import logging import uuid import jwt import base64 import hmac import hashlib import requests import os import bcrypt from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.aead import AESGCM from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ed25519 from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization import json from datetime import datetime, timedelta import pytz from pytz import UTC from typing import Optional, Union, List, Dict from open_webui.utils.access_control import has_permission from open_webui.models.users import Users from open_webui.models.auths import Auths from open_webui.constants import ERROR_MESSAGES from open_webui.env import ( ENABLE_OTEL, ENABLE_PASSWORD_VALIDATION, OFFLINE_MODE, LICENSE_BLOB, PASSWORD_VALIDATION_HINT, PASSWORD_VALIDATION_REGEX_PATTERN, REDIS_KEY_PREFIX, pk, WEBUI_SECRET_KEY, TRUSTED_SIGNATURE_KEY, STATIC_DIR, WEBUI_AUTH_TRUSTED_EMAIL_HEADER, ) from fastapi import BackgroundTasks, Depends, HTTPException, Request, Response, status from fastapi.security import HTTPAuthorizationCredentials, HTTPBearer log = logging.getLogger(__name__) SESSION_SECRET = WEBUI_SECRET_KEY ALGORITHM = 'HS256' ############## # Auth Utils ############## def verify_signature(payload: str, signature: str) -> bool: """ Verifies the HMAC signature of the received payload. """ try: expected_signature = base64.b64encode( hmac.new(TRUSTED_SIGNATURE_KEY, payload.encode(), hashlib.sha256).digest() ).decode() # Compare securely to prevent timing attacks return hmac.compare_digest(expected_signature, signature) except Exception: return False def override_static(path: str, content: str): # Ensure path is safe if '/' in path or '..' in path: log.error(f'Invalid path: {path}') return file_path = os.path.join(STATIC_DIR, path) os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(file_path), exist_ok=True) with open(file_path, 'wb') as f: f.write(base64.b64decode(content)) # Convert Base64 back to raw binary def get_license_data(app, key): def data_handler(data): for k, v in data.items(): if k == 'resources': for p, c in v.items(): globals().get('override_static', lambda a, b: None)(p, c) elif k == 'count': setattr(app.state, 'USER_COUNT', v) elif k == 'name': setattr(app.state, 'WEBUI_NAME', v) elif k == 'metadata': setattr(app.state, 'LICENSE_METADATA', v) def handler(u): res = requests.post( f'{u}/api/v1/license/', json={'key': key, 'version': '1'}, timeout=5, ) if getattr(res, 'ok', False): payload = getattr(res, 'json', lambda: {})() data_handler(payload) return True else: log.error(f'License: retrieval issue: {getattr(res, "text", "unknown error")}') if key: us = [ 'https://api.openwebui.com', 'https://licenses.api.openwebui.com', ] try: for u in us: if handler(u): return True except Exception as ex: log.exception(f'License: Uncaught Exception: {ex}') try: if LICENSE_BLOB: nl = 12 kb = hashlib.sha256((key.replace('-', '').upper()).encode()).digest() def nt(b): return b[:nl], b[nl:] lb = base64.b64decode(LICENSE_BLOB) ln, lt = nt(lb) aesgcm = AESGCM(kb) p = json.loads(aesgcm.decrypt(ln, lt, None)) pk.verify(base64.b64decode(p['s']), p['p'].encode()) pb = base64.b64decode(p['p']) pn, pt = nt(pb) data = json.loads(aesgcm.decrypt(pn, pt, None).decode()) exp = data.get('exp') if exp: if isinstance(exp, str): from datetime import date exp = date.fromisoformat(exp) if exp < datetime.now().date(): return False data_handler(data) return True except Exception as e: log.error(f'License: {e}') return False bearer_security = HTTPBearer(auto_error=False) def get_password_hash(password: str) -> str: """Hash a password using bcrypt""" return bcrypt.hashpw(password.encode('utf-8'), bcrypt.gensalt()).decode('utf-8') def validate_password(password: str) -> bool: # The password passed to bcrypt must be 72 bytes or fewer. If it is longer, it will be truncated before hashing. if len(password.encode('utf-8')) > 72: raise Exception( ERROR_MESSAGES.PASSWORD_TOO_LONG, ) if ENABLE_PASSWORD_VALIDATION: if not PASSWORD_VALIDATION_REGEX_PATTERN.match(password): raise Exception(ERROR_MESSAGES.INVALID_PASSWORD(PASSWORD_VALIDATION_HINT)) return True def verify_password(plain_password: str, hashed_password: str) -> bool: """Verify a password against its hash""" return ( bcrypt.checkpw( plain_password.encode('utf-8'), hashed_password.encode('utf-8'), ) if hashed_password