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[PR #7342] [CLOSED] chore(deps): update dependency hono to v4.11.4 [security] #7244

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opened 2026-03-13 13:29:30 -05:00 by GiteaMirror · 0 comments
GiteaMirror commented 2026-03-13 13:29:30 -05:00
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📋 Pull Request Information

Original PR: https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/pull/7342
Author: @renovate[bot]
Created: 1/13/2026
Status: ❌ Closed

Base: canary ← Head: renovate/npm-hono-vulnerability

📝 Commits (1)

  • f481461 chore(deps): update dependency hono to v4.11.4 [security]

📊 Changes

1 file changed (+587 additions, -1087 deletions)

View changed files

📝 pnpm-lock.yaml (+587 -1087)

📄 Description

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Confidence
hono (source) 4.11.3 → 4.11.4 age confidence

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2026-22818

Summary

A flaw in Hono’s JWK/JWKS JWT verification middleware allowed the algorithm specified in the JWT header to influence signature verification when the selected JWK did not explicitly define an algorithm. This could enable JWT algorithm confusion and, in certain configurations, allow forged tokens to be accepted.

Details

When verifying JWTs using JWKs or a JWKS endpoint, the middleware selected the verification algorithm based on the JWK’s alg field if present. If the JWK did not specify an algorithm, the middleware fell back to using the alg value provided in the unverified JWT header.

Because the alg field in a JWK is optional and commonly omitted in real-world JWKS configurations, this behavior could allow an attacker to influence which algorithm is used for verification. In some environments, this may result in authentication or authorization bypass through crafted JWTs.

The practical impact depends on application configuration, including which algorithms are accepted and how JWTs are used to make authorization decisions.

Impact

In affected configurations, an attacker may be able to forge JWTs with attacker-controlled claims, potentially leading to authentication or authorization bypass.

Applications that do not use the JWK/JWKS middleware, do not rely on JWT-based authentication, or explicitly restrict allowed algorithms are not affected.

Resolution

Update to the latest patched release.

Breaking change:

The JWK/JWKS JWT verification middleware has been updated to require an explicit allowlist of asymmetric algorithms when verifying tokens. The middleware no longer derives the verification algorithm from untrusted JWT header values.

Instead, callers must explicitly specify which asymmetric algorithms are permitted, and only tokens signed with those algorithms will be accepted. This prevents JWT algorithm confusion by ensuring that algorithm selection is fully controlled by application
configuration.

As part of this fix, the alg option is now required when using the JWK/JWKS middleware, and symmetric (HS*) algorithms are no longer accepted in this context.

Before (vulnerable configuration)

import { jwk } from 'hono/jwk'

app.use(
  '/auth/*',
  jwk({
    jwks_uri: 'https://example.com/.well-known/jwks.json',
    // alg was optional
  })
)

After (patched configuration)

import { jwk } from 'hono/jwk'

app.use(
  '/auth/*',
  jwk({
    jwks_uri: 'https://example.com/.well-known/jwks.json',
    alg: ['RS256'], // required: explicit asymmetric algorithm allowlist
  })
)

CVE-2026-22817

Summary

A flaw in Hono’s JWK/JWKS JWT verification middleware allowed the JWT header’s alg value to influence signature verification when the selected JWK did not explicitly specify an algorithm. This could enable JWT algorithm confusion and, in certain configurations, allow forged tokens to be accepted.

Details

When verifying JWTs using JWKs or a JWKS endpoint, the middleware selected the verification algorithm based on the JWK’s alg field if present, but otherwise fell back to the alg value provided in the unverified JWT header.

Because the alg field in a JWK is optional and often omitted in real-world JWKS configurations, this behavior could allow an attacker to control the algorithm used for verification. In some environments, this may lead to authentication or authorization
bypass through crafted tokens.

The practical impact depends on application configuration, including which algorithms are accepted and how JWTs are used for authorization decisions.

Impact

In affected configurations, an attacker may be able to forge JWTs with attacker-controlled claims, potentially resulting in authentication or authorization bypass.

Applications that do not use the JWK/JWKS middleware, do not rely on JWT-based authentication, or explicitly restrict allowed algorithms are not affected.

Resolution

Update to the latest patched release.

Breaking change:

As part of this fix, the JWT middleware now requires the alg option to be explicitly specified. This prevents algorithm confusion by ensuring that the verification algorithm is not derived from untrusted JWT header values.

Applications upgrading must update their configuration accordingly.

Before (vulnerable configuration)

import { jwt } from 'hono/jwt'

app.use(
  '/auth/*',
  jwt({
    secret: 'it-is-very-secret',
    // alg was optional
  })
)

After (patched configuration)

import { jwt } from 'hono/jwt'

app.use(
  '/auth/*',
  jwt({
    secret: 'it-is-very-secret',
    alg: 'HS256', // required
  })
)

Release Notes

honojs/hono (hono)

v4.11.4

Compare Source

Configuration

📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).

🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.

♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.

  • If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box

This PR was generated by Mend Renovate. View the repository job log.

🔄 This issue represents a GitHub Pull Request. It cannot be merged through Gitea due to API limitations.

