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Network Working Group M. StJohns
Internet-Draft Nominum, Inc.
Intended status: Informational November 29, 2006
Expires: June 2, 2007
Automated Updates of DNSSEC Trust Anchors
draft-ietf-dnsext-trustupdate-timers-05
Status of this Memo
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on June 2, 2007.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
Abstract
This document describes a means for automated, authenticated and
authorized updating of DNSSEC "trust anchors". The method provides
protection against N-1 key compromises of N keys in the trust point
key set. Based on the trust established by the presence of a current
anchor, other anchors may be added at the same place in the
hierarchy, and, ultimately, supplant the existing anchor(s).
This mechanism will require changes to resolver management behavior
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(but not resolver resolution behavior), and the addition of a single
flag bit to the DNSKEY record.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Compliance Nomenclature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Theory of Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Add Hold-Down . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3. Active Refresh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.4. Resolver Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4.1. Add Hold-Down Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4.2. Remove Hold-Down Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4.3. Minimum Trust Anchors per Trust Point . . . . . . . . 6
3. Changes to DNSKEY RDATA Wire Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. State Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Trust Point Deletion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Scenarios - Informative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.1. Adding a Trust Anchor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.2. Deleting a Trust Anchor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.3. Key Roll-Over . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.4. Active Key Compromised . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.5. Stand-by Key Compromised . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.6. Trust Point Deletion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.1. Key Ownership vs Acceptance Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.2. Multiple Key Compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.3. Dynamic Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Editorial Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 13
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1. Introduction
As part of the reality of fielding DNSSEC (Domain Name System
Security Extensions) [RFC4033] [RFC4034] [RFC4035], the community has
come to the realization that there will not be one signed name space,
but rather islands of signed name space each originating from
specific points (i.e. 'trust points') in the DNS tree. Each of those
islands will be identified by the trust point name, and validated by
at least one associated public key. For the purpose of this document
we'll call the association of that name and a particular key a 'trust
anchor'. A particular trust point can have more than one key
designated as a trust anchor.
For a DNSSEC-aware resolver to validate information in a DNSSEC
protected branch of the hierarchy, it must have knowledge of a trust
anchor applicable to that branch. It may also have more than one
trust anchor for any given trust point. Under current rules, a chain
of trust for DNSSEC-protected data that chains its way back to ANY
known trust anchor is considered 'secure'.
Because of the probable balkanization of the DNSSEC tree due to
signing voids at key locations, a resolver may need to know literally
thousands of trust anchors to perform its duties. (e.g. Consider an
unsigned ".COM".) Requiring the owner of the resolver to manually
manage this many relationships is problematic. It's even more
problematic when considering the eventual requirement for key
replacement/update for a given trust anchor. The mechanism described
herein won't help with the initial configuration of the trust anchors
in the resolvers, but should make trust point key replacement/
rollover more viable.
As mentioned above, this document describes a mechanism whereby a
resolver can update the trust anchors for a given trust point, mainly
without human intervention at the resolver. There are some corner
cases discussed (e.g. multiple key compromise) that may require
manual intervention, but they should be few and far between. This
document DOES NOT discuss the general problem of the initial
configuration of trust anchors for the resolver.
1.1. Compliance Nomenclature
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, [RFC2119].
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2. Theory of Operation
The general concept of this mechanism is that existing trust anchors
can be used to authenticate new trust anchors at the same point in
the DNS hierarchy. When a zone operator adds a new SEP key (i.e. a
DNSKEY with the Secure Entry Point bit set) (see [RFC4034]section
2.1.1) to a trust point DNSKEY RRSet, and when that RRSet is
validated by an existing trust anchor, then the resolver can add the
new key to its valid set of trust anchors for that trust point.
There are some issues with this approach which need to be mitigated.
For example, a compromise of one of the existing keys could allow an
attacker to add their own 'valid' data. This implies a need for a
method to revoke an existing key regardless of whether or not that
key is compromised. As another example, assuming a single key
compromise, we need to prevent an attacker from adding a new key and
revoking all the other old keys.
2.1. Revocation
Assume two trust anchor keys A and B. Assume that B has been
compromised. Without a specific revocation bit, B could invalidate A
simply by sending out a signed trust point key set which didn't
contain A. To fix this, we add a mechanism which requires knowledge
of the private key of a DNSKEY to revoke that DNSKEY.
A key is considered revoked when the resolver sees the key in a self-
signed RRSet and the key has the REVOKE bit (see Section 7 below) set
to '1'. Once the resolver sees the REVOKE bit, it MUST NOT use this
key as a trust anchor or for any other purposes except validating the
RRSIG it signed over the DNSKEY RRSet specifically for the purpose of
validating the revocation. Unlike the 'Add' operation below,
revocation is immediate and permanent upon receipt of a valid
revocation at the resolver.
