This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'v9_2'.

This commit is contained in:
cvs2git
2005-04-01 05:35:02 +00:00
20 changed files with 14833 additions and 0 deletions
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The following machines, at least today seem to have LOC
records:
*.cpod.fr (for instance www.cpod.fr)
130.104.3.*
195.202.193.*
Melanie.Tolna.Net
204.92.254.*
mail.vitts.com
alink.net
caida.org
ckdhr.com
distributed.net (rc5stats.distributed.net)
nikhef.nl
yahoo.com
nic.af
$Id: ADDRESSES,v 1.1 2005/04/01 05:34:59 marka Exp $
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Just for info, can be out of date.
RFC 1876, 5.2, specially 5.2.3
Important points:
- LOC RRs are always attached to a *name*.
- we can have two (or more) RRs for one address, one more specific than the other
main
if (host is a name)
getLOCbyname
else # host is an IP address
gethostbyaddr
if (name)
getLOCbyname
# If there is none, do not search. We assume the above was sufficient # (But check 5.2.2)
else
getLOCbyaddress
getLOCbyname (host)
get LOC for host
if (it exists)
OK
else
get all A records of the name
foreach A record
getLOCbyaddress
OK at the first one found
# we assume they are consistent
END
getLOCbyaddress (address)
# May receive a mask. Otherwise, deduce it from the class
makeNetAddress
getLOCbynetwork
getLOCbynetwork
get PTR and A for it
if (exist)
getLOCbyname
******* DIFFICULT : we have to manage a stack. See the code
makeNetAddress (level--)
getLOCbynetwork
else
END
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Type './configure', then 'make' and (as root if necessary) 'make
install'.
It requires a recent libresolv, with loc_ntoa, but use an alternative
which I provide, if not found.
Tested on Linux (i386 and Alpha), Solaris (Sparc) and Digital Unix (Alpha).
$Id: INSTALL,v 1.1 2005/04/01 05:34:59 marka Exp $
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# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.1 2005/04/01 05:34:59 marka Exp $
CC=@CC@
CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
LIBS=@LIBS@
DESTDIR=@prefix@
BINDIR=@prefix@/bin
MANDIR=@prefix@/share/man/man1
DISTRIB= README INSTALL ALGO USAGE ADDRESSES Makefile.in configure configure.in config.h.in install-sh loc.h loc.c query-loc.c loc_ntoa.c query-loc.1
OBJS=query-loc.o loc.o @LOC_NTOA@
VERSION=`grep VERSION loc.h | cut -d ' ' -f 3 | sed s/\"//g`
all: query-loc
query-loc: $(OBJS)
$(CC) -o $@ $(OBJS) $(LIBS)
%.o: %.c loc.h
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c $<
clean:
rm -f *.o query-loc *~
distclean: clean
rm -f config.h config.cache config.log config.status Makefile
distrib: clean
./reconf
@(echo Query-Loc is version ${VERSION}; \
mkdir query-loc-${VERSION}; \
cp $(DISTRIB) query-loc-${VERSION};\
tar cvf query-loc-${VERSION}.tar query-loc-${VERSION}; \
rm -rf query-loc-${VERSION}; \
gzip -v -9 -f query-loc-${VERSION}.tar);
install:
@INSTALL@ -m 0755 query-loc $(BINDIR)
if [ ! -d $(MANDIR) ]; then \
mkdir $(MANDIR); \
fi
@INSTALL@ -m 0644 query-loc.1 $(MANDIR)
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query-loc: a program to retrieve and display the location
information in the DNS.
It uses the algorithms described in
RFC 1876 (and RFC 1101 to get the network names).
You can find examples of networks wchich implement this scheme
in the ADDRESSES file.
It is under the General Public Licence (GPL, which
you can fetch from <http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html>.
Copyright Stéphane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@debian.org>, 1998.
Thanks to Paul Vixie for the RFC and its encouragements. Thanks
to Björn Augustsson for the xtraceroute program
<http://www.dtek.chalmers.se/~d3august/xt/>.
$Id: README,v 1.1 2005/04/01 05:34:59 marka Exp $
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query-loc [-v] [-d nnn] host-name-or-address
Examples of hosts with LOCation info (quite uncommon, if you know more,
please tell me):
- Everything in the 193.105.79.0 network, such as www.humanite.presse.fr
- Everything in the 192.88.144 network, such as www.kei.com
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/* config.h.in. Generated from configure.in by autoheader. */
/* $Id: config.h.in,v 1.1 2005/04/01 05:35:00 marka Exp $ */
/* Define to 1 if you have the <inttypes.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_INTTYPES_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `resolv' library (-lresolv). */
#undef HAVE_LIBRESOLV
/* Define to 1 if you have the <memory.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_MEMORY_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <stdint.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_STDINT_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <stdlib.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_STDLIB_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <strings.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_STRINGS_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <string.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_STRING_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/stat.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/types.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <unistd.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_UNISTD_H
/* Define to the address where bug reports for this package should be sent. */
#undef PACKAGE_BUGREPORT
/* Define to the full name of this package. */
#undef PACKAGE_NAME
/* Define to the full name and version of this package. */
#undef PACKAGE_STRING
/* Define to the one symbol short name of this package. */
#undef PACKAGE_TARNAME
/* Define to the version of this package. */
#undef PACKAGE_VERSION
/* The size of a `char', as computed by sizeof. */
#undef SIZEOF_CHAR
/* The size of a `int', as computed by sizeof. */
#undef SIZEOF_INT
/* The size of a `long', as computed by sizeof. */
#undef SIZEOF_LONG
/* The size of a `short', as computed by sizeof. */
#undef SIZEOF_SHORT
/* Define to 1 if you have the ANSI C header files. */
#undef STDC_HEADERS
/* Define to empty if `const' does not conform to ANSI C. */
#undef const
/* Is there a loc_ntoa on this system? */
#undef HAVE_LOC_NTOA
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dnl Process this file with autoconf to produce a configure script.
AC_RELEASE("$Id: configure.in,v 1.1 2005/04/01 05:35:00 marka Exp $")
AC_INIT(query-loc.c)
dnl Checks for programs.
AC_PROG_CC
if test "$GCC" = "yes"; then
CFLAGS="${CFLAGS} -Wall"
fi
AC_PROG_INSTALL
dnl Checks for libraries.
AC_CHECK_LIB(resolv, res_query)
dnl Checks for header files.
AC_HEADER_STDC
AC_CONFIG_HEADER(config.h)
AC_CHECK_HEADER(resolv.h, , AC_MSG_ERROR("No headers for name service applications"))
AC_CHECK_HEADER(arpa/nameser.h, , AC_MSG_ERROR("No headers for name service applications"))
AC_CHECK_HEADER(sys/time.h, , AC_MSG_ERROR("Mandatory header missing on your system"))
AC_CHECK_HEADER(unistd.h, , AC_MSG_ERROR("Mandatory header missing on your system"))
dnl This one is only useful for Solaris?
