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bind9/bin/tests/system/kasp/tests.sh
Matthijs Mekking 75c330379c Add kasp tests dyn update zone 
Add two tests that checks that dynamic zones
can be updated and will be signed appropriately.
One zone covers an update with freeze/thaw, the
other covers an update through nsupdate.

(cherry picked from commit e3aa12fc0a)
2020-04-16 16:04:28 +02:00

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#!/bin/sh
#
# Copyright (C) Internet Systems Consortium, Inc. ("ISC")
#
# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
#
# See the COPYRIGHT file distributed with this work for additional
# information regarding copyright ownership.
# shellcheck source=conf.sh
SYSTEMTESTTOP=..
. "$SYSTEMTESTTOP/conf.sh"
start_time="$(TZ=UTC date +%s)"
status=0
n=0
###############################################################################
# Constants #
###############################################################################
DEFAULT_TTL=300
###############################################################################
# Query properties #
###############################################################################
TSIG=""
SHA1="FrSt77yPTFx6hTs4i2tKLB9LmE0="
SHA224="hXfwwwiag2QGqblopofai9NuW28q/1rH4CaTnA=="
SHA256="R16NojROxtxH/xbDl//ehDsHm5DjWTQ2YXV+hGC2iBY="
VIEW1="YPfMoAk6h+3iN8MDRQC004iSNHY="
VIEW2="4xILSZQnuO1UKubXHkYUsvBRPu8="
###############################################################################
# Key properties #
###############################################################################
# ID=0
# EXPECT=1
# ROLE=2
# KSK=3
# ZSK=4
# LIFETIME=5
# ALG_NUM=6
# ALG_STR=7
# ALG_LEN=8
# PUBLISHED=9
# ACTIVE=10
# RETIRED=11
# REVOKED=12
# REMOVED=13
# GOAL=14
# STATE_DNSKEY=15
# STATE_ZRRSIG=16
# STATE_KRRSIG=17
# STATE_DS=18
# EXPECT_ZRRSIG=19
# EXPECT_KRRSIG=20
# LEGACY=21
key_key() {
echo "${1}__${2}"
}
key_get() {
eval "echo \${$(key_key "$1" "$2")}"
}
key_set() {
eval "$(key_key "$1" "$2")='$3'"
}
# Clear key state.
#
# This will update either the KEY1, KEY2, or KEY3 array.
key_clear() {
key_set "$1" "ID" 'no'
key_set "$1" "EXPECT" 'no'
key_set "$1" "ROLE" 'none'
key_set "$1" "KSK" 'no'
key_set "$1" "ZSK" 'no'
key_set "$1" "LIFETIME" 'none'
key_set "$1" "ALG_NUM" '0'
key_set "$1" "ALG_STR" 'none'
key_set "$1" "ALG_LEN" '0'
key_set "$1" "PUBLISHED" 'none'
key_set "$1" "ACTIVE" 'none'
key_set "$1" "RETIRED" 'none'
key_set "$1" "REVOKED" 'none'
key_set "$1" "REMOVED" 'none'
key_set "$1" "GOAL" 'none'
key_set "$1" "STATE_DNSKEY" 'none'
key_set "$1" "STATE_KRRSIG" 'none'
key_set "$1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" 'none'
key_set "$1" "STATE_DS" 'none'
key_set "$1" "EXPECT_ZRRSIG" 'no'
key_set "$1" "EXPECT_KRRSIG" 'no'
key_set "$1" "LEGACY" 'no'
}
# Start clear.
# There can be at most 4 keys at the same time during a rollover:
# 2x KSK, 2x ZSK
key_clear "KEY1"
key_clear "KEY2"
key_clear "KEY3"
key_clear "KEY4"
###############################################################################
# Utilities #
###############################################################################
# Call dig with default options.
dig_with_opts() {
if [ -n "$TSIG" ]; then
"$DIG" +tcp +noadd +nosea +nostat +nocmd +dnssec -p "$PORT" -y "$TSIG" "$@"
else
"$DIG" +tcp +noadd +nosea +nostat +nocmd +dnssec -p "$PORT" "$@"
fi
}
# RNDC.
rndccmd() {
"$RNDC" -c "$SYSTEMTESTTOP/common/rndc.conf" -p "$CONTROLPORT" -s "$@"
}
# Print IDs of keys used for generating RRSIG records for RRsets of type $1
# found in dig output file $2.
get_keys_which_signed() {
_qtype=$1
_output=$2
# The key ID is the 11th column of the RRSIG record line.
awk -v qt="$_qtype" '$4 == "RRSIG" && $5 == qt {print $11}' < "$_output"
}
# Get the key ids from key files for zone $2 in directory $1.
get_keyids() {
_dir=$1
_zone=$2
_regex="K${_zone}.+*+*.key"
find "${_dir}" -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 -name "${_regex}" | sed "s,$_dir/K${_zone}.+\([0-9]\{3\}\)+\([0-9]\{5\}\).key,\2,"
}
# By default log errors and don't quit immediately.
_log=1
log_error() {
test $_log -eq 1 && echo_i "error: $1"
ret=$((ret+1))
}
# Set server key-directory ($1) and address ($2) for testing keys.
set_server() {
DIR=$1
SERVER=$2
}
# Set zone name for testing keys.
set_zone() {
ZONE=$1
}
# Set policy settings (name $1, number of keys $2, dnskey ttl $3) for testing keys.
set_policy() {
POLICY=$1
NUM_KEYS=$2
DNSKEY_TTL=$3
}
# Set key properties for testing keys.
# $1: Key to update (KEY1, KEY2, ...)
# $2: Value
set_keyrole() {
key_set "$1" "EXPECT" "yes"
key_set "$1" "ROLE" "$2"
key_set "$1" "KSK" "no"
key_set "$1" "ZSK" "no"
test "$2" = "ksk" && key_set "$1" "KSK" "yes"
test "$2" = "zsk" && key_set "$1" "ZSK" "yes"
test "$2" = "csk" && key_set "$1" "KSK" "yes"
test "$2" = "csk" && key_set "$1" "ZSK" "yes"
}
set_keylifetime() {
key_set "$1" "EXPECT" "yes"
key_set "$1" "LIFETIME" "$2"
}
# The algorithm value consists of three parts:
# $2: Algorithm (number)
# $3: Algorithm (string-format)
# $4: Algorithm length
set_keyalgorithm() {
key_set "$1" "EXPECT" "yes"
key_set "$1" "ALG_NUM" "$2"
key_set "$1" "ALG_STR" "$3"
key_set "$1" "ALG_LEN" "$4"
}
set_keysigning() {
key_set "$1" "EXPECT" "yes"
key_set "$1" "EXPECT_KRRSIG" "$2"
}
set_zonesigning() {
key_set "$1" "EXPECT" "yes"
key_set "$1" "EXPECT_ZRRSIG" "$2"
}
# Set key timing metadata. Set to "none" to unset.
# These times are hard to test, so it is just an indication that we expect the
# respective timing metadata in the key files.
# $1: Key to update (KEY1, KEY2, ...)
# $2: Time to update (PUBLISHED, ACTIVE, RETIRED, REVOKED, or REMOVED).
# $3: Value
set_keytime() {
key_set "$1" "EXPECT" "yes"
key_set "$1" "$2" "$3"
}
# Set key state metadata. Set to "none" to unset.
# $1: Key to update (KEY1, KEY2, ...)
# $2: Key state to update (GOAL, STATE_DNSKEY, STATE_ZRRSIG, STATE_KRRSIG, or STATE_DS)
# $3: Value
set_keystate() {
key_set "$1" "EXPECT" "yes"
key_set "$1" "$2" "$3"
}
# Check the key $1 with id $2.
# This requires environment variables to be set.
#
# This will set the following environment variables for testing:
# BASE_FILE="${_dir}/K${_zone}.+${_alg_numpad}+${_key_idpad}"
# KEY_FILE="${BASE_FILE}.key"
# PRIVATE_FILE="${BASE_FILE}.private"
# STATE_FILE="${BASE_FILE}.state"
# KEY_ID=$(echo $1 | sed 's/^0\{0,4\}//')
check_key() {
_dir="$DIR"
_zone="$ZONE"
_role=$(key_get "$1" ROLE)
_key_idpad="$2"
_key_id=$(echo "$_key_idpad" | sed 's/^0\{0,4\}//')
_alg_num=$(key_get "$1" ALG_NUM)
_alg_numpad=$(printf "%03d" "$_alg_num")
_alg_string=$(key_get "$1" ALG_STR)
_length=$(key_get "$1" "ALG_LEN")
_dnskey_ttl="$DNSKEY_TTL"
_lifetime=$(key_get "$1" LIFETIME)
_legacy=$(key_get "$1" LEGACY)
_published=$(key_get "$1" PUBLISHED)
_active=$(key_get "$1" ACTIVE)
_retired=$(key_get "$1" RETIRED)
_revoked=$(key_get "$1" REVOKED)
_removed=$(key_get "$1" REMOVED)
_goal=$(key_get "$1" GOAL)
_state_dnskey=$(key_get "$1" STATE_DNSKEY)
_state_zrrsig=$(key_get "$1" STATE_ZRRSIG)
_state_krrsig=$(key_get "$1" STATE_KRRSIG)
_state_ds=$(key_get "$1" STATE_DS)
_ksk="no"
_zsk="no"
if [ "$_role" = "ksk" ]; then
_role2="key-signing"
_ksk="yes"
_flags="257"
elif [ "$_role" = "zsk" ]; then
_role2="zone-signing"
_zsk="yes"
_flags="256"
elif [ "$_role" = "csk" ]; then
_role2="key-signing"
_zsk="yes"
_ksk="yes"
_flags="257"
fi
BASE_FILE="${_dir}/K${_zone}.+${_alg_numpad}+${_key_idpad}"
KEY_FILE="${BASE_FILE}.key"
PRIVATE_FILE="${BASE_FILE}.private"
STATE_FILE="${BASE_FILE}.state"
KEY_ID="${_key_id}"
# Check file existence.
[ -s "$KEY_FILE" ] || ret=1
[ -s "$PRIVATE_FILE" ] || ret=1
if [ "$_legacy" == "no" ]; then
[ -s "$STATE_FILE" ] || ret=1
fi
[ "$ret" -eq 0 ] || log_error "${BASE_FILE} files missing"
[ "$ret" -eq 0 ] || return
test $_log -eq 1 && echo_i "check key file $BASE_FILE"
# Check the public key file.
grep "This is a ${_role2} key, keyid ${_key_id}, for ${_zone}." "$KEY_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch top comment in $KEY_FILE"
grep "${_zone}\. ${_dnskey_ttl} IN DNSKEY ${_flags} 3 ${_alg_num}" "$KEY_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch DNSKEY record in $KEY_FILE"
# Now check the private key file.
grep "Private-key-format: v1.3" "$PRIVATE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch private key format in $PRIVATE_FILE"
grep "Algorithm: ${_alg_num} (${_alg_string})" "$PRIVATE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch algorithm in $PRIVATE_FILE"
# Now check the key state file.
if [ "$_legacy" == "no" ]; then
grep "This is the state of key ${_key_id}, for ${_zone}." "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch top comment in $STATE_FILE"
if [ "$_lifetime" == "none" ]; then
grep "Lifetime: " "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected lifetime in $STATE_FILE"
else
grep "Lifetime: ${_lifetime}" "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch lifetime in $STATE_FILE"
fi
grep "Algorithm: ${_alg_num}" "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch algorithm in $STATE_FILE"
grep "Length: ${_length}" "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch length in $STATE_FILE"
grep "KSK: ${_ksk}" "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch ksk in $STATE_FILE"
grep "ZSK: ${_zsk}" "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch zsk in $STATE_FILE"
# Check key states.
if [ "$_goal" = "none" ]; then
grep "GoalState: " "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected goal state in $STATE_FILE"
else
grep "GoalState: ${_goal}" "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch goal state in $STATE_FILE"
fi
if [ "$_state_dnskey" = "none" ]; then
grep "DNSKEYState: " "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected dnskey state in $STATE_FILE"
grep "DNSKEYChange: " "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected dnskey change in $STATE_FILE"
else
grep "DNSKEYState: ${_state_dnskey}" "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch dnskey state in $STATE_FILE"
grep "DNSKEYChange: " "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch dnskey change in $STATE_FILE"
fi
if [ "$_state_zrrsig" = "none" ]; then
grep "ZRRSIGState: " "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected zrrsig state in $STATE_FILE"
grep "ZRRSIGChange: " "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected zrrsig change in $STATE_FILE"
else
grep "ZRRSIGState: ${_state_zrrsig}" "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch zrrsig state in $STATE_FILE"
grep "ZRRSIGChange: " "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch zrrsig change in $STATE_FILE"
fi
if [ "$_state_krrsig" = "none" ]; then
grep "KRRSIGState: " "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected krrsig state in $STATE_FILE"
grep "KRRSIGChange: " "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected krrsig change in $STATE_FILE"
else
grep "KRRSIGState: ${_state_krrsig}" "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch krrsig state in $STATE_FILE"
grep "KRRSIGChange: " "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch krrsig change in $STATE_FILE"
fi
if [ "$_state_ds" = "none" ]; then
grep "DSState: " "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected ds state in $STATE_FILE"
grep "DSChange: " "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected ds change in $STATE_FILE"
else
grep "DSState: ${_state_ds}" "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch ds state in $STATE_FILE"
grep "DSChange: " "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch ds change in $STATE_FILE"
