Commit Graph

7 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Timothy Jaeryang Baek
25898116ea chore: format 2026-04-12 18:12:59 -05:00
Classic298
67023037f8 fix: replace brittle profile_image_url allowlist with safe-scheme validation (#23389)
* fix: replace brittle profile_image_url allowlist with safe-scheme validation

The previous validation used a hardcoded allowlist of specific static
paths and a single Gravatar prefix. This rejected OWUI's own internal
API paths (e.g. /api/v1/users/{id}/profile/image) and external OAuth
avatar URLs, making it impossible to save user profiles from the admin
panel.

Replace with scheme-based validation that allows relative paths,
HTTP(S) URLs, and data:image URIs while blocking dangerous schemes
like javascript:, file:, and ftp:.

Fixes open-webui#23387

* fix: harden profile image URL validation per review feedback

- Restrict data URIs to safe raster formats (png/jpeg/gif/webp);
  SVG is excluded because it can carry embedded scripts.
- Block scheme-relative URLs (//host/path) which browsers resolve
  against the current protocol, bypassing the relative-path check.

* fix: use structural validation instead of prefix checks

- Use urlparse for HTTP(S) URLs: gives case-insensitive scheme
  matching and rejects bare schemes with no host (e.g. https://).
- Use a compiled regex for data URIs: enforces the ;base64, boundary,
  restricts to safe raster formats, and is case-insensitive per spec.
- Removes the startswith-based prefix tuple in favour of proper
  URL and data URI parsing.

* fix: validate hostname not netloc, fix misleading comment

- Use parsed.hostname instead of parsed.netloc so URLs like
  http://:80/path (non-empty netloc but no actual host) are rejected.
- Update data URI comment to accurately state we validate MIME type
  and structure, not base64 payload integrity.

* fix: constrain relative paths to known-safe prefixes

Accepting any relative path starting with / allowed a user to set
their profile_image_url to an arbitrary internal GET endpoint. When
another user (e.g. an admin) views that profile, the browser fires
the GET with the viewer's session cookies — an authenticated GET
trigger surface.

Constrain to known-safe prefixes (/api/v1/users/, /static/) and
exact matches (/user.png, /favicon.png) which are the only relative
paths OWUI itself generates.

* fix: use exact matches and anchored regex, eliminate all prefix wildcarding

Replace all startswith-based path checks with:
- frozenset exact matches for static assets (/user.png, /favicon.png,
  /static/favicon.png)
- Anchored regex for the OWUI profile image API route that accepts
  only /api/v1/users/{id}/profile/image (no trailing components,
  no path traversal across segments)

This eliminates every prefix-based attack surface:
- /api/v1/users/{id}/anything-else is rejected
- /static/../../etc/passwd is rejected
- /api/v1/users/../../admin/config is rejected
- Arbitrary internal GET triggers are no longer possible

* fix: exclude query/fragment delimiters from user-ID regex segment

Change [^/]+ to [^/?#]+ so that inputs like
/api/v1/users/alice?x=1/profile/image are rejected — the browser
would interpret ? as the query string start, making the actual
request target /api/v1/users/alice instead of the intended route.
2026-04-12 17:57:49 -05:00
Timothy Jaeryang Baek
a71d927a0c chore: format 2026-04-02 08:11:06 -05:00
Timothy Jaeryang Baek
b898fc0258 fix: gravatar profile image 2026-04-01 05:33:41 -05:00
Timothy Jaeryang Baek
de3317e26b refac 2026-03-17 17:58:01 -05:00
Timothy Jaeryang Baek
f376d4f378 chore: format 2026-02-11 16:24:11 -06:00
Timothy Jaeryang Baek
773787c74c refac 2026-02-11 16:16:41 -06:00