AC_MSG_CHECKING(if libnsl is mandatory)
AC_TRY_LINK([#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/nameser.h>
#include <resolv.h>
union
{
HEADER hdr;
u_char buf[4096]; /* With RFC 2671, otherwise 512 is enough */
}
response;
char *domain;
int requested_type; ],
[res_query(domain,
C_IN,
requested_type,
(u_char *) & response,
sizeof (response)) ], dnl
[AC_MSG_RESULT(no)], dnl
[AC_MSG_RESULT(yes); LIBS="${LIBS} -lnsl"])
dnl Check for the loc_ntoa macro/function
AC_MSG_CHECKING(loc_ntoa)
AC_TRY_LINK([#include <resolv.h>], dnl
[u_char *cp; char *result; loc_ntoa(cp, result)], dnl
[AC_MSG_RESULT(yes); AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LOC_NTOA)], dnl
[AC_MSG_RESULT([no, using the alternative]); LOC_NTOA=loc_ntoa.o])
AC_SUBST(LOC_NTOA)
dnl Checks for typedefs, structures, and compiler characteristics.
AC_C_CONST
AC_CHECK_SIZEOF(long)
AC_CHECK_SIZEOF(int)
AC_CHECK_SIZEOF(short)
AC_CHECK_SIZEOF(char)
dnl Misc.
AC_OUTPUT(Makefile)
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#!/bin/sh
#
# install - install a program, script, or datafile
# This comes from X11R5 (mit/util/scripts/install.sh).
#
# Copyright 1991 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
#
# Permission to use, copy, modify, distribute, and sell this software and its
# documentation for any purpose is hereby granted without fee, provided that
# the above copyright notice appear in all copies and that both that
# copyright notice and this permission notice appear in supporting
# documentation, and that the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or
# publicity pertaining to distribution of the software without specific,
# written prior permission. M.I.T. makes no representations about the
# suitability of this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is"
# without express or implied warranty.
#
# Calling this script install-sh is preferred over install.sh, to prevent
# `make' implicit rules from creating a file called install from it
# when there is no Makefile.
#
# This script is compatible with the BSD install script, but was written
# from scratch. It can only install one file at a time, a restriction
# shared with many OS's install programs.
# set DOITPROG to echo to test this script
# Don't use :- since 4.3BSD and earlier shells don't like it.
doit="${DOITPROG-}"
# put in absolute paths if you don't have them in your path; or use env. vars.
mvprog="${MVPROG-mv}"
cpprog="${CPPROG-cp}"
chmodprog="${CHMODPROG-chmod}"
chownprog="${CHOWNPROG-chown}"
chgrpprog="${CHGRPPROG-chgrp}"
stripprog="${STRIPPROG-strip}"
rmprog="${RMPROG-rm}"
mkdirprog="${MKDIRPROG-mkdir}"
transformbasename=""
transform_arg=""
instcmd="$mvprog"
chmodcmd="$chmodprog 0755"
chowncmd=""
chgrpcmd=""
stripcmd=""
rmcmd="$rmprog -f"
mvcmd="$mvprog"
src=""
dst=""
dir_arg=""
while [ x"$1" != x ]; do
case $1 in
-c) instcmd="$cpprog"
shift
continue;;
-d) dir_arg=true
shift
continue;;
-m) chmodcmd="$chmodprog $2"
shift
shift
continue;;
-o) chowncmd="$chownprog $2"
shift
shift
continue;;
-g) chgrpcmd="$chgrpprog $2"
shift
shift
continue;;
-s) stripcmd="$stripprog"
shift
continue;;
-t=*) transformarg=`echo $1 | sed 's/-t=//'`
shift
continue;;
-b=*) transformbasename=`echo $1 | sed 's/-b=//'`
shift
continue;;
*) if [ x"$src" = x ]
then
src=$1
else
# this colon is to work around a 386BSD /bin/sh bug
:
dst=$1
fi
shift
continue;;
esac
done
if [ x"$src" = x ]
then
echo "install: no input file specified"
exit 1
else
true
fi
if [ x"$dir_arg" != x ]; then
dst=$src
src=""
if [ -d $dst ]; then
instcmd=:
chmodcmd=""
else
instcmd=mkdir
fi
else
# Waiting for this to be detected by the "$instcmd $src $dsttmp" command
# might cause directories to be created, which would be especially bad
# if $src (and thus $dsttmp) contains '*'.
if [ -f $src -o -d $src ]
then
true
else
echo "install: $src does not exist"
exit 1
fi
if [ x"$dst" = x ]
then
echo "install: no destination specified"
exit 1
else
true
fi
# If destination is a directory, append the input filename; if your system
# does not like double slashes in filenames, you may need to add some logic
if [ -d $dst ]
then
dst="$dst"/`basename $src`
else
true
fi
fi
## this sed command emulates the dirname command
dstdir=`echo $dst | sed -e 's,[^/]*$,,;s,/$,,;s,^$,.,'`
# Make sure that the destination directory exists.
# this part is taken from Noah Friedman's mkinstalldirs script
# Skip lots of stat calls in the usual case.
if [ ! -d "$dstdir" ]; then
defaultIFS='
'
IFS="${IFS-${defaultIFS}}"
oIFS="${IFS}"
# Some sh's can't handle IFS=/ for some reason.
IFS='%'
set - `echo ${dstdir} | sed -e 's@/@%@g' -e 's@^%@/@'`
IFS="${oIFS}"
pathcomp=''
while [ $# -ne 0 ] ; do
pathcomp="${pathcomp}${1}"
shift
if [ ! -d "${pathcomp}" ] ;
then
$mkdirprog "${pathcomp}"
else
true
fi
pathcomp="${pathcomp}/"
done
fi
if [ x"$dir_arg" != x ]
then
$doit $instcmd $dst &&
if [ x"$chowncmd" != x ]; then $doit $chowncmd $dst; else true ; fi &&
if [ x"$chgrpcmd" != x ]; then $doit $chgrpcmd $dst; else true ; fi &&
if [ x"$stripcmd" != x ]; then $doit $stripcmd $dst; else true ; fi &&
if [ x"$chmodcmd" != x ]; then $doit $chmodcmd $dst; else true ; fi
else
# If we're going to rename the final executable, determine the name now.
if [ x"$transformarg" = x ]
then
dstfile=`basename $dst`
else
dstfile=`basename $dst $transformbasename |
sed $transformarg`$transformbasename
fi
# don't allow the sed command to completely eliminate the filename
if [ x"$dstfile" = x ]
