ans10 simulates a local anycast server which has both signed and
unsigned instances of a zone. 'A' queries get answered from the
signed instance. Everything else gets answered from the unsigned
instance. The resulting answer should be insecure.
(cherry picked from commit d7840f4b93)
In order to lower the amount of memory allocated at startup by named
instances used in the BIND system test suite, set the default value of
"max-cache-size" for these to 2 megabytes. The purpose of this change
is to prevent named instances (or even entire virtual machines) from
getting killed by the operating system on the test host due to excessive
memory use.
Remove all "max-cache-size" statements from named configuration files
used in system tests ("checkconf" notwithstanding) to prevent confusion
as the "-T maxcachesize=..." command line option takes precedence over
configuration files.
(cherry picked from commit dad6572093)
Check that resign interval is actually in days rather than hours
by checking that RRSIGs are all within the allowed day range.
(cherry picked from commit 11ecf7901b)
Add a note why we don't have a test case for the issue.
It is tricky to write a good test case for this if our tools are
not allowed to create signatures for unsupported algorithms.
(cherry picked from commit c6345fffe9)
as the update triggers by the rndc command to clear the signing records
may not have completed by the time the subsequent rndc command to test
that the records have been removed is commenced. Loop several times to
prevent false negative.
(cherry picked from commit 353018c0e5)
There is a failure mode which gets triggered on heavily loaded
systems. A key change is scheduled in 5 seconds to make ZSK2 inactive
and ZSK3 active, but `named` takes more than 5 seconds to progress
from `rndc loadkeys` to the query check. At this time the SOA RRset
is already signed by the new ZSK which is not expected to be active
at that point yet.
Split up the checks to test the case where RRsets are signed
correctly with the offline KSK (maintained the signature) and
the active ZSK. First run, RRsets should be signed with the still
active ZSK2, second run RRsets should be signed with the new active
ZSK3.
(cherry picked from commit aebb2aaa0f)
the internal keytable structure has not yet been changed, but
insertion of DS anchors is the only method now available.
NOTE: the keytable unit test is currently failing because of tests
that expect individual keynode objects to contain single DST key
objects.
Before this change, there was a missing blank line between the
negative trust anchors for one view, and the heading line for the next
view. This is because dns_ntatable_totext() omits the last newline.
There is an example of the incorrect output below; the fixed output
has a blank line before "Start view auth".
secure roots as of 21-Oct-2019 12:03:23.500:
Start view rec
Secure roots:
./RSASHA256/20326 ; managed
Negative trust anchors:
example.com: expiry 21-Oct-2019 13:03:15.000
Start view auth
Secure roots:
./RSASHA256/20326 ; managed
Negative trust anchors:
example.com: expiry 21-Oct-2019 13:03:07.000
this adds functions in conf.sh.common to create DS-style trust anchor
files. those functions are then used to create nearly all of the trust
anchors in the system tests.
there are a few exceptions:
- some tests in dnssec and mkeys rely on detection of unsupported
algorithms, which only works with key-style trust anchors, so those
are used for those tests in particular.
- the mirror test had a problem with the use of a CSK without a
SEP bit, which still needs addressing
in the future, some of these tests should be changed back to using
traditional trust anchors, so that both types will be exercised going
forward.
use empty placeholder KEYDATA records for all trust anchors, not just
DS-style trust anchors.
this revealed a pre-existing bug: keyfetch_done() skips keys without
the SEP bit when populating the managed-keys zone. consequently, if a
zone only has a single ZSK which is configured as trust anchor and no
KSKs, then no KEYDATA record is ever written to the managed-keys zone
when keys are refreshed.
that was how the root server in the dnssec system test was configured.
however, previously, the KEYDATA was created when the key was
initialized; this prevented us from noticing the bug until now.
configuring a ZSK as an RFC 5011 trust anchor is not forbidden by the
spec, but it is highly unusual and not well defined. so for the time
being, I have modified the system test to generate both a KSK and ZSK
for the root zone, enabling the test to pass.
we should consider adding code to detect this condition and allow keys
without the SEP bit to be used as trust anchors if no key with the SEP
bit is available, or at minimum, log a warning.
- ns__client_request() is now called by netmgr with an isc_nmhandle_t
parameter. The handle can then be permanently associated with an
ns_client object.
- The task manager is paused so that isc_task events that may be
triggred during client processing will not fire until after the netmgr is
finished with it. Before any asynchronous event, the client MUST
call isc_nmhandle_ref(client->handle), to prevent the client from
being reset and reused while waiting for an event to process. When
the asynchronous event is complete, isc_nmhandle_unref(client->handle)
must be called to ensure the handle can be reused later.
- reference counting of client objects is now handled in the nmhandle
object. when the handle references drop to zero, the client's "reset"
callback is used to free temporary resources and reiniialize it,
whereupon the handle (and associated client) is placed in the
"inactive handles" queue. when the sysstem is shutdown and the
handles are cleaned up, the client's "put" callback is called to free
all remaining resources.
- because client allocation is no longer handled in the same way,
the '-T clienttest' option has now been removed and is no longer
used by any system tests.
- the unit tests require wrapping the isc_nmhandle_unref() function;
when LD_WRAP is supported, that is used. otherwise we link a
libwrap.so interposer library and use that.