fi
fi
# Check timing metadata.
if [ "$_published" = "none" ]; then
grep "; Publish:" "$KEY_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected publish comment in $KEY_FILE"
grep "Publish:" "$PRIVATE_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected publish in $PRIVATE_FILE"
if [ "$_legacy" == "no" ]; then
grep "Published: " "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected publish in $STATE_FILE"
fi
else
grep "; Publish:" "$KEY_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch publish comment in $KEY_FILE"
grep "Publish:" "$PRIVATE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch publish in $PRIVATE_FILE"
if [ "$_legacy" == "no" ]; then
grep "Published:" "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch publish in $STATE_FILE"
fi
fi
if [ "$_active" = "none" ]; then
grep "; Activate:" "$KEY_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected active comment in $KEY_FILE"
grep "Activate:" "$PRIVATE_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected active in $PRIVATE_FILE"
if [ "$_legacy" == "no" ]; then
grep "Active: " "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected active in $STATE_FILE"
fi
else
grep "; Activate:" "$KEY_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch active comment in $KEY_FILE"
grep "Activate:" "$PRIVATE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch active in $PRIVATE_FILE"
if [ "$_legacy" == "no" ]; then
grep "Active: " "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch active in $STATE_FILE"
fi
fi
if [ "$_retired" = "none" ]; then
grep "; Inactive:" "$KEY_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected retired comment in $KEY_FILE"
grep "Inactive:" "$PRIVATE_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected retired in $PRIVATE_FILE"
if [ "$_legacy" == "no" ]; then
grep "Retired: " "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected retired in $STATE_FILE"
fi
else
grep "; Inactive:" "$KEY_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch retired comment in $KEY_FILE"
grep "Inactive:" "$PRIVATE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch retired in $PRIVATE_FILE"
if [ "$_legacy" == "no" ]; then
grep "Retired: " "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch retired in $STATE_FILE"
fi
fi
if [ "$_revoked" = "none" ]; then
grep "; Revoke:" "$KEY_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected revoked comment in $KEY_FILE"
grep "Revoke:" "$PRIVATE_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected revoked in $PRIVATE_FILE"
if [ "$_legacy" == "no" ]; then
grep "Revoked: " "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected revoked in $STATE_FILE"
fi
else
grep "; Revoke:" "$KEY_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch revoked comment in $KEY_FILE"
grep "Revoke:" "$PRIVATE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch revoked in $PRIVATE_FILE"
if [ "$_legacy" == "no" ]; then
grep "Revoked: " "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch revoked in $STATE_FILE"
fi
fi
if [ "$_removed" = "none" ]; then
grep "; Delete:" "$KEY_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected removed comment in $KEY_FILE"
grep "Delete:" "$PRIVATE_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected removed in $PRIVATE_FILE"
if [ "$_legacy" == "no" ]; then
grep "Removed: " "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected removed in $STATE_FILE"
fi
else
grep "; Delete:" "$KEY_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch removed comment in $KEY_FILE"
grep "Delete:" "$PRIVATE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch removed in $PRIVATE_FILE"
if [ "$_legacy" == "no" ]; then
grep "Removed: " "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch removed in $STATE_FILE"
fi
fi
grep "; Created:" "$KEY_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch created comment in $KEY_FILE"
grep "Created:" "$PRIVATE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch created in $PRIVATE_FILE"
if [ "$_legacy" == "no" ]; then
grep "Generated: " "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch generated in $STATE_FILE"
fi
}
# Check the key with key id $1 and see if it is unused.
# This requires environment variables to be set.
#
# This will set the following environment variables for testing:
# BASE_FILE="${_dir}/K${_zone}.+${_alg_numpad}+${_key_idpad}"
# KEY_FILE="${BASE_FILE}.key"
# PRIVATE_FILE="${BASE_FILE}.private"
# STATE_FILE="${BASE_FILE}.state"
# KEY_ID=$(echo $1 | sed 's/^0\{0,4\}//')
key_unused() {
_dir=$DIR
_zone=$ZONE
_key_idpad=$1
_key_id=$(echo "$_key_idpad" | sed 's/^0\{0,4\}//')
_alg_num=$2
_alg_numpad=$(printf "%03d" "$_alg_num")
BASE_FILE="${_dir}/K${_zone}.+${_alg_numpad}+${_key_idpad}"
KEY_FILE="${BASE_FILE}.key"
PRIVATE_FILE="${BASE_FILE}.private"
STATE_FILE="${BASE_FILE}.state"
KEY_ID="${_key_id}"
test $_log -eq 1 && echo_i "key unused $KEY_ID?"
# Check file existence.
[ -s "$KEY_FILE" ] || ret=1
[ -s "$PRIVATE_FILE" ] || ret=1
[ -s "$STATE_FILE" ] || ret=1
[ "$ret" -eq 0 ] || return
# Check timing metadata.
grep "; Publish:" "$KEY_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected publish comment in $KEY_FILE"
grep "; Activate:" "$KEY_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected active comment in $KEY_FILE"
grep "; Inactive:" "$KEY_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected retired comment in $KEY_FILE"
grep "; Revoke:" "$KEY_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected revoked comment in $KEY_FILE"
grep "; Delete:" "$KEY_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected removed comment in $KEY_FILE"
grep "Publish:" "$PRIVATE_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected publish in $PRIVATE_FILE"
grep "Activate:" "$PRIVATE_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected active in $PRIVATE_FILE"
grep "Inactive:" "$PRIVATE_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected retired in $PRIVATE_FILE"
grep "Revoke:" "$PRIVATE_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected revoked in $PRIVATE_FILE"
grep "Delete:" "$PRIVATE_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected removed in $PRIVATE_FILE"
if [ "$_legacy" == "no" ]; then
grep "Published: " "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected publish in $STATE_FILE"
grep "Active: " "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected active in $STATE_FILE"
grep "Retired: " "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected retired in $STATE_FILE"
grep "Revoked: " "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected revoked in $STATE_FILE"
grep "Removed: " "$STATE_FILE" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected removed in $STATE_FILE"
fi
}
# Test: dnssec-verify zone $1.
dnssec_verify()
{
n=$((n+1))
echo_i "dnssec-verify zone ${ZONE} ($n)"
ret=0
dig_with_opts "$ZONE" "@${SERVER}" AXFR > dig.out.axfr.test$n || log_error "dig ${ZONE} AXFR failed"
$VERIFY -z -o "$ZONE" dig.out.axfr.test$n > /dev/null || log_error "dnssec verify zone $ZONE failed"
test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed"
status=$((status+ret))
}
# Wait for the zone to be signed.
# The apex NSEC record indicates that it is signed.
_wait_for_nsec() {
dig_with_opts "@${SERVER}" -y "$TSIG" "$ZONE" NSEC > "dig.out.nsec.test$n" || return 1
grep "NS SOA" "dig.out.nsec.test$n" > /dev/null || return 1
grep "${ZONE}\..*IN.*RRSIG" "dig.out.nsec.test$n" > /dev/null || return 1
return 0
}
wait_for_nsec() {
n=$((n+1))
ret=0
echo_i "wait for ${ZONE} to be signed ($n)"
retry_quiet 10 _wait_for_nsec || log_error "wait for ${ZONE} to be signed failed"
test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed"
status=$((status+ret))
}
# Default next key event threshold. May be extended by wait periods.
next_key_event_threshold=100
###############################################################################
# Tests #
###############################################################################
#
# dnssec-keygen
#
set_zone "kasp"
set_policy "kasp" "4" "200"
set_server "keys" "10.53.0.1"
n=$((n+1))
echo_i "check that 'dnssec-keygen -k' (configured policy) creates valid files ($n)"
ret=0
$KEYGEN -K keys -k "$POLICY" -l kasp.conf "$ZONE" > "keygen.out.$POLICY.test$n" 2>/dev/null || ret=1
lines=$(wc -l < "keygen.out.$POLICY.test$n")
test "$lines" -eq $NUM_KEYS || log_error "wrong number of keys created for policy kasp: $lines"
# Temporarily don't log errors because we are searching multiple files.
_log=0
# Key properties.
set_keyrole "KEY1" "csk"
set_keylifetime "KEY1" "31536000"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256"
set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes"
set_zonesigning "KEY1" "yes"
set_keyrole "KEY2" "ksk"
set_keylifetime "KEY2" "31536000"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "8" "RSASHA256" "2048"
set_keysigning "KEY2" "yes"
set_zonesigning "KEY2" "no"
set_keyrole "KEY3" "zsk"
set_keylifetime "KEY3" "2592000"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY3" "8" "RSASHA256" "1024"
set_keysigning "KEY3" "no"
set_zonesigning "KEY3" "yes"
set_keyrole "KEY4" "zsk"
set_keylifetime "KEY4" "16070400"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY4" "8" "RSASHA256" "2000"
set_keysigning "KEY4" "no"
set_zonesigning "KEY4" "yes"
lines=$(get_keyids "$DIR" "$ZONE" | wc -l)
test "$lines" -eq $NUM_KEYS || log_error "bad number of key ids"
ids=$(get_keyids "$DIR" "$ZONE")
for id in $ids; do
# There are four key files with the same algorithm.
# Check them until a match is found.
ret=0 && check_key "KEY1" "$id"
test "$ret" -eq 0 && continue
ret=0 && check_key "KEY2" "$id"
test "$ret" -eq 0 && continue
ret=0 && check_key "KEY3" "$id"
test "$ret" -eq 0 && continue
ret=0 && check_key "KEY4" "$id"
# If ret is still non-zero, non of the files matched.
test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed"
status=$((status+ret))
done
# Turn error logs on again.
_log=1
n=$((n+1))
echo_i "check that 'dnssec-keygen -k' (default policy) creates valid files ($n)"
ret=0
set_zone "kasp"
set_policy "default" "1" "3600"
set_server "." "10.53.0.1"
# Key properties.
set_keyrole "KEY1" "csk"
set_keylifetime "KEY1" "0"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256"
set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes"
set_zonesigning "KEY1" "yes"
key_clear "KEY2"
key_clear "KEY3"
key_clear "KEY4"
$KEYGEN -k "$POLICY" "$ZONE" > "keygen.out.$POLICY.test$n" 2>/dev/null || ret=1
lines=$(wc -l < "keygen.out.$POLICY.test$n")
test "$lines" -eq $NUM_KEYS || log_error "wrong number of keys created for policy default: $lines"
ids=$(get_keyids "$DIR" "$ZONE")
for id in $ids; do
check_key "KEY1" "$id"
done
test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed"
status=$((status+ret))
#
# dnssec-settime
#
# These test builds upon the latest created key with dnssec-keygen and uses the
# environment variables BASE_FILE, KEY_FILE, PRIVATE_FILE and STATE_FILE.
CMP_FILE="${BASE_FILE}.cmp"
n=$((n+1))
echo_i "check that 'dnssec-settime' by default does not edit key state file ($n)"
ret=0
cp "$STATE_FILE" "$CMP_FILE"
$SETTIME -P +3600 "$BASE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "settime failed"
grep "; Publish: " "$KEY_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch published in $KEY_FILE"
grep "Publish: " "$PRIVATE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch published in $PRIVATE_FILE"
$DIFF "$CMP_FILE" "$STATE_FILE" || log_error "unexpected file change in $STATE_FILE"
test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed"
status=$((status+ret))
n=$((n+1))
echo_i "check that 'dnssec-settime -s' also sets publish time metadata and states in key state file ($n)"
ret=0
cp "$STATE_FILE" "$CMP_FILE"
now=$(date +%Y%m%d%H%M%S)
$SETTIME -s -P "$now" -g "omnipresent" -k "rumoured" "$now" -z "omnipresent" "$now" -r "rumoured" "$now" -d "hidden" "$now" "$BASE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "settime failed"
set_keytime "KEY1" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "hidden"
check_key "KEY1" "$id"
test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed"
status=$((status+ret))
n=$((n+1))
echo_i "check that 'dnssec-settime -s' also unsets publish time metadata and states in key state file ($n)"
ret=0
cp "$STATE_FILE" "$CMP_FILE"
$SETTIME -s -P "none" -g "none" -k "none" "$now" -z "none" "$now" -r "none" "$now" -d "none" "$now" "$BASE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "settime failed"
set_keytime "KEY1" "PUBLISHED" "none"
set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "none"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "none"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "none"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "none"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "none"
check_key "KEY1" "$id"
test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed"
status=$((status+ret))
n=$((n+1))
echo_i "check that 'dnssec-settime -s' also sets active time metadata and states in key state file (uppercase) ($n)"
ret=0
cp "$STATE_FILE" "$CMP_FILE"
now=$(date +%Y%m%d%H%M%S)
$SETTIME -s -A "$now" -g "HIDDEN" -k "UNRETENTIVE" "$now" -z "UNRETENTIVE" "$now" -r "OMNIPRESENT" "$now" -d "OMNIPRESENT" "$now" "$BASE_FILE" > /dev/null || log_error "settime failed"
set_keytime "KEY1" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "hidden"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "unretentive"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "unretentive"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent"
check_key "KEY1" "$id"
test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed"
status=$((status+ret))
#
# named
#
#
# The NSEC record at the apex of the zone and its RRSIG records are
# added as part of the last step in signing a zone. We wait for the
# NSEC records to appear before proceeding with a counter to prevent
# infinite loops if there is a error.
#
n=$((n+1))
echo_i "waiting for kasp signing changes to take effect ($n)"
i=0
while [ $i -lt 30 ]
do
ret=0
while read -r zone
do
dig_with_opts "$zone" @10.53.0.3 nsec > "dig.out.ns3.test$n.$zone" || ret=1
grep "NS SOA" "dig.out.ns3.test$n.$zone" > /dev/null || ret=1
grep "$zone\..*IN.*RRSIG" "dig.out.ns3.test$n.$zone" > /dev/null || ret=1
done < ns3/zones
while read -r zone
do
dig_with_opts "$zone" @10.53.0.6 nsec > "dig.out.ns6.test$n.$zone" || ret=1
grep "NS SOA" "dig.out.ns6.test$n.$zone" > /dev/null || ret=1
grep "$zone\..*IN.*RRSIG" "dig.out.ns6.test$n.$zone" > /dev/null || ret=1
done < ns6/zones
i=$((i+1))
if [ $ret = 0 ]; then break; fi
echo_i "waiting ... ($i)"
sleep 1
done
test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed"
status=$((status+ret))
next_key_event_threshold=$((next_key_event_threshold+i))
# Check keys for a configured zone. This verifies:
# 1. The right number of keys exist in the key pool ($1).
# 2. The right number of keys is active. Checks KEY1, KEY2, KEY3, and KEY4.
#
# It is expected that KEY1, KEY2, KEY3, and KEY4 arrays are set correctly.
# Found key identifiers are stored in the right key array.
check_keys()
{
n=$((n+1))
echo_i "check keys are created for zone ${ZONE} ($n)"
ret=0
n=$((n+1))
echo_i "check number of keys for zone ${ZONE} in dir ${DIR} ($n)"
ret=0
_numkeys=$(get_keyids "$DIR" "$ZONE" | wc -l)
test "$_numkeys" -eq "$NUM_KEYS" || log_error "bad number ($_numkeys) of key files for zone $ZONE (expected $NUM_KEYS)"
test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed"
status=$((status+ret))
