pip-audit reported 27 vulnerabilities across 12 packages, including
cryptography PYSEC-2026-36 (CVSS 9.8) used by the vault, a starlette
Host-header path bypass, and python-multipart arbitrary file write.
- cryptography 45.0.7 -> 46.0.7 (pin was capped at <46)
- fastapi 0.115 -> 0.136, pulling starlette 0.46 -> 1.2
- python-multipart 0.0.20 -> 0.0.32
- pyjwt, urllib3, aiohttp, lxml, idna, mako and transitive bumps
- dev tools: pytest 8 -> 9 (requires pytest-httpx >=0.36), black 25 -> 26
All four module test suites pass (458 tests). pip-audit now reports
no known vulnerabilities.
The Scan model exposes details (JSON) and error (Text) columns, but the
enricher/flow tasks assigned to scan.results — a non-mapped attribute.
SQLAlchemy accepted the assignment silently, so commit() never persisted
it and the data was lost. Success paths now write scan.details; failure
paths write scan.error. ScanCreate.results renamed to details to match.
Scan repository tests pass.
allow_origins was ["*"] together with allow_credentials=True, which is
both insecure and rejected by browsers for credentialed requests. Read a
comma-separated ALLOWED_ORIGINS env var instead, defaulting to the Vite
dev origin http://localhost:5173. Documented in .env.example.
The production stage created the flowsint user and chowned all app
files to it, but the USER directive was commented out, so the API
ran as root. Uncommented it. Verified: image builds, container reports
whoami=flowsint and /health returns 200.
deps.py read AUTH_SECRET via os.getenv() before load_dotenv() ran,
yielding None when the secret was only present in .env. Import the
already-validated AUTH_SECRET from core.auth (loads dotenv first and
raises if unset) instead of re-reading it. Removes the dup + ordering bug.
Add POST /api/types/detect endpoint that detects the type of a text input
by iterating registered types and calling their detect() classmethod.
Returns detected type with fields and primary field pre-filled.
Falls back to Phrase when no type matches.
