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doc/draft/draft-ietf-dnsop-inaddr-required-06.txt
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draft-ietf-dnsop-inaddr-required-06.txt
INTERNET-DRAFT D. Senie
Category: BCP Amaranth Networks Inc.
Expires in six months February 2005
Encouraging the use of DNS IN-ADDR Mapping
Status of this Memo
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of RFC 3668.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
<http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt>http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
<http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html>http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
Abstract
Mapping of addresses to names has been a feature of DNS. Many sites,
implement it, many others don't. Some applications attempt to use it
as a part of a security strategy. The goal of this document is to
encourage proper deployment of address to name mappings, and provide
guidance for their use.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society. (2005)
1. Introduction
The Domain Name Service has provision for providing mapping of IP
addresses to host names. It is common practice to ensure both name to
address, and address to name mappings are provided for networks. This
practice, while documented, has never been required, though it is
generally encouraged. This document both encourages the presence of
Senie [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Encouraging the use of DNS IN-ADDR Mapping February 2005
these mappings and discourages reliance on such mappings for security
checks.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. Discussion
From the early days of the Domain Name Service [RFC883] a special
domain has been set aside for resolving mappings of IP addresses to
domain names. This was refined in [RFC1035], describing the .IN-
ADDR.ARPA in use today. For the in the IPv6 address space, .IP6.ARPA
was added [RFC3152]. This document uses IPv4 CIDR block sizes and
allocation strategy where there are differences and uses IPv4
terminology. Aside from these differences, this document can and
should be applied to both address spaces.
The assignment of blocks of IP address space was delegated to three
regional registries. Guidelines for the registries are specified in
[RFC2050], which requires regional registries to maintain IN-ADDR
records on the large blocks of space issued to ISPs and others.
ARIN's policy requires ISPs to maintain IN-ADDR for /16 or larger
allocations. For smaller allocations, ARIN can provide IN-ADDR for
/24 and shorter prefixes. [ARIN]. APNIC provides methods for ISPs to
update IN-ADDR, however the present version of its policy document
for IPv4 [APNIC] dropped the IN-ADDR requirements that were in draft
copies of this document. As of this writing, it appears APNIC has no
actual policy on IN-ADDR. RIPE appears to have the strongest policy
in this area [RIPE302] indicating Local Internet Registries should
provide IN-ADDR services, and delegate those as appropriate when
address blocks are delegated.
As we can see, the regional registries have their own policies for
recommendations and/or requirements for IN-ADDR maintenance. It
should be noted, however, that many address blocks were allocated
before the creation of the regional registries, and thus it is
unclear whether any of the policies of the registries are binding on
those who hold blocks from that era.
Registries allocate address blocks on CIDR [RFC1519] boundaries.
Unfortunately the IN-ADDR zones are based on classful allocations.
Guidelines [RFC2317] for delegating on non-octet-aligned boundaries
exist, but are not always implemented.
3. Examples of impact of missing IN-ADDR
Senie [Page 2]
Internet-Draft Encouraging the use of DNS IN-ADDR Mapping February 2005
These are some examples of problems that may be introduced by
reliance on IN-ADDR.
Some applications use DNS lookups for security checks. To ensure
validity of claimed names, some applications will look up IN-ADDR
records to get names, and then look up the resultant name to see if
it maps back to the address originally known. Failure to resolve
matching names is seen as a potential security concern.
Some FTP sites will flat-out reject users, even for anonymous FTP, if
the IN-ADDR lookup fails or if the result of the IN-ADDR lookup when
itself resolved, does not match. Some Telnet servers also implement
this check.
Web sites are in some cases using IN-ADDR checks to verify whether
the client is located within a certain geopolitical entity. This
approach has been employed for downloads of crypto software, for
example, where export of that software is prohibited to some locales.
Credit card anti-fraud systems also use these methods for geographic
placement purposes.
