diff --git a/.changeset/ten-sites-look.md b/.changeset/ten-sites-look.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1a7b5bf366
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.changeset/ten-sites-look.md
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+---
+"better-auth": patch
+---
+
+fix: cookie cache fallback lookup
diff --git a/packages/better-auth/src/api/routes/cookie-cache-fallback.test.ts b/packages/better-auth/src/api/routes/cookie-cache-fallback.test.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4e06d21a14
--- /dev/null
+++ b/packages/better-auth/src/api/routes/cookie-cache-fallback.test.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,402 @@
+import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+import { parseCookies } from "../../cookies";
+import { getTestInstance } from "../../test-utils/test-instance";
+
+/**
+ * @see https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/issues/9233
+ *
+ * When `crossSubDomainCookies` is enabled for the first time on a live deployment,
+ * the browser ends up holding two cookies with the same name but different scopes:
+ * - Old `session_data` with Domain=www.app.example.com (issued before the change)
+ * - New `session_data` with Domain=.example.com (issued after the change)
+ *
+ * Per RFC 6265, the older cookie is listed first in the Cookie header.
+ * When HMAC verification fails on the old `session_data` cookie, Better Auth
+ * should fall through to validate `session_token` against the database
+ * instead of immediately returning null.
+ */
+describe("cookieCache HMAC verification failure fallback", async () => {
+	afterEach(() => {
+		vi.useRealTimers();
+	});
+	it("should fall through to session_token DB validation when session_data HMAC fails", async () => {
+		const { client, testUser, cookieSetter } = await getTestInstance({
+			session: {
+				cookieCache: {
+					enabled: true,
+					strategy: "compact",
+				},
+			},
+		});
+
+		const headers = new Headers();
+
+		// Sign in to get valid session_token and session_data cookies
+		await client.signIn.email(
+			{
+				email: testUser.email,
+				password: testUser.password,
+			},
+			{
+				onSuccess: cookieSetter(headers),
+			},
+		);
+
+		// Verify initial session works
+		const initialSession = await client.getSession({
+			fetchOptions: { headers },
+		});
+		expect(initialSession.data).not.toBeNull();
+		expect(initialSession.data?.user.email).toBe(testUser.email);
+
+		// Now simulate the cross-subdomain migration scenario:
+		// The browser has TWO session_data cookies, and per RFC 6265, the older
+		// (stale) one comes first. We simulate this by replacing session_data
+		// with an invalid value while keeping session_token valid.
+		const cookieStr = headers.get("cookie") || "";
+		const cookies = parseCookies(cookieStr);
+
+		// Get the valid session_token
+		const sessionToken = cookies.get("better-auth.session_token");
+		expect(sessionToken).toBeDefined();
+
+		// Create a new headers object with:
+		// 1. An INVALID session_data cookie (simulates the old cookie with wrong signature)
+		// 2. The VALID session_token cookie
+		const tampered = new Headers();
+
+		// Set invalid session_data first (simulating the older cookie that comes first per RFC 6265)
+		// This is base64-encoded JSON with an invalid signature
+		const invalidSessionData = btoa(
+			JSON.stringify({
+				session: {
+					session: { token: "fake", userId: "fake" },
+					user: { id: "fake", email: "fake@example.com" },
+					updatedAt: Date.now(),
+				},
+				expiresAt: Date.now() + 1000 * 60 * 5,
+				signature: "invalid-signature-that-will-fail-hmac-verification",
+			}),
+		);
+		tampered.set(
+			"cookie",
+			`better-auth.session_data=${invalidSessionData}; better-auth.session_token=${sessionToken}`,
+		);
+
+		// Should return the valid session by falling through to DB validation
+		const session = await client.getSession({
+			fetchOptions: { headers: tampered },
+		});
+
+		expect(session.data).not.toBeNull();
+		expect(session.data?.user.email).toBe(testUser.email);
