separated by the DST indirection layer, so it wasn't immediately
obvious that the risky VLA was in fact safe.
In fact this risky VLA was completely unnecessary, because the GSS
signature can be verified in place without being copied to the stack,
like the message covered by the signature. The `REGION_TO_GBUFFER()`
macro backwardly assigns the region in its left argument to the GSS
buffer in its right argument; this is just a pointer and length
conversion, without copying any data. The `gss_verify_mic()` call uses
both message and signature GSS buffers in a read-only manner.
Artem Boldariev
Artem Boldariev
Arаm Sаrgsyаn
Ondřej Surý
Tony FinchandOndřej Surý
Tony FinchandOndřej Surý
Ondřej SurýandOndřej Surý
Matthijs Mekking