The popular TCP Wrappers program found on most Unix and Linux systems
has options to enforce IN-ADDR checks and to reject any client that
does not resolve. This program also has a way to check to see that
the name given by a PTR record then resolves back to the same IP
address. This method provdes more comfort but no appreciable
additional security.
Some anti-spam (anti junk email) systems use IN-ADDR to verify the
presence of a PTR record, or validate the PTR value points back to
the same address.
Many web servers look up the IN-ADDR of visitors to be used in log
analysis. This adds to the server load, but in the case of IN-ADDR
unavailability, it can lead to delayed responses for users.
Traceroutes with descriptive IN-ADDR naming proves useful when
debugging problems spanning large areas. When this information is
missing, the traceroutes take longer, and it takes additional steps
to determine that network is the cause of problems.
Wider-scale implementation of IN-ADDR on dialup, wireless access and
other such client-oriented portions of the Internet would result in
lower latency for queries (due to lack of negative caching), and
lower name server load and DNS traffic.
4. Recommendations
Senie [Page 3]
Internet-Draft Encouraging the use of DNS IN-ADDR Mapping February 2005
4.1 Delegation Recommendations
Regional Registries and any Local Registries to whom they delegate
should establish and convey a policy to those to whom they delegate
blocks that IN-ADDR mappings are recommended. Policies should
recommend those receiving delegations to provide IN-ADDR service
and/or delegate to downstream customers.
Network operators should define and implement policies and procedures
which delegate IN-ADDR to their clients who wish to run their own IN-
ADDR DNS services, and provide IN-ADDR services for those who do not
have the resources to do it themselves. Delegation mechanisms should
permit the downstream customer to implement and comply with IETF
recommendations application of IN-ADDR to CIDR [RFC2317].
All IP address space assigned and in use should be resolved by IN-
ADDR records. All PTR records must use canonical names.
All IP addresses in use within a block should have an IN-ADDR
mapping. Those addresses not in use, and those that are not valid for
use (zeros or ones broadcast addresses within a CIDR block) need not
have mappings.
It should be noted that due to CIDR, many addresses that appear to be
otherwise valid host addresses may actually be zeroes or ones
broadcast addresses. As such, attempting to audit a site's degree of
compliance may only be done with knowledge of the internal subnet
architecture of the site. It can be assumed, however, any host that
originates an IP packet necessarily will have a valid host address,
and must therefore have an IN-ADDR mapping.
4.2 Application Recommendations
Applications SHOULD NOT rely on IN-ADDR for proper operation. The use
of IN-ADDR, sometimes in conjunction with a lookup of the name
resulting from the PTR record provides no real security, can lead to
erroneous results and generally just increases load on DNS servers.
Further, in cases where address block holders fail to properly
configure IN-ADDR, users of those blocks are penalized.
5. Security Considerations
This document has no negative impact on security. While it could be
argued that lack of PTR record capabilities provides a degree of
anonymity, this is really not valid. Trace routes, whois lookups and
other sources will still provide methods for discovering identity.
Senie [Page 4]
Internet-Draft Encouraging the use of DNS IN-ADDR Mapping February 2005
By recommending applications avoid using IN-ADDR as a security
mechanism this document points out that this practice, despite its
use by many applications, is an ineffective form of security.
Applications should use better mechanisms of authentication.
6. IANA Considerations
There are no IANA considerations for this document.
7. References
7.1 Normative References
[RFC883] P.V. Mockapetris, "Domain names: Implementation
specification," RFC883, November 1983.
[RFC1035] P.V. Mockapetris, "Domain Names: Implementation
Specification," RFC 1035, November 1987.
[RFC1519] V. Fuller, et. al., "Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR):
an Address Assignment and Aggregation Strategy," RFC 1519, September
1993.
[RFC2026] S. Bradner, "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3",
RFC 2026, BCP 9, October 1996.
[RFC2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997.
[RFC2050] K. Hubbard, et. al., "Internet Registry IP Allocation
Guidelines", RFC2050, BCP 12, Novebmer 1996.