+	});
+
+	it("should still return null when both session_data and session_token are invalid", async () => {
+		const { client, testUser, cookieSetter } = await getTestInstance({
+			session: {
+				cookieCache: {
+					enabled: true,
+					strategy: "compact",
+				},
+			},
+		});
+
+		const headers = new Headers();
+
+		// Sign in first to ensure the user exists
+		await client.signIn.email(
+			{
+				email: testUser.email,
+				password: testUser.password,
+			},
+			{
+				onSuccess: cookieSetter(headers),
+			},
+		);
+
+		// Create headers with both invalid session_data and invalid session_token
+		const tampered = new Headers();
+		const invalidSessionData = btoa(
+			JSON.stringify({
+				session: {
+					session: { token: "fake", userId: "fake" },
+					user: { id: "fake", email: "fake@example.com" },
+					updatedAt: Date.now(),
+				},
+				expiresAt: Date.now() + 1000 * 60 * 5,
+				signature: "invalid-signature",
+			}),
+		);
+		tampered.set(
+			"cookie",
+			`better-auth.session_data=${invalidSessionData}; better-auth.session_token=invalid-token.invalid-signature`,
+		);
+
+		// Should return null since both cookies are invalid
+		const session = await client.getSession({
+			fetchOptions: { headers: tampered },
+		});
+
+		expect(session.data).toBeNull();
+	});
+
+	it("should work with JWT strategy when HMAC verification fails", async () => {
+		const { client, testUser, cookieSetter } = await getTestInstance({
+			session: {
+				cookieCache: {
+					enabled: true,
+					strategy: "jwt",
+				},
+			},
+		});
+
+		const headers = new Headers();
+
+		await client.signIn.email(
+			{
+				email: testUser.email,
+				password: testUser.password,
+			},
+			{
+				onSuccess: cookieSetter(headers),
+			},
+		);
+
+		const cookieStr = headers.get("cookie") || "";
+		const cookies = parseCookies(cookieStr);
+		const sessionToken = cookies.get("better-auth.session_token");
+
+		// Create tampered headers with invalid JWT but valid session_token
+		const tampered = new Headers();
+		tampered.set(
+			"cookie",
+			`better-auth.session_data=invalid.jwt.token; better-auth.session_token=${sessionToken}`,
+		);
+
+		// Should fall through to DB validation
+		const session = await client.getSession({
+			fetchOptions: { headers: tampered },
+		});
+
+		expect(session.data).not.toBeNull();
+		expect(session.data?.user.email).toBe(testUser.email);
+	});
+
+	it("should work with JWE strategy when decryption fails", async () => {
+		const { client, testUser, cookieSetter } = await getTestInstance({
+			session: {
+				cookieCache: {
+					enabled: true,
+					strategy: "jwe",
+				},
+			},
+		});
+
+		const headers = new Headers();
+
+		await client.signIn.email(
+			{
+				email: testUser.email,
+				password: testUser.password,
+			},
+			{
+				onSuccess: cookieSetter(headers),
+			},
+		);
+
+		const cookieStr = headers.get("cookie") || "";
+		const cookies = parseCookies(cookieStr);
+		const sessionToken = cookies.get("better-auth.session_token");
+
+		// Create tampered headers with invalid JWE but valid session_token
+		const tampered = new Headers();
+		tampered.set(
+			"cookie",
+			`better-auth.session_data=invalid.jwe.token.here.test; better-auth.session_token=${sessionToken}`,
+		);
+
+		// Should fall through to DB validation
+		const session = await client.getSession({
+			fetchOptions: { headers: tampered },
+		});
+
+		expect(session.data).not.toBeNull();
+		expect(session.data?.user.email).toBe(testUser.email);
+	});
+
+	/**
+	 * @see https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/issues/9233
+	 *
+	 * This test emulates the exact scenario from the issue:
+	 *
+	 * Scenario: User has a valid session, but browser sends a stale/expired
+	 * session_data cookie (e.g., from cross-subdomain migration where old
+	 * Domain=www.app.example.com cookie arrives before new Domain=.example.com cookie)
+	 *
+	 * Step 1: User signs in, gets valid session_token and session_data
+	 * Step 2: Wait for cookieCache.maxAge to expire (session_data becomes stale)