When trying to extract the key ID from a key file name, some test code
incorrectly attempts to strip all leading zeros. This breaks tests when
keys with ID 0 are generated. Add a new helper shell function,
keyfile_to_key_id(), which properly handles keys with ID 0 and use it in
test code whenever a key ID needs to be extracted from a key file name.
- trusted-keys is now flagged as deprecated, but still works
- managed-keys can be used to configure permanent trust anchors by
using the "static-key" keyword in place of "initial-key"
- parser now uses an enum for static-key and initial-key keywords
If named is configured to perform DNSSEC validation and also forwards
all queries ("forward only;") to validating resolvers, negative trust
anchors do not work properly because the CD bit is not set in queries
sent to the forwarders. As a result, instead of retrieving bogus DNSSEC
material and making validation decisions based on its configuration,
named is only receiving SERVFAIL responses to queries for bogus data.
Fix by ensuring the CD bit is always set in queries sent to forwarders
if the query name is covered by an NTA.
This affects two cases:
* When writing a `dsset` file for this zone, to be used by its
parent, only write a SHA-256 DS record.
* When reading a `keyset` file for a child, to generate DS records
to include in this zone, generate SHA-256 DS records only.
This change does not affect digests used in CDS records.
This is for conformance with the DS/CDS algorithm requirements in
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-algorithm-update
This makes the `-12a` options to `dnssec-dsfromkey` work more like
`dnssec-cds`, in that you can specify more than one digest and you
will get multiple records. (Previously you could only get one
non-default digest type at a time.)
The default is now `-2`. You can get the old behaviour with `-12`.
Tests and tools that use `dnssec-dsfromkey` have been updated to use
`-12` where necessary.
This is for conformance with the DS/CDS algorithm requirements in
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-algorithm-update
Windows systems do not allow a trailing period in file names while Unix
systems do. When BIND system tests are run, the $TP environment
variable is set to an empty string on Windows systems and to "." on Unix
systems. This environment variable is then used by system test scripts
for handling this discrepancy properly.
In multiple system test scripts, a variable holding a zone name is set
to a string with a trailing period while the names of the zone's
corresponding dlvset-* and/or dsset-* files are determined using
numerous sed invocations like the following one:
dlvsets="$dlvsets dlvset-`echo $zone |sed -e "s/.$//g"`$TP"
In order to improve code readability, use zone names without trailing
periods and replace sed invocations with variable substitutions.
To retain local consistency, also remove the trailing period from
certain other zone names used in system tests that are not subsequently
processed using sed.
Key IDs may accidentally match dig output that is not the key ID (for
example the RRSIG inception or expiration time, the query ID, ...).
Search for key ID + signer name should prevent that, as that is what
only should occur in the RRSIG record, and signer name always follows
the key ID.
Remove sleep calls from test, rely on wait_for_log(). Make
wait_for_log() and dnssec_loadkeys_on() fail the test if the
appropriate log line is not found.
Slightly adjust the echo_i() lines to print only the key ID (not the
key name).
On Windows, the bin/tests/system/dnssec/signer/example.db.signed file
contains carriage return characters at the end of each line. Remove
them before passing the aforementioned file to the awk script extracting
key IDs so that the latter can work properly.
This commit adds a lengthy test where the ZSK is rolled but the
KSK is offline (except for when the DNSKEY RRset is changed). The
specific scenario has the `dnskey-kskonly` configuration option set
meaning the DNSKEY RRset should only be signed with the KSK.
A new zone `updatecheck-kskonly.secure` is added to test against,
that can be dynamically updated, and that can be controlled with rndc
to load the DNSSEC keys.
There are some pre-checks for this test to make sure everything is
fine before the ZSK roll, after the new ZSK is published, and after
the old ZSK is deleted. Note there are actually two ZSK rolls in
quick succession.
When the latest added ZSK becomes active and its predecessor becomes
inactive, the KSK is offline. However, the DNSKEY RRset did not
change and it has a good signature that is valid for long enough.
The expected behavior is that the DNSKEY RRset stays signed with
the KSK only (signature does not need to change). However, the
test will fail because after reconfiguring the keys for the zone,
it wants to add re-sign tasks for the new active keys (in sign_apex).
Because the KSK is offline, named determines that the only other
active key, the latest ZSK, will be used to resign the DNSKEY RRset,
in addition to keeping the RRSIG of the KSK.
The question is: Why do we need to resign the DNSKEY RRset
immediately when a new key becomes active? This is not required,
only once the next resign task is triggered the new active key
should replace signatures that are in need of refreshing.
Simply looking for the key ID surrounded by spaces in the tested
dnssec-signzone output file is not a precise enough method of checking
for signatures prepared using a given key ID: it can be tripped up by
cross-algorithm key ID collisions and certain low key IDs (e.g. 60, the
TTL specified in bin/tests/system/dnssec/signer/example.db.in), which
triggers false positives for the "dnssec" system test. Make key ID
extraction precise by using an awk script which operates on specific
fields.
More specifically: ignore configured trusted and managed keys that
match a disabled algorithm. The behavioral change is that
associated responses no longer SERVFAIL, but return insecure.