[RFC2317] H. Eidnes, et. al., "Classless IN-ADDR.ARPA delegation,"
RFC 2317, March 1998.
[RFC3152] R. Bush, "Delegation of IP6.ARPA," RFC 3152, BCP 49, August
2001.
7.2 Informative References
[ARIN] "ISP Guidelines for Requesting Initial IP Address Space," date
unknown,
<http://www.arin.net/regserv/initial-isp.html>http://www.arin.net/regserv/initial-isp.html
[APNIC] "Policies For IPv4 Address Space Management in the Asia
Pacific Region," APNIC-086, 13 January 2003.
[RIPE302] "Policy for Reverse Address Delegation of IPv4 and IPv6
Address Space in the RIPE NCC Service Region", RIPE-302, April 26,
Senie [Page 5]
Internet-Draft Encouraging the use of DNS IN-ADDR Mapping February 2005
2004.
<http://www.ripe.net//ripe/docs/rev-del.html>http://www.ripe.net//ripe/docs/rev-del.html
8. Acknowledgements
Thanks to Peter Koch and Gary Miller for their input, and to many
people who encouraged me to write this document.
9. Author's Address
Daniel Senie
Amaranth Networks Inc.
324 Still River Road
Bolton, MA 01740
Phone: (978) 779-5100
EMail: <mailto:dts@senie.com>dts@senie.com
10. Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). This document is
subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in
BCP 78 and except as set forth therein, the authors retain
all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided
on an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE
REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND
THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES,
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT
THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR
ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A
PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Intellectual Property
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed
to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology
described in this document or the extent to which any license
under such rights might or might not be available; nor does it
represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any
such rights. Information on the procedures with respect to
rights in RFC documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
Senie [Page 6]
Internet-Draft Encouraging the use of DNS IN-ADDR Mapping February 2005
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use
of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository
at <http://www.ietf.org/ipr>http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention
any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other
proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required
to implement this standard. Please address the information to the
IETF at <mailto:ietf-ipr@ietf.org>ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
Acknowledgement
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
Internet Society.
Senie [Page 7]

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@@ -0,0 +1,396 @@
INTERNET-DRAFT D. Senie
Category: BCP Amaranth Networks Inc.
Expires in six months July 2005
Encouraging the use of DNS IN-ADDR Mapping
draft-ietf-dnsop-inaddr-required-07.txt
Status of this Memo
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
Abstract
Mapping of addresses to names has been a feature of DNS. Many sites,
implement it, many others don't. Some applications attempt to use it
as a part of a security strategy. The goal of this document is to
encourage proper deployment of address to name mappings, and provide
guidance for their use.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society. (2005)
1. Introduction
The Domain Name Service has provision for providing mapping of IP
addresses to host names. It is common practice to ensure both name to
address, and address to name mappings are provided for networks. This
practice, while documented, has never been required, though it is
generally encouraged. This document both encourages the presence of
Senie [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Encouraging the use of DNS IN-ADDR Mapping July 2005
these mappings and discourages reliance on such mappings for security
checks.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. Discussion
From the early days of the Domain Name Service [RFC883] a special
domain has been set aside for resolving mappings of IP addresses to
domain names. This was refined in [RFC1035], describing the .IN-
ADDR.ARPA in use today. For the in the IPv6 address space, .IP6.ARPA
was added [RFC3152]. This document uses IPv4 CIDR block sizes and
allocation strategy where there are differences and uses IPv4
terminology. Aside from these differences, this document can and
should be applied to both address spaces.
The assignment of blocks of IP address space was delegated to three
regional registries. Guidelines for the registries are specified in
[RFC2050], which requires regional registries to maintain IN-ADDR
records on the large blocks of space issued to ISPs and others.