then
dstfile=`basename $dst`
else
true
fi
# Make a temp file name in the proper directory.
dsttmp=$dstdir/#inst.$$#
# Move or copy the file name to the temp name
$doit $instcmd $src $dsttmp &&
trap "rm -f ${dsttmp}" 0 &&
# and set any options; do chmod last to preserve setuid bits
# If any of these fail, we abort the whole thing. If we want to
# ignore errors from any of these, just make sure not to ignore
# errors from the above "$doit $instcmd $src $dsttmp" command.
if [ x"$chowncmd" != x ]; then $doit $chowncmd $dsttmp; else true;fi &&
if [ x"$chgrpcmd" != x ]; then $doit $chgrpcmd $dsttmp; else true;fi &&
if [ x"$stripcmd" != x ]; then $doit $stripcmd $dsttmp; else true;fi &&
if [ x"$chmodcmd" != x ]; then $doit $chmodcmd $dsttmp; else true;fi &&
# Now rename the file to the real destination.
$doit $rmcmd -f $dstdir/$dstfile &&
$doit $mvcmd $dsttmp $dstdir/$dstfile
fi &&
exit 0
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#include "loc.h"
/* $Id: loc.c,v 1.1 2005/04/01 05:35:00 marka Exp $ */
/* Global variables */
short rr_errno;
/*
Prints the actual usage
*/
void
usage ()
{
(void) fprintf (stderr,
"Usage: %s: [-v] [-d nnn] hostname\n", progname);
exit (2);
}
/*
Panics
*/
void
panic (message)
char *message;
{
(void) fprintf (stderr,
"%s: %s\n", progname, message);
exit (2);
}
/*
** IN_ADDR_ARPA -- Convert dotted quad string to reverse in-addr.arpa
** ------------------------------------------------------------------
**
** Returns:
** Pointer to appropriate reverse in-addr.arpa name
** with trailing dot to force absolute domain name.
** NULL in case of invalid dotted quad input string.
*/
#ifndef ARPA_ROOT
#define ARPA_ROOT "in-addr.arpa"
#endif
char *
in_addr_arpa (dottedquad)
char *dottedquad; /* input string with dotted quad */
{
static char addrbuf[4 * 4 + sizeof (ARPA_ROOT) + 2];
unsigned int a[4];
register int n;
n = sscanf (dottedquad, "%u.%u.%u.%u", &a[0], &a[1], &a[2], &a[3]);
switch (n)
{
case 4:
(void) sprintf (addrbuf, "%u.%u.%u.%u.%s.",
a[3] & 0xff, a[2] & 0xff, a[1] & 0xff, a[0] & 0xff, ARPA_ROOT);
break;
case 3:
(void) sprintf (addrbuf, "%u.%u.%u.%s.",
a[2] & 0xff, a[1] & 0xff, a[0] & 0xff, ARPA_ROOT);
break;
case 2:
(void) sprintf (addrbuf, "%u.%u.%s.",
a[1] & 0xff, a[0] & 0xff, ARPA_ROOT);
break;
case 1:
(void) sprintf (addrbuf, "%u.%s.",
a[0] & 0xff, ARPA_ROOT);
break;
default:
return (NULL);
}
while (--n >= 0)
if (a[n] > 255)
return (NULL);
return (addrbuf);
}
/*
Returns a human-readable version of the LOC information or
NULL if it failed. Argument is a name (of a network or a machine)
and a boolean telling is it is a network name or a machine name.
*/
char *
getlocbyname (name, is_network)
const char *name;
short is_network;
{
char *result;
struct list_in_addr *list, *p;
result = findRR (name, T_LOC);
if (result != NULL)
{
if (debug >= 2)
printf ("LOC record found for the name %s\n", name);
return result;
}
else
{
if (!is_network)
{
list = findA (name);
if (debug >= 2)
printf ("No LOC record found for the name %s, trying addresses\n", name);
if (list != NULL)
{
for (p = list; p != NULL; p = p->next)
{
if (debug >= 2)
printf ("Trying address %s\n", inet_ntoa (p->addr));
result = getlocbyaddr (p->addr, NULL);
if (result != NULL)
return result;
}
return NULL;
}
else
{
if (debug >= 2)
printf (" No A record found for %s\n", name);
return NULL;
}
}
else
{
if (debug >= 2)
printf ("No LOC record found for the network name %s\n", name);
return NULL;
}
}
}
/*
Returns a human-readable version of the LOC information or
NULL if it failed. Argument is an IP address.
*/
char *
getlocbyaddr (addr, mask)
const struct in_addr addr;
const struct in_addr *mask;
{
struct in_addr netaddr;
u_int32_t a;
struct in_addr themask;
char *text_addr, *text_mask;
if (mask == NULL)
{
themask.s_addr = (u_int32_t) 0;
}
else
{
themask = *mask;
}
text_addr = (char *) malloc (256);
text_mask = (char *) malloc (256);
strcpy (text_addr, inet_ntoa (addr));
strcpy (text_mask, inet_ntoa (themask));
if (debug >= 2)
printf ("Testing address %s/%s\n", text_addr, text_mask);
if (mask == NULL)
{
a = ntohl (addr.s_addr);
if (IN_CLASSA (a))
{
netaddr.s_addr = htonl (a & IN_CLASSA_NET);
}
else if (IN_CLASSB (a))
{
netaddr.s_addr = htonl (a & IN_CLASSB_NET);
}
else if (IN_CLASSC (a))
{
netaddr.s_addr = htonl (a & IN_CLASSC_NET);
}
else
{
/* Error */
}
return getlocbynet (in_addr_arpa (inet_ntoa (netaddr)), addr, mask);
}
else
{
netaddr.s_addr = addr.s_addr & themask.s_addr;
return getlocbynet (in_addr_arpa (inet_ntoa (netaddr)), addr, mask);
}
}
/*
Returns a human-readable LOC.
Argument is a network name in the 0.z.y.x.in-addr.arpa format
and the original address
*/
char *
getlocbynet (name, addr, mask)
char *name;
struct in_addr addr;
struct in_addr *mask;
{
char *network;
char *result, *result_int;
struct list_in_addr *list;
if (debug >= 2)
printf ("Testing network %s\n", name);
network = findRR (name, T_PTR);
if (network == NULL)
{
if (debug >= 2)
printf ("No name for network %s\n", name);
return NULL;
}
else
{
result = getlocbyname (network, TRUE);
list = findA (network);
if (list == NULL)
{
return result;
}
else if ((mask != NULL) &&
((mask->s_addr) == (list->addr.s_addr)))
{
/* Already checked */
return result;
}
else
{
result_int = getlocbyaddr (addr, &list->addr);
if (result_int == NULL)
return result;
else
return result_int;
}
}
}
/*
The code for these two functions is stolen from the examples in Liu and Albitz
book "DNS and BIND" (O'Reilly).
*/
/****************************************************************
* skipName -- This routine skips over a domain name. If the *
* domain name expansion fails, it crashes. *
* dn_skipname() is probably not on your manual *
* page; it is similar to dn_expand() except that it just *
* skips over the name. dn_skipname() is in res_comp.c if *
* you need to find it. *
****************************************************************/
int
skipName (cp, endOfMsg)
u_char *cp;
u_char *endOfMsg;
{
int n;
if ((n = dn_skipname (cp, endOfMsg)) < 0)
{
panic ("dn_skipname failed\n");
}
return (n);
}
/****************************************************************
* skipToData -- This routine advances the cp pointer to the *
* start of the resource record data portion. On the way, *
* it fills in the type, class, ttl, and data length *
****************************************************************/
int
skipToData (cp, type, class, ttl, dlen, endOfMsg)
u_char *cp;
u_short *type;
u_short *class;
u_int32_t *ttl;
u_short *dlen;
u_char *endOfMsg;
{
u_char *tmp_cp = cp; /* temporary version of cp */
/* Skip the domain name; it matches the name we looked up */
tmp_cp += skipName (tmp_cp, endOfMsg);
/*
* Grab the type, class, and ttl. GETSHORT and GETLONG
* are macros defined in arpa/nameser.h.
*/
GETSHORT (*type, tmp_cp);
GETSHORT (*class, tmp_cp);
GETLONG (*ttl, tmp_cp);
GETSHORT (*dlen, tmp_cp);
return (tmp_cp - cp);
}
/*
Returns a human-readable version of a DNS RR (resource record)
associated with the name 'domain'.
If it does not find, ir returns NULL and sets rr_errno to explain why.
The code for this function is stolen from the examples in Liu and Albitz
book "DNS and BIND" (O'Reilly).
