IAB Technical Comment on the Unique DNS Root
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2782: A DNS RR for specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)
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2825: A Tangled Web: Issues of I18N, Domain Names, and the
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Other Internet protocols
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2826: IAB Technical Comment on the Unique DNS Root
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2845: Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (TSIG)
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2874: DNS Extensions to Support IPv6 Address Aggregation and Renumbering
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2915: The Naming Authority Pointer (NAPTR) DNS Resource Record
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doc/rfc/rfc2826.txt
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doc/rfc/rfc2826.txt
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Network Working Group Internet Architecture Board
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Request for Comments: 2826 May 2000
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Category: Informational
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IAB Technical Comment on the Unique DNS Root
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Status of this Memo
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This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does
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not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this
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memo is unlimited.
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Copyright Notice
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Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved.
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Summary
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To remain a global network, the Internet requires the existence of a
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globally unique public name space. The DNS name space is a
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hierarchical name space derived from a single, globally unique root.
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This is a technical constraint inherent in the design of the DNS.
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Therefore it is not technically feasible for there to be more than
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one root in the public DNS. That one root must be supported by a set
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of coordinated root servers administered by a unique naming
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authority.
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Put simply, deploying multiple public DNS roots would raise a very
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strong possibility that users of different ISPs who click on the same
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link on a web page could end up at different destinations, against
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the will of the web page designers.
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This does not preclude private networks from operating their own
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private name spaces, but if they wish to make use of names uniquely
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defined for the global Internet, they have to fetch that information
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from the global DNS naming hierarchy, and in particular from the
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coordinated root servers of the global DNS naming hierarchy.
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1. Detailed Explanation
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There are several distinct reasons why the DNS requires a single root
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in order to operate properly.
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1.1. Maintenance of a Common Symbol Set
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Effective communications between two parties requires two essential
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preconditions:
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IAB Informational [Page 1]
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RFC 2826 IAB Technical Comment on the Unique DNS Root May 2000
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- The existence of a common symbol set, and
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- The existence of a common semantic interpretation of these
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symbols.
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Failure to meet the first condition implies a failure to communicate
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at all, while failure to meet the second implies that the meaning of
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the communication is lost.
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In the case of a public communications system this condition of a
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common symbol set with a common semantic interpretation must be
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further strengthened to that of a unique symbol set with a unique
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semantic interpretation. This condition of uniqueness allows any
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party to initiate a communication that can be received and understood
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by any other party. Such a condition rules out the ability to define
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a symbol within some bounded context. In such a case, once the
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communication moves out of the context of interpretation in which it
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was defined, the meaning of the symbol becomes lost.
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Within public digital communications networks such as the Internet
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this requirement for a uniquely defined symbol set with a uniquely
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defined meaning exists at many levels, commencing with the binary
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encoding scheme, extending to packet headers and payload formats and
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the protocol that an application uses to interact. In each case a
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variation of the symbol set or a difference of interpretation of the
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symbols being used within the interaction causes a protocol failure,
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and the communication fails. The property of uniqueness allows a
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symbol to be used unambiguously in any context, allowing the symbol
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to be passed on, referred to, and reused, while still preserving the
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meaning of the original use.
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The DNS fulfills an essential role within the Internet protocol
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environment, allowing network locations to be referred to using a
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label other than a protocol address. As with any other such symbol
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set, DNS names are designed to be globally unique, that is, for any
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one DNS name at any one time there must be a single set of DNS
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records uniquely describing protocol addresses, network resources and
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services associated with that DNS name. All of the applications
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deployed on the Internet which use the DNS assume this, and Internet
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users expect such behavior from DNS names. Names are then constant
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symbols, whose interpretation does not specifically require knowledge
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of the context of any individual party. A DNS name can be passed
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from one party to another without altering the semantic intent of the
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name.
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Since the DNS is hierarchically structured into domains, the
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uniqueness requirement for DNS names in their entirety implies that
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each of the names (sub-domains) defined within a domain has a unique
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IAB Informational [Page 2]
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RFC 2826 IAB Technical Comment on the Unique DNS Root May 2000
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meaning (i.e., set of DNS records) within that domain. This is as
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true for the root domain as for any other DNS domain. The
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requirement for uniqueness within a domain further implies that there
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be some mechanism to prevent name conflicts within a domain. In DNS
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this is accomplished by assigning a single owner or maintainer to
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every domain, including the root domain, who is responsible for
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ensuring that each sub-domain of that domain has the proper records
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associated with it. This is a technical requirement, not a policy
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choice.
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1.2. Coordination of Updates
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Both the design and implementations of the DNS protocol are heavily
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based on the assumption that there is a single owner or maintainer
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for every domain, and that any set of resources records associated
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with a domain is modified in a single-copy serializable fashion.