ARIN's policy requires ISPs to maintain IN-ADDR for /16 or larger
allocations. For smaller allocations, ARIN can provide IN-ADDR for
/24 and shorter prefixes. [ARIN]. APNIC provides methods for ISPs to
update IN-ADDR, however the present version of its policy document
for IPv4 [APNIC] dropped the IN-ADDR requirements that were in draft
copies of this document. As of this writing, it appears APNIC has no
actual policy on IN-ADDR. RIPE appears to have the strongest policy
in this area [RIPE302] indicating Local Internet Registries should
provide IN-ADDR services, and delegate those as appropriate when
address blocks are delegated.
As we can see, the regional registries have their own policies for
recommendations and/or requirements for IN-ADDR maintenance. It
should be noted, however, that many address blocks were allocated
before the creation of the regional registries, and thus it is
unclear whether any of the policies of the registries are binding on
those who hold blocks from that era.
Registries allocate address blocks on CIDR [RFC1519] boundaries.
Unfortunately the IN-ADDR zones are based on classful allocations.
Guidelines [RFC2317] for delegating on non-octet-aligned boundaries
exist, but are not always implemented.
3. Examples of impact of missing IN-ADDR
Senie [Page 2]
Internet-Draft Encouraging the use of DNS IN-ADDR Mapping July 2005
These are some examples of problems that may be introduced by
reliance on IN-ADDR.
Some applications use DNS lookups for security checks. To ensure
validity of claimed names, some applications will look up IN-ADDR
records to get names, and then look up the resultant name to see if
it maps back to the address originally known. Failure to resolve
matching names is seen as a potential security concern.
Some FTP sites will flat-out reject users, even for anonymous FTP, if
the IN-ADDR lookup fails or if the result of the IN-ADDR lookup when
itself resolved, does not match. Some Telnet servers also implement
this check.
Web sites are in some cases using IN-ADDR checks to verify whether
the client is located within a certain geopolitical entity. This
approach has been employed for downloads of crypto software, for
example, where export of that software is prohibited to some locales.
Credit card anti-fraud systems also use these methods for geographic
placement purposes.
The popular TCP Wrappers program found on most Unix and Linux systems
has options to enforce IN-ADDR checks and to reject any client that
does not resolve. This program also has a way to check to see that
the name given by a PTR record then resolves back to the same IP
address. This method provdes more comfort but no appreciable
additional security.
Some anti-spam (anti junk email) systems use IN-ADDR to verify the
presence of a PTR record, or validate the PTR value points back to
the same address.
Many web servers look up the IN-ADDR of visitors to be used in log
analysis. This adds to the server load, but in the case of IN-ADDR
unavailability, it can lead to delayed responses for users.
Traceroutes with descriptive IN-ADDR naming proves useful when
debugging problems spanning large areas. When this information is
missing, the traceroutes take longer, and it takes additional steps
to determine that network is the cause of problems.
Wider-scale implementation of IN-ADDR on dialup, wireless access and
other such client-oriented portions of the Internet would result in
lower latency for queries (due to lack of negative caching), and
lower name server load and DNS traffic.
4. Recommendations
Senie [Page 3]
Internet-Draft Encouraging the use of DNS IN-ADDR Mapping July 2005
4.1 Delegation Recommendations
Regional Registries and any Local Registries to whom they delegate
should establish and convey a policy to those to whom they delegate
blocks that IN-ADDR mappings are recommended. Policies should
recommend those receiving delegations to provide IN-ADDR service
and/or delegate to downstream customers.
Network operators should define and implement policies and procedures
which delegate IN-ADDR to their clients who wish to run their own IN-
ADDR DNS services, and provide IN-ADDR services for those who do not
have the resources to do it themselves. Delegation mechanisms should
permit the downstream customer to implement and comply with IETF
recommendations application of IN-ADDR to CIDR [RFC2317].
All IP address space assigned and in use should be resolved by IN-
ADDR records. All PTR records must use canonical names.