*/
char *
findRR (domain, requested_type)
char *domain;
int requested_type;
{
char *result, *message;
union
{
HEADER hdr; /* defined in resolv.h */
u_char buf[PACKETSZ]; /* defined in arpa/nameser.h */
}
response; /* response buffers */
short found = 0;
int responseLen; /* buffer length */
u_char *cp; /* character pointer to parse DNS packet */
u_char *endOfMsg; /* need to know the end of the message */
u_short class; /* classes defined in arpa/nameser.h */
u_short type; /* types defined in arpa/nameser.h */
u_int32_t ttl; /* resource record time to live */
u_short dlen; /* size of resource record data */
int i, count, dup; /* misc variables */
char *ptrList[1];
int ptrNum = 0;
struct in_addr addr;
result = (char *) malloc (256);
message = (char *) malloc (256);
/*
* Look up the records for the given domain name.
* We expect the domain to be a fully qualified name, so
* we use res_query(). If we wanted the resolver search
* algorithm, we would have used res_search() instead.
*/
if ((responseLen =
res_query (domain, /* the domain we care about */
C_IN, /* Internet class records */
requested_type, /* Look up name server records */
(u_char *) & response, /*response buffer */
sizeof (response))) /*buffer size */
< 0)
{ /*If negative */
rr_errno = h_errno;
return NULL;
}
/*
* Keep track of the end of the message so we don't
* pass it while parsing the response. responseLen is
* the value returned by res_query.
*/
endOfMsg = response.buf + responseLen;
/*
* Set a pointer to the start of the question section,
* which begins immediately AFTER the header.
*/
cp = response.buf + sizeof (HEADER);
/*
* Skip over the whole question section. The question
* section is comprised of a name, a type, and a class.
* QFIXEDSZ (defined in arpa/nameser.h) is the size of
* the type and class portions, which is fixed. Therefore,
* we can skip the question section by skipping the
* name (at the beginning) and then advancing QFIXEDSZ.
* After this calculation, cp points to the start of the
* answer section, which is a list of NS records.
*/
cp += skipName (cp, endOfMsg) + QFIXEDSZ;
count = ntohs (response.hdr.ancount) +
ntohs (response.hdr.nscount);
while ((--count >= 0) /* still more records */
&& (cp < endOfMsg))
{ /* still inside the packet */
/* Skip to the data portion of the resource record */
cp += skipToData (cp, &type, &class, &ttl, &dlen, endOfMsg);
if (type == requested_type)
{
switch (requested_type)
{
case (T_LOC):
loc_ntoa (cp, result);
return result;
break;
case (T_PTR):
ptrList[ptrNum] = (char *) malloc (MAXDNAME);
if (ptrList[ptrNum] == NULL)
{
panic ("Malloc failed");
}
if (dn_expand (response.buf, /* Start of the packet */
endOfMsg, /* End of the packet */
cp, /* Position in the packet */
(u_char *) ptrList[ptrNum], /* Result */
MAXDNAME) /* size of ptrList buffer */
< 0)
{ /* Negative: error */
panic ("dn_expand failed");
}
/*
* Check the name we've just unpacked and add it to
* the list if it is not a duplicate.
* If it is a duplicate, just ignore it.
*/
for (i = 0, dup = 0; (i < ptrNum) && !dup; i++)
dup = !strcasecmp (ptrList[i], ptrList[ptrNum]);
if (dup)
free (ptrList[ptrNum]);
else
ptrNum++;
strcpy (result, ptrList[0]);
return result;
break;
case (T_A):
bcopy ((char *) cp, (char *) &addr, INADDRSZ);
strcat (result, " ");
strcat (result, inet_ntoa (addr));
found = 1;
break;
default:
sprintf (message, "Unexpected type %u", requested_type);
panic (message);
}
}
/* Advance the pointer over the resource record data */
cp += dlen;
} /* end of while */
if (found)
return result;
else
return NULL;
}
struct list_in_addr *
findA (domain)
char *domain;
{
struct list_in_addr *result, *end;
union
{
HEADER hdr; /* defined in resolv.h */
u_char buf[PACKETSZ]; /* defined in arpa/nameser.h */
}
response; /* response buffers */
int responseLen; /* buffer length */
u_char *cp; /* character pointer to parse DNS packet */
u_char *endOfMsg; /* need to know the end of the message */
u_short class; /* classes defined in arpa/nameser.h */
u_short type; /* types defined in arpa/nameser.h */
u_int32_t ttl; /* resource record time to live */
u_short dlen; /* size of resource record data */
int count; /* misc variables */
struct in_addr addr;
end = NULL;
result = NULL;
/*
* Look up the records for the given domain name.
* We expect the domain to be a fully qualified name, so
* we use res_query(). If we wanted the resolver search
* algorithm, we would have used res_search() instead.
*/
if ((responseLen =
res_query (domain, /* the domain we care about */
C_IN, /* Internet class records */
T_A,
(u_char *) & response, /*response buffer */
sizeof (response))) /*buffer size */
< 0)
{ /*If negative */
rr_errno = h_errno;
return NULL;
}
/*
* Keep track of the end of the message so we don't
* pass it while parsing the response. responseLen is
* the value returned by res_query.
*/
endOfMsg = response.buf + responseLen;
/*
* Set a pointer to the start of the question section,
* which begins immediately AFTER the header.
*/
cp = response.buf + sizeof (HEADER);
/*
* Skip over the whole question section. The question
* section is comprised of a name, a type, and a class.
* QFIXEDSZ (defined in arpa/nameser.h) is the size of
* the type and class portions, which is fixed. Therefore,
* we can skip the question section by skipping the
* name (at the beginning) and then advancing QFIXEDSZ.
* After this calculation, cp points to the start of the
* answer section, which is a list of NS records.
*/
cp += skipName (cp, endOfMsg) + QFIXEDSZ;
count = ntohs (response.hdr.ancount) +
ntohs (response.hdr.nscount);
while ((--count >= 0) /* still more records */
&& (cp < endOfMsg))
{ /* still inside the packet */
/* Skip to the data portion of the resource record */
cp += skipToData (cp, &type, &class, &ttl, &dlen, endOfMsg);
if (type == T_A)
{
bcopy ((char *) cp, (char *) &addr, INADDRSZ);
if (end == NULL)
{
result = (void *) malloc (sizeof (struct list_in_addr));
result->addr = addr;
result->next = NULL;
end = result;
}
else
{
end->next = (void *) malloc (sizeof (struct list_in_addr));
end = end->next;
end->addr = addr;
end->next = NULL;
}
}
/* Advance the pointer over the resource record data */
cp += dlen;
} /* end of while */
return result;
}
+78
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@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
/* $Id: loc.h,v 1.1 2005/04/01 05:35:00 marka Exp $ */
#define VERSION "0.3.0"
#include "config.h"
/* Probably too many inclusions but this is to keep 'gcc -Wall' happy... */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <arpa/nameser.h>
#include <resolv.h>
#ifndef FALSE
#define FALSE 0
#endif
#ifndef TRUE
#define TRUE 1
#endif
#if SIZEOF_LONG == 4
#define u_int32_t unsigned long
#ifndef int32_t
#define int32_t long
#endif
#else
#define u_int32_t unsigned int
#ifndef int32_t
#define int32_t int
#endif
#endif
#if SIZEOF_CHAR == 1
#define u_int8_t unsigned char
#ifndef int8_t
#define int8_t char
#endif
#else
#if SIZEOF_SHORT == 1
#define u_int8_t unsigned short
#ifndef int8_t
#define int8_t short
#endif
#else
#error "No suitable native type for storing bytes"
#endif
#endif
#ifndef INADDR_NONE
#define INADDR_NONE (in_addr_t)-1
#endif
struct list_in_addr
{
struct in_addr addr;
void *next;
};
void usage ();
void panic ();
char *getlocbyname ();
char *getlocbyaddr ();
char *getlocbynet ();
char *findRR ();
struct list_in_addr *findA ();
extern char *progname;
extern short debug;
+248
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
/* Stolen from BIND */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1985
* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* This product includes software developed by the University of
* California, Berkeley and its contributors.