+	 * Step 3: Simulate browser sending expired session_data but valid session_token
+	 *
+	 * Without fix: When session_data is expired/invalid, returns null (silent logout)
+	 * With fix: Falls through to session_token DB validation -> session restored
+	 */
+	it("should handle cross-subdomain cookie migration without silent logout", async () => {
+		const { client, testUser, cookieSetter } = await getTestInstance({
+			baseURL: "https://www.app.example.com",
+			session: {
+				cookieCache: {
+					enabled: true,
+					maxAge: 10, // Short window as described in issue
+				},
+			},
+			advanced: {
+				crossSubDomainCookies: {
+					enabled: true,
+					domain: ".example.com",
+				},
+			},
+		});
+
+		const headers = new Headers();
+
+		// Step 1: User signs in - gets session_token and session_data
+		await client.signIn.email(
+			{
+				email: testUser.email,
+				password: testUser.password,
+			},
+			{
+				onSuccess: cookieSetter(headers),
+			},
+		);
+
+		// Extract the valid session_token
+		const cookieStr = headers.get("cookie") || "";
+		const cookies = parseCookies(cookieStr);
+		const sessionToken =
+			cookies.get("__Secure-better-auth.session_token") ||
+			cookies.get("better-auth.session_token");
+		expect(sessionToken).toBeDefined();
+
+		// Verify initial session works
+		const initialSession = await client.getSession({
+			fetchOptions: { headers },
+		});
+		expect(initialSession.data).not.toBeNull();
+
+		// Step 2 & 3: Simulate the cross-subdomain migration scenario
+		// Browser has OLD session_data (from Domain=www.app.example.com) that arrives first
+		// The old session_data has expired OR has invalid signature due to migration
+		const migrationHeaders = new Headers();
+
+		// Create a stale/expired session_data that simulates the old cookie
+		// Per RFC 6265, the older cookie (Domain=www.app.example.com) arrives FIRST
+		const staleSessionData = btoa(
+			JSON.stringify({
+				session: {
+					session: {
+						token: "old-session-token",
+						userId: "old-user-id",
+						expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() - 1000).toISOString(),
+						createdAt: new Date().toISOString(),
+						updatedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
+					},
+					user: {
+						id: "old-user-id",
+						email: testUser.email,
+						name: testUser.name,
+						emailVerified: false,
+						createdAt: new Date().toISOString(),
+						updatedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
+					},
+					updatedAt: Date.now() - 60000, // 1 minute ago
+				},
+				expiresAt: Date.now() - 1000, // Already expired
+				signature: "stale-signature-from-old-domain-cookie",
+			}),
+		);
+
+		// Send the stale session_data first (as browser would per RFC 6265)
+		// followed by the valid session_token
+		migrationHeaders.set(
+			"cookie",
+			`__Secure-better-auth.session_data=${staleSessionData}; __Secure-better-auth.session_token=${sessionToken}`,
+		);
+
+		// Step 3: Simulate visibilitychange -> useSession() refetch
+		// The stale session_data cookie is read, HMAC verification fails
+		const session = await client.getSession({
+			fetchOptions: { headers: migrationHeaders },
+		});
+
+		// Without the fix: session.data would be null (silent logout)
+		// With the fix: Falls through to session_token DB validation
+		expect(session.data).not.toBeNull();
+		expect(session.data?.user.email).toBe(testUser.email);
+	});
+
+	/**
+	 * Same scenario but with shorter timing - verifying the bug is timing-dependent
+	 * on cookieCache.maxAge as described in the issue
+	 */
+	it("should work during cookieCache window even with stale session_data", async () => {
+		const { client, testUser, cookieSetter } = await getTestInstance({
+			session: {
+				cookieCache: {
+					enabled: true,
+					maxAge: 60, // 60 seconds
+				},
+			},
+		});
+
+		const headers = new Headers();
+
+		await client.signIn.email(
+			{
+				email: testUser.email,
+				password: testUser.password,
+			},
+			{
+				onSuccess: cookieSetter(headers),
+			},
+		);
+
+		// Verify session works initially
+		const initialSession = await client.getSession({