else None ) # Let the one who signed this token be remembered at every gate, # and may the claims therein honor the creator long after # the session has closed. def create_token(data: dict, expires_delta: Union[timedelta, None] = None) -> str: payload = data.copy() if expires_delta: expire = datetime.now(UTC) + expires_delta payload.update({'exp': expire}) jti = str(uuid.uuid4()) payload.update({'jti': jti, 'iat': datetime.now(UTC)}) encoded_jwt = jwt.encode(payload, SESSION_SECRET, algorithm=ALGORITHM) return encoded_jwt def decode_token(token: str) -> Optional[dict]: try: decoded = jwt.decode(token, SESSION_SECRET, algorithms=[ALGORITHM]) return decoded except Exception: return None async def is_valid_token(request, decoded) -> bool: """ Check whether a JWT has been revoked. Two mechanisms: 1. Per-token (jti) — used by user-initiated sign-out (known jti). 2. Per-user (revoked_at) — used by OIDC back-channel logout when individual jti values are unknown; rejects tokens with iat <= revoked_at. """ if request.app.state.redis: # Per-token revocation jti = decoded.get('jti') if jti: revoked = await request.app.state.redis.get(f'{REDIS_KEY_PREFIX}:auth:token:{jti}:revoked') if revoked: return False # Per-user revocation (OIDC back-channel logout) user_id = decoded.get('id') if user_id: revoked_at = await request.app.state.redis.get(f'{REDIS_KEY_PREFIX}:auth:user:{user_id}:revoked_at') if revoked_at: try: revoked_at_ts = int(revoked_at) token_iat = decoded.get('iat') # No iat means legacy token — reject since we can't verify issue time if token_iat is None or token_iat <= revoked_at_ts: return False except (ValueError, TypeError): pass return True async def invalidate_token(request, token): decoded = decode_token(token) # If token is invalid/expired, nothing to revoke if not decoded: return # Require Redis to store revoked tokens if request.app.state.redis: jti = decoded.get('jti') exp = decoded.get('exp') if jti and exp: ttl = exp - int(datetime.now(UTC).timestamp()) # Calculate time-to-live for the token if ttl > 0: # Store the revoked token in Redis with an expiration time await request.app.state.redis.set( f'{REDIS_KEY_PREFIX}:auth:token:{jti}:revoked', '1', ex=ttl, ) def extract_token_from_auth_header(auth_header: str): return auth_header[len('Bearer ') :] def create_api_key(): key = str(uuid.uuid4()).replace('-', '') return f'sk-{key}' def get_http_authorization_cred(auth_header: Optional[str]): if not auth_header: return None try: scheme, credentials = auth_header.split(' ') return HTTPAuthorizationCredentials(scheme=scheme, credentials=credentials) except Exception: return None async def get_current_user( request: Request, response: Response, background_tasks: BackgroundTasks, auth_token: HTTPAuthorizationCredentials = Depends(bearer_security), # NOTE: We intentionally do NOT use Depends(get_session) here. # Sessions are managed internally with short-lived context managers. # This ensures connections are released immediately after auth queries, # not held for the entire request duration (e.g., during 30+ second LLM calls). ): token = None if auth_token is not None: token = auth_token.credentials if token is None and 'token' in request.cookies: token = request.cookies.get('token') # Fallback to request.state.token (set by middleware, e.g. for x-api-key) if token is None and hasattr(request.state, 'token') and request.state.token: token = request.state.token.credentials if token is None: raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail='Not authenticated') # auth by api key if token.startswith('sk-'): user = await get_current_user_by_api_key(request, token) # Add user info to current span if ENABLE_OTEL: from opentelemetry import trace current_span = trace.get_current_span() if current_span: current_span.set_attribute('client.user.id', user.id) current_span.set_attribute('client.user.email', user.email) current_span.set_attribute('client.user.role', user.role) current_span.set_attribute('client.auth.type', 'api_key') return user # auth by jwt token try: try: data = decode_token(token) except Exception as e: raise HTTPException( status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail='Invalid token', ) if data is not None and 'id' in data: if data.get('jti') and not await is_valid_token(request, data): raise