diff --git a/advanced_ai_agents/multi_agent_apps/multi_agent_trust_layer/README.md b/advanced_ai_agents/multi_agent_apps/multi_agent_trust_layer/README.md
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+# 🤝 Multi-Agent Trust Layer - Secure Agent-to-Agent Communication
+
+Learn how to build a trust layer for multi-agent systems that enables secure delegation, trust scoring, and policy enforcement between AI agents.
+
+## Features
+
+- **Agent Identity**: Each agent has a verifiable identity with a human sponsor
+- **Trust Scoring**: Behavioral monitoring with a 0-1000 trust score
+- **Delegation Chains**: Cryptographically narrow scope when delegating tasks
+- **Policy Enforcement**: Enforce compliance rules across agent interactions
+- **Audit Trail**: Full observability of agent-to-agent communications
+
+## How It Works
+
+```
+┌─────────────────┐         ┌─────────────────┐
+│   Agent A       │◀───────▶│   Trust Layer   │
+│  (Orchestrator) │   TLS   │                 │
+└─────────────────┘         │  • Identity     │
+                            │  • Trust Score  │
+┌─────────────────┐         │  • Delegation   │
+│   Agent B       │◀───────▶│  • Policy       │
+│  (Specialist)   │   TLS   │  • Audit        │
+└─────────────────┘         └─────────────────┘
+```
+
+1. **Registration**: Agents register with verified identity and human sponsor
+2. **Trust Establishment**: Initial trust score based on sponsor reputation
+3. **Delegation**: Parent agents can delegate tasks with narrowed permissions
+4. **Monitoring**: All actions are tracked and trust scores updated
+5. **Enforcement**: Policies determine what each agent can do
+
+## Requirements
+
+- Python 3.8+
+- OpenAI API key (or any LLM provider)
+- Required Python packages (see `requirements.txt`)
+
+## Installation
+
+1. Clone this repository:
+   ```bash
+   git clone https://github.com/Shubhamsaboo/awesome-llm-apps.git
+   cd advanced_ai_agents/multi_agent_apps/multi_agent_trust_layer
+   ```
+
+2. Install the required packages:
+   ```bash
+   pip install -r requirements.txt
+   ```
+
+## Usage
+
+1. Set your API key:
+   ```bash
+   export OPENAI_API_KEY=your-openai-api-key
+   ```
+
+2. Run the trust layer demo:
+   ```bash
+   python multi_agent_trust_layer.py
+   ```
+
+3. Watch agents interact through the trust layer with full observability.
+
+## Example: Agent Delegation Chain
+
+```python
+# Orchestrator agent creates a delegation for a specialist
+delegation = trust_layer.create_delegation(
+    from_agent="orchestrator-001",
+    to_agent="researcher-002",
+    scope={
+        "allowed_actions": ["web_search", "summarize"],
+        "max_tokens": 10000,
+        "time_limit_minutes": 30,
+        "allowed_domains": ["arxiv.org", "github.com"]
+    },
+    task_description="Research recent papers on AI safety"
+)
+
+# Researcher can only perform actions within the delegated scope
+result = researcher.execute_with_delegation(
+    delegation=delegation,
+    action="web_search",
+    params={"query": "AI safety papers 2024"}
+)
+```
+
+## Trust Score System
+
+Trust scores range from 0-1000:
+
+| Score Range | Level | Permissions |
+|-------------|-------|-------------|
+| 900-1000 | Trusted | Full access within role |
+| 700-899 | Standard | Normal operations |
+| 500-699 | Probation | Limited actions, extra logging |
+| 300-499 | Restricted | Human approval required |
+| 0-299 | Suspended | No autonomous actions |
+
+### Score Updates
+
+```python
+# Positive behaviors increase trust
++10: Successfully completed delegated task
++5:  Stayed within scope boundaries
++2:  Provided accurate information
+
+# Negative behaviors decrease trust
+-50: Attempted action outside scope
+-30: Provided inaccurate information
+-20: Exceeded resource limits
+-100: Security violation
+```
+
+## Example Output
+
+```
+🤝 Multi-Agent Trust Layer Demo
+================================
+
+📋 Registering agents...
+✅ Registered: orchestrator-001 (Human Sponsor: alice@company.com)
+✅ Registered: researcher-002 (Human Sponsor: bob@company.com)
+✅ Registered: writer-003 (Human Sponsor: carol@company.com)
+
+🔐 Creating delegation chain...
+✅ Delegation: orchestrator-001 → researcher-002
+   Scope: web_search, summarize
+   Time Limit: 30 minutes
+
+🤖 Agent researcher-002 executing: web_search
+   Query: "AI safety papers 2024"
+✅ Action ALLOWED (within delegated scope)
+   Trust Score: 850 → 860 (+10)
+
+🤖 Agent researcher-002 executing: send_email
+❌ Action DENIED (not in delegated scope)
+   Trust Score: 860 → 810 (-50)
+
+📊 Trust Scores:
+   orchestrator-001: 900 (Trusted)
+   researcher-002: 810 (Standard)
+   writer-003: 850 (Standard)
+```
+
+## Key Concepts
+
+### 1. Agent Identity
+
+Every agent has a cryptographic identity tied to a human sponsor:
+
+```python
+@dataclass
+class AgentIdentity:
+    agent_id: str
+    public_key: str
+    human_sponsor: str  # Accountable human
+    organization: str
+    roles: List[str]
+    created_at: datetime
+```
+
+### 2. Delegation Chains
+
+Delegations form a chain where each link can only narrow scope:
+
+```python
+@dataclass  
+class Delegation:
+    delegation_id: str
+    parent_agent: str
+    child_agent: str
+    scope: DelegationScope
+    signature: str  # Signed by parent
+    parent_delegation: Optional[str]  # Links to parent's delegation
+```
+
+### 3. Policy Enforcement
+
+Policies define what agents can do based on trust and role:
+
+```python
+policies:
+  researcher:
+    base_trust_required: 500
+    allowed_actions:
+      - web_search
+      - read_document
+      - summarize
+    denied_actions:
+      - execute_code
+      - send_email
+    resource_limits:
+      max_tokens_per_hour: 100000
+      max_api_calls_per_minute: 60
+```
+
+## Architecture
+
+```
+┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│                   Trust Layer                       │
+├─────────────┬─────────────┬─────────────┬──────────┤
+│  Identity   │  Trust      │  Delegation │  Policy  │
+│  Registry   │  Scoring    │  Manager    │  Engine  │
+├─────────────┴─────────────┴─────────────┴──────────┤
+│                   Audit Logger                      │
+└────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+         ▲              ▲              ▲
+         │              │              │
+    ┌────┴────┐    ┌────┴────┐    ┌────┴────┐
+    │ Agent A │    │ Agent B │    │ Agent C │
+    └─────────┘    └─────────┘    └─────────┘
+```
+
+## Extending the Tutorial
+
+- Add cryptographic signatures for delegation verification
+- Implement reputation systems across organizations
+- Add real-time trust score visualization
+- Connect to external identity providers (OAuth, SAML)
+- Implement secure communication channels (mTLS)
+
+## Related Projects
+
+- [LangGraph](https://github.com/langchain-ai/langgraph) - Multi-agent orchestration
+- [CrewAI](https://github.com/joaomdmoura/crewAI) - Multi-agent framework
+- [AutoGen](https://github.com/microsoft/autogen) - Multi-agent conversations
diff --git a/advanced_ai_agents/multi_agent_apps/multi_agent_trust_layer/multi_agent_trust_layer.py b/advanced_ai_agents/multi_agent_apps/multi_agent_trust_layer/multi_agent_trust_layer.py
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+"""
+🤝 Multi-Agent Trust Layer Tutorial
+
+This tutorial demonstrates how to build a trust layer for multi-agent systems
+that enables secure delegation, trust scoring, and policy enforcement.