A self-signed RRSet is a DNSKEY RRSet which contains the specific
DNSKEY and for which there is a corresponding validated RRSIG record.
It's not a special DNSKEY RRSet, just a way of describing the
validation requirements for that RRSet.
N.B. A DNSKEY with the REVOKE bit set has a different fingerprint
than one without the bit set. This affects the matching of a DNSKEY
to DS records in the parent, or the fingerprint stored at a resolver
used to configure a trust point.
In the given example, the attacker could revoke B because it has
knowledge of B's private key, but could not revoke A.
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2.2. Add Hold-Down
Assume two trust point keys A and B. Assume that B has been
compromised. An attacker could generate and add a new trust anchor
key - C (by adding C to the DNSKEY RRSet and signing it with B), and
then invalidate the compromised key. This would result in both the
attacker and owner being able to sign data in the zone and have it
accepted as valid by resolvers.
To mitigate but not completely solve this problem, we add a hold-down
time to the addition of the trust anchor. When the resolver sees a
new SEP key in a validated trust point DNSKEY RRSet, the resolver
starts an acceptance timer, and remembers all the keys that validated
the RRSet. If the resolver ever sees the DNSKEY RRSet without the
new key but validly signed, it stops the acceptance process for that
key and resets the acceptance timer. If all of the keys which were
originally used to validate this key are revoked prior to the timer
expiring, the resolver stops the acceptance process and resets the
timer.
Once the timer expires, the new key will be added as a trust anchor
the next time the validated RRSet with the new key is seen at the
resolver. The resolver MUST NOT treat the new key as a trust anchor
until the hold down time expires AND it has retrieved and validated a
DNSKEY RRSet after the hold down time which contains the new key.
N.B.: Once the resolver has accepted a key as a trust anchor, the key
MUST be considered a valid trust anchor by that resolver until
explictly revoked as described above.
In the given example, the zone owner can recover from a compromise by
revoking B and adding a new key D and signing the DNSKEY RRSet with
both A and B.
The reason this does not completely solve the problem has to do with
the distributed nature of DNS. The resolver only knows what it sees.
A determined attacker who holds one compromised key could keep a
single resolver from realizing that key had been compromised by
intercepting 'real' data from the originating zone and substituting
their own (e.g. using the example, signed only by B). This is no
worse than the current situation assuming a compromised key.
2.3. Active Refresh
A resolver which has been configured for automatic update of keys
from a particular trust point MUST query that trust point (e.g. do a
lookup for the DNSKEY RRSet and related RRSIG records) no less often
than the lesser of 15 days or half the original TTL for the DNSKEY
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RRSet or half the RRSIG expiration interval and no more often than
once per hour. The expiration interval is the amount of time from
when the RRSIG was last retrieved until the expiration time in the
RRSIG.
If the query fails, the resolver MUST repeat the query until
satisfied no more often than once an hour and no less often than the
lesser of 1 day or 10% of the original TTL or 10% of the original
expiration interval. I.e.: retryTime = MAX (1 hour, MIN (1 day, .1 *
origTTL, .1 * expireInterval)).
2.4. Resolver Parameters
2.4.1. Add Hold-Down Time
The add hold-down time is 30 days or the expiration time of the
original TTL of the first trust point DNSKEY RRSet which contained
the new key, whichever is greater. This ensures that at least two
validated DNSKEY RRSets which contain the new key MUST be seen by the
resolver prior to the key's acceptance.
2.4.2. Remove Hold-Down Time
The remove hold-down time is 30 days. This parameter is solely a key
management database bookeeping parameter. Failure to remove
information about the state of defunct keys from the database will
not adversely impact the security of this protocol, but may end up
with a database cluttered with obsolete key information.
2.4.3. Minimum Trust Anchors per Trust Point
A compliant resolver MUST be able to manage at least five SEP keys
per trust point.
3. Changes to DNSKEY RDATA Wire Format
Bit n [msj2]of the DNSKEY Flags field is designated as the 'REVOKE'
flag. If this bit is set to '1', AND the resolver sees an
RRSIG(DNSKEY) signed by the associated key, then the resolver MUST
consider this key permanently invalid for all purposes except for
validating the revocation.
4. State Table
The most important thing to understand is the resolver's view of any
key at a trust point. The following state table describes that view
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at various points in the key's lifetime. The table is a normative
part of this specification. The initial state of the key is 'Start'.
The resolver's view of the state of the key changes as various events
occur.
This is the state of a trust point key as seen from the resolver.
The column on the left indicates the current state. The header at
the top shows the next state. The intersection of the two shows the
event that will cause the state to transition from the current state
to the next.