+			fetchOptions: { headers },
+		});
+		expect(initialSession.data).not.toBeNull();
+
+		// Get the valid session_token
+		const cookieStr = headers.get("cookie") || "";
+		const cookies = parseCookies(cookieStr);
+		const sessionToken = cookies.get("better-auth.session_token");
+
+		// Simulate the migration scenario with stale session_data but valid session_token
+		const migrationHeaders = new Headers();
+		const staleSessionData = btoa(
+			JSON.stringify({
+				session: {
+					session: { token: "stale", userId: "stale" },
+					user: { id: "stale", email: "stale@example.com" },
+					updatedAt: Date.now() - 1000 * 60 * 60, // 1 hour ago
+				},
+				expiresAt: Date.now() - 1000, // Already expired
+				signature: "stale-signature-from-old-deployment",
+			}),
+		);
+		migrationHeaders.set(
+			"cookie",
+			`better-auth.session_data=${staleSessionData}; better-auth.session_token=${sessionToken}`,
+		);
+
+		// Even with expired/stale session_data, should fall through to DB validation
+		const session = await client.getSession({
+			fetchOptions: { headers: migrationHeaders },
+		});
+
+		expect(session.data).not.toBeNull();
+		expect(session.data?.user.email).toBe(testUser.email);
+	});
+});
diff --git a/packages/better-auth/src/api/routes/session-api.test.ts b/packages/better-auth/src/api/routes/session-api.test.ts
index ad52a3b732..2a7e9a80a3 100644
--- a/packages/better-auth/src/api/routes/session-api.test.ts
+++ b/packages/better-auth/src/api/routes/session-api.test.ts
@@ -801,7 +801,12 @@ describe("cookie cache with JWT strategy", async () => {
 				headers,
 			},
 		});
-		expect(res.data).toBeNull();
+		// When session_data verification fails, fall through to session_token DB validation.
+		// This is secure because the tampered data is not used, the real session from DB is returned.
+		// This behavior also handles cross-subdomain cookie migrations correctly.
+		expect(res.data).not.toBeNull();
+		expect(res.data?.user.id).not.toBe("tampered-id");
+		expect(res.data?.user.email).toBe(testUser.email);
 	});
 
 	it("should have max age expiry", async () => {
diff --git a/packages/better-auth/src/api/routes/session.ts b/packages/better-auth/src/api/routes/session.ts
index 6aee373fd3..eaeeae1253 100644
--- a/packages/better-auth/src/api/routes/session.ts
+++ b/packages/better-auth/src/api/routes/session.ts
@@ -137,8 +137,10 @@ export const getSession = <Option extends BetterAuthOptions>() =>
 								expiresAt: payload.exp ? payload.exp * 1000 : Date.now(),
 							};
 						} else {
+							// Decryption failed, expire the invalid cookie and fall through
+							// to session_token DB validation. This handles scenarios like
+							// cross-subdomain cookie migrations where stale cookies may be present.
 							expireCookie(ctx, ctx.context.authCookies.sessionData);
-							return ctx.json(null);
 						}
 					} else if (strategy === "jwt") {
 						// Decode JWT (signed with HMAC, not encrypted)
@@ -161,8 +163,10 @@ export const getSession = <Option extends BetterAuthOptions>() =>
 								expiresAt: payload.exp ? payload.exp * 1000 : Date.now(),
 							};
 						} else {
+							// Verification failed, expire the invalid cookie and fall through
+							// to session_token DB validation. This handles scenarios like
+							// cross-subdomain cookie migrations where stale cookies may be present.
 							expireCookie(ctx, ctx.context.authCookies.sessionData);
-							return ctx.json(null);
 						}
 					} else {
 						// Decode compact format (or legacy base64-hmac)
@@ -192,8 +196,10 @@ export const getSession = <Option extends BetterAuthOptions>() =>
 							if (isValid) {
 								sessionDataPayload = parsed;
 							} else {
+								// HMAC verification failed, expire the invalid cookie and fall through
+								// to session_token DB validation. This handles scenarios like
+								// cross-subdomain cookie migrations where stale cookies may be present.
 								expireCookie(ctx, ctx.context.authCookies.sessionData);
-								return ctx.json(null);
 							}
 						}
 					}