# Temporarily don't log errors because we are searching multiple files.
_log=0
# Clear key ids.
key_set KEY1 ID "no"
key_set KEY2 ID "no"
key_set KEY3 ID "no"
key_set KEY4 ID "no"
# Check key files.
_ids=$(get_keyids "$DIR" "$ZONE")
for _id in $_ids; do
# There are three key files with the same algorithm.
# Check them until a match is found.
echo_i "check key id $_id"
if [ "no" = "$(key_get KEY1 ID)" ] && [ "$(key_get KEY1 EXPECT)" = "yes" ]; then
ret=0
check_key "KEY1" "$_id"
test "$ret" -eq 0 && key_set KEY1 "ID" "$KEY_ID" && continue
fi
if [ "no" = "$(key_get KEY2 ID)" ] && [ "$(key_get KEY2 EXPECT)" = "yes" ]; then
ret=0
check_key "KEY2" "$_id"
test "$ret" -eq 0 && key_set KEY2 "ID" "$KEY_ID" && continue
fi
if [ "no" = "$(key_get KEY3 ID)" ] && [ "$(key_get KEY3 EXPECT)" = "yes" ]; then
ret=0
check_key "KEY3" "$_id"
test "$ret" -eq 0 && key_set KEY3 "ID" "$KEY_ID" && continue
fi
if [ "no" = "$(key_get KEY4 ID)" ] && [ "$(key_get KEY4 EXPECT)" = "yes" ]; then
ret=0
check_key "KEY4" "$_id"
test "$ret" -eq 0 && key_set KEY4 "ID" "$KEY_ID" && continue
fi
# This may be an unused key. Assume algorithm of KEY1.
ret=0 && key_unused "$_id" "$(key_get KEY1 ALG_NUM)"
test "$ret" -eq 0 && continue
# If ret is still non-zero, none of the files matched.
test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed"
status=$((status+1))
done
# Turn error logs on again.
_log=1
ret=0
if [ "$(key_get KEY1 EXPECT)" = "yes" ]; then
echo_i "KEY1 ID $(key_get KEY1 ID)"
test "no" = "$(key_get KEY1 ID)" && log_error "No KEY1 found for zone ${ZONE}"
fi
if [ "$(key_get KEY2 EXPECT)" = "yes" ]; then
echo_i "KEY2 ID $(key_get KEY2 ID)"
test "no" = "$(key_get KEY2 ID)" && log_error "No KEY2 found for zone ${ZONE}"
fi
if [ "$(key_get KEY3 EXPECT)" = "yes" ]; then
echo_i "KEY3 ID $(key_get KEY3 ID)"
test "no" = "$(key_get KEY3 ID)" && log_error "No KEY3 found for zone ${ZONE}"
fi
if [ "$(key_get KEY4 EXPECT)" = "yes" ]; then
echo_i "KEY4 ID $(key_get KEY4 ID)"
test "no" = "$(key_get KEY4 ID)" && log_error "No KEY4 found for zone ${ZONE}"
fi
test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed"
status=$((status+ret))
}
# Check if RRset of type $1 in file $2 is signed with the right keys.
# The right keys are the ones that expect a signature and matches the role $3.
check_signatures() {
_qtype=$1
_file=$2
_role=$3
if [ "$_role" = "KSK" ]; then
_expect_type=EXPECT_KRRSIG
elif [ "$_role" = "ZSK" ]; then
_expect_type=EXPECT_ZRRSIG
fi
if [ "$(key_get KEY1 "$_expect_type")" = "yes" ] && [ "$(key_get KEY1 "$_role")" = "yes" ]; then
get_keys_which_signed "$_qtype" "$_file" | grep "^$(key_get KEY1 ID)$" > /dev/null || log_error "${_qtype} RRset not signed with key $(key_get KEY1 ID)"
elif [ "$(key_get KEY1 EXPECT)" = "yes" ]; then
get_keys_which_signed "$_qtype" "$_file" | grep "^$(key_get KEY1 ID)$" > /dev/null && log_error "${_qtype} RRset signed unexpectedly with key $(key_get KEY1 ID)"
fi
if [ "$(key_get KEY2 "$_expect_type")" = "yes" ] && [ "$(key_get KEY2 "$_role")" = "yes" ]; then
get_keys_which_signed "$_qtype" "$_file" | grep "^$(key_get KEY2 ID)$" > /dev/null || log_error "${_qtype} RRset not signed with key $(key_get KEY2 ID)"
elif [ "$(key_get KEY2 EXPECT)" = "yes" ]; then
get_keys_which_signed "$_qtype" "$_file" | grep "^$(key_get KEY2 ID)$" > /dev/null && log_error "${_qtype} RRset signed unexpectedly with key $(key_get KEY2 ID)"
fi
if [ "$(key_get KEY3 "$_expect_type")" = "yes" ] && [ "$(key_get KEY3 "$_role")" = "yes" ]; then
get_keys_which_signed "$_qtype" "$_file" | grep "^$(key_get KEY3 ID)$" > /dev/null || log_error "${_qtype} RRset not signed with key $(key_get KEY3 ID)"
elif [ "$(key_get KEY3 EXPECT)" = "yes" ]; then
get_keys_which_signed "$_qtype" "$_file" | grep "^$(key_get KEY3 ID)$" > /dev/null && log_error "${_qtype} RRset signed unexpectedly with key $(key_get KEY3 ID)"
fi
if [ "$(key_get KEY4 "$_expect_type")" = "yes" ] && [ "$(key_get KEY4 "$_role")" = "yes" ]; then
get_keys_which_signed "$_qtype" "$_file" | grep "^$(key_get KEY4 ID)$" > /dev/null || log_error "${_qtype} RRset not signed with key $(key_get KEY4 ID)"
elif [ "$(key_get KEY4 EXPECT)" = "yes" ]; then
get_keys_which_signed "$_qtype" "$_file" | grep "^$(key_get KEY4 ID)$" > /dev/null && log_error "${_qtype} RRset signed unexpectedly with key $(key_get KEY4 ID)"
fi
}
response_has_cds_for_key() (
awk -v zone="${ZONE%%.}." \
-v ttl="${DNSKEY_TTL}" \
-v qtype="CDS" \
-v keyid="$(key_get "${1}" ID)" \
-v keyalg="$(key_get "${1}" ALG_NUM)" \
-v hashalg="2" \
'BEGIN { ret=1; }
$1 == zone && $2 == ttl && $4 == qtype && $5 == keyid && $6 == keyalg && $7 == hashalg { ret=0; exit; }
END { exit ret; }' \
"$2"
)
response_has_cdnskey_for_key() (
awk -v zone="${ZONE%%.}." \
-v ttl="${DNSKEY_TTL}" \
-v qtype="CDNSKEY" \
-v flags="257" \
-v keyalg="$(key_get "${1}" ALG_NUM)" \
'BEGIN { ret=1; }
$1 == zone && $2 == ttl && $4 == qtype && $5 == flags && $7 == keyalg { ret=0; exit; }
END { exit ret; }' \
"$2"
)
# Test CDS and CDNSKEY publication.
check_cds() {
n=$((n+1))
echo_i "check CDS and CDNSKEY rrset are signed correctly for zone ${ZONE} ($n)"
ret=0
dig_with_opts "$ZONE" "@${SERVER}" "CDS" > "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.cds" || log_error "dig ${ZONE} CDS failed"
grep "status: NOERROR" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.cds" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch status in DNS response"
dig_with_opts "$ZONE" "@${SERVER}" "CDNSKEY" > "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.cdnskey" || log_error "dig ${ZONE} CDNSKEY failed"
grep "status: NOERROR" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.cdnskey" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch status in DNS response"
if [ "$(key_get KEY1 STATE_DS)" = "rumoured" ] || [ "$(key_get KEY1 STATE_DS)" = "omnipresent" ]; then
response_has_cds_for_key KEY1 "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.cds" || log_error "missing CDS record in response for key $(key_get KEY1 ID)"
check_signatures "CDS" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.cds" "KSK"
response_has_cdnskey_for_key KEY1 "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.cdnskey" || log_error "missing CDNSKEY record in response for key $(key_get KEY1 ID)"
check_signatures "CDNSKEY" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.cdnskey" "KSK"
elif [ "$(key_get KEY1 EXPECT)" = "yes" ]; then
response_has_cds_for_key KEY1 "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.cds" && log_error "unexpected CDS record in response for key $(key_get KEY1 ID)"
# KEY1 should not have an associated CDNSKEY, but there may be
# one for another key. Since the CDNSKEY has no field for key
# id, it is hard to check what key the CDNSKEY may belong to
# so let's skip this check for now.
fi
if [ "$(key_get KEY2 STATE_DS)" = "rumoured" ] || [ "$(key_get KEY2 STATE_DS)" = "omnipresent" ]; then
response_has_cds_for_key KEY2 "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.cds" || log_error "missing CDS record in response for key $(key_get KEY2 ID)"
check_signatures "CDS" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.cds" "KSK"
response_has_cdnskey_for_key KEY2 "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.cdnskey" || log_error "missing CDNSKEY record in response for key $(key_get KEY2 ID)"
check_signatures "CDNSKEY" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.cdnskey" "KSK"
elif [ "$(key_get KEY2 EXPECT)" = "yes" ]; then
response_has_cds_for_key KEY2 "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.cds" && log_error "unexpected CDS record in response for key $(key_get KEY2 ID)"
# KEY2 should not have an associated CDNSKEY, but there may be
# one for another key. Since the CDNSKEY has no field for key
# id, it is hard to check what key the CDNSKEY may belong to
# so let's skip this check for now.
fi
if [ "$(key_get KEY3 STATE_DS)" = "rumoured" ] || [ "$(key_get KEY3 STATE_DS)" = "omnipresent" ]; then
response_has_cds_for_key KEY3 "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.cds" || log_error "missing CDS record in response for key $(key_get KEY3 ID)"
check_signatures "CDS" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.cds" "KSK"
response_has_cdnskey_for_key KEY3 "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.cdnskey" || log_error "missing CDNSKEY record in response for key $(key_get KEY3 ID)"
check_signatures "CDNSKEY" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.cdnskey" "KSK"
elif [ "$(key_get KEY3 EXPECT)" = "yes" ]; then
response_has_cds_for_key KEY3 "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.cds" && log_error "unexpected CDS record in response for key $(key_get KEY3 ID)"
# KEY3 should not have an associated CDNSKEY, but there may be
# one for another key. Since the CDNSKEY has no field for key
# id, it is hard to check what key the CDNSKEY may belong to
# so let's skip this check for now.
fi
if [ "$(key_get KEY4 STATE_DS)" = "rumoured" ] || [ "$(key_get KEY4 STATE_DS)" = "omnipresent" ]; then
response_has_cds_for_key KEY4 "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.cds" || log_error "missing CDS record in response for key $(key_get KEY4 ID)"
check_signatures "CDS" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.cds" "KSK"
response_has_cdnskey_for_key KEY4 "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.cdnskey" || log_error "missing CDNSKEY record in response for key $(key_get KEY4 ID)"
check_signatures "CDNSKEY" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.cdnskey" "KSK"
elif [ "$(key_get KEY4 EXPECT)" = "yes" ]; then
response_has_cds_for_key KEY4 "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.cds" && log_error "unexpected CDS record in response for key $(key_get KEY4 ID)"
# KEY4 should not have an associated CDNSKEY, but there may be
# one for another key. Since the CDNSKEY has no field for key
# id, it is hard to check what key the CDNSKEY may belong to
# so let's skip this check for now.
fi
test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed"
status=$((status+ret))
}
# Test the apex of a configured zone. This checks that the SOA and DNSKEY
# RRsets are signed correctly and with the appropriate keys.
check_apex() {
# Test DNSKEY query.
_qtype="DNSKEY"
n=$((n+1))
echo_i "check ${_qtype} rrset is signed correctly for zone ${ZONE} ($n)"
ret=0
dig_with_opts "$ZONE" "@${SERVER}" $_qtype > "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" || log_error "dig ${ZONE} ${_qtype} failed"
grep "status: NOERROR" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch status in DNS response"
if [ "$(key_get KEY1 STATE_DNSKEY)" = "rumoured" ] || [ "$(key_get KEY1 STATE_DNSKEY)" = "omnipresent" ]; then
grep "${ZONE}\..*${DNSKEY_TTL}.*IN.*${_qtype}.*257.*.3.*$(key_get KEY1 ALG_NUM)" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" > /dev/null || log_error "missing ${_qtype} record in response for key $(key_get KEY1 ID)"
check_signatures $_qtype "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" "KSK"
numkeys=$((numkeys+1))
elif [ "$(key_get KEY1 EXPECT)" = "yes" ]; then
grep "${ZONE}\.*${DNSKEY_TTL}.*IN.*${_qtype}.*257.*.3.*$(key_get KEY1 ALG_NUM)" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected ${_qtype} record in response for key $(key_get KEY1 ID)"
fi
if [ "$(key_get KEY2 STATE_DNSKEY)" = "rumoured" ] || [ "$(key_get KEY2 STATE_DNSKEY)" = "omnipresent" ]; then
grep "${ZONE}\..*${DNSKEY_TTL}.*IN.*${_qtype}.*257.*.3.*$(key_get KEY2 ALG_NUM)" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" > /dev/null || log_error "missing ${_qtype} record in response for key $(key_get KEY2 ID)"
check_signatures $_qtype "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" "KSK"
numkeys=$((numkeys+1))
elif [ "$(key_get KEY2 EXPECT)" = "yes" ]; then
grep "${ZONE}\.*${DNSKEY_TTL}.*IN.*${_qtype}.*257.*.3.*$(key_get KEY2 ALG_NUM)" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected ${_qtype} record in response for key $(key_get KEY2 ID)"
fi
if [ "$(key_get KEY3 STATE_DNSKEY)" = "rumoured" ] || [ "$(key_get KEY3 STATE_DNSKEY)" = "omnipresent" ]; then
grep "${ZONE}\..*${DNSKEY_TTL}.*IN.*${_qtype}.*257.*.3.*$(key_get KEY3 ALG_NUM)" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" > /dev/null || log_error "missing ${_qtype} record in response for key $(key_get KEY3 ID)"
check_signatures $_qtype "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" "KSK"
numkeys=$((numkeys+1))
elif [ "$(key_get KEY3 EXPECT)" = "yes" ]; then
grep "${ZONE}\..*${DNSKEY_TTL}.*IN.*${_qtype}.*257.*.3.*$(key_get KEY3 ALG_NUM)" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected ${_qtype} record in response for key $(key_get KEY3 ID)"
fi
if [ "$(key_get KEY4 STATE_DNSKEY)" = "rumoured" ] || [ "$(key_get KEY4 STATE_DNSKEY)" = "omnipresent" ]; then
grep "${ZONE}\..*${DNSKEY_TTL}.*IN.*${_qtype}.*257.*.3.*$(key_get KEY4 ALG_NUM)" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" > /dev/null || log_error "missing ${_qtype} record in response for key $(key_get KEY4 ID)"
check_signatures $_qtype "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" "KSK"
numkeys=$((numkeys+1))
elif [ "$(key_get KEY4 EXPECT)" = "yes" ]; then
grep "${ZONE}\..*${DNSKEY_TTL}.*IN.*${_qtype}.*257.*.3.*$(key_get KEY4 ALG_NUM)" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" > /dev/null && log_error "unexpected ${_qtype} record in response for key $(key_get KEY4 ID)"
fi
lines=$(get_keys_which_signed $_qtype "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" | wc -l)
check_signatures $_qtype "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" "KSK"
test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed"
status=$((status+ret))