* 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/*
* Portions Copyright (c) 1993 by Digital Equipment Corporation.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies, and that
* the name of Digital Equipment Corporation not be used in advertising or
* publicity pertaining to distribution of the document or software without
* specific, written prior permission.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORP. DISCLAIMS ALL
* WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL DIGITAL EQUIPMENT
* CORPORATION BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR
* PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS
* ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS
* SOFTWARE.
*/
/*
* Portions Copyright (c) 1995 by International Business Machines, Inc.
*
* International Business Machines, Inc. (hereinafter called IBM) grants
* permission under its copyrights to use, copy, modify, and distribute this
* Software with or without fee, provided that the above copyright notice and
* all paragraphs of this notice appear in all copies, and that the name of IBM
* not be used in connection with the marketing of any product incorporating
* the Software or modifications thereof, without specific, written prior
* permission.
*
* To the extent it has a right to do so, IBM grants an immunity from suit
* under its patents, if any, for the use, sale or manufacture of products to
* the extent that such products are used for performing Domain Name System
* dynamic updates in TCP/IP networks by means of the Software. No immunity is
* granted for any product per se or for any other function of any product.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", AND IBM DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES,
* INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
* PARTICULAR PURPOSE. IN NO EVENT SHALL IBM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL,
* DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER ARISING
* OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN
* IF IBM IS APPRISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
*/
/*
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-1999 by Internet Software Consortium.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM DISCLAIMS
* ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTERNET SOFTWARE
* CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR
* PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS
* ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS
* SOFTWARE.
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <arpa/nameser.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <math.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <resolv.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
#include "loc.h"
const char *precsize_ntoa();
/* takes an on-the-wire LOC RR and formats it in a human readable format. */
const char *
loc_ntoa(binary, ascii)
const u_char *binary;
char *ascii;
{
static char *error = "?";
static char tmpbuf[sizeof
"1000 60 60.000 N 1000 60 60.000 W -12345678.00m 90000000.00m 90000000.00m 90000000.00m"];
const u_char *cp = binary;
int latdeg, latmin, latsec, latsecfrac;
int longdeg, longmin, longsec, longsecfrac;
char northsouth, eastwest;
int altmeters, altfrac, altsign;
const u_int32_t referencealt = 100000 * 100;
int32_t latval, longval, altval;
u_int32_t templ;
u_int8_t sizeval, hpval, vpval, versionval;
char *sizestr, *hpstr, *vpstr;
versionval = *cp++;
if (ascii == NULL)
ascii = tmpbuf;
if (versionval) {
(void) sprintf(ascii, "; error: unknown LOC RR version");
return (ascii);
}
sizeval = *cp++;
hpval = *cp++;
vpval = *cp++;
GETLONG(templ, cp);
latval = (templ - ((unsigned)1<<31));
GETLONG(templ, cp);
longval = (templ - ((unsigned)1<<31));
GETLONG(templ, cp);
if (templ < referencealt) { /* below WGS 84 spheroid */
altval = referencealt - templ;
altsign = -1;
} else {
altval = templ - referencealt;
altsign = 1;
}
if (latval < 0) {
northsouth = 'S';
latval = -latval;
} else
northsouth = 'N';
latsecfrac = latval % 1000;
latval = latval / 1000;
latsec = latval % 60;
latval = latval / 60;
latmin = latval % 60;
latval = latval / 60;
latdeg = latval;
if (longval < 0) {
eastwest = 'W';
longval = -longval;
} else
eastwest = 'E';
longsecfrac = longval % 1000;
longval = longval / 1000;
longsec = longval % 60;
longval = longval / 60;
longmin = longval % 60;
longval = longval / 60;
longdeg = longval;
altfrac = altval % 100;
altmeters = (altval / 100) * altsign;
if ((sizestr = strdup(precsize_ntoa(sizeval))) == NULL)
sizestr = error;
if ((hpstr = strdup(precsize_ntoa(hpval))) == NULL)
hpstr = error;
if ((vpstr = strdup(precsize_ntoa(vpval))) == NULL)
vpstr = error;
sprintf(ascii,
"%d %.2d %.2d.%.3d %c %d %.2d %.2d.%.3d %c %d.%.2dm %sm %sm %sm",
latdeg, latmin, latsec, latsecfrac, northsouth,
longdeg, longmin, longsec, longsecfrac, eastwest,
altmeters, altfrac, sizestr, hpstr, vpstr);
if (sizestr != error)
free(sizestr);
if (hpstr != error)
free(hpstr);
if (vpstr != error)
free(vpstr);
return (ascii);
}
static unsigned int poweroften[10] = {1, 10, 100, 1000, 10000, 100000,
1000000,10000000,100000000,1000000000};
/* takes an XeY precision/size value, returns a string representation. */
const char *
precsize_ntoa(prec)
u_int8_t prec;
{
static char retbuf[sizeof "90000000.00"]; /* XXX nonreentrant */
unsigned long val;
int mantissa, exponent;
mantissa = (int)((prec >> 4) & 0x0f) % 10;
exponent = (int)((prec >> 0) & 0x0f) % 10;
val = mantissa * poweroften[exponent];
(void) sprintf(retbuf, "%ld.%.2ld", val/100, val%100);
return (retbuf);
}
+55
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
.\" Hey, EMACS: -*- nroff -*-
.\" First parameter, NAME, should be all caps
.\" Second parameter, SECTION, should be 1-8, maybe w/ subsection
.\" other parameters are allowed: see man(7), man(1)
.TH QUERY-LOC SECTION "January 11, 2005"
.\" Please adjust this date whenever revising the manpage.
.\"
.\" Some roff macros, for reference:
.\" .nh disable hyphenation
.\" .hy enable hyphenation
.\" .ad l left justify
.\" .ad b justify to both left and right margins
.\" .nf disable filling
.\" .fi enable filling
.\" .br insert line break
.\" .sp <n> insert n+1 empty lines
.\" for manpage-specific macros, see man(7)
.SH NAME
query-loc \- to retrieve and display the location information in the DNS
.SH SYNOPSIS
.B query-loc
.RI [-v] [-d nnn] " host"
.SH DESCRIPTION
This manual page documents briefly the
.B query-loc
command.
.PP
.\" TeX users may be more comfortable with the \fB<whatever>\fP and
.\" \fI<whatever>\fP escape sequences to invode bold face and italics,
.\" respectively.
\fBquery-loc\fP is a program to retrieve and display the location
information in the DNS.
It uses the algorithms described in
RFC 1876 (and RFC 1101 to get the network names).
You can find examples of networks wchich implement this scheme
in the ADDRESSES file.
.SH OPTIONS
.TP
.B \-v
Verbose mode.