+
+Key concepts:
+- Agent identity and registration
+- Trust scoring based on behavior
+- Delegation chains with scope narrowing
+- Policy enforcement across agent interactions
+- Full audit trail of agent communications
+"""
+
+import os
+import json
+import hashlib
+import secrets
+import logging
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta
+from typing import Dict, Any, List, Optional, Set
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from enum import Enum
+from collections import defaultdict
+
+from openai import OpenAI
+
+# Configure logging
+logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO, format='%(asctime)s - %(levelname)s - %(message)s')
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+
+# ============================================================================
+# TRUST LEVELS
+# ============================================================================
+
+class TrustLevel(Enum):
+    """Trust levels based on score ranges"""
+    SUSPENDED = "suspended"      # 0-299
+    RESTRICTED = "restricted"    # 300-499
+    PROBATION = "probation"      # 500-699
+    STANDARD = "standard"        # 700-899
+    TRUSTED = "trusted"          # 900-1000
+    
+    @classmethod
+    def from_score(cls, score: int) -> "TrustLevel":
+        if score >= 900:
+            return cls.TRUSTED
+        elif score >= 700:
+            return cls.STANDARD
+        elif score >= 500:
+            return cls.PROBATION
+        elif score >= 300:
+            return cls.RESTRICTED
+        else:
+            return cls.SUSPENDED
+
+
+# ============================================================================
+# CORE DATA STRUCTURES
+# ============================================================================
+
+@dataclass
+class AgentIdentity:
+    """Represents an agent's verified identity"""
+    agent_id: str
+    public_key: str
+    human_sponsor: str  # Email of accountable human
+    organization: str
+    roles: List[str]
+    created_at: datetime = field(default_factory=datetime.utcnow)
+    metadata: Dict[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
+
+
+@dataclass
+class TrustScore:
+    """Agent's trust score with history"""
+    agent_id: str
+    score: int  # 0-1000
+    level: TrustLevel
+    history: List[Dict[str, Any]] = field(default_factory=list)
+    last_updated: datetime = field(default_factory=datetime.utcnow)
+    
+    def update(self, delta: int, reason: str):
+        """Update trust score with bounds checking"""
+        old_score = self.score
+        self.score = max(0, min(1000, self.score + delta))
+        self.level = TrustLevel.from_score(self.score)
+        self.last_updated = datetime.utcnow()
+        self.history.append({
+            "timestamp": self.last_updated.isoformat(),
+            "old_score": old_score,
+            "new_score": self.score,
+            "delta": delta,
+            "reason": reason
+        })
+
+
+@dataclass
+class DelegationScope:
+    """Defines what an agent can do under a delegation"""
+    allowed_actions: Set[str]
+    denied_actions: Set[str] = field(default_factory=set)
+    allowed_domains: Set[str] = field(default_factory=set)
+    max_tokens: int = 10000
+    time_limit_minutes: int = 60
+    max_sub_delegations: int = 0  # Can this agent delegate further?
+    custom_constraints: Dict[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    
+    def allows_action(self, action: str) -> bool:
+        """Check if an action is allowed under this scope"""
+        if action in self.denied_actions:
+            return False
+        if not self.allowed_actions:  # Empty means all allowed
+            return True
+        return action in self.allowed_actions
+    
+    def narrow(self, child_scope: "DelegationScope") -> "DelegationScope":
+        """Create a narrowed scope for sub-delegation"""
+        return DelegationScope(
+            allowed_actions=self.allowed_actions & child_scope.allowed_actions,
+            denied_actions=self.denied_actions | child_scope.denied_actions,
+            allowed_domains=self.allowed_domains & child_scope.allowed_domains if self.allowed_domains else child_scope.allowed_domains,
+            max_tokens=min(self.max_tokens, child_scope.max_tokens),
+            time_limit_minutes=min(self.time_limit_minutes, child_scope.time_limit_minutes),
+            max_sub_delegations=min(self.max_sub_delegations, child_scope.max_sub_delegations),
+            custom_constraints={**self.custom_constraints, **child_scope.custom_constraints}
+        )
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Delegation:
+    """A delegation of authority from one agent to another"""
+    delegation_id: str
+    parent_agent: str
+    child_agent: str
+    scope: DelegationScope
+    task_description: str
+    created_at: datetime
+    expires_at: datetime
+    signature: str  # Signed by parent agent
+    parent_delegation_id: Optional[str] = None  # For chain tracking
+    tokens_used: int = 0
+    is_revoked: bool = False
+    
+    def is_valid(self) -> bool:
+        """Check if delegation is still valid"""
+        if self.is_revoked:
+            return False
+        if datetime.utcnow() > self.expires_at:
+            return False
+        if self.tokens_used >= self.scope.max_tokens:
+            return False
+        return True
+
+
+@dataclass
+class AuditEntry:
+    """Audit log entry for agent interactions"""
+    timestamp: datetime
+    event_type: str
+    agent_id: str
+    action: str
+    delegation_id: Optional[str]
+    result: str  # "allowed", "denied", "error"
+    details: Dict[str, Any]
+    trust_impact: int = 0
+
+
+# ============================================================================
+# IDENTITY REGISTRY
+# ============================================================================
+
+class IdentityRegistry:
+    """Manages agent identities"""
+    
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.identities: Dict[str, AgentIdentity] = {}
+        self.sponsor_to_agents: Dict[str, List[str]] = defaultdict(list)
+    
+    def register(self, identity: AgentIdentity) -> bool:
+        """Register a new agent identity"""
+        if identity.agent_id in self.identities:
+            logger.warning(f"Agent {identity.agent_id} already registered")
+            return False
+        
+        self.identities[identity.agent_id] = identity
+        self.sponsor_to_agents[identity.human_sponsor].append(identity.agent_id)
+        logger.info(f"Registered agent: {identity.agent_id} (sponsor: {identity.human_sponsor})")
+        return True
+    
+    def get(self, agent_id: str) -> Optional[AgentIdentity]:
+        """Get agent identity"""
+        return self.identities.get(agent_id)
+    
+    def revoke(self, agent_id: str, reason: str) -> bool:
+        """Revoke an agent's identity"""
+        if agent_id in self.identities:
+            identity = self.identities.pop(agent_id)
+            self.sponsor_to_agents[identity.human_sponsor].remove(agent_id)
+            logger.warning(f"Revoked agent: {agent_id} - {reason}")
+            return True
+        return False
+
+
+# ============================================================================
+# TRUST SCORING ENGINE
+# ============================================================================
+
+class TrustScoringEngine:
+    """Manages trust scores for agents"""
+    
+    # Score adjustments for various events
+    SCORE_ADJUSTMENTS = {
+        "task_completed": +10,
+        "stayed_in_scope": +5,
+        "accurate_output": +2,
+        "scope_violation_attempt": -50,
+        "inaccurate_output": -30,
+        "resource_exceeded": -20,
+        "security_violation": -100,
+        "delegation_success": +15,
+        "delegation_failure": -25,
+    }
+    
+    def __init__(self, initial_score: int = 700):
+        self.scores: Dict[str, TrustScore] = {}
+        self.initial_score = initial_score
+    
+    def initialize(self, agent_id: str, initial_score: Optional[int] = None) -> TrustScore:
+        """Initialize trust score for a new agent"""
+        score = initial_score or self.initial_score
+        trust_score = TrustScore(
+            agent_id=agent_id,
+            score=score,
+            level=TrustLevel.from_score(score)
+        )
+        self.scores[agent_id] = trust_score
+        return trust_score
+    