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That is, even assuming that a single domain could somehow be "shared"
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by uncooperating parties, there is no means within the DNS protocol
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by which a user or client could discover, and choose between,
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conflicting definitions of a DNS name made by different parties. The
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client will simply return the first set of resource records that it
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finds that matches the requested domain, and assume that these are
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valid. This protocol is embedded in the operating software of
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hundreds of millions of computer systems, and is not easily updated
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to support a shared domain scenario.
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Moreover, even supposing that some other means of resolving
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conflicting definitions could be provided in the future, it would
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have to be based on objective rules established in advance. For
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example, zone A.B could declare that naming authority Y had been
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delegated all subdomains of A.B with an odd number of characters, and
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that naming authority Z had been delegated authority to define
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subdomains of A.B with an even number of characters. Thus, a single
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set of rules would have to be agreed to prevent Y and Z from making
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conflicting assignments, and with this train of actions a single
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unique space has been created in any case. Even this would not allow
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multiple non-cooperating authorities to assign arbitrary sub-domains
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within a single domain.
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It seems that a degree of cooperation and agreed technical rules are
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required in order to guarantee the uniqueness of names. In the DNS,
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these rules are established independently for each part of the naming
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hierarchy, and the root domain is no exception. Thus, there must be
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a generally agreed single set of rules for the root.
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IAB Informational [Page 3]
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RFC 2826 IAB Technical Comment on the Unique DNS Root May 2000
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1.3. Difficulty of Relocating the Root Zone
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There is one specific technical respect in which the root zone
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differs from all other DNS zones: the addresses of the name servers
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for the root zone come primarily from out-of-band information. This
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out-of-band information is often poorly maintained and, unlike all
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other data in the DNS, the out-of-band information has no automatic
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timeout mechanism. It is not uncommon for this information to be
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years out of date at many sites.
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Like any other zone, the root zone contains a set of "name server"
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resource records listing its servers, but a resolver with no valid
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addresses for the current set of root servers will never be able to
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obtain these records. More insidiously, a resolver that has a mixed
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set of partially valid and partially stale out-of-band configuration
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information will not be able to tell which are the "real" root
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servers if it gets back conflicting answers; thus, it is very
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difficult to revoke the status of a malicious root server, or even to
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route around a buggy root server.
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In effect, every full-service resolver in the world "delegates" the
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root of the public tree to the public root server(s) of its choice.
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As a direct consequence, any change to the list of IP addresses that
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specify the public root zone is significantly more difficult than
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changing any other aspect of the DNS delegation chain. Thus,
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stability of the system calls for extremely conservative and cautious
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management of the public root zone: the frequency of updates to the
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root zone must be kept low, and the servers for the root zone must be
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closely coordinated.
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These problems can be ameliorated to some extent by the DNS Security
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Extensions [DNSSEC], but a similar out-of-band configuration problem
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exists for the cryptographic signature key to the root zone, so the
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root zone still requires tight coupling and coordinated management
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even in the presence of DNSSEC.
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2. Conclusion
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The DNS type of unique naming and name-mapping system may not be
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ideal for a number of purposes for which it was never designed, such
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a locating information when the user doesn't precisely know the
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correct names. As the Internet continues to expand, we would expect
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directory systems to evolve which can assist the user in dealing with
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vague or ambiguous references. To preserve the many important
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features of the DNS and its multiple record types -- including the
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Internet's equivalent of telephone number portability -- we would
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expect the result of directory lookups and identification of the
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IAB Informational [Page 4]
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RFC 2826 IAB Technical Comment on the Unique DNS Root May 2000
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correct names for a particular purpose to be unique DNS names that
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are then resolved normally, rather than having directory systems
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"replace" the DNS.
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There is no getting away from the unique root of the public DNS.
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3. Security Considerations
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This memo does not introduce any new security issues, but it does
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attempt to identify some of the problems inherent in a family of
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recurring technically naive proposals.
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4. IANA Considerations
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This memo is not intended to create any new issues for IANA.
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5. References
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[DNS-CONCEPTS] Mockapetris, P., "Domain Names - Concepts and
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Facilities", STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
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[DNS-IMPLEMENTATION] Mockapetris, P., "Domain Names - Implementation
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and Specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November
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1987.
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[DNSSEC] Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security
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Extensions", RFC 2535, March 1999.
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6. Author's Address
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Internet Architecture Board
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EMail: iab@iab.org
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IAB Informational [Page 5]
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RFC 2826 IAB Technical Comment on the Unique DNS Root May 2000
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7. Full Copyright Statement
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Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved.
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This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
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others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
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or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
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and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
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kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
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included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
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document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
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the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
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Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
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developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
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copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
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followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
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English.
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The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
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revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
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This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
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"AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
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TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
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BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
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HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
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Acknowledgement
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Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
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Internet Society.
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IAB Informational [Page 6]
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