# Test SOA query.
_qtype="SOA"
n=$((n+1))
echo_i "check ${_qtype} rrset is signed correctly for zone ${ZONE} ($n)"
ret=0
dig_with_opts "$ZONE" "@${SERVER}" $_qtype > "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" || log_error "dig ${ZONE} ${_qtype} failed"
grep "status: NOERROR" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch status in DNS response"
grep "${ZONE}\..*${DEFAULT_TTL}.*IN.*${_qtype}.*" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" > /dev/null || log_error "missing ${_qtype} record in response"
lines=$(get_keys_which_signed $_qtype "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" | wc -l)
check_signatures $_qtype "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" "ZSK"
test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed"
status=$((status+ret))
# Test CDS and CDNSKEY publication.
check_cds
}
# Test an RRset below the apex and verify it is signed correctly.
check_subdomain() {
_qtype="A"
n=$((n+1))
echo_i "check ${_qtype} a.${ZONE} rrset is signed correctly for zone ${ZONE} ($n)"
ret=0
dig_with_opts "a.$ZONE" "@${SERVER}" $_qtype > "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" || log_error "dig a.${ZONE} ${_qtype} failed"
grep "status: NOERROR" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch status in DNS response"
grep "a.${ZONE}\..*${DEFAULT_TTL}.*IN.*${_qtype}.*10\.0\.0\.1" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" > /dev/null || log_error "missing a.${ZONE} ${_qtype} record in response"
lines=$(get_keys_which_signed $_qtype "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" | wc -l)
check_signatures $_qtype "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" "ZSK"
test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed"
status=$((status+ret))
}
#
# Zone: default.kasp.
#
# Check the zone with default kasp policy has loaded and is signed.
set_zone "default.kasp"
set_policy "default" "1" "3600"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# Key properties.
set_keyrole "KEY1" "csk"
set_keylifetime "KEY1" "0"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256"
set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes"
set_zonesigning "KEY1" "yes"
# The first key is immediately published and activated.
set_keytime "KEY1" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY1" "ACTIVE" "yes"
# DNSKEY, RRSIG (ksk), RRSIG (zsk) are published. DS needs to wait.
set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "hidden"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Update zone.
n=$((n+1))
echo_i "modify unsigned zone file and check that new record is signed for zone ${ZONE} ($n)"
ret=0
cp "${DIR}/template2.db.in" "${DIR}/${ZONE}.db"
rndccmd 10.53.0.3 reload "$ZONE" > /dev/null || log_error "rndc reload zone ${ZONE} failed"
update_is_signed() {
dig_with_opts "a.${ZONE}" "@${SERVER}" A > "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.a" || return 1
grep "status: NOERROR" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.a" > /dev/null || return 1
grep "a.${ZONE}\..*${DEFAULT_TTL}.*IN.*A.*10\.0\.0\.11" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.a" > /dev/null || return 1
lines=$(get_keys_which_signed A "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.a" | wc -l)
test "$lines" -eq 1 || return 1
get_keys_which_signed A "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.a" | grep "^${KEY_ID}$" > /dev/null || return 1
dig_with_opts "d.${ZONE}" "@${SERVER}" A > "dig.out.$DIR.test$n".d || return 1
grep "status: NOERROR" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n".d > /dev/null || return 1
grep "d.${ZONE}\..*${DEFAULT_TTL}.*IN.*A.*10\.0\.0\.4" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n".d > /dev/null || return 1
lines=$(get_keys_which_signed A "dig.out.$DIR.test$n".d | wc -l)
test "$lines" -eq 1 || return 1
get_keys_which_signed A "dig.out.$DIR.test$n".d | grep "^${KEY_ID}$" > /dev/null || return 1
}
retry_quiet 10 update_is_signed || ret=1
test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed"
status=$((status+ret))
#
# Zone: dynamic.kasp
#
set_zone "dynamic.kasp"
set_policy "default" "1" "3600"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# Key properties, timings and states same as above.
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Update zone with nsupdate.
n=$((n+1))
echo_i "nsupdate zone and check that new record is signed for zone ${ZONE} ($n)"
ret=0
(
echo zone ${ZONE}
echo server 10.53.0.3 "$PORT"
echo update del "a.${ZONE}" 300 A 10.0.0.1
echo update add "a.${ZONE}" 300 A 10.0.0.11
echo update add "d.${ZONE}" 300 A 10.0.0.4
echo send
) | $NSUPDATE
retry_quiet 10 update_is_signed || ret=1
test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed"
status=$((status+ret))
#
# Zone: dynamic-inline-signing.kasp
#
set_zone "dynamic-inline-signing.kasp"
set_policy "default" "1" "3600"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# Key properties, timings and states same as above.
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Update zone with freeze/thaw.
n=$((n+1))
echo_i "modify unsigned zone file and check that new record is signed for zone ${ZONE} ($n)"
ret=0
rndccmd 10.53.0.3 freeze "$ZONE" > /dev/null || log_error "rndc freeze zone ${ZONE} failed"
sleep 1
cp "${DIR}/template2.db.in" "${DIR}/${ZONE}.db"
rndccmd 10.53.0.3 thaw "$ZONE" > /dev/null || log_error "rndc thaw zone ${ZONE} failed"
retry_quiet 10 update_is_signed || ret=1
test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed"
status=$((status+ret))
#
# Zone: inline-signing.kasp
#
set_zone "inline-signing.kasp"
set_policy "default" "1" "3600"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# Key properties, timings and states same as above.
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
#
# Zone: rsasha1.kasp.
#
set_zone "rsasha1.kasp"
set_policy "rsasha1" "3" "1234"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# Key properties.
key_clear "KEY1"
set_keyrole "KEY1" "ksk"
set_keylifetime "KEY1" "315360000"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "5" "RSASHA1" "2048"
set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes"
set_zonesigning "KEY1" "no"
key_clear "KEY2"
set_keyrole "KEY2" "zsk"
set_keylifetime "KEY2" "157680000"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "5" "RSASHA1" "2048"
set_keysigning "KEY2" "no"
set_zonesigning "KEY2" "yes"
key_clear "KEY3"
set_keyrole "KEY3" "zsk"
set_keylifetime "KEY3" "31536000"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY3" "5" "RSASHA1" "2000"
set_keysigning "KEY3" "no"
set_zonesigning "KEY3" "yes"
# The first keys are immediately published and activated.
# Because lifetime > 0, retired timing is also set.
set_keytime "KEY1" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY1" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY1" "RETIRED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY2" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY2" "RETIRED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY3" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY3" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY3" "RETIRED" "yes"
# KSK: DNSKEY, RRSIG (ksk) published. DS needs to wait.
# ZSK: DNSKEY, RRSIG (zsk) published.
set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "hidden"
set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY3" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "rumoured"
# Three keys only.
key_clear "KEY4"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
#
# Zone: unsigned.kasp.
#
set_zone "unsigned.kasp"
set_policy "none" "0" "0"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
key_clear "KEY1"
key_clear "KEY2"
key_clear "KEY3"
key_clear "KEY4"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
#
# Zone: unlimited.kasp.
#
set_zone "unlimited.kasp"
set_policy "unlimited" "1" "1234"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# Key properties.
set_keyrole "KEY1" "csk"
set_keylifetime "KEY1" "0"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256"
set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes"
set_zonesigning "KEY1" "yes"
# The first key is immediately published and activated.
set_keytime "KEY1" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY1" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY1" "RETIRED" "none"
# DNSKEY, RRSIG (ksk), RRSIG (zsk) are published. DS needs to wait.
set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "hidden"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
#
# Zone: inherit.kasp.
#
set_zone "inherit.kasp"
set_policy "rsasha1" "3" "1234"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# Key properties.
key_clear "KEY1"
set_keyrole "KEY1" "ksk"
set_keylifetime "KEY1" "315360000"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "5" "RSASHA1" "2048"
set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes"
set_zonesigning "KEY1" "no"
key_clear "KEY2"
set_keyrole "KEY2" "zsk"
set_keylifetime "KEY2" "157680000"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "5" "RSASHA1" "2048"
set_keysigning "KEY2" "no"
set_zonesigning "KEY2" "yes"
key_clear "KEY3"
set_keyrole "KEY3" "zsk"
set_keylifetime "KEY3" "31536000"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY3" "5" "RSASHA1" "2000"
set_keysigning "KEY3" "no"
set_zonesigning "KEY3" "yes"
# The first keys are immediately published and activated.
# Because lifetime > 0, retired timing is also set.
set_keytime "KEY1" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY1" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY1" "RETIRED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY2" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY2" "RETIRED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY3" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY3" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY3" "RETIRED" "yes"
# KSK: DNSKEY, RRSIG (ksk) published. DS needs to wait.
# ZSK: DNSKEY, RRSIG (zsk) published.
set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "hidden"
set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY3" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "rumoured"
# Three keys only.
key_clear "KEY4"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
#
# Zone: dnssec-keygen.kasp.
#
set_zone "dnssec-keygen.kasp"
set_policy "rsasha1" "3" "1234"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# Key properties, timings and states same as above.
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
#
# Zone: some-keys.kasp.
#
set_zone "some-keys.kasp"
set_policy "rsasha1" "3" "1234"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# Key properties, timings and states same as above.
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
#
# Zone: legacy-keys.kasp.
#
set_zone "legacy-keys.kasp"
set_policy "rsasha1" "3" "1234"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# Key properties, timings and states same as above.
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
#
# Zone: pregenerated.kasp.
#
# There are more pregenerated keys than needed, hence the number of keys is
# six, not three.
set_zone "pregenerated.kasp"
set_policy "rsasha1" "6" "1234"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# Key properties, timings and states same as above.
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
#
# Zone: rumoured.kasp.
#
# There are three keys in rumoured state.
set_zone "rumoured.kasp"
set_policy "rsasha1" "3" "1234"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# Key properties, timings and states same as above.
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
#
# Zone: secondary.kasp.
#
set_zone "secondary.kasp"
set_policy "rsasha1" "3" "1234"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# Key properties, timings and states same as above.
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Update zone.
n=$((n+1))
echo_i "check that we correctly sign the zone after IXFR for zone ${ZONE} ($n)"
ret=0
cp ns2/secondary.kasp.db.in2 ns2/secondary.kasp.db
rndccmd 10.53.0.2 reload "$ZONE" > /dev/null || log_error "rndc reload zone ${ZONE} failed"
_log=0
i=0
while [ $i -lt 5 ]
do
ret=0
dig_with_opts "a.${ZONE}" "@${SERVER}" A > "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.a" || log_error "dig a.${ZONE} A failed"
grep "status: NOERROR" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.a" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch status in DNS response"
grep "a.${ZONE}\..*${DEFAULT_TTL}.*IN.*A.*10\.0\.0\.11" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.a" > /dev/null || log_error "missing a.${ZONE} A record in response"
check_signatures $_qtype "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.a" "ZSK"
dig_with_opts "d.${ZONE}" "@${SERVER}" A > "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.d" || log_error "dig d.${ZONE} A failed"
grep "status: NOERROR" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.d" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch status in DNS response"
grep "d.${ZONE}\..*${DEFAULT_TTL}.*IN.*A.*10\.0\.0\.4" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.d" > /dev/null || log_error "missing d.${ZONE} A record in response"
lines=$(get_keys_which_signed A "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.d" | wc -l)
check_signatures $_qtype "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.d" "ZSK"
i=$((i+1))
if [ $ret = 0 ]; then break; fi
echo_i "waiting ... ($i)"
sleep 1
done
_log=1
test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed"
status=$((status+ret))
# TODO: we might want to test:
# - configuring a zone with too many active keys (should trigger retire).
# - configuring a zone with keys not matching the policy.
#
# Zone: rsasha1-nsec3.kasp.
#
set_zone "rsasha1-nsec3.kasp"
set_policy "rsasha1-nsec3" "3" "1234"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# Key properties.
set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "7" "NSEC3RSASHA1" "2048"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "7" "NSEC3RSASHA1" "2048"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY3" "7" "NSEC3RSASHA1" "2000"
# Key timings and states same as above.
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
#
# Zone: rsasha256.kasp.
#
set_zone "rsasha256.kasp"
set_policy "rsasha256" "3" "1234"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# Key properties.
set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "8" "RSASHA256" "2048"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "8" "RSASHA256" "2048"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY3" "8" "RSASHA256" "2000"
# Key timings and states same as above.
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
#
# Zone: rsasha512.kasp.
#
set_zone "rsasha512.kasp"
set_policy "rsasha512" "3" "1234"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# Key properties.
set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "10" "RSASHA512" "2048"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "10" "RSASHA512" "2048"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY3" "10" "RSASHA512" "2000"
# Key timings and states same as above.
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
#
# Zone: ecdsa256.kasp.
#
set_zone "ecdsa256.kasp"
set_policy "ecdsa256" "3" "1234"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# Key properties.
set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY3" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256"
# Key timings and states same as above.
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
#
# Zone: ecdsa512.kasp.
#
set_zone "ecdsa384.kasp"
set_policy "ecdsa384" "3" "1234"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# Key properties.
set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "14" "ECDSAP384SHA384" "384"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "14" "ECDSAP384SHA384" "384"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY3" "14" "ECDSAP384SHA384" "384"
# Key timings and states same as above.
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# TODO: ED25519 and ED448.