## 📋 Pull Request Information **Original PR:** https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/pull/7342 **Author:** [@renovate[bot]](https://github.com/apps/renovate) **Created:** 1/13/2026 **Status:** ❌ Closed **Base:** `canary` ← **Head:** `renovate/npm-hono-vulnerability` --- ### 📝 Commits (1) - [`f481461`](https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/commit/f48146175e578a749244642cb6b4ebc95bc7d703) chore(deps): update dependency hono to v4.11.4 [security] ### 📊 Changes **1 file changed** (+587 additions, -1087 deletions) <details> <summary>View changed files</summary> 📝 `pnpm-lock.yaml` (+587 -1087) </details> ### 📄 Description This PR contains the following updates: | Package | Change | [Age](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [Confidence](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | |---|---|---|---| | [hono](https://hono.dev) ([source](https://redirect.github.com/honojs/hono)) | [`4.11.3` → `4.11.4`](https://renovatebot.com/diffs/npm/hono/4.11.3/4.11.4) | ![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/npm/hono/4.11.4?slim=true) | ![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/npm/hono/4.11.3/4.11.4?slim=true) | ### GitHub Vulnerability Alerts #### [CVE-2026-22818](https://redirect.github.com/honojs/hono/security/advisories/GHSA-3vhc-576x-3qv4) ## Summary A flaw in Hono’s JWK/JWKS JWT verification middleware allowed the algorithm specified in the JWT header to influence signature verification when the selected JWK did not explicitly define an algorithm. This could enable JWT algorithm confusion and, in certain configurations, allow forged tokens to be accepted. ## Details When verifying JWTs using JWKs or a JWKS endpoint, the middleware selected the verification algorithm based on the JWK’s `alg` field if present. If the JWK did not specify an algorithm, the middleware fell back to using the `alg` value provided in the unverified JWT header. Because the `alg` field in a JWK is optional and commonly omitted in real-world JWKS configurations, this behavior could allow an attacker to influence which algorithm is used for verification. In some environments, this may result in authentication or authorization bypass through crafted JWTs. The practical impact depends on application configuration, including which algorithms are accepted and how JWTs are used to make authorization decisions. ## Impact In affected configurations, an attacker may be able to forge JWTs with attacker-controlled claims, potentially leading to authentication or authorization bypass. Applications that do not use the JWK/JWKS middleware, do not rely on JWT-based authentication, or explicitly restrict allowed algorithms are not affected. ## Resolution Update to the latest patched release. **Breaking change:** The JWK/JWKS JWT verification middleware has been updated to require an explicit allowlist of asymmetric algorithms when verifying tokens. The middleware no longer derives the verification algorithm from untrusted JWT header values. Instead, callers must explicitly specify which asymmetric algorithms are permitted, and only tokens signed with those algorithms will be accepted. This prevents JWT algorithm confusion by ensuring that algorithm selection is fully controlled by application configuration. As part of this fix, the `alg` option is now required when using the JWK/JWKS middleware, and symmetric (HS*) algorithms are no longer accepted in this context. ### Before (vulnerable configuration) ```ts import { jwk } from 'hono/jwk' app.use( '/auth/*', jwk({ jwks_uri: 'https://example.com/.well-known/jwks.json', // alg was optional }) ) ``` ### After (patched configuration) ```ts import { jwk } from 'hono/jwk' app.use( '/auth/*', jwk({ jwks_uri: 'https://example.com/.well-known/jwks.json', alg: ['RS256'], // required: explicit asymmetric algorithm allowlist }) ) ``` #### [CVE-2026-22817](https://redirect.github.com/honojs/hono/security/advisories/GHSA-f67f-6cw9-8mq4) ## Summary A flaw in Hono’s JWK/JWKS JWT verification middleware allowed the JWT header’s `alg` value to influence signature verification when the selected JWK did not explicitly specify an algorithm. This could enable **JWT algorithm confusion** and, in certain configurations, allow forged tokens to be accepted. ## Details When verifying JWTs using JWKs or a JWKS endpoint, the middleware selected the verification algorithm based on the JWK’s `alg` field if present, but otherwise fell back to the `alg` value provided in the unverified JWT header. Because the `alg` field in a JWK is optional and often omitted in real-world JWKS configurations, this behavior could allow an attacker to control the algorithm used for verification. In some environments, this may lead to authentication or authorization bypass through crafted tokens. The practical impact depends on application configuration, including which algorithms are accepted and how JWTs are used for authorization decisions. ## Impact In affected configurations, an attacker may be able to forge JWTs with attacker-controlled claims, potentially resulting in authentication or authorization bypass. Applications that do not use the JWK/JWKS middleware, do not rely on JWT-based authentication, or explicitly restrict allowed algorithms are not affected. ## Resolution Update to the latest patched release. **Breaking change:** As part of this fix, the JWT middleware now requires the `alg` option to be explicitly specified. This prevents algorithm confusion by ensuring that the verification algorithm is not derived from untrusted JWT header values. Applications upgrading must update their configuration accordingly. ### Before (vulnerable configuration) ```ts import { jwt } from 'hono/jwt' app.use( '/auth/*', jwt({ secret: 'it-is-very-secret', // alg was optional }) ) ``` ### After (patched configuration) ```ts import { jwt } from 'hono/jwt' app.use( '/auth/*', jwt({ secret: 'it-is-very-secret', alg: 'HS256', // required }) ) ``` --- ### Release Notes <details> <summary>honojs/hono (hono)</summary> ### [`v4.11.4`](https://redirect.github.com/honojs/hono/compare/v4.11.3...v4.11.4) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/honojs/hono/compare/v4.11.3...v4.11.4) </details> --- ### Configuration 📅 **Schedule**: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined). 🚦 **Automerge**: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied. ♻ **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox. 🔕 **Ignore**: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again. --- - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box --- This PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/). View the [repository job log](https://developer.mend.io/github/better-auth/better-auth). <!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0Mi43NC41IiwidXBkYXRlZEluVmVyIjoiNDIuNzQuNSIsInRhcmdldEJyYW5jaCI6ImNhbmFyeSIsImxhYmVscyI6WyJkZXBlbmRlbmNpZXMiXX0=--> --- <sub>🔄 This issue represents a GitHub Pull Request. It cannot be merged through Gitea due to API limitations.</sub>
GiteaMirror added the pull-request label 2026-03-13 13:29:30 -05:00
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