.TP
.B \-d nnn
Debug mode. Displays the RFC's algorithm
.SH BUGS
Very few hosts have location information.
.SH AUTHOR
This manual page was written by Stephane Bortzmeyer
<bortzmeyer@debian.org>.
.\" $Id: query-loc.1,v 1.1 2005/04/01 05:35:01 marka Exp $
+98
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
#include "loc.h"
/* $Id: query-loc.c,v 1.1 2005/04/01 05:35:01 marka Exp $ */
/* Global variables */
char *progname;
short debug;
int
main (argc, argv)
int argc;
char *argv[];
{
extern char *optarg;
extern int optind;
short verbose = FALSE;
char *host;
char ch;
char *loc = NULL;
struct in_addr addr;
struct hostent *hp;
progname = argv[0];
while ((ch = getopt (argc, argv, "vd:")) != EOF)
{
switch (ch)
{
case 'v':
verbose = TRUE;
break;
case 'd':
debug = atoi (optarg);
if (debug <= 0)
{
(void) fprintf (stderr,
"%s: illegal debug value.\n", progname);
exit (2);
}
break;
default:
usage ();
}
}
argc -= optind;
argv += optind;
if (argc != 1)
{
usage ();
}
if (verbose || debug)
{
printf ("\nThis is %s, version %s.\n\n", progname, VERSION);
}
host = argv[0];
(void) res_init ();
if ((addr.s_addr = inet_addr (host)) == INADDR_NONE)
{
if (debug >= 1)
printf ("%s is a name\n", host);
loc = getlocbyname (host, FALSE);
}
else
{
if (debug >= 1)
printf ("%s is an IP address ", host);
hp = (struct hostent *) gethostbyaddr
((char *) &addr, sizeof (addr), AF_INET);
if (hp)
{
if (debug >= 1)
printf ("and %s is its official name\n",
hp->h_name);
loc = getlocbyname (hp->h_name, FALSE);
}
else
{
if (debug >= 1)
printf ("which has no name\n");
loc = getlocbyaddr (addr, NULL);
}
}
if (loc == NULL)
{
printf ("No LOCation found for %s\n", host);
exit (1);
}
else
{
if (verbose || debug)
printf ("LOCation for %s is ", host);
printf ("%s\n", loc);
exit (0);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,466 @@
INTERNET-DRAFT DSA Information in the DNS
OBSOLETES: RFC 2536 Donald E. Eastlake 3rd
Motorola Laboratories
Expires: September 2005 March 2005
DSA Keying and Signature Information in the DNS
--- ------ --- --------- ----------- -- --- ---
<draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2536bis-dsa-05.txt>
Donald E. Eastlake 3rd
Status of This Document
By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any applicable
patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been disclosed,
or will be disclosed, and any of which I become aware will be
disclosed, in accordance with RFC 3668.
Distribution of this document is unlimited. Comments should be sent
to the DNS extensions working group mailing list
<namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than a "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
Abstract
The standard method of encoding US Government Digital Signature
Algorithm keying and signature information for use in the Domain Name
System is specified.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society 2005. All Rights Reserved.
D. Eastlake 3rd [Page 1]
INTERNET-DRAFT DSA Information in the DNS
Table of Contents
Status of This Document....................................1
Abstract...................................................1
Copyright Notice...........................................1
Table of Contents..........................................2
1. Introduction............................................3
2. DSA Keying Information..................................3
3. DSA Signature Information...............................4
4. Performance Considerations..............................4
5. Security Considerations.................................5
6. IANA Considerations.....................................5
Copyright and Disclaimer...................................5
Normative References.......................................7
Informative References.....................................7
Authors Address............................................8
Expiration and File Name...................................8
D. Eastlake 3rd [Page 2]
INTERNET-DRAFT DSA Information in the DNS
1. Introduction
The Domain Name System (DNS) is the global hierarchical replicated
distributed database system for Internet addressing, mail proxy, and
other information [RFC 1034, 1035]. The DNS has been extended to
include digital signatures and cryptographic keys as described in
[RFC intro, proto, records] and additional work is underway which
would require the storage of keying and signature information in the
DNS.
This document describes how to encode US Government Digital Signature
Algorithm (DSA) keys and signatures in the DNS. Familiarity with the
US Digital Signature Algorithm is assumed [FIPS 186-2, Schneier].
2. DSA Keying Information
When DSA public keys are stored in the DNS, the structure of the
relevant part of the RDATA part of the RR being used is the fields
listed below in the order given.
The period of key validity is not included in this data but is
indicated separately, for example by an RR such as RRSIG which signs
and authenticates the RR containing the keying information.
Field Size
----- ----
T 1 octet
Q 20 octets
P 64 + T*8 octets
G 64 + T*8 octets
Y 64 + T*8 octets
As described in [FIPS 186-2] and [Schneier], T is a key size
parameter chosen such that 0 <= T <= 8. (The meaning if the T octet
is greater than 8 is reserved and the remainder of the data may have
a different format in that case.) Q is a prime number selected at
key generation time such that 2**159 < Q < 2**160. Thus Q is always
20 octets long and, as with all other fields, is stored in "big-
endian" network order. P, G, and Y are calculated as directed by the
[FIPS 186-2] key generation algorithm [Schneier]. P is in the range
2**(511+64T) < P < 2**(512+64T) and thus is 64 + 8*T octets long. G
and Y are quantities modulo P and so can be up to the same length as
P and are allocated fixed size fields with the same number of octets
as P.
During the key generation process, a random number X must be
generated such that 1 <= X <= Q-1. X is the private key and is used
in the final step of public key generation where Y is computed as
D. Eastlake 3rd [Page 3]
INTERNET-DRAFT DSA Information in the DNS
Y = G**X mod P
3. DSA Signature Information
The portion of the RDATA area used for US Digital Signature Algorithm
signature information is shown below with fields in the order they
are listed and the contents of each multi-octet field in "big-endian"
network order.
Field Size
----- ----
T 1 octet
R 20 octets
S 20 octets
First, the data signed must be determined. Then the following steps
are taken, as specified in [FIPS 186-2], where Q, P, G, and Y are as
specified in the public key [Schneier]:
hash = SHA-1 ( data )
Generate a random K such that 0 < K < Q.
R = ( G**K mod P ) mod Q
S = ( K**(-1) * (hash + X*R) ) mod Q
For information on the SHA-1 hash function see [FIPS 180-1] and [RFC
3174].
Since Q is 160 bits long, R and S can not be larger than 20 octets,
which is the space allocated.
T is copied from the public key. It is not logically necessary in
the SIG but is present so that values of T > 8 can more conveniently
be used as an escape for extended versions of DSA or other algorithms
as later standardized.
4. Performance Considerations
General signature generation speeds are roughly the same for RSA [RFC
3110] and DSA. With sufficient pre-computation, signature generation
with DSA is faster than RSA. Key generation is also faster for DSA.
However, signature verification is an order of magnitude slower than
RSA when the RSA public exponent is chosen to be small, as is
recommended for some applications.
D. Eastlake 3rd [Page 4]
INTERNET-DRAFT DSA Information in the DNS
Current DNS implementations are optimized for small transfers,
typically less than 512 bytes including DNS overhead. Larger
transfers will perform correctly and extensions have been
standardized [RFC 2671] to make larger transfers more efficient, it
is still advisable at this time to make reasonable efforts to
minimize the size of RR sets containing keying and/or signature
inforamtion consistent with adequate security.