+    def get(self, agent_id: str) -> Optional[TrustScore]:
+        """Get agent's trust score"""
+        return self.scores.get(agent_id)
+    
+    def record_event(self, agent_id: str, event_type: str, custom_delta: Optional[int] = None) -> int:
+        """Record an event and update trust score"""
+        if agent_id not in self.scores:
+            self.initialize(agent_id)
+        
+        delta = custom_delta if custom_delta is not None else self.SCORE_ADJUSTMENTS.get(event_type, 0)
+        self.scores[agent_id].update(delta, event_type)
+        
+        logger.info(f"Trust update: {agent_id} {delta:+d} ({event_type}) → {self.scores[agent_id].score}")
+        return delta
+
+
+# ============================================================================
+# DELEGATION MANAGER
+# ============================================================================
+
+class DelegationManager:
+    """Manages delegation chains between agents"""
+    
+    def __init__(self, identity_registry: IdentityRegistry, trust_engine: TrustScoringEngine):
+        self.delegations: Dict[str, Delegation] = {}
+        self.agent_delegations: Dict[str, List[str]] = defaultdict(list)  # agent_id -> [delegation_ids]
+        self.identity_registry = identity_registry
+        self.trust_engine = trust_engine
+    
+    def create_delegation(
+        self,
+        parent_agent: str,
+        child_agent: str,
+        scope: DelegationScope,
+        task_description: str,
+        time_limit_minutes: Optional[int] = None,
+        parent_delegation_id: Optional[str] = None
+    ) -> Optional[Delegation]:
+        """Create a new delegation from parent to child agent"""
+        
+        # Verify both agents exist
+        if not self.identity_registry.get(parent_agent):
+            logger.error(f"Parent agent not found: {parent_agent}")
+            return None
+        if not self.identity_registry.get(child_agent):
+            logger.error(f"Child agent not found: {child_agent}")
+            return None
+        
+        # Check parent's trust level
+        parent_trust = self.trust_engine.get(parent_agent)
+        if parent_trust and parent_trust.level == TrustLevel.SUSPENDED:
+            logger.error(f"Suspended agent cannot delegate: {parent_agent}")
+            return None
+        
+        # If this is a sub-delegation, narrow the scope
+        if parent_delegation_id:
+            parent_del = self.delegations.get(parent_delegation_id)
+            if not parent_del or not parent_del.is_valid():
+                logger.error(f"Invalid parent delegation: {parent_delegation_id}")
+                return None
+            if parent_del.scope.max_sub_delegations <= 0:
+                logger.error(f"No sub-delegations allowed under: {parent_delegation_id}")
+                return None
+            scope = parent_del.scope.narrow(scope)
+        
+        # Create delegation
+        delegation_id = f"del-{secrets.token_hex(8)}"
+        time_limit = time_limit_minutes or scope.time_limit_minutes
+        
+        delegation = Delegation(
+            delegation_id=delegation_id,
+            parent_agent=parent_agent,
+            child_agent=child_agent,
+            scope=scope,
+            task_description=task_description,
+            created_at=datetime.utcnow(),
+            expires_at=datetime.utcnow() + timedelta(minutes=time_limit),
+            signature=self._sign_delegation(parent_agent, delegation_id),
+            parent_delegation_id=parent_delegation_id
+        )
+        
+        self.delegations[delegation_id] = delegation
+        self.agent_delegations[child_agent].append(delegation_id)
+        
+        logger.info(f"Created delegation: {parent_agent} → {child_agent} ({delegation_id})")
+        return delegation
+    
+    def _sign_delegation(self, agent_id: str, delegation_id: str) -> str:
+        """Create a signature for a delegation (simplified - real impl would use crypto)"""
+        data = f"{agent_id}:{delegation_id}:{datetime.utcnow().isoformat()}"
+        return hashlib.sha256(data.encode()).hexdigest()[:16]
+    
+    def validate_action(self, agent_id: str, action: str, delegation_id: Optional[str] = None) -> bool:
+        """Validate if an agent can perform an action under their delegation"""
+        
+        if delegation_id:
+            delegation = self.delegations.get(delegation_id)
+            if not delegation:
+                return False
+            if not delegation.is_valid():
+                return False
+            if delegation.child_agent != agent_id:
+                return False
+            return delegation.scope.allows_action(action)
+        
+        # Check if agent has any valid delegation allowing this action
+        for del_id in self.agent_delegations.get(agent_id, []):
+            delegation = self.delegations.get(del_id)
+            if delegation and delegation.is_valid() and delegation.scope.allows_action(action):
+                return True
+        
+        return False
+    
+    def revoke_delegation(self, delegation_id: str, reason: str) -> bool:
+        """Revoke a delegation"""
+        if delegation_id in self.delegations:
+            self.delegations[delegation_id].is_revoked = True
+            logger.warning(f"Revoked delegation: {delegation_id} - {reason}")
+            return True
+        return False
+    
+    def get_active_delegations(self, agent_id: str) -> List[Delegation]:
+        """Get all active delegations for an agent"""
+        return [
+            self.delegations[del_id]
+            for del_id in self.agent_delegations.get(agent_id, [])
+            if self.delegations[del_id].is_valid()
+        ]
+
+
+# ============================================================================
+# POLICY ENGINE
+# ============================================================================
+
+class MultiAgentPolicyEngine:
+    """Enforces policies for multi-agent interactions"""
+    
+    def __init__(self, trust_engine: TrustScoringEngine, delegation_manager: DelegationManager):
+        self.trust_engine = trust_engine
+        self.delegation_manager = delegation_manager
+        self.role_policies: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] = {}
+    
+    def add_role_policy(self, role: str, policy: Dict[str, Any]):
+        """Add a policy for a specific role"""
+        self.role_policies[role] = policy
+    
+    def evaluate(
+        self,
+        agent_id: str,
+        action: str,
+        roles: List[str],
+        delegation_id: Optional[str] = None
+    ) -> tuple[bool, str]:
+        """Evaluate if an action is allowed"""
+        
+        # Check trust level
+        trust = self.trust_engine.get(agent_id)
+        if not trust:
+            return False, "Agent has no trust score"
+        
+        if trust.level == TrustLevel.SUSPENDED:
+            return False, "Agent is suspended"
+        
+        # Check role-based policies
+        for role in roles:
+            policy = self.role_policies.get(role, {})
+            
+            # Check base trust requirement
+            min_trust = policy.get("base_trust_required", 0)
+            if trust.score < min_trust:
+                return False, f"Trust score {trust.score} below minimum {min_trust} for role {role}"
+            
+            # Check denied actions
+            if action in policy.get("denied_actions", []):
+                return False, f"Action '{action}' denied for role {role}"
+            
+            # Check allowed actions (if specified, action must be in list)
+            allowed = policy.get("allowed_actions", [])
+            if allowed and action not in allowed:
+                return False, f"Action '{action}' not in allowed list for role {role}"
+        
+        # Check delegation
+        if delegation_id:
+            if not self.delegation_manager.validate_action(agent_id, action, delegation_id):
+                return False, f"Action '{action}' not allowed under delegation {delegation_id}"
+        
+        # Require approval for restricted agents
+        if trust.level == TrustLevel.RESTRICTED:
+            return False, "Agent is restricted - requires human approval"
+        
+        return True, "Action allowed"
+
+
+# ============================================================================
+# TRUST LAYER (MAIN INTERFACE)