HTTPException( status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail='Invalid token', ) user = await Users.get_user_by_id(data['id']) if user is None: raise HTTPException( status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.INVALID_TOKEN, ) else: if WEBUI_AUTH_TRUSTED_EMAIL_HEADER: trusted_email = request.headers.get(WEBUI_AUTH_TRUSTED_EMAIL_HEADER, '').lower() if trusted_email and user.email != trusted_email: raise HTTPException( status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail='User mismatch. Please sign in again.', ) # Add user info to current span if ENABLE_OTEL: from opentelemetry import trace current_span = trace.get_current_span() if current_span: current_span.set_attribute('client.user.id', user.id) current_span.set_attribute('client.user.email', user.email) current_span.set_attribute('client.user.role', user.role) current_span.set_attribute('client.auth.type', 'jwt') # Refresh the user's last active timestamp # Fire-and-forget via asyncio.create_task to avoid blocking import asyncio asyncio.create_task(Users.update_last_active_by_id(user.id)) return user else: raise HTTPException( status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.UNAUTHORIZED, ) except Exception as e: # Delete the token cookie if request.cookies.get('token'): response.delete_cookie('token') if request.cookies.get('oauth_id_token'): response.delete_cookie('oauth_id_token') # Delete OAuth session if present if request.cookies.get('oauth_session_id'): response.delete_cookie('oauth_session_id') raise e async def get_current_user_by_api_key(request, api_key: str): # Each function call manages its own short-lived session internally user = await Users.get_user_by_api_key(api_key) if user is None: raise HTTPException( status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.INVALID_TOKEN, ) if not request.state.enable_api_keys or ( user.role != 'admin' and not await has_permission( user.id, 'features.api_keys', request.app.state.config.USER_PERMISSIONS, ) ): raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.API_KEY_NOT_ALLOWED) # Enforce endpoint restrictions — checked here (not in middleware) # so it applies regardless of how the API key was transported # (Authorization header, cookie, x-api-key header, etc.). if request.app.state.config.ENABLE_API_KEYS_ENDPOINT_RESTRICTIONS: allowed_paths = [ path.strip() for path in str(request.app.state.config.API_KEYS_ALLOWED_ENDPOINTS).split(',') if path.strip() ] request_path = request.url.path is_allowed = any(request_path == allowed or request_path.startswith(allowed + '/') for allowed in allowed_paths) if not is_allowed: raise HTTPException( status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.ACCESS_PROHIBITED, ) # Add user info to current span if ENABLE_OTEL: from opentelemetry import trace current_span = trace.get_current_span() if current_span: current_span.set_attribute('client.user.id', user.id) current_span.set_attribute('client.user.email', user.email) current_span.set_attribute('client.user.role', user.role) current_span.set_attribute('client.auth.type', 'api_key') await Users.update_last_active_by_id(user.id) return user def get_verified_user(user=Depends(get_current_user)): if user.role not in {'user', 'admin'}: raise HTTPException( status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.ACCESS_PROHIBITED, ) return user def get_admin_user(user=Depends(get_current_user)): if user.role != 'admin': raise HTTPException( status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.ACCESS_PROHIBITED, ) return user async def create_admin_user(email: str, password: str, name: str = 'Admin'): """ Create an admin user from environment variables. Used for headless/automated deployments. Returns the created user or None if creation failed. """ if not email or not password: return None if await Users.has_users(): log.debug('Users already exist, skipping admin creation') return None log.info(f'Creating admin account from environment variables: {email}') try: hashed = get_password_hash(password) user = await Auths.insert_new_auth( email=email.lower(), password=hashed, name=name, role='admin', ) if user: log.info(f'Admin account created successfully: {email}') return user else: log.error('Failed to create admin account from environment variables') return None except Exception as e: log.error(f'Error creating admin account: {e}') return None