#
# Zone: expired-sigs.autosign.
#
set_zone "expired-sigs.autosign"
set_policy "autosign" "2" "300"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# Key properties.
key_clear "KEY1"
set_keyrole "KEY1" "ksk"
set_keylifetime "KEY1" "63072000"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256"
set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes"
set_zonesigning "KEY1" "no"
key_clear "KEY2"
set_keyrole "KEY2" "zsk"
set_keylifetime "KEY2" "31536000"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256"
set_keysigning "KEY2" "no"
set_zonesigning "KEY2" "yes"
# Key timings.
set_keytime "KEY1" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY1" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY1" "RETIRED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY2" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY2" "RETIRED" "yes"
# Both KSK and ZSK stay OMNIPRESENT.
set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent"
# Expect only two keys.
key_clear "KEY3"
key_clear "KEY4"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Verify all signatures have been refreshed.
check_rrsig_refresh() {
# Apex.
_qtypes="DNSKEY SOA NS NSEC"
for _qtype in $_qtypes
do
n=$((n+1))
echo_i "check ${_qtype} rrsig is refreshed correctly for zone ${ZONE} ($n)"
ret=0
dig_with_opts "$ZONE" "@${SERVER}" "$_qtype" > "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" || log_error "dig ${ZONE} ${_qtype} failed"
grep "status: NOERROR" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch status in DNS response"
grep "${ZONE}\..*IN.*RRSIG.*${_qtype}.*${ZONE}" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" > "rrsig.out.$ZONE.$_qtype" || log_error "missing RRSIG (${_qtype}) record in response"
# If this exact RRSIG is also in the zone file it is not refreshed.
_rrsig=$(cat "rrsig.out.$ZONE.$_qtype")
grep "${_rrsig}" "${DIR}/${ZONE}.db" > /dev/null && log_error "RRSIG (${_qtype}) not refreshed in zone ${ZONE}"
test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed"
status=$((status+ret))
done
# Below apex.
_labels="a b c ns3"
for _label in $_labels;
do
_qtypes="A NSEC"
for _qtype in $_qtypes
do
n=$((n+1))
echo_i "check ${_label} ${_qtype} rrsig is refreshed correctly for zone ${ZONE} ($n)"
ret=0
dig_with_opts "${_label}.${ZONE}" "@${SERVER}" "$_qtype" > "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" || log_error "dig ${_label}.${ZONE} ${_qtype} failed"
grep "status: NOERROR" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch status in DNS response"
grep "${ZONE}\..*IN.*RRSIG.*${_qtype}.*${ZONE}" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" > "rrsig.out.$ZONE.$_qtype" || log_error "missing RRSIG (${_qtype}) record in response"
_rrsig=$(cat "rrsig.out.$ZONE.$_qtype")
grep "${_rrsig}" "${DIR}/${ZONE}.db" > /dev/null && log_error "RRSIG (${_qtype}) not refreshed in zone ${ZONE}"
test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed"
status=$((status+ret))
done
done
}
check_rrsig_refresh
#
# Zone: fresh-sigs.autosign.
#
set_zone "fresh-sigs.autosign"
set_policy "autosign" "2" "300"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# Key properties, timings and states same as above.
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Verify signature reuse.
check_rrsig_reuse() {
# Apex.
_qtypes="NS NSEC"
for _qtype in $_qtypes
do
n=$((n+1))
echo_i "check ${_qtype} rrsig is reused correctly for zone ${ZONE} ($n)"
ret=0
dig_with_opts "$ZONE" "@${SERVER}" "$_qtype" > "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" || log_error "dig ${ZONE} ${_qtype} failed"
grep "status: NOERROR" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch status in DNS response"
grep "${ZONE}\..*IN.*RRSIG.*${_qtype}.*${ZONE}" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" > "rrsig.out.$ZONE.$_qtype" || log_error "missing RRSIG (${_qtype}) record in response"
# If this exact RRSIG is also in the zone file it is not refreshed.
_rrsig=$(awk '{print $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, $10, $11, $12, $13, $14;}' < "rrsig.out.$ZONE.$_qtype")
grep "${_rrsig}" "${DIR}/${ZONE}.db" > /dev/null || log_error "RRSIG (${_qtype}) not reused in zone ${ZONE}"
test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed"
status=$((status+ret))
done
# Below apex.
_labels="a b c ns3"
for _label in $_labels;
do
_qtypes="A NSEC"
for _qtype in $_qtypes
do
n=$((n+1))
echo_i "check ${_label} ${_qtype} rrsig is reused correctly for zone ${ZONE} ($n)"
ret=0
dig_with_opts "${_label}.${ZONE}" "@${SERVER}" "$_qtype" > "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" || log_error "dig ${_label}.${ZONE} ${_qtype} failed"
grep "status: NOERROR" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch status in DNS response"
grep "${ZONE}\..*IN.*RRSIG.*${_qtype}.*${ZONE}" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n" > "rrsig.out.$ZONE.$_qtype" || log_error "missing RRSIG (${_qtype}) record in response"
_rrsig=$(awk '{print $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, $10, $11, $12, $13, $14;}' < "rrsig.out.$ZONE.$_qtype")
grep "${_rrsig}" "${DIR}/${ZONE}.db" > /dev/null || log_error "RRSIG (${_qtype}) not reused in zone ${ZONE}"
test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed"
status=$((status+ret))
done
done
}
check_rrsig_reuse
#
# Zone: unfresh-sigs.autosign.
#
set_zone "unfresh-sigs.autosign"
set_policy "autosign" "2" "300"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# Key properties, timings and states same as above.
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
check_rrsig_refresh
#
# Zone: zsk-missing.autosign.
#
set_zone "zsk-missing.autosign"
set_policy "autosign" "2" "300"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# Key properties, timings and states same as above.
# TODO.
#
# Zone: zsk-retired.autosign.
#
set_zone "zsk-retired.autosign"
set_policy "autosign" "3" "300"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# The third key is not yet expected to be signing.
set_keyrole "KEY3" "zsk"
set_keylifetime "KEY3" "31536000"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY3" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256"
set_keysigning "KEY3" "no"
set_zonesigning "KEY3" "no"
# Key timings.
set_keytime "KEY3" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY3" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY3" "RETIRED" "yes"
# The ZSK goal is set to HIDDEN but records stay OMNIPRESENT until the new ZSK
# is active.
set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "hidden"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent"
# A new ZSK should be introduced, so expect a key with goal OMNIPRESENT,
# the DNSKEY introduced (RUMOURED) and the signatures HIDDEN.
set_keystate "KEY3" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "hidden"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
check_rrsig_refresh
#
# Test dnssec-policy inheritance.
#
# These zones should be unsigned:
# ns2/unsigned.tld
# ns4/none.inherit.signed
# ns4/none.override.signed
# ns4/inherit.none.signed
# ns4/none.none.signed
# ns5/inherit.inherit.unsigned
# ns5/none.inherit.unsigned
# ns5/none.override.unsigned
# ns5/inherit.none.unsigned
# ns5/none.none.unsigned
key_clear "KEY1"
key_clear "KEY2"
key_clear "KEY3"
key_clear "KEY4"
set_zone "unsigned.tld"
set_policy "none" "0" "0"
set_server "ns2" "10.53.0.2"
TSIG=""
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
set_zone "none.inherit.signed"
set_policy "none" "0" "0"
set_server "ns4" "10.53.0.4"
TSIG="hmac-sha1:sha1:$SHA1"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
set_zone "none.override.signed"
set_policy "none" "0" "0"
set_server "ns4" "10.53.0.4"
TSIG="hmac-sha224:sha224:$SHA224"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
set_zone "inherit.none.signed"
set_policy "none" "0" "0"
set_server "ns4" "10.53.0.4"
TSIG="hmac-sha256:sha256:$SHA256"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
set_zone "none.none.signed"
set_policy "none" "0" "0"
set_server "ns4" "10.53.0.4"
TSIG="hmac-sha256:sha256:$SHA256"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
set_zone "inherit.inherit.unsigned"
set_policy "none" "0" "0"
set_server "ns5" "10.53.0.5"
TSIG="hmac-sha1:sha1:$SHA1"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
set_zone "none.inherit.unsigned"
set_policy "none" "0" "0"
set_server "ns5" "10.53.0.5"
TSIG="hmac-sha1:sha1:$SHA1"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
set_zone "none.override.unsigned"
set_policy "none" "0" "0"
set_server "ns5" "10.53.0.5"
TSIG="hmac-sha224:sha224:$SHA224"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
set_zone "inherit.none.unsigned"
set_policy "none" "0" "0"
set_server "ns5" "10.53.0.5"
TSIG="hmac-sha256:sha256:$SHA256"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
set_zone "none.none.unsigned"
set_policy "none" "0" "0"
set_server "ns5" "10.53.0.5"
TSIG="hmac-sha256:sha256:$SHA256"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
# These zones should be signed with the default policy:
# ns2/signed.tld
# ns4/override.inherit.signed
# ns4/inherit.override.signed
# ns5/override.inherit.signed
# ns5/inherit.override.signed
set_keyrole "KEY1" "csk"
set_keylifetime "KEY1" "0"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256"
set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes"
set_zonesigning "KEY1" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY1" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY1" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY1" "RETIRED" "none"
set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "hidden"
set_zone "signed.tld"
set_policy "default" "1" "3600"
set_server "ns2" "10.53.0.2"
TSIG=""
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
set_zone "override.inherit.signed"
set_policy "default" "1" "3600"
set_server "ns4" "10.53.0.4"
TSIG="hmac-sha1:sha1:$SHA1"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
set_zone "inherit.override.signed"
set_policy "default" "1" "3600"
set_server "ns4" "10.53.0.4"
TSIG="hmac-sha224:sha224:$SHA224"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
set_zone "override.inherit.unsigned"
set_policy "default" "1" "3600"
set_server "ns5" "10.53.0.5"
TSIG="hmac-sha1:sha1:$SHA1"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
set_zone "inherit.override.unsigned"
set_policy "default" "1" "3600"
set_server "ns5" "10.53.0.5"
TSIG="hmac-sha224:sha224:$SHA224"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# These zones should be signed with the test policy:
# ns4/inherit.inherit.signed
# ns4/override.override.signed
# ns4/override.none.signed
# ns5/override.override.unsigned
# ns5/override.none.unsigned
# ns4/example.net (both views)
set_keyrole "KEY1" "csk"
set_keylifetime "KEY1" "0"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "14" "ECDSAP384SHA384" "384"
set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes"
set_zonesigning "KEY1" "yes"
set_zone "inherit.inherit.signed"
set_policy "test" "1" "3600"
set_server "ns4" "10.53.0.4"
TSIG="hmac-sha1:sha1:$SHA1"
wait_for_nsec
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
set_zone "override.override.signed"
set_policy "test" "1" "3600"
set_server "ns4" "10.53.0.4"
TSIG="hmac-sha224:sha224:$SHA224"
wait_for_nsec
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
set_zone "override.none.signed"
set_policy "test" "1" "3600"
set_server "ns4" "10.53.0.4"
TSIG="hmac-sha256:sha256:$SHA256"
wait_for_nsec
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
set_zone "override.override.unsigned"
set_policy "test" "1" "3600"
set_server "ns5" "10.53.0.5"
TSIG="hmac-sha224:sha224:$SHA224"
wait_for_nsec
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
set_zone "override.none.unsigned"
set_policy "test" "1" "3600"
set_server "ns5" "10.53.0.5"
TSIG="hmac-sha256:sha256:$SHA256"
wait_for_nsec
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
set_zone "example.net"
set_server "ns4" "10.53.0.4"
TSIG="hmac-sha1:keyforview1:$VIEW1"
wait_for_nsec
check_keys
check_apex
dnssec_verify
n=$((n+1))
# check subdomain
echo_i "check TXT example.net (view example1) rrset is signed correctly ($n)"
ret=0
dig_with_opts "view.${ZONE}" "@${SERVER}" TXT > "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.txt" || log_error "dig view.${ZONE} TXT failed"
grep "status: NOERROR" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.txt" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch status in DNS response"
grep "view.${ZONE}\..*${DEFAULT_TTL}.*IN.*TXT.*view1" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.txt" > /dev/null || log_error "missing view.${ZONE} TXT record in response"
check_signatures TXT "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.txt" "ZSK"
test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed"
status=$((status+ret))
TSIG="hmac-sha1:keyforview2:$VIEW2"
wait_for_nsec
check_keys
check_apex
dnssec_verify
n=$((n+1))
# check subdomain
echo_i "check TXT example.net (view example2) rrset is signed correctly ($n)"
ret=0
dig_with_opts "view.${ZONE}" "@${SERVER}" TXT > "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.txt" || log_error "dig view.${ZONE} TXT failed"
grep "status: NOERROR" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.txt" > /dev/null || log_error "mismatch status in DNS response"
grep "view.${ZONE}\..*${DEFAULT_TTL}.*IN.*TXT.*view2" "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.txt" > /dev/null || log_error "missing view.${ZONE} TXT record in response"
check_signatures TXT "dig.out.$DIR.test$n.txt" "ZSK"
test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed"
status=$((status+ret))
# Clear TSIG.
TSIG=""
#
# Testing DNSSEC introduction.
#
#
# Zone: step1.enable-dnssec.autosign.
#
set_zone "step1.enable-dnssec.autosign"
set_policy "enable-dnssec" "1" "300"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# Key properties.
key_clear "KEY1"
set_keyrole "KEY1" "csk"
set_keylifetime "KEY1" "0"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256"
set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes"
set_zonesigning "KEY1" "yes"
# Key timings.
set_keytime "KEY1" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY1" "ACTIVE" "yes"
# The DNSKEY and signatures are introduced first, the DS remains hidden.
set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "hidden"
# This policy lists only one key (CSK).
key_clear "KEY2"
key_clear "KEY3"
key_clear "KEY4"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
check_next_key_event() {
_expect=$1
n=$((n+1))
echo_i "check next key event for zone ${ZONE} ($n)"
ret=0
grep "zone ${ZONE}.*: next key event in .* seconds" "${DIR}/named.run" > "keyevent.out.$ZONE.test$n" || log_error "no next key event for zone ${ZONE}"
# Get the latest next key event.
_time=$(awk '{print $10}' < "keyevent.out.$ZONE.test$n" | tail -1)
# The next key event time must within threshold of the
# expected time.
_expectmin=$((_expect-next_key_event_threshold))
_expectmax=$((_expect+next_key_event_threshold))
test $_expectmin -le "$_time" || log_error "bad next key event time ${_time} for zone ${ZONE} (expect ${_expect})"
test $_expectmax -ge "$_time" || log_error "bad next key event time ${_time} for zone ${ZONE} (expect ${_expect})"
test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed"
status=$((status+ret))
}
# Next key event is when the DNSKEY RRset becomes OMNIPRESENT: DNSKEY TTL plus
# publish safety plus the zone propagation delay: 900 seconds.
check_next_key_event 900
#
# Zone: step2.enable-dnssec.autosign.
#
set_zone "step2.enable-dnssec.autosign"
set_policy "enable-dnssec" "1" "300"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# The DNSKEY is omnipresent, but the zone signatures not yet.