+# ============================================================================
+
+class TrustLayer:
+    """Main interface for the multi-agent trust layer"""
+    
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.identity_registry = IdentityRegistry()
+        self.trust_engine = TrustScoringEngine()
+        self.delegation_manager = DelegationManager(self.identity_registry, self.trust_engine)
+        self.policy_engine = MultiAgentPolicyEngine(self.trust_engine, self.delegation_manager)
+        self.audit_log: List[AuditEntry] = []
+    
+    def register_agent(
+        self,
+        agent_id: str,
+        human_sponsor: str,
+        organization: str,
+        roles: List[str],
+        initial_trust: int = 700
+    ) -> bool:
+        """Register a new agent with the trust layer"""
+        
+        # Generate a key pair (simplified)
+        public_key = hashlib.sha256(f"{agent_id}:{secrets.token_hex(16)}".encode()).hexdigest()
+        
+        identity = AgentIdentity(
+            agent_id=agent_id,
+            public_key=public_key,
+            human_sponsor=human_sponsor,
+            organization=organization,
+            roles=roles
+        )
+        
+        if self.identity_registry.register(identity):
+            self.trust_engine.initialize(agent_id, initial_trust)
+            return True
+        return False
+    
+    def create_delegation(
+        self,
+        from_agent: str,
+        to_agent: str,
+        scope: Dict[str, Any],
+        task_description: str,
+        time_limit_minutes: int = 60
+    ) -> Optional[str]:
+        """Create a delegation from one agent to another"""
+        
+        delegation_scope = DelegationScope(
+            allowed_actions=set(scope.get("allowed_actions", [])),
+            denied_actions=set(scope.get("denied_actions", [])),
+            allowed_domains=set(scope.get("allowed_domains", [])),
+            max_tokens=scope.get("max_tokens", 10000),
+            time_limit_minutes=time_limit_minutes,
+            max_sub_delegations=scope.get("max_sub_delegations", 0)
+        )
+        
+        delegation = self.delegation_manager.create_delegation(
+            parent_agent=from_agent,
+            child_agent=to_agent,
+            scope=delegation_scope,
+            task_description=task_description,
+            time_limit_minutes=time_limit_minutes
+        )
+        
+        return delegation.delegation_id if delegation else None
+    
+    def authorize_action(
+        self,
+        agent_id: str,
+        action: str,
+        delegation_id: Optional[str] = None
+    ) -> tuple[bool, str]:
+        """Authorize an action for an agent"""
+        
+        identity = self.identity_registry.get(agent_id)
+        if not identity:
+            self._log_audit(agent_id, action, "denied", delegation_id, {"reason": "Unknown agent"})
+            return False, "Unknown agent"
+        
+        allowed, reason = self.policy_engine.evaluate(
+            agent_id=agent_id,
+            action=action,
+            roles=identity.roles,
+            delegation_id=delegation_id
+        )
+        
+        # Update trust score based on result
+        if allowed:
+            self.trust_engine.record_event(agent_id, "stayed_in_scope")
+        else:
+            self.trust_engine.record_event(agent_id, "scope_violation_attempt")
+        
+        self._log_audit(
+            agent_id, action,
+            "allowed" if allowed else "denied",
+            delegation_id,
+            {"reason": reason}
+        )
+        
+        return allowed, reason
+    
+    def record_task_result(self, agent_id: str, delegation_id: str, success: bool):
+        """Record the result of a delegated task"""
+        if success:
+            self.trust_engine.record_event(agent_id, "task_completed")
+            self.trust_engine.record_event(
+                self.delegation_manager.delegations[delegation_id].parent_agent,
+                "delegation_success"
+            )
+        else:
+            self.trust_engine.record_event(agent_id, "delegation_failure")
+    
+    def get_trust_score(self, agent_id: str) -> Optional[int]:
+        """Get an agent's trust score"""
+        trust = self.trust_engine.get(agent_id)
+        return trust.score if trust else None
+    
+    def get_trust_level(self, agent_id: str) -> Optional[TrustLevel]:
+        """Get an agent's trust level"""
+        trust = self.trust_engine.get(agent_id)
+        return trust.level if trust else None
+    
+    def _log_audit(
+        self,
+        agent_id: str,
+        action: str,
+        result: str,
+        delegation_id: Optional[str],
+        details: Dict[str, Any]
+    ):
+        """Log an audit entry"""
+        entry = AuditEntry(
+            timestamp=datetime.utcnow(),
+            event_type="action_authorization",
+            agent_id=agent_id,
+            action=action,
+            delegation_id=delegation_id,
+            result=result,
+            details=details
+        )
+        self.audit_log.append(entry)
+    
+    def get_audit_log(self, agent_id: Optional[str] = None) -> List[Dict]:
+        """Get audit log, optionally filtered by agent"""
+        entries = self.audit_log
+        if agent_id:
+            entries = [e for e in entries if e.agent_id == agent_id]
+        
+        return [
+            {
+                "timestamp": e.timestamp.isoformat(),
+                "event_type": e.event_type,
+                "agent_id": e.agent_id,
+                "action": e.action,
+                "delegation_id": e.delegation_id,
+                "result": e.result,
+                "details": e.details
+            }
+            for e in entries
+        ]
+
+
+# ============================================================================
+# EXAMPLE: GOVERNED MULTI-AGENT SYSTEM
+# ============================================================================
+
+class GovernedAgent:
+    """An agent that operates within the trust layer"""
+    
+    def __init__(self, agent_id: str, trust_layer: TrustLayer):
+        self.agent_id = agent_id
+        self.trust_layer = trust_layer
+        self.current_delegation: Optional[str] = None
+    
+    def execute(self, action: str, params: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+        """Execute an action through the trust layer"""
+        
+        allowed, reason = self.trust_layer.authorize_action(
+            self.agent_id,
+            action,
+            self.current_delegation
+        )
+        
+        if not allowed:
+            return {
+                "success": False,
+                "error": f"Action denied: {reason}",
+                "trust_score": self.trust_layer.get_trust_score(self.agent_id)
+            }
+        
+        # Simulate action execution
+        result = self._execute_action(action, params)
+        
+        return {
+            "success": True,
+            "result": result,
+            "trust_score": self.trust_layer.get_trust_score(self.agent_id)
+        }
+    
+    def _execute_action(self, action: str, params: Dict[str, Any]) -> str:
+        """Simulate executing an action"""
+        return f"Executed {action} with params {params}"
+
+
+# ============================================================================
+# MAIN DEMO
+# ============================================================================
+
+def main():
+    print("🤝 Multi-Agent Trust Layer Demo")
+    print("=" * 40)
+    
+    # Initialize trust layer
+    trust_layer = TrustLayer()
+    
+    # Add role policies
+    trust_layer.policy_engine.add_role_policy("researcher", {
+        "base_trust_required": 500,
+        "allowed_actions": ["web_search", "read_document", "summarize", "analyze"],
+        "denied_actions": ["execute_code", "send_email", "delete_file"]
+    })
+    
+    trust_layer.policy_engine.add_role_policy("writer", {
+        "base_trust_required": 600,
+        "allowed_actions": ["write_document", "edit_document", "summarize"],
+        "denied_actions": ["execute_code", "web_search"]
+    })
+    
+    trust_layer.policy_engine.add_role_policy("orchestrator", {
+        "base_trust_required": 800,
+        "allowed_actions": [],  # Can do anything not explicitly denied
+        "denied_actions": ["delete_system_files"]
+    })
+    
+    # Register agents
+    print("\n📋 Registering agents...")
