When inline signing is enabled for a zone without creating signing keys
for it, changes subsequently applied to the raw zone will not be
reflected in the secure zone due to the dns_update_signaturesinc() call
inside receive_secure_serial() failing. Given that an inline zone will
be served (without any signatures) even with no associated signing keys
being present, keep applying raw zone deltas to the secure zone until
keys become available in an attempt to follow the principle of least
astonishment.
(cherry picked from commit 6acf326969)
(cherry picked from commit 8a58a60772)
properly determining if there were active KSK and
ZSK keys for a algorithm when update-check-ksk is
true (default) leaving records unsigned. [RT #46743]
(cherry picked from commit 196e01da5f)
4727. [bug] Retransferring an inline-signed slave using NSEC3
around the time its NSEC3 salt was changed could result
in an infinite signing loop. [RT #45080]
(cherry picked from commit f665c724e4)
4421. [func] When built with LMDB (Lightning Memory-mapped
Database), named will now use a database to store
the configuration for zones added by "rndc addzone"
instead of using a flat NZF file. This improves
performance of "rndc delzone" and "rndc modzone"
significantly. Existing NZF files will
automatically by converted to NZD databases.
To view the contents of an NZD or to roll back to
NZF format, use "named-nzd2nzf". To disable
this feature, use "configure --without-lmdb".
[RT #39837]
Conflicts:
bin/tests/system/conf.sh.in
lib/dns/win32/libdns.def.in
lib/isc/win32/file.c
The merge also needed to update files in legacy and tcp system tests
(newly introduced in master after branch was created) to introduce use
of lockfile.
3943. [func] SERVFAIL responses can now be cached for a
limited time (configured by "servfail-ttl",
default 10 seconds, limit 30). This can reduce
the frequency of retries when an authoritative
server is known to be failing, e.g., due to
ongoing DNSSEC validation problems. [RT #21347]
3705. [func] "configure --enable-native-pkcs11" enables BIND
to use the PKCS#11 API for all cryptographic
functions, so that it can drive a hardware service
module directly without the need to use a modified
OpenSSL as intermediary (so long as the HSM's vendor
provides a complete-enough implementation of the
PKCS#11 interface). This has been tested successfully
with the Thales nShield HSM and with SoftHSMv2 from
the OpenDNSSEC project. [RT #29031]