# Thus, the DS remains hidden.
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when the zone signatures become OMNIPRESENT: max-zone-ttl
# plus zone propagation delay plus retire safety minus the already elapsed
# 900 seconds: 12h + 300s + 20m - 900 = 44700 - 900 = 43800 seconds
check_next_key_event 43800
#
# Zone: step3.enable-dnssec.autosign.
#
set_zone "step3.enable-dnssec.autosign"
set_policy "enable-dnssec" "1" "300"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# The DS can be introduced.
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "rumoured"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when the DS can move to the OMNIPRESENT state. This occurs
# when the parent registration and propagation delay have passed, plus the
# DS TTL and retire safety delay: 1d + 1h + 2h + 20m = 27h20m = 98400 seconds
check_next_key_event 98400
#
# Zone: step4.enable-dnssec.autosign.
#
set_zone "step4.enable-dnssec.autosign"
set_policy "enable-dnssec" "1" "300"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# The DS is omnipresent.
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is never, the zone dnssec-policy has been established. So we
# fall back to the default loadkeys interval.
check_next_key_event 3600
#
# Testing ZSK Pre-Publication rollover.
#
#
# Zone: step1.zsk-prepub.autosign.
#
set_zone "step1.zsk-prepub.autosign"
set_policy "zsk-prepub" "2" "3600"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# Key properties.
key_clear "KEY1"
set_keyrole "KEY1" "ksk"
set_keylifetime "KEY1" "63072000"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256"
set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes"
set_zonesigning "KEY1" "no"
key_clear "KEY2"
set_keyrole "KEY2" "zsk"
set_keylifetime "KEY2" "2592000"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256"
set_keysigning "KEY2" "no"
set_zonesigning "KEY2" "yes"
# Key timings.
set_keytime "KEY1" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY1" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY1" "RETIRED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY2" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY2" "RETIRED" "yes"
# Both KSK (KEY1) and ZSK (KEY2) start in OMNIPRESENT.
set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent"
# Initially only two keys.
key_clear "KEY3"
key_clear "KEY4"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when the successor ZSK needs to be published. That is
# the ZSK lifetime - prepublication time. The prepublication time is DNSKEY
# TTL plus publish safety plus the zone propagation delay. For the
# zsk-prepub policy that means: 30d - 3600s + 1d + 1h = 2498400 seconds.
check_next_key_event 2498400
#
# Zone: step2.zsk-prepub.autosign.
#
set_zone "step2.zsk-prepub.autosign"
set_policy "zsk-prepub" "3" "3600"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# New ZSK (KEY3) is prepublished, but not yet signing.
key_clear "KEY3"
set_keyrole "KEY3" "zsk"
set_keylifetime "KEY3" "2592000"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY3" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256"
set_keysigning "KEY3" "no"
set_zonesigning "KEY3" "no"
# Key timings.
set_keytime "KEY3" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY3" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY3" "RETIRED" "yes"
# Key states.
set_keystate "KEY3" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "hidden"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when the successor ZSK becomes OMNIPRESENT. That is the
# DNSKEY TTL plus the zone propagation delay, plus the publish-safety. For
# the zsk-prepub policy, this means: 3600s + 1h + 1d = 93600 seconds.
check_next_key_event 93600
#
# Zone: step3.zsk-prepub.autosign.
#
set_zone "step3.zsk-prepub.autosign"
set_policy "zsk-prepub" "3" "3600"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# ZSK (KEY2) no longer is actively signing, RRSIG state in UNRETENTIVE.
# New ZSK (KEY3) is now actively signing, RRSIG state in RUMOURED.
set_zonesigning "KEY2" "no"
set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "hidden"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "unretentive"
set_zonesigning "KEY3" "yes"
set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "rumoured"
check_keys
check_apex
# Subdomain still has good signatures of ZSK (KEY2).
# Set expected zone signing on for KEY2 and off for KEY3,
# testing whether signatures which are still valid are being reused.
set_zonesigning "KEY2" "yes"
set_zonesigning "KEY3" "no"
check_subdomain
# Restore the expected zone signing properties.
set_zonesigning "KEY2" "no"
set_zonesigning "KEY3" "yes"
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when all the RRSIG records have been replaced with
# signatures of the new ZSK, in other words when ZRRSIG becomes OMNIPRESENT.
# That is Dsgn plus the maximum zone TTL plus the zone propagation delay plus
# retire-safety. For the zsk-prepub policy that means: 1w (because 2w validity
# and refresh within a week) + 1d + 1h + 2d = 10d1h = 867600 seconds.
check_next_key_event 867600
#
# Zone: step4.zsk-prepub.autosign.
#
set_zone "step4.zsk-prepub.autosign"
set_policy "zsk-prepub" "3" "3600"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# ZSK (KEY2) DNSKEY is no longer needed.
# ZSK (KEY3) is now actively signing, RRSIG state in RUMOURED.
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "unretentive"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "hidden"
set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when the DNSKEY enters the HIDDEN state. This is the
# DNSKEY TTL plus zone propagation delay. For the zsk-prepub policy this is:
# 3600s + 1h = 7200s
check_next_key_event 7200
#
# Zone: step5.zsk-prepub.autosign.
#
set_zone "step5.zsk-prepub.autosign"
set_policy "zsk-prepub" "3" "3600"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# ZSK (KEY3) DNSKEY is now completely HIDDEN and removed.
set_keytime "KEY2" "REMOVED" "yes"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "hidden"
# ZSK (KEY3) remains actively signing, staying in OMNIPRESENT.
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when the new successor needs to be published. This is the
# ZSK lifetime minus Iret minus Ipub minus DNSKEY TTL. For the zsk-prepub
# policy this is: 30d - 867600s - 93600s - 3600s = 1627200 seconds.
check_next_key_event 1627200
#
# Testing KSK Double-KSK rollover.
#
#
# Zone: step1.ksk-doubleksk.autosign.
#
set_zone "step1.ksk-doubleksk.autosign"
set_policy "ksk-doubleksk" "2" "7200"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# Key properties.
key_clear "KEY1"
set_keyrole "KEY1" "ksk"
set_keylifetime "KEY1" "5184000"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256"
set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes"
set_zonesigning "KEY1" "no"
key_clear "KEY2"
set_keyrole "KEY2" "zsk"
set_keylifetime "KEY2" "31536000"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256"
set_keysigning "KEY2" "no"
set_zonesigning "KEY2" "yes"
# Key timings.
set_keytime "KEY1" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY1" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY1" "RETIRED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY2" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY2" "RETIRED" "yes"
# Both KSK (KEY1) and ZSK (KEY2) start in OMNIPRESENT.
set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent"
# Initially only two keys.
key_clear "KEY3"
key_clear "KEY4"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when the successor KSK needs to be published. That is
# the KSK lifetime - prepublication time - DS registration delay. The
# prepublication time is DNSKEY TTL plus publish safety plus the zone
# propagation delay. For the ksk-doubleksk policy that means:
# 60d - (1d3h) - (1d) = 5000400 seconds.
check_next_key_event 5000400
#
# Zone: step2.ksk-doubleksk.autosign.
#
set_zone "step2.ksk-doubleksk.autosign"
set_policy "ksk-doubleksk" "3" "7200"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# New KSK (KEY3) is prepublished (and signs DNSKEY RRset).
key_clear "KEY3"
set_keyrole "KEY3" "ksk"
set_keylifetime "KEY3" "5184000"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY3" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256"
set_keysigning "KEY3" "yes"
set_zonesigning "KEY3" "no"
# Key timings.
set_keytime "KEY3" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY3" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY3" "RETIRED" "yes"
# Key states.
set_keystate "KEY3" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DS" "hidden"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when the successor KSK becomes OMNIPRESENT. That is the
# DNSKEY TTL plus the zone propagation delay, plus the publish-safety. For
# the ksk-doubleksk policy, this means: 7200s + 1h + 1d = 97200 seconds.
check_next_key_event 97200
#
# Zone: step3.ksk-doubleksk.autosign.
#
set_zone "step3.ksk-doubleksk.autosign"
set_policy "ksk-doubleksk" "3" "7200"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# KSK (KEY1) DS will be removed, so it is UNRETENTIVE.
set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "hidden"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "unretentive"
# New KSK (KEY3) has its DS submitted.
set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DS" "rumoured"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when the predecessor DS has been replaced with the
# successor DS and enough time has passed such that the all validators that
# have this DS RRset cached only know about the successor DS. This is the
# registration delay plus the retire interval, which is the parent
# propagation delay plus the DS TTL plus the retire-safety. For the
# ksk-double-ksk policy this means: 1d + 1h + 3600s + 2d = 3d2h =
# 266400 seconds.
check_next_key_event 266400
#
# Zone: step4.ksk-doubleksk.autosign.
#
set_zone "step4.ksk-doubleksk.autosign"
set_policy "ksk-doubleksk" "3" "7200"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# KSK (KEY1) DNSKEY can be removed.
set_keysigning "KEY1" "no"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "unretentive"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "unretentive"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "hidden"
# New KSK (KEY3) DS is now OMNIPRESENT.
set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when the DNSKEY enters the HIDDEN state. This is the
# DNSKEY TTL plus zone propagation delay. For the ksk-doubleksk policy this is:
# 7200s + 1h = 10800s
check_next_key_event 10800
#
# Zone: step5.ksk-doubleksk.autosign.
#
set_zone "step5.ksk-doubleksk.autosign"
set_policy "ksk-doubleksk" "3" "7200"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# KSK (KEY1) DNSKEY is now HIDDEN.
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "hidden"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "hidden"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when the new successor needs to be published. This is the
# KSK lifetime minus Ipub minus Dreg minus Iret minus DNSKEY TTL. For the
# ksk-doubleksk this is: 60d - 1d3h - 1d - 2d2h - 2h =
# 5184000 - 97200 - 86400 - 180000 - 7200 = 4813200 seconds.
check_next_key_event 4813200
#
# Testing CSK key rollover (1).
#
#
# Zone: step1.csk-roll.autosign.
#
set_zone "step1.csk-roll.autosign"
set_policy "csk-roll" "1" "3600"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# Key properties.
key_clear "KEY1"
set_keyrole "KEY1" "csk"
set_keylifetime "KEY1" "16070400"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256"
set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes"
set_zonesigning "KEY1" "yes"
# Key timings.
set_keytime "KEY1" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY1" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY1" "RETIRED" "yes"
# The CSK (KEY1) starts in OMNIPRESENT.
set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent"
# Initially only one key.
key_clear "KEY2"
key_clear "KEY3"
key_clear "KEY4"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when the successor CSK needs to be published. That is
# the CSK lifetime - prepublication time - DS registration delay. The
# prepublication time is DNSKEY TTL plus publish safety plus the zone
# propagation delay. For the csk-roll policy that means:
# 6mo - 1d - 3h = 15973200 seconds.
check_next_key_event 15973200
#
# Zone: step2.csk-roll.autosign.
#
set_zone "step2.csk-roll.autosign"
set_policy "csk-roll" "2" "3600"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# New CSK (KEY2) is prepublished (signs DNSKEY RRset, but not yet other RRsets).
key_clear "KEY2"
set_keyrole "KEY2" "csk"
set_keylifetime "KEY2" "16070400"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256"
set_keysigning "KEY2" "yes"
set_zonesigning "KEY2" "no"
# Key timings.
set_keytime "KEY2" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY2" "RETIRED" "yes"
# Key states.
set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "hidden"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DS" "hidden"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when the successor CSK becomes OMNIPRESENT. That is the
# DNSKEY TTL plus the zone propagation delay, plus the publish-safety. For
# the csk-roll policy, this means 3 hours = 10800 seconds.
check_next_key_event 10800
#
# Zone: step3.csk-roll.autosign.
#
set_zone "step3.csk-roll.autosign"
set_policy "csk-roll" "2" "3600"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# Swap zone signing role.
set_zonesigning "KEY1" "no"
set_zonesigning "KEY2" "yes"
# CSK (KEY1) DS and ZRRSIG will be removed, so it is UNRETENTIVE.
set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "hidden"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "unretentive"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "unretentive"
# New CSK (KEY2) has its DS submitted, and is signing, so the DS and ZRRSIG
# are in RUMOURED state.
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DS" "rumoured"
check_keys
check_apex
# Subdomain still has good signatures of old CSK (KEY1).
# Set expected zone signing on for KEY1 and off for KEY2,
# testing whether signatures which are still valid are being reused.
set_zonesigning "KEY1" "yes"
set_zonesigning "KEY2" "no"
check_subdomain
# Restore the expected zone signing properties.
set_zonesigning "KEY1" "no"
set_zonesigning "KEY2" "yes"
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when the predecessor DS has been replaced with the
# successor DS and enough time has passed such that the all validators that
# have this DS RRset cached only know about the successor DS. This is the
# registration delay plus the retire interval, which is the parent
# propagation delay plus the DS TTL plus the retire-safety. For the
# csk-roll policy this means: 1d + 1h + 1h + 2h = 1d4h = 100800 seconds.
check_next_key_event 100800
#
# Zone: step4.csk-roll.autosign.
#
set_zone "step4.csk-roll.autosign"
set_policy "csk-roll" "2" "3600"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# The old CSK (KEY1) is no longer signing the DNSKEY RRset.
set_keysigning "KEY1" "no"
# The old CSK (KEY1) DS is hidden. We still need to keep the DNSKEY public
# but can remove the KRRSIG records.
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "unretentive"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "hidden"
# The new CSK (KEY2) DS is now OMNIPRESENT.
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when the KRRSIG enters the HIDDEN state. This is the
# DNSKEY TTL plus zone propagation delay. For the csk-roll policy this is:
# 1h + 1h = 7200 seconds.
check_next_key_event 7200
#
# Zone: step5.csk-roll.autosign.
#
set_zone "step5.csk-roll.autosign"
set_policy "csk-roll" "2" "3600"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# The old CSK (KEY1) KRRSIG records are now all hidden.