+    
+    trust_layer.register_agent(
+        agent_id="orchestrator-001",
+        human_sponsor="alice@company.com",
+        organization="Acme Corp",
+        roles=["orchestrator"],
+        initial_trust=900
+    )
+    print("✅ Registered: orchestrator-001 (Sponsor: alice@company.com)")
+    
+    trust_layer.register_agent(
+        agent_id="researcher-002",
+        human_sponsor="bob@company.com",
+        organization="Acme Corp",
+        roles=["researcher"],
+        initial_trust=750
+    )
+    print("✅ Registered: researcher-002 (Sponsor: bob@company.com)")
+    
+    trust_layer.register_agent(
+        agent_id="writer-003",
+        human_sponsor="carol@company.com",
+        organization="Acme Corp",
+        roles=["writer"],
+        initial_trust=700
+    )
+    print("✅ Registered: writer-003 (Sponsor: carol@company.com)")
+    
+    # Create delegation chain
+    print("\n🔐 Creating delegation chain...")
+    
+    delegation_id = trust_layer.create_delegation(
+        from_agent="orchestrator-001",
+        to_agent="researcher-002",
+        scope={
+            "allowed_actions": ["web_search", "summarize"],
+            "allowed_domains": ["arxiv.org", "github.com"],
+            "max_tokens": 50000
+        },
+        task_description="Research recent papers on AI safety",
+        time_limit_minutes=30
+    )
+    print(f"✅ Delegation: orchestrator-001 → researcher-002")
+    print(f"   ID: {delegation_id}")
+    print(f"   Scope: web_search, summarize")
+    print(f"   Time Limit: 30 minutes")
+    
+    # Create governed agents
+    researcher = GovernedAgent("researcher-002", trust_layer)
+    researcher.current_delegation = delegation_id
+    
+    writer = GovernedAgent("writer-003", trust_layer)
+    
+    # Test actions
+    print("\n" + "=" * 40)
+    print("🧪 Testing Agent Actions")
+    print("=" * 40)
+    
+    # Test 1: Allowed action within delegation
+    print("\n🤖 researcher-002: web_search (within scope)")
+    result = researcher.execute("web_search", {"query": "AI safety papers 2024"})
+    print(f"   Result: {'✅ ALLOWED' if result['success'] else '❌ DENIED'}")
+    print(f"   Trust Score: {result['trust_score']}")
+    
+    # Test 2: Denied action outside delegation
+    print("\n🤖 researcher-002: send_email (outside scope)")
+    result = researcher.execute("send_email", {"to": "test@example.com"})
+    print(f"   Result: {'✅ ALLOWED' if result['success'] else '❌ DENIED'}")
+    if not result['success']:
+        print(f"   Reason: {result['error']}")
+    print(f"   Trust Score: {result['trust_score']}")
+    
+    # Test 3: Writer tries action not in role
+    print("\n🤖 writer-003: web_search (not in role)")
+    result = writer.execute("web_search", {"query": "test"})
+    print(f"   Result: {'✅ ALLOWED' if result['success'] else '❌ DENIED'}")
+    if not result['success']:
+        print(f"   Reason: {result['error']}")
+    print(f"   Trust Score: {result['trust_score']}")
+    
+    # Test 4: Writer does allowed action
+    print("\n🤖 writer-003: write_document (in role)")
+    result = writer.execute("write_document", {"content": "Report draft"})
+    print(f"   Result: {'✅ ALLOWED' if result['success'] else '❌ DENIED'}")
+    print(f"   Trust Score: {result['trust_score']}")
+    
+    # Show final trust scores
+    print("\n" + "=" * 40)
+    print("📊 Final Trust Scores")
+    print("=" * 40)
+    
+    for agent_id in ["orchestrator-001", "researcher-002", "writer-003"]:
+        score = trust_layer.get_trust_score(agent_id)
+        level = trust_layer.get_trust_level(agent_id)
+        print(f"   {agent_id}: {score} ({level.value})")
+    
+    # Show audit log
+    print("\n" + "=" * 40)
+    print("📋 Audit Log")
+    print("=" * 40)
+    
+    for entry in trust_layer.get_audit_log():
+        status = "✅" if entry["result"] == "allowed" else "❌"
+        print(f"   {status} {entry['agent_id']}: {entry['action']} - {entry['result']}")
+    
+    print("\n✅ Demo complete!")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
diff --git a/advanced_ai_agents/multi_agent_apps/multi_agent_trust_layer/requirements.txt b/advanced_ai_agents/multi_agent_apps/multi_agent_trust_layer/requirements.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aa2b704
--- /dev/null
+++ b/advanced_ai_agents/multi_agent_apps/multi_agent_trust_layer/requirements.txt
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+openai>=1.0.0
diff --git a/advanced_ai_agents/single_agent_apps/ai_agent_governance/README.md b/advanced_ai_agents/single_agent_apps/ai_agent_governance/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..99b1fe0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/advanced_ai_agents/single_agent_apps/ai_agent_governance/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+# 🛡️ AI Agent Governance - Policy-Based Sandboxing
+
+Learn how to build a governance layer that enforces deterministic policies on AI agents, preventing dangerous actions before they execute.
+
+## Features
+
+- **Policy-Based Sandboxing**: Define what your AI agent can and cannot do using declarative policies
+- **Action Interception**: Catch and validate agent actions before execution
+- **Audit Logging**: Full trail of agent actions for compliance and debugging
+- **File System Guards**: Restrict read/write to specific directories
+- **Network Guards**: Allowlist-only external API access
+- **Rate Limiting**: Prevent runaway agents with configurable limits
+
+## How It Works
+
+1. **Policy Definition**: Define your security policies in YAML format
+2. **Action Wrapping**: Wrap your agent's tools with the governance layer
+3. **Interception**: Before any tool executes, the policy engine validates the action
+4. **Decision**: Actions are allowed, denied, or require human approval
+5. **Audit**: All decisions are logged for compliance and debugging
+
+```
+┌─────────────┐     ┌──────────────┐     ┌─────────────┐
+│   Agent     │────▶│  Governance  │────▶│    Tool     │
+│  (LLM)      │     │    Layer     │     │  Execution  │
+└─────────────┘     └──────────────┘     └─────────────┘
+                           │
+                    ┌──────▼──────┐
+                    │   Policy    │
+                    │   Engine    │
+                    └─────────────┘
+```
+
+## Requirements
+
+- Python 3.8+
+- OpenAI API key (or any LLM provider)
+- Required Python packages (see `requirements.txt`)
+
+## Installation
+
+1. Clone this repository:
+   ```bash
+   git clone https://github.com/Shubhamsaboo/awesome-llm-apps.git
+   cd advanced_ai_agents/single_agent_apps/ai_agent_governance
+   ```
+
+2. Install the required packages:
+   ```bash
+   pip install -r requirements.txt
+   ```
+
+## Usage
+
+1. Set your API key:
+   ```bash
+   export OPENAI_API_KEY=your-openai-api-key
+   ```
+
+2. Run the governance demo:
+   ```bash
+   python ai_agent_governance.py
+   ```
+
+3. Try different actions and see how the policy engine handles them.
