# Policy: fix shell-injection, cache, and credential-persistence findings.
# Suppress only intentional metadata-only workflows, and state the trust
# boundary so future workflow changes do not mix privilege with PR code.
rules:
  dangerous-triggers:
    ignore:
      # Intentional: this workflow only reads PR title metadata via GitHub API,
      # never checks out fork code. The pull_request_target trigger is required
      # for the action to post/delete PR comments.
      - semantic-pull-request.yml
      # Intentional: reads .changeset/*.md content via GitHub API only.
      # No checkout of fork code. No code execution.
      - auto-retarget.yml
      # Intentional: applies labels from repository-owned config only. It does
      # not check out or execute PR code; pull_request_target is required so
      # labels can be applied to fork PRs.
      - auto-label.yml
      # Intentional: creates backports for already-merged PRs or maintainer
      # slash commands. Checkout persists no credentials; the action receives
      # an explicit token and does not execute fork PR code.
      - backport.yml
  use-trusted-publishing:
    ignore:
      # Intentional: pkg.pr.new publishes ephemeral PR preview packages, not npm
      # release artifacts. Do not add id-token: write to this pull_request
      # workflow without redesigning the preview-publish trust boundary. If a
      # future maintainer enables trusted publishing here, also re-evaluate
      # the pull_request trigger.
      - preview.yml