All IP addresses in use within a block should have an IN-ADDR
mapping. Those addresses not in use, and those that are not valid for
use (zeros or ones broadcast addresses within a CIDR block) need not
have mappings.
It should be noted that due to CIDR, many addresses that appear to be
otherwise valid host addresses may actually be zeroes or ones
broadcast addresses. As such, attempting to audit a site's degree of
compliance may only be done with knowledge of the internal subnet
architecture of the site. It can be assumed, however, any host that
originates an IP packet necessarily will have a valid host address,
and must therefore have an IN-ADDR mapping.
4.2 Application Recommendations
Applications SHOULD NOT rely on IN-ADDR for proper operation. The use
of IN-ADDR, sometimes in conjunction with a lookup of the name
resulting from the PTR record provides no real security, can lead to
erroneous results and generally just increases load on DNS servers.
Further, in cases where address block holders fail to properly
configure IN-ADDR, users of those blocks are penalized.
5. Security Considerations
This document has no negative impact on security. While it could be
argued that lack of PTR record capabilities provides a degree of
anonymity, this is really not valid. Trace routes, whois lookups and
other sources will still provide methods for discovering identity.
Senie [Page 4]
Internet-Draft Encouraging the use of DNS IN-ADDR Mapping July 2005
By recommending applications avoid using IN-ADDR as a security
mechanism this document points out that this practice, despite its
use by many applications, is an ineffective form of security.
Applications should use better mechanisms of authentication.
6. IANA Considerations
There are no IANA considerations for this document.
7. References
7.1 Normative References
[RFC883] P.V. Mockapetris, "Domain names: Implementation
specification," RFC883, November 1983.
[RFC1035] P.V. Mockapetris, "Domain Names: Implementation
Specification," RFC 1035, November 1987.
[RFC1519] V. Fuller, et. al., "Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR):
an Address Assignment and Aggregation Strategy," RFC 1519, September
1993.
[RFC2026] S. Bradner, "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3",
RFC 2026, BCP 9, October 1996.
[RFC2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997.
[RFC2050] K. Hubbard, et. al., "Internet Registry IP Allocation
Guidelines", RFC2050, BCP 12, Novebmer 1996.
[RFC2317] H. Eidnes, et. al., "Classless IN-ADDR.ARPA delegation,"
RFC 2317, March 1998.
[RFC3152] R. Bush, "Delegation of IP6.ARPA," RFC 3152, BCP 49, August
2001.
7.2 Informative References
[ARIN] "ISP Guidelines for Requesting Initial IP Address Space," date
unknown, http://www.arin.net/regserv/initial-isp.html
[APNIC] "Policies For IPv4 Address Space Management in the Asia
Pacific Region," APNIC-086, 13 January 2003.
[RIPE302] "Policy for Reverse Address Delegation of IPv4 and IPv6
Address Space in the RIPE NCC Service Region", RIPE-302, April 26,
Senie [Page 5]
Internet-Draft Encouraging the use of DNS IN-ADDR Mapping July 2005
2004. http://www.ripe.net//ripe/docs/rev-del.html
8. Acknowledgements
Thanks to Peter Koch and Gary Miller for their input, and to many
people who encouraged me to write this document.
9. Author's Address
Daniel Senie
Amaranth Networks Inc.
324 Still River Road
Bolton, MA 01740
Phone: (978) 779-5100
EMail: dts@senie.com
10. Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided
on an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE
REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND
THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES,
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT
THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR
ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A
PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Intellectual Property
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed
to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology
described in this document or the extent to which any license
under such rights might or might not be available; nor does it
represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any
such rights. Information on the procedures with respect to
rights in RFC documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Senie [Page 6]
Internet-Draft Encouraging the use of DNS IN-ADDR Mapping July 2005
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use
of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository
at http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention
any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other
proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required
to implement this standard. Please address the information to the
IETF at ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its
working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of
six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by
other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use
Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other
than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be
accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
Acknowledgement
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
Internet Society.