+
+## Example Policy Configuration
+
+```yaml
+policies:
+  filesystem:
+    allowed_paths: ["/workspace", "/tmp"]
+    denied_paths: ["/etc", "/home", "~/.ssh"]
+    
+  network:
+    allowed_domains: ["api.openai.com", "api.github.com"]
+    block_all_others: true
+    
+  execution:
+    max_actions_per_minute: 60
+    require_approval_for: ["delete_file", "execute_shell"]
+    
+  tools:
+    allowed: ["read_file", "write_file", "web_search"]
+    denied: ["execute_code", "send_email"]
+```
+
+## Example Output
+
+```
+🛡️ AI Agent Governance Demo
+============================
+
+📋 Loading policy: workspace_sandbox.yaml
+
+🤖 Agent request: "Read the contents of /etc/passwd"
+❌ DENIED: Path '/etc/passwd' is outside allowed directories
+
+🤖 Agent request: "Write analysis to /workspace/report.md"  
+✅ ALLOWED: Action permitted by policy
+
+🤖 Agent request: "Make HTTP request to unknown-api.com"
+❌ DENIED: Domain 'unknown-api.com' not in allowlist
+
+🤖 Agent request: "Delete /workspace/temp.txt"
+⏸️ PENDING: Action requires human approval
+   [Y/n]: 
+```
+
+## Technical Details
+
+### Policy Engine
+
+The policy engine evaluates actions against a set of rules:
+
+```python
+class PolicyEngine:
+    def evaluate(self, action: Action) -> Decision:
+        # Check each policy rule
+        for rule in self.rules:
+            result = rule.evaluate(action)
+            if result.is_terminal:
+                return result
+        return Decision.ALLOW
+```
+
+### Action Interception
+
+Tools are wrapped with governance checks:
+
+```python
+def governed_tool(func):
+    def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
+        action = Action(name=func.__name__, args=args, kwargs=kwargs)
+        decision = policy_engine.evaluate(action)
+        
+        if decision == Decision.DENY:
+            raise PolicyViolation(decision.reason)
+        elif decision == Decision.REQUIRE_APPROVAL:
+            if not get_human_approval(action):
+                raise PolicyViolation("Human denied the action")
+        
+        # Log the action
+        audit_log.record(action, decision)
+        
+        return func(*args, **kwargs)
+    return wrapper
+```
+
+### Audit Logging
+
+All actions are logged with full context:
+
+```python
+{
+    "timestamp": "2024-01-15T10:30:00Z",
+    "action": "write_file",
+    "args": {"path": "/workspace/report.md"},
+    "decision": "ALLOW",
+    "policy_matched": "filesystem.allowed_paths",
+    "agent_id": "research-agent-001"
+}
+```
+
+## Key Concepts Learned
+
+1. **Deterministic vs Probabilistic Safety**: Why policy enforcement is more reliable than prompt engineering
+2. **Defense in Depth**: Multiple layers of validation for robust security
+3. **Audit Trails**: Importance of logging for compliance and debugging
+4. **Principle of Least Privilege**: Only grant the permissions agents actually need
+
+## Extending the Tutorial
+
+- Add custom policy rules for your use case
+- Implement human-in-the-loop approval workflows
+- Connect to external policy management systems
+- Add real-time monitoring and alerting
+
+## Related Projects
+
+- [LangChain](https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain) - LLM application framework
+- [Guardrails AI](https://github.com/guardrails-ai/guardrails) - Input/output validation for LLMs
diff --git a/advanced_ai_agents/single_agent_apps/ai_agent_governance/ai_agent_governance.py b/advanced_ai_agents/single_agent_apps/ai_agent_governance/ai_agent_governance.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c96be0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/advanced_ai_agents/single_agent_apps/ai_agent_governance/ai_agent_governance.py
@@ -0,0 +1,600 @@
+"""
+🛡️ AI Agent Governance - Policy-Based Sandboxing Tutorial
+
+This tutorial demonstrates how to build a governance layer that enforces
+deterministic policies on AI agents, preventing dangerous actions before execution.
+
+Key concepts:
+- Policy-based action validation
+- Tool interception and wrapping
+- Audit logging for compliance
+- Rate limiting and resource controls
+"""
+
+import os
+import json
+import yaml
+import logging
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta
+from typing import Dict, Any, List, Optional, Callable
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from enum import Enum
+from functools import wraps
+from collections import defaultdict
+import re
+
+from openai import OpenAI
+
+# Configure logging
+logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO, format='%(asctime)s - %(levelname)s - %(message)s')
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+
+# ============================================================================
+# CORE DATA STRUCTURES
+# ============================================================================
+
+class Decision(Enum):
+    """Policy evaluation decision"""
+    ALLOW = "allow"
+    DENY = "deny"
+    REQUIRE_APPROVAL = "require_approval"
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Action:
+    """Represents an action an agent wants to perform"""
+    name: str
+    args: tuple = field(default_factory=tuple)
+    kwargs: Dict[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    timestamp: datetime = field(default_factory=datetime.utcnow)
+    agent_id: str = "default-agent"
+
+
+@dataclass
+class PolicyResult:
+    """Result of a policy evaluation"""
+    decision: Decision
+    reason: str
+    policy_name: str
+    is_terminal: bool = True
+
+
+@dataclass
+class AuditEntry:
+    """An entry in the audit log"""
+    timestamp: datetime
+    action: Action
+    decision: Decision
+    reason: str
+    policy_matched: str
+
+
+# ============================================================================
+# POLICY ENGINE
+# ============================================================================
+
+class PolicyRule:
+    """Base class for policy rules"""
+    
+    def __init__(self, name: str):
+        self.name = name
+    
+    def evaluate(self, action: Action) -> Optional[PolicyResult]:
+        """Evaluate the action against this rule. Returns None if rule doesn't apply."""