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "hidden"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when the DNSKEY can be removed. This is when all ZRRSIG
# records have been replaced with signatures of the new CSK. We have
# calculated the interval to be 26d3h of which 1d4h (Dreg + Iret(KSK)) plus
# 2h (DNSKEY TTL + Dprp) have already passed. So next key event is in
# 26d3h - 1d4h - 2h = 597h = 2149200 seconds.
check_next_key_event 2149200
#
# Zone: step6.csk-roll.autosign.
#
set_zone "step6.csk-roll.autosign"
set_policy "csk-roll" "2" "3600"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# The old CSK (KEY1) ZRRSIG records are now all hidden (so the DNSKEY can
# be removed).
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "unretentive"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "hidden"
# The new CSK (KEY2) is now fully OMNIPRESENT.
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when the DNSKEY enters the HIDDEN state. This is the
# DNSKEY TTL plus zone propagation delay. For the csk-roll policy this is:
# 1h + 1h = 7200 seconds.
check_next_key_event 7200
#
# Zone: step7.csk-roll.autosign.
#
set_zone "step7.csk-roll.autosign"
set_policy "csk-roll" "2" "3600"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# The old CSK (KEY1) is now completely HIDDEN.
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "hidden"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when the new successor needs to be published. This is the
# CSK lifetime minus Ipub minus Dreg minus Iret minus DNSKEY TTL minus zone
# propagation delay. For the csk-roll this is:
# 6mo - 3h - 1d - 26d3h - 1h - 1h = 6mo - 27d8h = 13708800 seconds.
check_next_key_event 13708800
#
# Testing CSK key rollover (2).
#
#
# Zone: step1.csk-roll2.autosign.
#
set_zone "step1.csk-roll2.autosign"
set_policy "csk-roll2" "1" "3600"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# Key properties.
key_clear "KEY1"
set_keyrole "KEY1" "csk"
set_keylifetime "KEY1" "16070400"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256"
set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes"
set_zonesigning "KEY1" "yes"
# Key timings.
set_keytime "KEY1" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY1" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY1" "RETIRED" "yes"
# The CSK (KEY1) starts in OMNIPRESENT.
set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent"
# Initially only one key.
key_clear "KEY2"
key_clear "KEY3"
key_clear "KEY4"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when the successor CSK needs to be published. That is
# the CSK lifetime - prepublication time - DS registration delay. The
# prepublication time is DNSKEY TTL plus publish safety plus the zone
# propagation delay. For the csk-roll2 policy that means:
# 6mo - 3h - 1w = 15454800 seconds.
check_next_key_event 15454800
#
# Zone: step2.csk-roll2.autosign.
#
set_zone "step2.csk-roll2.autosign"
set_policy "csk-roll2" "2" "3600"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# New CSK (KEY2) is prepublished (signs DNSKEY RRset, but not yet other RRsets).
key_clear "KEY2"
set_keyrole "KEY2" "csk"
set_keylifetime "KEY2" "16070400"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256"
set_keysigning "KEY2" "yes"
set_zonesigning "KEY2" "no"
# Key timings.
set_keytime "KEY2" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY2" "RETIRED" "yes"
# Key states.
set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "hidden"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DS" "hidden"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when the successor CSK becomes OMNIPRESENT. That is the
# DNSKEY TTL plus the zone propagation delay, plus the publish-safety. For
# the csk-roll2 policy, this means 3 hours = 10800 seconds.
check_next_key_event 10800
#
# Zone: step3.csk-roll2.autosign.
#
set_zone "step3.csk-roll2.autosign"
set_policy "csk-roll2" "2" "3600"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# CSK (KEY1) DS and ZRRSIG will be removed, so it is UNRETENTIVE.
set_zonesigning "KEY1" "no"
set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "hidden"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "unretentive"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "unretentive"
# New CSK (KEY2) has its DS submitted, and is signing, so the DS and ZRRSIG
# are in RUMOURED state.
set_zonesigning "KEY2" "yes"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DS" "rumoured"
check_keys
check_apex
# Subdomain still has good signatures of old CSK (KEY1).
# Set expected zone signing on for KEY1 and off for KEY2,
# testing whether signatures which are still valid are being reused.
set_zonesigning "KEY1" "yes"
set_zonesigning "KEY2" "no"
check_subdomain
# Restore the expected zone signing properties.
set_zonesigning "KEY1" "no"
set_zonesigning "KEY2" "yes"
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when the predecessor ZRRSIG records have been replaced
# with that of the successor and enough time has passed such that the all
# validators that have such signed RRsets in cache only know about the
# successor signatures. This is the retire interval: Dsgn plus the
# maximum zone TTL plus the zone propagation delay plus retire-safety. For the
# csk-roll2 policy that means: 12h (because 1d validity and refresh within
# 12 hours) + 1d + 1h + 1h = 38h = 136800 seconds.
check_next_key_event 136800
#
# Zone: step4.csk-roll2.autosign.
#
set_zone "step4.csk-roll2.autosign"
set_policy "csk-roll2" "2" "3600"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# The old CSK (KEY1) ZRRSIG is now HIDDEN.
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "hidden"
# The new CSK (KEY2) ZRRSIG is now OMNIPRESENT.
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when the predecessor DS has been replaced with the
# successor DS and enough time has passed such that the all validators that
# have this DS RRset cached only know about the successor DS. This is the
# registration delay plus the retire interval, which is the parent
# propagation delay plus the DS TTL plus the retire-safety. For the
# csk-roll2 policy this means: 1w + 1h + 1h + 1h = 171h = 615600 seconds.
# However, 136800 seconds have passed already, so 478800 seconds left.
check_next_key_event 478800
#
# Zone: step5.csk-roll2.autosign.
#
set_zone "step5.csk-roll2.autosign"
set_policy "csk-roll2" "2" "3600"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# The old CSK (KEY1) DNSKEY can be removed.
set_keysigning "KEY1" "no"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "unretentive"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "unretentive"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "hidden"
# The new CSK (KEY2) is now fully OMNIPRESENT.
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when the DNSKEY enters the HIDDEN state. This is the
# DNSKEY TTL plus zone propagation delay. For the csk-roll policy this is:
# 1h + 1h = 7200 seconds.
check_next_key_event 7200
#
# Zone: step6.csk-roll2.autosign.
#
set_zone "step6.csk-roll2.autosign"
set_policy "csk-roll2" "2" "3600"
set_server "ns3" "10.53.0.3"
# The old CSK (KEY1) is now completely HIDDEN.
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "hidden"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "hidden"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when the new successor needs to be published.
check_next_key_event 14684400
#
# Testing algorithm rollover.
#
#
# Zone: step1.algorithm-roll.kasp
#
set_zone "step1.algorithm-roll.kasp"
set_policy "rsasha1" "2" "3600"
set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6"
# Key properties.
key_clear "KEY1"
set_keyrole "KEY1" "ksk"
set_keylifetime "KEY1" "0"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "5" "RSASHA1" "2048"
set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes"
set_zonesigning "KEY1" "no"
key_clear "KEY2"
set_keyrole "KEY2" "zsk"
set_keylifetime "KEY2" "0"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "5" "RSASHA1" "2048"
set_keysigning "KEY2" "no"
set_zonesigning "KEY2" "yes"
key_clear "KEY3"
key_clear "KEY4"
# Key timings.
set_keytime "KEY1" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY1" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY2" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" "yes"
# The KSK (KEY1) and ZSK (KEY2) start in OMNIPRESENT.
set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when the successor keys need to be published.
# Since the lifetime of the keys are unlimited, so default to loadkeys
# interval.
check_next_key_event 3600
#
# Zone: step1.csk-algorithm-roll.kasp
#
set_zone "step1.csk-algorithm-roll.kasp"
set_policy "csk-algoroll" "1" "3600"
set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6"
# Key properties.
key_clear "KEY1"
set_keyrole "KEY1" "csk"
set_keylifetime "KEY1" "0"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "5" "RSASHA1" "2048"
set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes"
set_zonesigning "KEY1" "yes"
key_clear "KEY2"
key_clear "KEY3"
key_clear "KEY4"
# Key timings.
set_keytime "KEY1" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY1" "ACTIVE" "yes"
# The CSK (KEY1) starts in OMNIPRESENT.
set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when the successor keys need to be published.
# Since the lifetime of the keys are unlimited, so default to loadkeys
# interval.
check_next_key_event 3600
#
# Testing good migration.
#
set_zone "migrate.kasp"
set_policy "none" "2" "7200"
set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6"
init_migration_match() {
key_clear "KEY1"
key_set "KEY1" "LEGACY" "yes"
set_keyrole "KEY1" "ksk"
set_keylifetime "KEY1" "0"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256"
set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes"
set_zonesigning "KEY1" "no"
key_clear "KEY2"
key_set "KEY2" "LEGACY" "yes"
set_keyrole "KEY2" "zsk"
set_keylifetime "KEY2" "5184000"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256"
set_keysigning "KEY2" "no"
set_zonesigning "KEY2" "yes"
key_clear "KEY3"
key_clear "KEY4"
set_keytime "KEY1" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY1" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY1" "RETIRED" "none"
set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "rumoured"
set_keytime "KEY2" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY2" "RETIRED" "none"
set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "rumoured"
}
init_migration_match
# Make sure the zone is signed with legacy keys.
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Remember legacy key tags.
_migrate_ksk=$(key_get KEY1 ID)
_migrate_zsk=$(key_get KEY2 ID)
#
# Testing migration with unmatched existing keys (different algorithm).
#
set_zone "migrate-nomatch-algnum.kasp"
set_policy "none" "2" "300"
set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6"
init_migration_nomatch_algnum() {
key_clear "KEY1"
key_set "KEY1" "LEGACY" "yes"
set_keyrole "KEY1" "ksk"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "5" "RSASHA1" "2048"
set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes"
set_zonesigning "KEY1" "no"
key_clear "KEY2"
key_set "KEY2" "LEGACY" "yes"
set_keyrole "KEY2" "zsk"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "5" "RSASHA1" "1024"
set_keysigning "KEY2" "no"
set_zonesigning "KEY2" "yes"
key_clear "KEY3"
key_clear "KEY4"
set_keytime "KEY1" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY1" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY1" "RETIRED" "none"
set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent"
set_keytime "KEY2" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY2" "RETIRED" "none"
set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent"
}
init_migration_nomatch_algnum
# Make sure the zone is signed with legacy keys.
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Remember legacy key tags.
_migratenomatch_algnum_ksk=$(key_get KEY1 ID)
_migratenomatch_algnum_zsk=$(key_get KEY2 ID)
#
# Testing migration with unmatched existing keys (different length).
#
set_zone "migrate-nomatch-alglen.kasp"
set_policy "none" "2" "300"
set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6"
init_migration_nomatch_alglen() {
key_clear "KEY1"
key_set "KEY1" "LEGACY" "yes"
set_keyrole "KEY1" "ksk"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "5" "RSASHA1" "1024"
set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes"
set_zonesigning "KEY1" "no"
key_clear "KEY2"
key_set "KEY2" "LEGACY" "yes"
set_keyrole "KEY2" "zsk"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "5" "RSASHA1" "1024"
set_keysigning "KEY2" "no"
set_zonesigning "KEY2" "yes"
key_clear "KEY3"
key_clear "KEY4"
set_keytime "KEY1" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY1" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY1" "RETIRED" "none"
set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent"
set_keytime "KEY2" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY2" "RETIRED" "none"
set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent"
}
init_migration_nomatch_alglen
# Make sure the zone is signed with legacy keys.
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Remember legacy key tags.
_migratenomatch_alglen_ksk=$(key_get KEY1 ID)
_migratenomatch_alglen_zsk=$(key_get KEY2 ID)
# Reconfig dnssec-policy (triggering algorithm roll and other dnssec-policy
# changes).
echo_i "reconfig dnssec-policy to trigger algorithm rollover"
copy_setports ns6/named2.conf.in ns6/named.conf
rndc_reconfig ns6 10.53.0.6
# Calculate time passed to correctly check for next key events.
now="$(TZ=UTC date +%s)"
time_passed=$((now-start_time))
echo_i "${time_passed} seconds passed between start of tests and reconfig"
# The NSEC record at the apex of the zone and its RRSIG records are
# added as part of the last step in signing a zone. We wait for the
# NSEC records to appear before proceeding with a counter to prevent
# infinite loops if there is a error.
#
n=$((n+1))
echo_i "waiting for reconfig signing changes to take effect ($n)"
i=0
while [ $i -lt 30 ]
do
ret=0
while read -r zone
do
dig_with_opts "$zone" @10.53.0.6 nsec > "dig.out.ns6.test$n.$zone" || ret=1
grep "NS SOA" "dig.out.ns6.test$n.$zone" > /dev/null || ret=1
grep "$zone\..*IN.*RRSIG" "dig.out.ns6.test$n.$zone" > /dev/null || ret=1
done < ns6/zones.2
i=$((i+1))
if [ $ret = 0 ]; then break; fi
echo_i "waiting ... ($i)"
sleep 1
done
test "$ret" -eq 0 || echo_i "failed"
status=$((status+ret))
next_key_event_threshold=$((next_key_event_threshold+i))
#
# Testing migration.
#
set_zone "migrate.kasp"
set_policy "migrate" "2" "7200"
set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6"
# Key properties, timings and metadata should be the same as legacy keys above.
# However, because the zsk has a lifetime, kasp will set the retired time.
init_migration_match
key_set "KEY1" "LEGACY" "no"
key_set "KEY2" "LEGACY" "no"
set_keytime "KEY2" "RETIRED" "yes"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Check key tags, should be the same.