5. Security Considerations
Keys retrieved from the DNS should not be trusted unless (1) they
have been securely obtained from a secure resolver or independently
verified by the user and (2) this secure resolver and secure
obtainment or independent verification conform to security policies
acceptable to the user. As with all cryptographic algorithms,
evaluating the necessary strength of the key is essential and
dependent on local policy.
The key size limitation of a maximum of 1024 bits ( T = 8 ) in the
current DSA standard may limit the security of DSA. For particular
applications, implementors are encouraged to consider the range of
available algorithms and key sizes.
DSA assumes the ability to frequently generate high quality random
numbers. See [random] for guidance. DSA is designed so that if
biased rather than random numbers are used, high bandwidth covert
channels are possible. See [Schneier] and more recent research. The
leakage of an entire DSA private key in only two DSA signatures has
been demonstrated. DSA provides security only if trusted
implementations, including trusted random number generation, are
used.
6. IANA Considerations
Allocation of meaning to values of the T parameter that are not
defined herein (i.e., > 8 ) requires an IETF standards actions. It
is intended that values unallocated herein be used to cover future
extensions of the DSS standard.
Copyright and Disclaimer
Copyright (C) The Internet Society 2005. This document is subject to
the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78 and except
as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
D. Eastlake 3rd [Page 5]
INTERNET-DRAFT DSA Information in the DNS
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
D. Eastlake 3rd [Page 6]
INTERNET-DRAFT DSA Information in the DNS
Normative References
[FIPS 180-1] - U.S. Federal Information Processing Standard: Secure
Hash Standard, April 1995.
[FIPS 186-2] - U.S. Federal Information Processing Standard: Digital
Signature Standard, 27 January 2000.
[RFC records] - "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
R. Arends, R. Austein, M. Larson, D. Massey, S. Rose, work in
progress, draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records- *.txt.
Informative References
[random] - "Randomness Recommendations for Security", D. Eastlake, S.
Crocker, J. Schiller, work in progress, draft-eastlake-
randomness2-*.txt currently in RFC Editor's queue.
[RFC 1034] - "Domain names - concepts and facilities", P.
Mockapetris, 11/01/1987.
[RFC 1035] - "Domain names - implementation and specification", P.
Mockapetris, 11/01/1987.
[RFC intro] - "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", R.
Arends, M. Larson, R. Austein, D. Massey, S. Rose, work in progress,
draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-intro-*.txt.
[RFC protocol] - "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", R. Arends, M. Larson, R. Austein, D. Massey, S. Rose,
work in progress, draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol-*.txt.
[RFC 2671] - "Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)", P. Vixie, August
1999.
[RFC 3110] - "RSA/SHA-1 SIGs and RSA KEYs in the Domain Name System
(DNS)", D. Eastlake 3rd. May 2001.
[RFC 3174] - "US Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1)", D. Eastlake, P.
Jones, September 2001.
[Schneier] - "Applied Cryptography Second Edition: protocols,
algorithms, and source code in C" (second edition), Bruce Schneier,
1996, John Wiley and Sons, ISBN 0-471-11709-9.
D. Eastlake 3rd [Page 7]
INTERNET-DRAFT DSA Information in the DNS
Authors Address
Donald E. Eastlake 3rd
Motorola Labortories
155 Beaver Street
Milford, MA 01757 USA
Telephone: +1-508-786-7554(w)
EMail: Donald.Eastlake@motorola.com
Expiration and File Name
This draft expires in September 2005.
Its file name is draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2536bis-dsa-05.txt.
D. Eastlake 3rd [Page 8]
@@ -0,0 +1,581 @@
INTERNET-DRAFT Diffie-Hellman Information in the DNS
OBSOLETES: RFC 2539 Donald E. Eastlake 3rd
Motorola Laboratories
Expires: September 2005 March 2005
Storage of Diffie-Hellman Keying Information in the DNS
------- -- -------------- ------ ----------- -- --- ---
<draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2539bis-dhk-05.txt>
Status of This Document
By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any applicable
patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been disclosed,
or will be disclosed, and any of which I become aware will be
disclosed, in accordance with RFC 3668.
Distribution of this document is unlimited. Comments should be sent
to the DNS extensions working group mailing list
<namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than a "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
Abstract
The standard method for encoding Diffie-Hellman keys in the Domain
Name System is specified.
Copyright
Copyright (C) The Internet Society 2005.
D. Eastlake 3rd [Page 1]
INTERNET-DRAFT Diffie-Hellman Information in the DNS
Acknowledgements
Part of the format for Diffie-Hellman keys and the description
thereof was taken from a work in progress by Ashar Aziz, Tom Markson,
and Hemma Prafullchandra. In addition, the following persons
provided useful comments that were incorporated into the predecessor
of this document: Ran Atkinson, Thomas Narten.
Table of Contents
Status of This Document....................................1
Abstract...................................................1
Copyright..................................................1
Acknowledgements...........................................2
Table of Contents..........................................2
1. Introduction............................................3
1.1 About This Document....................................3
1.2 About Diffie-Hellman...................................3
2. Encoding Diffie-Hellman Keying Information..............4
3. Performance Considerations..............................5
4. IANA Considerations.....................................5
5. Security Considerations.................................5
Copyright and Disclaimer...................................5
Normative References.......................................7
Informative Refences.......................................7
Author Address.............................................7
Expiration and File Name...................................8
Appendix A: Well known prime/generator pairs...............9
A.1. Well-Known Group 1: A 768 bit prime..................9
A.2. Well-Known Group 2: A 1024 bit prime.................9
A.3. Well-Known Group 3: A 1536 bit prime................10
D. Eastlake 3rd [Page 2]
INTERNET-DRAFT Diffie-Hellman Information in the DNS
1. Introduction
The Domain Name System (DNS) is the global hierarchical replicated
distributed database system for Internet addressing, mail proxy, and
similar information [RFC 1034, 1035]. The DNS has been extended to
include digital signatures and cryptographic keys as described in
[RFC intro, proto, records] and additonal work is underway which
would use the storage of keying information in the DNS.
1.1 About This Document
This document describes how to store Diffie-Hellman keys in the DNS.
Familiarity with the Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm is assumed
[Schneier, RFC 2631].
1.2 About Diffie-Hellman
Diffie-Hellman requires two parties to interact to derive keying
information which can then be used for authentication. Thus Diffie-
Hellman is inherently a key agreement algorithm. As a result, no
format is defined for Diffie-Hellman "signature information". For
example, assume that two parties have local secrets "i" and "j".
Assume they each respectively calculate X and Y as follows:
X = g**i ( mod p )
Y = g**j ( mod p )
They exchange these quantities and then each calculates a Z as
follows:
Zi = Y**i ( mod p )
Zj = X**j ( mod p )
Zi and Zj will both be equal to g**(i*j)(mod p) and will be a shared
secret between the two parties that an adversary who does not know i
or j will not be able to learn from the exchanged messages (unless
the adversary can derive i or j by performing a discrete logarithm
mod p which is hard for strong p and g).
The private key for each party is their secret i (or j). The public
key is the pair p and g, which must be the same for the parties, and
their individual X (or Y).
For further information about Diffie-Hellman and precautions to take
D. Eastlake 3rd [Page 3]
INTERNET-DRAFT Diffie-Hellman Information in the DNS
in deciding on a p and g, see [RFC 2631].