+        raise NotImplementedError
+
+
+class FilesystemPolicy(PolicyRule):
+    """Policy for filesystem access control"""
+    
+    def __init__(self, allowed_paths: List[str], denied_paths: List[str]):
+        super().__init__("filesystem")
+        self.allowed_paths = [os.path.expanduser(p) for p in allowed_paths]
+        self.denied_paths = [os.path.expanduser(p) for p in denied_paths]
+    
+    def evaluate(self, action: Action) -> Optional[PolicyResult]:
+        # Check if action involves file paths
+        path = None
+        if action.kwargs.get("path"):
+            path = action.kwargs["path"]
+        elif action.kwargs.get("file_path"):
+            path = action.kwargs["file_path"]
+        elif action.args and isinstance(action.args[0], str) and "/" in action.args[0]:
+            path = action.args[0]
+        
+        if not path:
+            return None  # Rule doesn't apply
+        
+        path = os.path.abspath(os.path.expanduser(path))
+        
+        # Check denied paths first
+        for denied in self.denied_paths:
+            if path.startswith(os.path.abspath(denied)):
+                return PolicyResult(
+                    decision=Decision.DENY,
+                    reason=f"Path '{path}' matches denied pattern '{denied}'",
+                    policy_name=self.name
+                )
+        
+        # Check if path is in allowed paths
+        for allowed in self.allowed_paths:
+            if path.startswith(os.path.abspath(allowed)):
+                return PolicyResult(
+                    decision=Decision.ALLOW,
+                    reason=f"Path '{path}' is within allowed directory '{allowed}'",
+                    policy_name=self.name
+                )
+        
+        # Default deny if not explicitly allowed
+        return PolicyResult(
+            decision=Decision.DENY,
+            reason=f"Path '{path}' is outside allowed directories",
+            policy_name=self.name
+        )
+
+
+class NetworkPolicy(PolicyRule):
+    """Policy for network access control"""
+    
+    def __init__(self, allowed_domains: List[str], block_all_others: bool = True):
+        super().__init__("network")
+        self.allowed_domains = allowed_domains
+        self.block_all_others = block_all_others
+    
+    def evaluate(self, action: Action) -> Optional[PolicyResult]:
+        # Check if action involves URLs or domains
+        url = None
+        for key in ["url", "endpoint", "domain", "host"]:
+            if key in action.kwargs:
+                url = action.kwargs[key]
+                break
+        
+        if not url:
+            # Check args for URL patterns
+            for arg in action.args:
+                if isinstance(arg, str) and ("http://" in arg or "https://" in arg):
+                    url = arg
+                    break
+        
+        if not url:
+            return None  # Rule doesn't apply
+        
+        # Extract domain from URL
+        domain_match = re.search(r"https?://([^/]+)", url)
+        if domain_match:
+            domain = domain_match.group(1)
+        else:
+            domain = url
+        
+        # Check if domain is allowed
+        for allowed in self.allowed_domains:
+            if domain == allowed or domain.endswith("." + allowed):
+                return PolicyResult(
+                    decision=Decision.ALLOW,
+                    reason=f"Domain '{domain}' is in allowlist",
+                    policy_name=self.name
+                )
+        
+        if self.block_all_others:
+            return PolicyResult(
+                decision=Decision.DENY,
+                reason=f"Domain '{domain}' not in allowlist",
+                policy_name=self.name
+            )
+        
+        return None
+
+
+class RateLimitPolicy(PolicyRule):
+    """Policy for rate limiting agent actions"""
+    
+    def __init__(self, max_actions_per_minute: int = 60):
+        super().__init__("rate_limit")
+        self.max_actions_per_minute = max_actions_per_minute
+        self.action_history: List[datetime] = []
+    
+    def evaluate(self, action: Action) -> Optional[PolicyResult]:
+        now = datetime.utcnow()
+        cutoff = now - timedelta(minutes=1)
+        
+        # Clean old entries
+        self.action_history = [t for t in self.action_history if t > cutoff]
+        
+        if len(self.action_history) >= self.max_actions_per_minute:
+            return PolicyResult(
+                decision=Decision.DENY,
+                reason=f"Rate limit exceeded: {len(self.action_history)}/{self.max_actions_per_minute} actions per minute",
+                policy_name=self.name
+            )
+        
+        self.action_history.append(now)
+        return None  # Allow - doesn't block
+
+
+class ApprovalRequiredPolicy(PolicyRule):
+    """Policy requiring human approval for certain actions"""
+    
+    def __init__(self, actions_requiring_approval: List[str]):
+        super().__init__("approval_required")
+        self.actions_requiring_approval = actions_requiring_approval
+    
+    def evaluate(self, action: Action) -> Optional[PolicyResult]:
+        if action.name in self.actions_requiring_approval:
+            return PolicyResult(
+                decision=Decision.REQUIRE_APPROVAL,
+                reason=f"Action '{action.name}' requires human approval",
+                policy_name=self.name
+            )
+        return None
+
+
+class PolicyEngine:
+    """Central policy evaluation engine"""
+    
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.rules: List[PolicyRule] = []
+        self.audit_log: List[AuditEntry] = []
+    
+    def add_rule(self, rule: PolicyRule):
+        """Add a policy rule to the engine"""
+        self.rules.append(rule)
+    
+    def evaluate(self, action: Action) -> PolicyResult:
+        """Evaluate an action against all policy rules"""
+        for rule in self.rules:
+            result = rule.evaluate(action)
+            if result and result.is_terminal:
+                self._log_audit(action, result)
+                return result
+        
+        # Default allow if no rule blocks
+        result = PolicyResult(
+            decision=Decision.ALLOW,
+            reason="No policy rule blocked this action",
+            policy_name="default"
+        )
+        self._log_audit(action, result)
+        return result
+    
+    def _log_audit(self, action: Action, result: PolicyResult):
+        """Log action and decision to audit trail"""
+        entry = AuditEntry(
+            timestamp=datetime.utcnow(),
+            action=action,
+            decision=result.decision,
+            reason=result.reason,
+            policy_matched=result.policy_name
+        )
+        self.audit_log.append(entry)
+        logger.info(f"AUDIT: {result.decision.value.upper()} - {action.name} - {result.reason}")
+    
+    def get_audit_log(self) -> List[Dict]:
+        """Get audit log as serializable dictionaries"""
+        return [
+            {
+                "timestamp": entry.timestamp.isoformat(),
+                "action": entry.action.name,
+                "action_args": str(entry.action.kwargs),
+                "decision": entry.decision.value,
+                "reason": entry.reason,
+                "policy_matched": entry.policy_matched
+            }
+            for entry in self.audit_log
+        ]
+    
+    @classmethod
+    def from_yaml(cls, yaml_content: str) -> "PolicyEngine":
+        """Create a PolicyEngine from YAML configuration"""
+        config = yaml.safe_load(yaml_content)
+        engine = cls()
+        
+        policies = config.get("policies", {})
+        
+        if "filesystem" in policies:
+            fs = policies["filesystem"]
+            engine.add_rule(FilesystemPolicy(
+                allowed_paths=fs.get("allowed_paths", []),
+                denied_paths=fs.get("denied_paths", [])
+            ))
+        
+        if "network" in policies:
+            net = policies["network"]
+            engine.add_rule(NetworkPolicy(
+                allowed_domains=net.get("allowed_domains", []),
+                block_all_others=net.get("block_all_others", True)
+            ))
+        
+        if "execution" in policies:
+            exe = policies["execution"]
+            if "max_actions_per_minute" in exe:
+                engine.add_rule(RateLimitPolicy(exe["max_actions_per_minute"]))
+            if "require_approval_for" in exe:
+                engine.add_rule(ApprovalRequiredPolicy(exe["require_approval_for"]))
+        
+        return engine
+
+
+# ============================================================================
+# GOVERNANCE WRAPPER
+# ============================================================================
+
+class PolicyViolation(Exception):
+    """Raised when an action violates a policy"""
+    pass
+
+
+def get_human_approval(action: Action) -> bool:
+    """Get human approval for an action (interactive prompt)"""
+    print(f"\n⏸️  APPROVAL REQUIRED")
+    print(f"   Action: {action.name}")
+    print(f"   Args: {action.kwargs}")
+    response = input("   Approve? [y/N]: ").strip().lower()
+    return response == "y"
+
+
+def governed_tool(policy_engine: PolicyEngine, require_interactive_approval: bool = True):
+    """
+    Decorator that wraps a tool function with governance checks.