Senie [Page 7]

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@@ -2,18 +2,18 @@
Network Working Group S. Woolf
Internet-Draft Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.
Expires: January 16, 2005 D. Conrad
Expires: September 14, 2005 D. Conrad
Nominum, Inc.
July 18, 2004
March 13, 2005
Identifying an Authoritative Name `Server
draft-ietf-dnsop-serverid-02
Identifying an Authoritative Name Server
draft-ietf-dnsop-serverid-04
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is subject to all provisions
of section 3 of RFC 3667. By submitting this Internet-Draft, each
of Section 3 of RFC 3667. By submitting this Internet-Draft, each
author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of
which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of
which he or she become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with
@@ -29,17 +29,17 @@ Status of this Memo
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://
www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 16, 2005.
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 14, 2005.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
Abstract
@@ -48,18 +48,18 @@ Abstract
IP address, it is sometimes difficult to tell which of a pool of name
servers has answered a particular query. A standardized mechanism to
determine the identity of a name server responding to a particular
query would be useful, particularly as a diagnostic aid. Existing ad
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query would be useful, particularly as a diagnostic aid. Existing ad
hoc mechanisms for addressing this concern are not adequate. This
document attempts to describe the common ad hoc solution to this
problem, including its advantages and disadvantasges, and to
problem, including its advantages and disadvantages, and to
characterize an improved mechanism.
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1. Introduction
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2. Rationale
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balancing solutions, including the use of shared unicast addresses as
documented in [RFC3258].
An unfortunate side effect of these load balancing solutions is that
traditional methods of determining which server is responding can be
unreliable. Specifically, non-DNS methods such as ICMP ping, TCP
connections, or non-DNS UDP packets (e.g., as generated by tools such
as "traceroute"), etc., can end up going to a different server than
that which receives the DNS queries.
An unfortunate side effect of these load balancing solutions, and
some changes in management practices as the public Internet has
evolved, is that traditional methods of determining which server is
responding can be unreliable. Specifically, non-DNS methods such as
ICMP ping, TCP connections, or non-DNS UDP packets (such as those
generated by tools such as "traceroute"), etc., can end up going to a
different server than that which receives the DNS queries.
The widespread use of the existing convention suggests a need for a
documented, interoperable means of querying the identity of a
nameserver that may be part of an anycast or load-balancing cluster.
At the same time, however, it also has some drawbacks that argue
against standardizing it as it's been practiced so far.
There is a well-known and frequently-used technique for determining
an identity for a nameserver more specific than the
possibly-non-unique "server that answered my query". The widespread
use of the existing convention suggests a need for a documented,
interoperable means of querying the identity of a nameserver that may
be part of an anycast or load-balancing cluster. At the same time,
however, it also has some drawbacks that argue against standardizing
it as it's been practiced so far.
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3. Existing Conventions
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For reference, the other well-known name used by recent versions of
BIND within the CHAOS class "BIND." domain is "VERSION.BIND." A
query for a TXT RR for this name will return an administratively re-
definable string which defaults to the version of the server
responding.
query for a TXT RR for this name will return an administratively
defined string which defaults to the version of the server
responding. This is, however, not generally implemented by other
vendors.
3.1 Advantages
There are several valuable attributes to this mechanism, which
account for its usefulness.
1. This mechanism is within the DNS protocol itself. An
identification mechanism that relies on the DNS protocol is more
likely to be successful (although not guaranteed) in going to the
same machine as a "normal" DNS query.
2. It is simple to configure. An administrator can easily turn on
1. The "hostname.bind" query response mechanism is within the DNS
protocol itself. An identification mechanism that relies on the
DNS protocol is more likely to be successful (although not
guaranteed) in going to the same machine as a "normal" DNS query.
2. Since the identity information is requested and returned within
the DNS protocol, it doesn't require allowing any other query
mechanism to the server, such as holes in firewalls for
otherwise-unallowed ICMP Echo requests. Thus it does not require
any special exceptions to site security policy.