NEXT STATE
--------------------------------------------------
FROM |Start |AddPend |Valid |Missing|Revoked|Removed|
----------------------------------------------------------
Start | |NewKey | | | | |
----------------------------------------------------------
AddPend |KeyRem | |AddTime| | |
----------------------------------------------------------
Valid | | | |KeyRem |Revbit | |
----------------------------------------------------------
Missing | | |KeyPres| |Revbit | |
----------------------------------------------------------
Revoked | | | | | |RemTime|
----------------------------------------------------------
Removed | | | | | | |
----------------------------------------------------------
State Table
4.1. Events
NewKey The resolver sees a valid DNSKEY RRSet with a new SEP key.
That key will become a new trust anchor for the named trust point
after it's been present in the RRSet for at least 'add time'.
KeyPres The key has returned to the valid DNSKEY RRSet.
KeyRem The resolver sees a valid DNSKEY RRSet that does not contain
this key.
AddTime The key has been in every valid DNSKEY RRSet seen for at
least the 'add time'.
RemTime A revoked key has been missing from the trust point DNSKEY
RRSet for sufficient time to be removed from the trust set.
RevBit The key has appeared in the trust anchor DNSKEY RRSet with
its "REVOKED" bit set, and there is an RRSig over the DNSKEY RRSet
signed by this key.
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4.2. States
Start The key doesn't yet exist as a trust anchor at the resolver.
It may or may not exist at the zone server, but either hasn't yet
been seen at the resolver or was seen but was absent from the last
DNSKEY RRSet (e.g. KeyRem event).
AddPend The key has been seen at the resolver, has its 'SEP' bit
set, and has been included in a validated DNSKEY RRSet. There is
a hold-down time for the key before it can be used as a trust
anchor.
Valid The key has been seen at the resolver and has been included in
all validated DNSKEY RRSets from the time it was first seen up
through the hold-down time. It is now valid for verifying RRSets
that arrive after the hold down time. Clarification: The DNSKEY
RRSet does not need to be continuously present at the resolver
(e.g. its TTL might expire). If the RRSet is seen, and is
validated (i.e. verifies against an existing trust anchor), this
key MUST be in the RRSet otherwise a 'KeyRem' event is triggered.
Missing This is an abnormal state. The key remains as a valid trust
point key, but was not seen at the resolver in the last validated
DNSKEY RRSet. This is an abnormal state because the zone operator
should be using the REVOKE bit prior to removal.
Revoked This is the state a key moves to once the resolver sees an
RRSIG(DNSKEY) signed by this key where that DNSKEY RRSet contains
this key with its REVOKE bit set to '1'. Once in this state, this
key MUST permanently be considered invalid as a trust anchor.
Removed After a fairly long hold-down time, information about this
key may be purged from the resolver. A key in the removed state
MUST NOT be considered a valid trust anchor. (Note: this state is
more or less equivalent to the "Start" state, except that it's bad
practice to re-introduce previously used keys - think of this as
the holding state for all the old keys for which the resolver no
longer needs to track state.)
5. Trust Point Deletion
A trust point which has all of its trust anchors revoked is
considered deleted and is treated as if the trust point was never
configured. If there are no superior configured trust points, data
at and below the deleted trust point are considered insecure by the
resolver. If there ARE superior configured trust points, data at and
below the deleted trust point are evaluated with respect to the
superior trust point(s).
Alternately, a trust point which is subordinate to another configured
trust point MAY be deleted by a resolver after 180 days where such
subordinate trust point validly chains to a superior trust point.
The decision to delete the subordinate trust anchor is a local
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configuration decision. Once the subordinate trust point is deleted,
validation of the subordinate zone is dependent on validating the
chain of trust to the superior trust point.
6. Scenarios - Informative
The suggested model for operation is to have one active key and one
stand-by key at each trust point. The active key will be used to
sign the DNSKEY RRSet. The stand-by key will not normally sign this
RRSet, but the resolver will accept it as a trust anchor if/when it
sees the signature on the trust point DNSKEY RRSet.
Since the stand-by key is not in active signing use, the associated
private key may (and should) be provided with additional protections
not normally available to a key that must be used frequently. E.g.
locked in a safe, split among many parties, etc. Notionally, the
stand-by key should be less subject to compromise than an active key,
but that will be dependent on operational concerns not addressed
here.
6.1. Adding a Trust Anchor
Assume an existing trust anchor key 'A'.
1. Generate a new key pair.
2. Create a DNSKEY record from the key pair and set the SEP and Zone
Key bits.
3. Add the DNSKEY to the RRSet.
4. Sign the DNSKEY RRSet ONLY with the existing trust anchor key -
'A'.
5. Wait a while (i.e. for various resolvers timers to go off and for
them to retrieve the new DNSKEY RRSet and signatures).
6. The new trust anchor will be populated at the resolvers on the
schedule described by the state table and update algorithm - see
Section 2 above
6.2. Deleting a Trust Anchor
Assume existing trust anchors 'A' and 'B' and that you want to revoke
and delete 'A'.