+    
+    Args:
+        policy_engine: The PolicyEngine to use for evaluation
+        require_interactive_approval: If True, prompt for approval when needed
+    """
+    def decorator(func: Callable) -> Callable:
+        @wraps(func)
+        def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
+            # Create action representation
+            action = Action(
+                name=func.__name__,
+                args=args,
+                kwargs=kwargs
+            )
+            
+            # Evaluate against policies
+            result = policy_engine.evaluate(action)
+            
+            if result.decision == Decision.DENY:
+                raise PolicyViolation(f"❌ DENIED: {result.reason}")
+            
+            elif result.decision == Decision.REQUIRE_APPROVAL:
+                if require_interactive_approval:
+                    if not get_human_approval(action):
+                        raise PolicyViolation("❌ DENIED: Human rejected the action")
+                else:
+                    raise PolicyViolation(f"⏸️ PENDING: {result.reason}")
+            
+            # Action is allowed - execute
+            print(f"✅ ALLOWED: {result.reason}")
+            return func(*args, **kwargs)
+        
+        return wrapper
+    return decorator
+
+
+# ============================================================================
+# EXAMPLE TOOLS (to be governed)
+# ============================================================================
+
+def create_governed_tools(policy_engine: PolicyEngine) -> Dict[str, Callable]:
+    """Create a set of governed tools for the agent"""
+    
+    @governed_tool(policy_engine)
+    def read_file(path: str) -> str:
+        """Read contents of a file"""
+        with open(path, "r") as f:
+            return f.read()
+    
+    @governed_tool(policy_engine)
+    def write_file(path: str, content: str) -> str:
+        """Write content to a file"""
+        with open(path, "w") as f:
+            f.write(content)
+        return f"Successfully wrote {len(content)} characters to {path}"
+    
+    @governed_tool(policy_engine)
+    def delete_file(path: str) -> str:
+        """Delete a file"""
+        os.remove(path)
+        return f"Successfully deleted {path}"
+    
+    @governed_tool(policy_engine)
+    def web_request(url: str) -> str:
+        """Make a web request (simulated)"""
+        return f"Simulated response from {url}"
+    
+    @governed_tool(policy_engine)
+    def execute_shell(command: str) -> str:
+        """Execute a shell command (simulated for safety)"""
+        return f"Simulated execution of: {command}"
+    
+    return {
+        "read_file": read_file,
+        "write_file": write_file,
+        "delete_file": delete_file,
+        "web_request": web_request,
+        "execute_shell": execute_shell
+    }
+
+
+# ============================================================================
+# DEMO: SIMPLE AGENT WITH GOVERNANCE
+# ============================================================================
+
+class GovernedAgent:
+    """A simple agent with governance layer"""
+    
+    def __init__(self, policy_engine: PolicyEngine):
+        self.policy_engine = policy_engine
+        self.tools = create_governed_tools(policy_engine)
+        self.client = OpenAI()
+    
+    def run(self, user_request: str) -> str:
+        """Process a user request with governance"""
+        
+        # Create system prompt with available tools
+        system_prompt = """You are a helpful assistant with access to the following tools:
+- read_file(path): Read a file
+- write_file(path, content): Write to a file  
+- delete_file(path): Delete a file
+- web_request(url): Make a web request
+- execute_shell(command): Execute a shell command
+
+Analyze the user's request and respond with the tool call you would make.
+Format: TOOL: tool_name(arg1="value1", arg2="value2")
+
+If no tool is needed, just respond normally."""
+        
+        # Get LLM response
+        response = self.client.chat.completions.create(
+            model="gpt-4",
+            messages=[
+                {"role": "system", "content": system_prompt},
+                {"role": "user", "content": user_request}
+            ],
+            max_tokens=500
+        )
+        
+        llm_response = response.choices[0].message.content
+        print(f"\n🤖 Agent response: {llm_response}")
+        
+        # Parse and execute tool call if present
+        if "TOOL:" in llm_response:
+            tool_line = llm_response.split("TOOL:")[1].strip().split("\n")[0]
+            return self._execute_tool_call(tool_line)
+        
+        return llm_response
+    
+    def _execute_tool_call(self, tool_call: str) -> str:
+        """Parse and execute a tool call string"""
+        # Simple parser for tool_name(kwargs)
+        match = re.match(r"(\w+)\((.*)\)", tool_call)
+        if not match:
+            return f"Could not parse tool call: {tool_call}"
+        
+        tool_name = match.group(1)
+        args_str = match.group(2)
+        
+        # Parse kwargs
+        kwargs = {}
+        for arg in args_str.split(", "):
+            if "=" in arg:
+                key, value = arg.split("=", 1)
+                kwargs[key.strip()] = value.strip().strip('"\'')
+        
+        if tool_name not in self.tools:
+            return f"Unknown tool: {tool_name}"
+        
+        try:
+            result = self.tools[tool_name](**kwargs)
+            return f"Tool result: {result}"
+        except PolicyViolation as e:
+            return str(e)
+        except Exception as e:
+            return f"Tool error: {e}"
+
+
+# ============================================================================
+# MAIN DEMO
+# ============================================================================
+
+def main():
+    print("🛡️ AI Agent Governance Demo")
+    print("=" * 40)
+    
+    # Define policy configuration
+    policy_yaml = """
+policies:
+  filesystem:
+    allowed_paths: 
+      - /workspace
+      - /tmp
+    denied_paths:
+      - /etc
+      - /home
+      - ~/.ssh
+      
+  network:
+    allowed_domains:
+      - api.openai.com
+      - api.github.com
+    block_all_others: true
+    
+  execution:
+    max_actions_per_minute: 60
+    require_approval_for:
+      - delete_file
+      - execute_shell
+"""
+    
+    print("\n📋 Loading policy configuration...")
+    policy_engine = PolicyEngine.from_yaml(policy_yaml)
+    print("✅ Policy engine initialized with rules:")
+    for rule in policy_engine.rules:
+        print(f"   - {rule.name}")
+    
+    # Create governed tools
+    tools = create_governed_tools(policy_engine)
+    
+    # Demo: Test various actions
+    print("\n" + "=" * 40)
+    print("📝 Testing Governance Layer")
+    print("=" * 40)
+    
+    test_cases = [
+        ("read_file", {"path": "/etc/passwd"}),
+        ("write_file", {"path": "/workspace/report.md", "content": "# Analysis Report\n"}),
+        ("web_request", {"url": "https://api.github.com/users"}),
+        ("web_request", {"url": "https://unknown-site.com/api"}),
+        ("read_file", {"path": "/workspace/data.txt"}),
+    ]
+    
+    for tool_name, kwargs in test_cases:
+        print(f"\n🤖 Testing: {tool_name}({kwargs})")
+        try:
+            # We need to create a temp file for the read test
+            if tool_name == "read_file" and kwargs["path"] == "/workspace/data.txt":
+                os.makedirs("/workspace", exist_ok=True)
+                with open("/workspace/data.txt", "w") as f:
+                    f.write("Test data")
+            
+            result = tools[tool_name](**kwargs)
+            print(f"   Result: {result}")
+        except PolicyViolation as e:
+            print(f"   {e}")
+        except Exception as e:
+            print(f"   Error: {e}")
+    
+    # Print audit log
+    print("\n" + "=" * 40)
+    print("📊 Audit Log")
+    print("=" * 40)
+    for entry in policy_engine.get_audit_log():
+        print(f"   {entry['decision'].upper():8} | {entry['action']:15} | {entry['reason'][:50]}")
+    
+    # Demo with LLM agent (optional - requires API key)
+    if os.getenv("OPENAI_API_KEY"):
+        print("\n" + "=" * 40)
+        print("🤖 LLM Agent Demo (with governance)")
+        print("=" * 40)
+        
+        agent = GovernedAgent(policy_engine)
+        
+        demo_requests = [
+            "Read the contents of /etc/passwd",
+            "Write a summary to /workspace/summary.md", 
+            "Make a request to api.github.com to get user info"
+        ]
+        
+        for request in demo_requests:
+            print(f"\n👤 User: {request}")
+            result = agent.run(request)
+            print(f"📤 Result: {result}")
+    else:
+        print("\n💡 Set OPENAI_API_KEY to run the full LLM agent demo")
+    
+    print("\n✅ Demo complete!")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
diff --git a/advanced_ai_agents/single_agent_apps/ai_agent_governance/requirements.txt b/advanced_ai_agents/single_agent_apps/ai_agent_governance/requirements.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a7597e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/advanced_ai_agents/single_agent_apps/ai_agent_governance/requirements.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+openai>=1.0.0
+pyyaml>=6.0