n=$((n+1))
echo_i "check that of zone ${ZONE} migration to dnssec-policy uses the same keys ($n)"
ret=0
[ $_migrate_ksk == $(key_get KEY1 ID) ] || log_error "mismatch ksk tag"
[ $_migrate_zsk == $(key_get KEY2 ID) ] || log_error "mismatch zsk tag"
status=$((status+ret))
# Test migration to dnssec-policy, existing keys do not match key algorithm.
set_zone "migrate-nomatch-algnum.kasp"
set_policy "migrate-nomatch-algnum" "4" "300"
set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6"
# The legacy keys need to be retired, but otherwise stay present until the
# new keys are omnipresent, and can be used to construct a chain of trust.
init_migration_nomatch_algnum
key_set "KEY1" "LEGACY" "no"
set_keytime "KEY1" "RETIRED" "yes"
set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "hidden"
key_set "KEY2" "LEGACY" "no"
set_keytime "KEY2" "RETIRED" "yes"
set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "hidden"
set_keyrole "KEY3" "ksk"
set_keylifetime "KEY3" "0"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY3" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256"
set_keysigning "KEY3" "yes"
set_zonesigning "KEY3" "no"
set_keyrole "KEY4" "zsk"
set_keylifetime "KEY4" "5184000"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY4" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256"
set_keysigning "KEY4" "no"
set_zonesigning "KEY4" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY3" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY3" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY3" "RETIRED" "none"
set_keystate "KEY3" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DS" "hidden"
set_keytime "KEY4" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY4" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY4" "RETIRED" "yes"
set_keystate "KEY4" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY4" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY4" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "rumoured"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Check key tags, should be the same.
n=$((n+1))
echo_i "check that of zone ${ZONE} migration to dnssec-policy keeps existing keys ($n)"
ret=0
[ $_migratenomatch_algnum_ksk == $(key_get KEY1 ID) ] || log_error "mismatch ksk tag"
[ $_migratenomatch_algnum_zsk == $(key_get KEY2 ID) ] || log_error "mismatch zsk tag"
status=$((status+ret))
# Test migration to dnssec-policy, existing keys do not match key length.
set_zone "migrate-nomatch-alglen.kasp"
set_policy "migrate-nomatch-alglen" "4" "300"
set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6"
# The legacy keys need to be retired, but otherwise stay present until the
# new keys are omnipresent, and can be used to construct a chain of trust.
init_migration_nomatch_alglen
key_set "KEY1" "LEGACY" "no"
set_keytime "KEY1" "RETIRED" "yes"
set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "hidden"
key_set "KEY2" "LEGACY" "no"
set_keytime "KEY2" "RETIRED" "yes"
set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "hidden"
set_keyrole "KEY3" "ksk"
set_keylifetime "KEY3" "0"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY3" "5" "RSASHA1" "2048"
set_keysigning "KEY3" "yes"
set_zonesigning "KEY3" "no"
set_keyrole "KEY4" "zsk"
set_keylifetime "KEY4" "5184000"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY4" "5" "RSASHA1" "2048"
set_keysigning "KEY4" "no"
# This key is considered to be prepublished, so it is not yet signing.
set_zonesigning "KEY4" "no"
set_keytime "KEY3" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY3" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY3" "RETIRED" "none"
set_keystate "KEY3" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DS" "hidden"
set_keytime "KEY4" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY4" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY4" "RETIRED" "yes"
set_keystate "KEY4" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY4" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY4" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "hidden"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Check key tags, should be the same.
n=$((n+1))
echo_i "check that of zone ${ZONE} migration to dnssec-policy keeps existing keys ($n)"
ret=0
[ $_migratenomatch_alglen_ksk == $(key_get KEY1 ID) ] || log_error "mismatch ksk tag"
[ $_migratenomatch_alglen_zsk == $(key_get KEY2 ID) ] || log_error "mismatch zsk tag"
status=$((status+ret))
#
# Testing KSK/ZSK algorithm rollover.
#
#
# Zone: step1.algorithm-roll.kasp
#
set_zone "step1.algorithm-roll.kasp"
set_policy "ecdsa256" "4" "3600"
set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6"
# Old RSASHA1 keys.
key_clear "KEY1"
set_keyrole "KEY1" "ksk"
set_keylifetime "KEY1" "0"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "5" "RSASHA1" "2048"
set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes"
set_zonesigning "KEY1" "no"
key_clear "KEY2"
set_keyrole "KEY2" "zsk"
set_keylifetime "KEY2" "0"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "5" "RSASHA1" "2048"
set_keysigning "KEY2" "no"
set_zonesigning "KEY2" "yes"
# New ECDSAP256SHA256 keys.
key_clear "KEY3"
set_keyrole "KEY3" "ksk"
set_keylifetime "KEY3" "0"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY3" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256"
set_keysigning "KEY3" "yes"
set_zonesigning "KEY3" "no"
key_clear "KEY4"
set_keyrole "KEY4" "zsk"
set_keylifetime "KEY4" "0"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY4" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256"
set_keysigning "KEY4" "no"
set_zonesigning "KEY4" "yes"
# The RSAHSHA1 keys are outroducing.
set_keytime "KEY1" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY1" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY1" "RETIRED" "yes"
set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "hidden"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent"
set_keytime "KEY2" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY2" "RETIRED" "yes"
set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "hidden"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent"
# The ECDSAP256SHA256 keys are introducing.
set_keytime "KEY3" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY3" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keystate "KEY3" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DS" "hidden"
set_keytime "KEY4" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY4" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keystate "KEY4" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY4" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY4" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "rumoured"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when the ecdsa256 keys have been propagated.
# This is the DNSKEY TTL plus publish safety plus zone propagation delay:
# 3 times an hour: 10800 seconds.
check_next_key_event 10800
#
# Zone: step2.algorithm-roll.kasp
#
set_zone "step2.algorithm-roll.kasp"
set_policy "ecdsa256" "4" "3600"
set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6"
# The RSAHSHA1 keys are outroducing, but need to stay present until the new
# algorithm chain of trust has been established. Thus the properties, timings
# and states of the KEY1 and KEY2 are the same as above.
#
# The ECDSAP256SHA256 keys are introducing. The DNSKEY RRset is omnipresent,
# but the zone signatures are not.
set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY4" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when all zone signatures are signed with the new
# algorithm. This is the max-zone-ttl plus zone propagation delay
# plus retire safety: 6h + 1h + 2h. But three hours have already passed
# (the time it took to make the DNSKEY omnipresent), so the next event
# should be scheduled in 6 hour: 21600 seconds. Prevent intermittent
# false positives on slow platforms by subtracting the number of seconds
# which passed between key creation and invoking 'rndc reconfig'.
next_time=$((21600-time_passed))
check_next_key_event $next_time
#
# Zone: step3.algorithm-roll.kasp
#
set_zone "step3.algorithm-roll.kasp"
set_policy "ecdsa256" "4" "3600"
set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6"
# The RSAHSHA1 keys are outroducing, and it is time to swap the DS.
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "unretentive"
# The ECDSAP256SHA256 keys are introducing. The DNSKEY RRset and all signatures
# are now omnipresent, so the DS can be introduced.
set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DS" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY4" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when the DS becomes OMNIPRESENT. This happens after the
# parent registration delay, parent propagation delay, retire safety delay,
# and DS TTL: 24h + 1h + 2h + 2h = 29h = 104400 seconds.
check_next_key_event 104400
#
# Zone: step4.algorithm-roll.kasp
#
set_zone "step4.algorithm-roll.kasp"
set_policy "ecdsa256" "4" "3600"
set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6"
# The old DS is HIDDEN, we can remove the old algorithm DNSKEY/RRSIG records.
set_keysigning "KEY1" "no"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "unretentive"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "unretentive"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "hidden"
set_zonesigning "KEY2" "no"
set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "hidden"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "unretentive"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "unretentive"
# The ECDSAP256SHA256 DS is now OMNIPRESENT.
set_keystate "KEY3" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when the old DNSKEY becomes HIDDEN. This happens after the
# DNSKEY TTL plus zone propagation delay (2h).
check_next_key_event 7200
#
# Zone: step5.algorithm-roll.kasp
#
set_zone "step5.algorithm-roll.kasp"
set_policy "ecdsa256" "4" "3600"
set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6"
# The DNSKEY becomes HIDDEN.
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "hidden"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "hidden"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "hidden"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when the RSASHA1 signatures become HIDDEN. This happens
# after the max-zone-ttl plus zone propagation delay plus retire safety
# (6h + 1h + 2h) minus the time already passed since the UNRETENTIVE state has
# been reached (2h): 9h - 2h = 7h = 25200 seconds. Prevent intermittent
# false positives on slow platforms by subtracting the number of seconds
# which passed between key creation and invoking 'rndc reconfig'.
next_time=$((25200-time_passed))
check_next_key_event $next_time
#
# Zone: step6.algorithm-roll.kasp
#
set_zone "step6.algorithm-roll.kasp"
set_policy "ecdsa256" "4" "3600"
set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6"
# The old zone signatures (KEY2) should now also be HIDDEN.
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "hidden"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is never since we established the policy and the keys have
# an unlimited lifetime. Fallback to the default loadkeys interval.
check_next_key_event 3600
#
# Testing CSK algorithm rollover.
#
#
# Zone: step1.csk-algorithm-roll.kasp
#
set_zone "step1.csk-algorithm-roll.kasp"
set_policy "csk-algoroll" "2" "3600"
set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6"
# Old RSASHA1 key.
key_clear "KEY1"
set_keyrole "KEY1" "csk"
set_keylifetime "KEY1" "0"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY1" "5" "RSASHA1" "2048"
set_keysigning "KEY1" "yes"
set_zonesigning "KEY1" "yes"
# New ECDSAP256SHA256 key.
key_clear "KEY2"
set_keyrole "KEY2" "csk"
set_keylifetime "KEY2" "0"
set_keyalgorithm "KEY2" "13" "ECDSAP256SHA256" "256"
set_keysigning "KEY2" "yes"
set_zonesigning "KEY2" "yes"
key_clear "KEY3"
key_clear "KEY4"
# The RSAHSHA1 key is outroducing.
set_keytime "KEY1" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY1" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY1" "RETIRED" "yes"
set_keystate "KEY1" "GOAL" "hidden"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent"
# The ECDSAP256SHA256 key is introducing.
set_keytime "KEY2" "PUBLISHED" "yes"
set_keytime "KEY2" "ACTIVE" "yes"
set_keystate "KEY2" "GOAL" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_KRRSIG" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "rumoured"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DS" "hidden"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when the new key has been propagated.
# This is the DNSKEY TTL plus publish safety plus zone propagation delay:
# 3 times an hour: 10800 seconds.
check_next_key_event 10800
#
# Zone: step2.csk-algorithm-roll.kasp
#
set_zone "step2.csk-algorithm-roll.kasp"
set_policy "csk-algoroll" "2" "3600"
set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6"
# The RSAHSHA1 key is outroducing, but need to stay present until the new
# algorithm chain of trust has been established. Thus the properties, timings
# and states of KEY1 is the same as above.
#
# The ECDSAP256SHA256 keys are introducing. The DNSKEY RRset is omnipresent,
# but the zone signatures are not.
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DNSKEY" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_KRRSIG" "omnipresent"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when all zone signatures are signed with the new
# algorithm. This is the max-zone-ttl plus zone propagation delay
# plus retire safety: 6h + 1h + 2h. But three hours have already passed
# (the time it took to make the DNSKEY omnipresent), so the next event
# should be scheduled in 6 hour: 21600 seconds. Prevent intermittent
# false positives on slow platforms by subtracting the number of seconds
# which passed between key creation and invoking 'rndc reconfig'.
next_time=$((21600-time_passed))
check_next_key_event $next_time
#
# Zone: step3.csk-algorithm-roll.kasp
#
set_zone "step3.csk-algorithm-roll.kasp"
set_policy "csk-algoroll" "2" "3600"
set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6"
# The RSAHSHA1 key is outroducing, and it is time to swap the DS.
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "unretentive"
# The ECDSAP256SHA256 key is introducing. The DNSKEY RRset and all signatures
# are now omnipresent, so the DS can be introduced.
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "omnipresent"
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DS" "rumoured"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when the DS becomes OMNIPRESENT. This happens after the
# parent registration delay, parent propagation delay, retire safety delay,
# and DS TTL: 24h + 1h + 2h + 2h = 29h = 104400 seconds.
check_next_key_event 104400
#
# Zone: step4.csk-algorithm-roll.kasp
#
set_zone "step4.csk-algorithm-roll.kasp"
set_policy "csk-algoroll" "2" "3600"
set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6"
# The old DS is HIDDEN, we can remove the old algorithm DNSKEY/RRSIG records.
set_keysigning "KEY1" "no"
set_zonesigning "KEY1" "no"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "unretentive"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "unretentive"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "unretentive"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DS" "hidden"
# The ECDSAP256SHA256 DS is now OMNIPRESENT.
set_keystate "KEY2" "STATE_DS" "omnipresent"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when the old DNSKEY becomes HIDDEN. This happens after the
# DNSKEY TTL plus zone propagation delay (2h).
check_next_key_event 7200
#
# Zone: step5.csk-algorithm-roll.kasp
#
set_zone "step5.csk-algorithm-roll.kasp"
set_policy "csk-algoroll" "2" "3600"
set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6"
# The DNSKEY becomes HIDDEN.
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_DNSKEY" "hidden"
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_KRRSIG" "hidden"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is when the RSASHA1 signatures become HIDDEN. This happens
# after the max-zone-ttl plus zone propagation delay plus retire safety
# (6h + 1h + 2h) minus the time already passed since the UNRETENTIVE state has
# been reached (2h): 9h - 2h = 7h = 25200 seconds. Prevent intermittent
# false positives on slow platforms by subtracting the number of seconds
# which passed between key creation and invoking 'rndc reconfig'.
next_time=$((25200-time_passed))
check_next_key_event $next_time
#
# Zone: step6.csk-algorithm-roll.kasp
#
set_zone "step6.csk-algorithm-roll.kasp"
set_policy "csk-algoroll" "2" "3600"
set_server "ns6" "10.53.0.6"
# The zone signatures should now also be HIDDEN.
set_keystate "KEY1" "STATE_ZRRSIG" "hidden"
check_keys
check_apex
check_subdomain
dnssec_verify
# Next key event is never since we established the policy and the keys have
# an unlimited lifetime. Fallback to the default loadkeys interval.
check_next_key_event 3600
echo_i "exit status: $status"
[ $status -eq 0 ] || exit 1
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