1. Set the revocation bit on key 'A'.
2. Sign the DNSKEY RRSet with both 'A' and 'B'.
'A' is now revoked. The operator should include the revoked 'A' in
the RRSet for at least the remove hold-down time, but then may remove
it from the DNSKEY RRSet.
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6.3. Key Roll-Over
Assume existing keys A and B. 'A' is actively in use (i.e. has been
signing the DNSKEY RRSet.) 'B' was the stand-by key. (i.e. has been
in the DNSKEY RRSet and is a valid trust anchor, but wasn't being
used to sign the RRSet.)
1. Generate a new key pair 'C'.
2. Add 'C' to the DNSKEY RRSet.
3. Set the revocation bit on key 'A'.
4. Sign the RRSet with 'A' and 'B'.
'A' is now revoked, 'B' is now the active key, and 'C' will be the
stand-by key once the hold-down expires. The operator should include
the revoked 'A' in the RRSet for at least the remove hold-down time,
but may then remove it from the DNSKEY RRSet.
6.4. Active Key Compromised
This is the same as the mechanism for Key Roll-Over (Section 6.3)
above assuming 'A' is the active key.
6.5. Stand-by Key Compromised
Using the same assumptions and naming conventions as Key Roll-Over
(Section 6.3) above:
1. Generate a new key pair 'C'.
2. Add 'C' to the DNSKEY RRSet.
3. Set the revocation bit on key 'B'.
4. Sign the RRSet with 'A' and 'B'.
'B' is now revoked, 'A' remains the active key, and 'C' will be the
stand-by key once the hold-down expires. 'B' should continue to be
included in the RRSet for the remove hold-down time.
6.6. Trust Point Deletion
To delete a trust point which is subordinate to another configured
trust point (e.g. example.com to .com) requires some juggling of the
data. The specific process is:
1. Generate a new DNSKEY and DS record and provide the DS record to
the parent along with DS records for the old keys
2. Once the parent has published the DSs, add the new DNSKEY to the
RRSet and revoke ALL of the old keys at the same time while
signing the DNSKEY RRSet with all of the old and new keys.
3. After 30 days stop publishing the old, revoked keys and remove
any corresponding DS records in the parent.
Revoking the old trust point keys at the same time as adding new keys
that chain to a superior trust prevents the resolver from adding the
new keys as trust anchors. Adding DS records for the old keys avoids
a race condition where either the subordinate zone becomes unsecure
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(because the trust point was deleted) or becomes bogus (because it
didn't chain to the superior zone).
7. IANA Considerations
The IANA will need to assign a bit in the DNSKEY flags field (see
section 4.3 of [RFC3755]) for the REVOKE bit. There are no other
IANA actions required.
8. Security Considerations
In addition to the following sections, see also Theory of Operation
above and especially Section 2.2 for related discussions.
8.1. Key Ownership vs Acceptance Policy
The reader should note that, while the zone owner is responsible for
creating and distributing keys, it's wholly the decision of the
resolver owner as to whether to accept such keys for the
authentication of the zone information. This implies the decision to
update trust anchor keys based on trust for a current trust anchor
key is also the resolver owner's decision.
The resolver owner (and resolver implementers) MAY choose to permit
or prevent key status updates based on this mechanism for specific
trust points. If they choose to prevent the automated updates, they
will need to establish a mechanism for manual or other out-of-band
updates outside the scope of this document.
8.2. Multiple Key Compromise
This scheme permits recovery as long as at least one valid trust
anchor key remains uncompromised. E.g. if there are three keys, you
can recover if two of them are compromised. The zone owner should
determine their own level of comfort with respect to the number of
active valid trust anchors in a zone and should be prepared to
implement recovery procedures once they detect a compromise. A
manual or other out-of-band update of all resolvers will be required
if all trust anchor keys at a trust point are compromised.
8.3. Dynamic Updates
Allowing a resolver to update its trust anchor set based on in-band
key information is potentially less secure than a manual process.
However, given the nature of the DNS, the number of resolvers that
would require update if a trust anchor key were compromised, and the
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lack of a standard management framework for DNS, this approach is no
worse than the existing situation.
9. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3755] Weiler, S., "Legacy Resolver Compatibility for Delegation
Signer (DS)", RFC 3755, May 2004.
[RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
RFC 4033, March 2005.
[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
RFC 4034, March 2005.
[RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.
Editorial Comments
[msj2] msj: To be assigned.
Author's Address
Michael StJohns
Nominum, Inc.
2385 Bay Road
Redwood City, CA 94063
USA
Phone: +1-301-528-4729
Email: Mike.StJohns@nominum.com
URI: www.nominum.com
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Full Copyright Statement
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contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
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