2. Encoding Diffie-Hellman Keying Information
When Diffie-Hellman keys appear within the RDATA portion of a RR,
they are encoded as shown below.
The period of key validity is not included in this data but is
indicated separately, for example by an RR such as RRSIG which signs
and authenticates the RR containing the keying information.
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| KEY flags | protocol | algorithm=2 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| prime length (or flag) | prime (p) (or special) /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ prime (p) (variable length) | generator length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| generator (g) (variable length) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| public value length | public value (variable length)/
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ public value (g^i mod p) (variable length) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Prime length is the length of the Diffie-Hellman prime (p) in bytes
if it is 16 or greater. Prime contains the binary representation of
the Diffie-Hellman prime with most significant byte first (i.e., in
network order). If "prime length" field is 1 or 2, then the "prime"
field is actually an unsigned index into a table of 65,536
prime/generator pairs and the generator length SHOULD be zero. See
Appedix A for defined table entries and Section 4 for information on
allocating additional table entries. The meaning of a zero or 3
through 15 value for "prime length" is reserved.
Generator length is the length of the generator (g) in bytes.
Generator is the binary representation of generator with most
significant byte first. PublicValueLen is the Length of the Public
Value (g**i (mod p)) in bytes. PublicValue is the binary
representation of the DH public value with most significant byte
first.
D. Eastlake 3rd [Page 4]
INTERNET-DRAFT Diffie-Hellman Information in the DNS
3. Performance Considerations
Current DNS implementations are optimized for small transfers,
typically less than 512 bytes including DNS overhead. Larger
transfers will perform correctly and extensions have been
standardized [RFC 2671] to make larger transfers more efficient. But
it is still advisable at this time to make reasonable efforts to
minimize the size of RR sets containing keying information consistent
with adequate security.
4. IANA Considerations
Assignment of meaning to Prime Lengths of 0 and 3 through 15 requires
an IETF consensus as defined in [RFC 2434].
Well known prime/generator pairs number 0x0000 through 0x07FF can
only be assigned by an IETF standards action. [RFC 2539], the
Proposed Standard predecessor of this document, assigned 0x0001
through 0x0002. This document additionally assigns 0x0003. Pairs
number 0s0800 through 0xBFFF can be assigned based on RFC
documentation. Pairs number 0xC000 through 0xFFFF are available for
private use and are not centrally coordinated. Use of such private
pairs outside of a closed environment may result in conflicts and/or
security failures.
5. Security Considerations
Keying information retrieved from the DNS should not be trusted
unless (1) it has been securely obtained from a secure resolver or
independently verified by the user and (2) this secure resolver and
secure obtainment or independent verification conform to security
policies acceptable to the user. As with all cryptographic
algorithms, evaluating the necessary strength of the key is important
and dependent on security policy.
In addition, the usual Diffie-Hellman key strength considerations
apply. (p-1)/2 should also be prime, g should be primitive mod p, p
should be "large", etc. See [RFC 2631, Schneier].
Copyright and Disclaimer
Copyright (C) The Internet Society 2005. This document is subject to
the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78 and except
as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
D. Eastlake 3rd [Page 5]
INTERNET-DRAFT Diffie-Hellman Information in the DNS
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
D. Eastlake 3rd [Page 6]
INTERNET-DRAFT Diffie-Hellman Information in the DNS
Normative References
[RFC 2631] - "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method", E. Rescorla, June
1999.
[RFC 2434] - "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section
in RFCs", T. Narten, H. Alvestrand, October 1998.
[RFC records] - "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
R. Arends, R. Austein, M. Larson, D. Massey, S. Rose, work in
progress, draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records- *.txt.
Informative Refences
[RFC 1034] - "Domain names - concepts and facilities", P.
Mockapetris, November 1987.
[RFC 1035] - "Domain names - implementation and specification", P.
Mockapetris, November 1987.
[RFC 2539] - "Storage of Diffie-Hellman Keys in the Domain Name
System (DNS)", D. Eastlake, March 1999, obsoleted by this RFC.
[RFC 2671] - "Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)", P. Vixie, August
1999.
[RFC intro] - "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", R.
Arends, M. Larson, R. Austein, D. Massey, S. Rose, work in progress,
draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-intro-*.txt.
[RFC protocol] - "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", R. Arends, M. Larson, R. Austein, D. Massey, S. Rose,
work in progress, draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol-*.txt.
[Schneier] - Bruce Schneier, "Applied Cryptography: Protocols,
Algorithms, and Source Code in C" (Second Edition), 1996, John Wiley
and Sons.
Author Address
Donald E. Eastlake 3rd
Motorola Laboratories
155 Beaver Street
Milford, MA 01757 USA
Telephone: +1-508-786-7554
D. Eastlake 3rd [Page 7]
INTERNET-DRAFT Diffie-Hellman Information in the DNS
EMail: Donald.Eastlake@motorola.com
Expiration and File Name
This draft expires in September 2005.
Its file name is draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2539bis-dhk-05.txt.
D. Eastlake 3rd [Page 8]
INTERNET-DRAFT Diffie-Hellman Information in the DNS
Appendix A: Well known prime/generator pairs
These numbers are copied from the IPSEC effort where the derivation of
these values is more fully explained and additional information is
available.
Richard Schroeppel performed all the mathematical and computational
work for this appendix.
A.1. Well-Known Group 1: A 768 bit prime
The prime is 2^768 - 2^704 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^638 pi] + 149686 }. Its
decimal value is
155251809230070893513091813125848175563133404943451431320235
119490296623994910210725866945387659164244291000768028886422
915080371891804634263272761303128298374438082089019628850917
0691316593175367469551763119843371637221007210577919
Prime modulus: Length (32 bit words): 24, Data (hex):
FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1
29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD
EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245
E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A63A3620 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
Generator: Length (32 bit words): 1, Data (hex): 2
A.2. Well-Known Group 2: A 1024 bit prime
The prime is 2^1024 - 2^960 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^894 pi] + 129093 }.
Its decimal value is
179769313486231590770839156793787453197860296048756011706444
423684197180216158519368947833795864925541502180565485980503
646440548199239100050792877003355816639229553136239076508735
759914822574862575007425302077447712589550957937778424442426
617334727629299387668709205606050270810842907692932019128194
467627007
Prime modulus: Length (32 bit words): 32, Data (hex):
FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1
29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD
EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245
E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED
EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE65381
FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
Generator: Length (32 bit words): 1, Data (hex): 2
D. Eastlake 3rd [Page 9]
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A.3. Well-Known Group 3: A 1536 bit prime
The prime is 2^1536 - 2^1472 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^1406 pi] + 741804 }.
Its decimal value is
241031242692103258855207602219756607485695054850245994265411
694195810883168261222889009385826134161467322714147790401219
650364895705058263194273070680500922306273474534107340669624
601458936165977404102716924945320037872943417032584377865919
814376319377685986952408894019557734611984354530154704374720
774996976375008430892633929555996888245787241299381012913029
459299994792636526405928464720973038494721168143446471443848
8520940127459844288859336526896320919633919
Prime modulus Length (32 bit words): 48, Data (hex):
FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1
29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD
EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245
E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED
EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE45B3D
C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8 FD24CF5F
83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D
670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA237327 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
Generator: Length (32 bit words): 1, Data (hex): 2
D. Eastlake 3rd [Page 10]
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