3. It is simple to configure. An administrator can easily turn on
this feature and control the results of the relevant query.
3. It allows the administrator complete control of what information
4. It allows the administrator complete control of what information
is given out in the response, minimizing passive leakage of
implementation or configuration details. Such details are often
considered sensitive by infrastructure operators.
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At the same time, there are some forbidding drawbacks to the
VERSION.BIND mechanism that argue against standardizing it as it
currently operates.
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1. It requires an additional query to correlate between the answer
to a DNS query under normal conditions and the supposed identity
of the server receiving the query. There are a number of
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2. It reserves an entire class in the DNS (CHAOS) for what amounts
to one zone. While CHAOS class is defined in [RFC1034] and
[RFC1035], it's not clear that supporting it solely for this
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purpose is a good use of the namespace or of implementation
effort.
3. It is implementation specific. BIND is one DNS implementation.
At the time of this writing, it is probably the most prevalent,
for authoritative servers anyway. This does not justify
standardizing on its ad hoc solution to a problem shared across
many operators and implementors.
At the time of this writing, it is probably the most prevalent
for authoritative servers. This does not justify standardizing
on its ad hoc solution to a problem shared across many operators
and implementors.
The first of the listed disadvantages is technically the most
serious. It argues for an attempt to design a good answer to the
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4. Characteristics of an Implementation Neutral Convention
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information to be part of a normal, operational query. It SHOULD
also permit a separate, dedicated query for the server's
identifying information.
2. The new mechanism should not require dedicated namespaces or
2. The new mechanism SHOULD not require dedicated namespaces or
other reserved values outside of the existing protocol mechanisms
for these, i.e. the OPT pseudo-RR.
for these, i.e. the OPT pseudo-RR. In particular, it should not
propagate the existing drawback of requiring support for a CLASS
and top level domain in the authoritative server (or the querying
tool) to be useful.
3. Support for the identification functionality SHOULD be easy to
implement and easy to enable. It MUST be easy to disable and
SHOULD lend itself to access controls on who can query for it.
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5. IANA Considerations
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6. Security Considerations
Providing identifying information as to which server is responding
can be seen as information leakage and thus a security risk. This
motivates the suggestion above that a new mechanism for server
identification allow the administrator to disable the functionality
altogether or partially restrict availability of the data. It also
suggests that the serverid data should not be readily correlated with
a hostname or unicast IP address that may be considered private to
the nameserver operator's management infrastructure.
Providing identifying information as to which server is responding to
a particular query from a particular location in the Internet can be
seen as information leakage and thus a security risk. This motivates
the suggestion above that a new mechanism for server identification
allow the administrator to disable the functionality altogether or
partially restrict availability of the data. It also suggests that
the serverid data should not be readily correlated with a hostname or
unicast IP address that may be considered private to the nameserver
operator's management infrastructure.
Propagation of protocol or service meta-data can sometimes expose the
application to denial of service or other attack. As DNS is a
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7. Acknowledgements
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Berkeley Internet Name Daemon package. Comments and questions on
earlier drafts were provided by Bob Halley, Brian Wellington, Andreas
Gustafsson, Ted Hardie, Chris Yarnell, Randy Bush, and members of the
ICANN Root Server System Advisory Committee. The newest draft takes
a significantly different direction from previous versions, owing to
discussion among contributors to the DNSOP working group and others,
particularly Olafur Gudmundsson, Ed Lewis, Bill Manning, Sam Weiler,
and Rob Austein.
ICANN Root Server System Advisory Committee. The newest version
takes a significantly different direction from previous versions,
owing to discussion among contributors to the DNSOP working group and
others, particularly Olafur Gudmundsson, Ed Lewis, Bill Manning, Sam
Weiler, and Rob Austein.
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Intellectual Property Statement
@@ -599,7 +598,7 @@ Disclaimer of Validity
Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). This document is subject
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). This document is subject
to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
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